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Introduction The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international financial 
institution that acts as a lender of the last resort for countries experiencing balance of 
payments problems. Its loans to national authorities come with conditions, which 
typically include tighter control of public spending, though the nature and extent of 
conditions as well as the emphasis on social protection may vary according to the type 
of lending agreement. A subject of intense debate has been the effects of these loans 
on the capacity of health systems to meet health need. This study investigates the 
effects of IMF agreements on one crucial determinant of that capacity: government 
health expenditure (GHE). To do so, it evaluates: (i) the effects of IMF agreements on 
GHE across low- and middle-income countries; (ii) how these effects vary across 
different country income groups; and (iii) how these effects vary according to the type 
of agreement.  
Methods The study employs a dataset that includes GHE for 127 countries for the 
years 1995-2012, estimates the effects of IMF agreements using the Fixed Effects 
estimator, controls for determinants of GHE and accounts for endogeneity using a 
Heckman-style selection model. 
Results When controlling for endogeneity and important determinants of government 
health expenditure, the results suggest that, across all countries, agreements do not 
have a statistically significant effect on GHE. However, the effect differs according to 
country income group, with low-income countries experiencing increases in spending 
during agreement, lower-middle income countries seeing decreases in expenditure, for 
upper-middle income countries no effect on spending are observed. In addition, the 
effect differs according to agreement type: agreements with a social protection 
component are associated with increases in spending in low-income countries but have 
no statistically significant effects among middle-income countries. Agreement types 
with no social protection component are associated with decreases in spending among 
lower-middle income countries; and there is no statistically significant effect among 
low-income and upper-middle income countries.  
iv 
Conclusions The results indicate that, contrary to claims in the existing literature, IMF 
agreements do not have a statistically significant effect on GHE (positive or negative). 
However, this aggregate finding obscures the effect of particular agreement types in 
particular contexts. In low-income countries, agreements with an emphasis on social 
protection are associated with increases in GHE. When agreements have no social 
protection component they are associated with decreases in GHE for lower-middle-
income countries, but not in other countries. In such contexts, IMF agreements either 
fail to enhance, or actually reduce, the capacity of health systems to meet health need.
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Over recent years a significant amount of research on health systems and health 
policy has been produced. Given that the formulation of health policy is largely 
considered to be in the domestic domain, as regulations and legal obligations around 
health systems remain at the level of national governments (Blank and Burau, 2014), 
a sizable share of this research has focussed on the national level of health policy. 
However, a large number and variety of transnational actors – such as international 
governmental organisations, civil society organisations including philanthropic 
organisations, as well as international meetings, such as the World Economic Forum 
or the G-20 – exist, which play a key role in the global discourse about health systems 
and health policy, influencing decisions through information, recommendations and 
other means (Kaasch, 2015).  
This study focusses on one of these international organisations, the 
International Monetary Fund (the IMF, or the Fund), which is seen to be one of the 
key actors in global health governance (Cockerham and Cockerham, 2000). This 
organisation lends money in the form of loans to countries that are experiencing 
economic instability and/or face long-term constraints to economic growth. These 
loans come with strings attached, so-called conditionalities, policy prescriptions that 
4 
are designed to re-stabilise a country’s economy but often require countries to reshape 
policies across a number of domains, including fiscal and monetary policy, and 
typically require stricter control of government expenditure as well as, in some cases, 
structural adjustments1 (Dreher et al, 2015; IMF, 2013b; Stuckler and Basu, 2009; 
Vreeland, 2007). If and to what extent these conditionalities impact on health systems 
is subject to intense debate. 
Critics of the role of the IMF in global health have argued that agreements can 
have disastrous effects on health systems. An early study by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) entitled “Adjustment with a Human Face”, later published 
by Cornia et al (1987), argued that the conditionalities attached to agreements have 
undermined health systems by requiring governments to aggressively reduce public 
expenditure. Others, for instance Rowden (2009), have argued that the Fund’s 
conditionalities and its primary focus on economic stability has caused cuts to social 
and health expenditure that hit the poor especially hard. Similarly, Goldsbrough et al 
(2007b) argued that budget targets have led to short-term public expenditure cuts, 
which are invidious to sustainable health systems due to their long-term consequences. 
In their assessment of evidence on the IMF’s effects on health systems,  Stuckler and 
Basu (2009: 771) conclude that “IMF programs have been significantly associated 
with weakened health care systems.”  
In contrast, some authors, many of whom are employed by or otherwise 
affiliated with the IMF, have asserted that agreements are in fact associated with higher 
government health expenditure. In a 2006 speech the then-managing director of the 
IMF, Rodrigo de Rato, claimed that “the Fund is … strongly committed to making 
sure that countries have the fiscal space they need to expand social programs, 
especially in health” (IMF, 2006). In 2009 the IMF re-stated its commitment to social 
protection and assured that its policies prevent millions of people from falling into 
poverty (IMF, 2009b).  
                                                 
1 Structural adjustment means the reform or adjustment or the structure of a country’s economy 
through a number of policies. Feldstein et al (2003) describes structural polices as those that 
aim to reduce government-imposed distortions or create institutional features of market 
economies. These can include financial sector policies, liberalisation of trade, capital markets 
or the exchange rate system, privatisation or tax policies, as well as pricing or marketing 
policies, and those policies directed at poverty reduction and social safety-nets. 
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The IMF’s global reach and worldwide lending activity imply that its actions 
have the potential to affect health systems globally and thus impact on the health and 
well-being of millions of people around the world. Understanding the effects of the 
Fund’s actions is therefore of great importance to global health policy.  
This is a particularly timely moment to be studying this issue, for two reasons. 
Firstly, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the IMF received extra funding in the 
range of $750 billion from the G-20 in order to enhance its lending capacity and 
respond to the crisis and to provide loan agreements to a large number of additional 
countries (IMF, 2009a; The Economist, 2009). This means that millions more people 
around the world are being exposed to the effects of Fund policies. Secondly, the recent 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa (Piot et al, 2014) reignited the debate around the effects 
of IMF agreements on health systems. Kentikelenis et al (2015a), for instance, suggest 
that the IMF might have contributed to the extent of the recent disease outbreak in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea as a result of its lending policies and their impact on 
the health systems in these countries. The IMF countered that a link between its 
agreements and the outbreak cannot be established and that it is committed to 
extending spending on health systems (Gupta, 2015). 
Despite the highly polarised debate on the effects of IMF activities on health 
systems, empirical studies assessing the effects of agreements on government health 
spending – an important indicator of the capacity of health systems to meet population 
health need in an equitable manner, and the widely recognised goal of universal health 
coverage (section 1.1; pg. 6) – are rare and their findings mixed (see literature review 
in chapter 2). The results of a recent study by Clements et al (2013) indicate that Fund 
agreements have significant positive effects on health spending in low-income 
countries, but no such impact in countries of higher income. Kentikelenis et al (2015b), 
in contrast, find that agreements have no impact on health expenditure in low-income 
countries in general.  
This study aims to contribute to this debate by evaluating the effects of 
specific kinds of IMF agreements on government health expenditure in specific 
economic contexts. While the literature considers, though in a non-systematic way, 
that effects of agreements differ across countries’ income groups, it does not 
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acknowledge that the IMF conducts lending through a number of different lending 
facilities that differ in their nature and extent of conditionality as well as the emphasis 
they place on social protection2 (section 1.2.4; pg. 15). These differences in terms of 
conditionality and emphasis on social protection are likely to be associated with 
differences in the effects of IMF lending on government health expenditure. These 
differences should therefore be considered as an important determinant when trying to 
understand the effects of IMF agreements on government health expenditure. This 
current study seeks to contribute to, and expand, the debate around the effects of IMF 
lending on government health expenditure by assessing these effects systematically 
across each income group. Beyond this and unlike previous studies, this present study 
incorporates the fact that the Fund offers loans through different agreement facilities 
that vary in the nature and extent of conditionality and, in particular, the emphasis they 
place on social protection, and hypothesises that the differences between the lending 
facility types impact on the agreements’ effects on government health expenditure. It 
therefore assesses the effects for each of the agreement types on government health 
expenditure.  
The following sections establish in more detail a background to understanding 
the analytical framework of this study. In particular, the next section (1.1) offers a 
justification for using government health expenditure as indicator for this study. 
Section 1.2 develops the classification of lending agreement types into three clusters 
according to the agreements’ level of conditionality and their emphasis on social 
protection, and outlines the anticipated effects of each such cluster on government 
health expenditure. The third section presents this study’s aims and objectives in more 
detail. Section four outlines the structure of the study. 
1.1 Health Systems and Government Finance  
This section offers a justification of the selection of government health 
expenditure as an indicator of health system capacity. Health systems, defined as all 
activities with primary purpose to promote, restore or maintain health (WHO, 2000), 
                                                 
2 Social protection thereby describes policies aimed at preventing or reducing poverty. See 
section 1.2.2 (pg. 10) for more details.  
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are an important component of broader societal efforts to promote and sustain the 
health of the population, and are essential to human welfare and sustained economic 
and social development in all countries (Hellowell and Ralston, 2015; WHO, 2010). 
The health financing system is one important component of every health system, as its 
organisation will contribute to achieving broader goals of health systems including 
gains in health outcomes and its capacity to meet population health needs in an 
equitable manner (Kutzin, 2013).  
A widely accepted goal of health system financing is the idea of universal 
health coverage (UHC), which has, especially since the 2010 World Health Report 
(WHO, 2010), gained support from scholars and policy makers around the world 
(Kutzin et al, 2016; Yates, 2009). Financing systems that contribute to UHC goals are 
those which “are specifically designed to (i) provide all people with access to needed 
health services (including prevention, promotion, treatment and rehabilitation) of 
sufficient quality to be effective; [and] (ii) ensure that the use of the services does not 
expose the user to financial hardship” (WHO, 2010: 6). As no country has so far 
achieved the goal completely, UHC should be seen as a policy direction rather than a 
destination (Kutzin, 2013; Kutzin et al, 2016). While no generally accepted roadmap 
for achieving UHC exists, there is broad consensus that government financing needs 
to play a central role (WHO, 2010). This is because relying on other, market-based3 
forms of financing health services, in particular direct payments, are unlikely to 
support progress towards UHC.  
Direct payment of medical services requires people to pay for services at the 
point of need without any form of pre-payment or pooling of resources. Arranging 
health service financing in this way has two negative effects from an UHC perspective. 
Firstly, direct payments are unable to provide all people with access to the needed 
health services as it discourages a part of the population from the uptake of needed 
services because they are unable to afford them (Preker et al, 2004; WHO, 2010). 
                                                 
3 Regulating markets through voluntary or mandatory insurance is unlikely to help achieving 
the access and equity goals of UHC, as people will be unable to purchase insurance due to high 
risk of illness or too high levels of premiums (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998; Fuchs, 1996; 
Hellowell and Ralston, 2015; Olsen, 2009). As a result, not all people will have access to 
needed health services, leaving those who are unable to take out insurance exposed to potential 
financial hardship. 
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Secondly, direct payments risk exposing patients to financial hardship, because high 
costs from medical services can be associated with catastrophic health spending, which 
risk pushing people into poverty (van Doorslaer et al, 2007; WHO, 2010; Xu et al, 
2007). Overall, direct payments cause both inefficiency and inequality and are 
therefore counter to the goals of UHC.   
Similarly, market-based insurance is unable to provide the broad access to 
health-related goods and services that UHC calls for. This is because, like other 
markets, they allocate goods and services on the basis of ability and willingness to pay. 
Hence, a strong publicly financed health system is required in order to ensure that 
people have access to needed health services without being exposed to the risk of 
financial hardship (Hellowell and Ralston, 2015; Hurley, 2001). Government 
financing is therefore a key component of financing to progress towards UHC, and a 
useful measure of health financing to support the creation of a health system that 
secures equity of access and financial protection. 
1.2 The IMF, its Lending and Effects on Health Systems  
The IMF is an international financial organisation with the mission to support 
international monetary cooperation, maintain financial stability, foster international 
trade, ensure high employment, sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty 
(IMF, 2011; 2013b). This section argues that the impact of agreements on government 
health expenditure originates from the agreements’ extent of conditionality and the 
emphasis on social protection. To do so, it is structured into four subsections. The first 
subsection begins by briefly outlining the origins and purpose of the Fund. Subsection 
1.2.2 outlines in more detail the lending process and the development of 
conditionalities, as well as differences in the emphasis placed on social protection. 
Subsection 1.2.3 identifies pathways through which agreements’ conditionalities and 
social protection elements impact on health systems, and health spending in particular. 
Subsection 1.2.4 shows that the IMF’s lending is conducted through a number of 
different facilities. These can be classified into three clusters of agreements based on 
their nature of the conditionalities they include. It is explained how agreements in 
different clusters are expected to vary in their effects on government health 
expenditure. 
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1.2.1 The IMF, its Origins and Purpose 
Faced with the challenges to finance the reconstruction of Europe after the end 
of the Second World War and aiming to create a new economic and global monetary 
system that would avoid another Great Depression derailing the economic community, 
economic delegates met in 1944 at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States to devise a new 
financial system designed to foster international trade, stabilise exchange rates and 
prevent balance of payment crises (Steil, 2013). This system established the IMF, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, today known as the World 
Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), today known as the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Bird, 1995; Eichengreen, 2008; IMF, 2013b; 
Stuckler and Basu, 2009; Vreeland, 2003; Vreeland, 2007; Woods, 2006).  
Today the IMF is a truly global institution, boasting virtually universal 
membership of currently 188 countries from around the world4 (IMF, 2013b; 
Vreeland, 2007). Its purpose, outlined in Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement (IMF, 
2011), is to ensure stability of the international monetary system of exchange rates and 
international payments which enables countries to interact financially (IMF, 2013b). 
This is executed through two main lines of work. Firstly, the Articles provide the IMF 
with a mandate to oversee the exchange rate policies of member countries to ensure 
the effective operation of the international monetary system. The IMF thereby assesses 
whether its members’ economic policies and performance are consistent with the 
achievement of macroeconomic stability (IMF, 2013b; Wolff, 2014). With the end of 
fixed exchange rate system in the 1970s,  the importance of this mandate has 
diminished, and the second task, that of financial assistance, which established the IMF 
as the world’s “lender of the last resort”, gained in prominence (Thirkell-White, 2005). 
While financial assistance was initially constructed to support Western countries, the 
1960s saw a shift in the Fund’s focus towards the developing world to support newly 
independent and economically ailing African countries. Between 2003 and 2012, 71 
per cent of all lending activity was to low- and lower-middle-income countries (Bird, 
                                                 
4 Its members only exclude the two remaining full-fledged communist countries Cuba and 
North Korea and those countries too small to have ever had their own currency. 
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1995; Eichengreen, 2008; IMF, 2013e; Vreeland, 2003; Vreeland, 2007). The 
organisation of this lending activity is highly controversial, because, as noted, the IMF 
attaches conditions to its loans.  
1.2.2 Lending, Conditionality and Social Protection 
To fulfil its lending mandate, the Fund acts as an international credit union, 
pooling resources provided by its member states to support countries requesting the 
IMF’s financial assistance when experiencing balance of payment5 needs (IMF, 
2016e). The balance of payment is a statistical record of all economic transactions 
between a country and the rest of the world. It contains statistics on imports and exports 
of goods and services, financial transactions and the stock of foreign currencies. It is 
in balance when the sum of the current account, the capital account and changes in the 
country’s foreign reserves equal zero. Imbalances cause macroeconomic instability as 
currencies appreciate or depreciate and price levels or interest rates fluctuate6 (Burda 
and Wyplosz, 2001; Pilbeam, 2013). Upon request the IMF makes resources available 
through a lending arrangement. In consultation with the respective country, the IMF 
specifies economic policies and measures for a country to implement in return for IMF 
credit (Gold, 1979; IMF, 2016e; Stiles, 1991). These are the conditionalities. While 
not originally a part of the IMF’s lending architecture, they have become an almost 7 
universal part of IMF lending (Polak, 1991; Stone, 2008). The rationale for attaching 
conditions to loans is twofold. Firstly, they act as a mechanism for controlling moral 
hazard among country decision-makers and hence enhance the likelihood of the IMF 
receiving scheduled repayments. Secondly, as it is assumed that countries seeking IMF 
funds are undergoing a crisis, it is assumed that governments have followed “bad 
policies”, which need to be corrected before a viable balance of payments position can 
be established (Guitián, 1981: 3; Paloni and Zanardi, 2006; Polak, 1991; Stuckler and 
                                                 
5 While the original focus of the IMF was on financial assistance in situations of short-term 
balance of payment problems, the IMF does now also provide assistance for long-term balance 
of payment problems (see 1.2.3; pg. 13). 
6 An imbalance can for instance be seen in a current account deficit, which necessitates a capital 
inflow to maintain demand for the currency. 
7 A notable exception to this rule are newly introduced facilities for specific purposes. See 
section 1.2.3 (pg. 13) for more detail. 
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Basu, 2009; Tarp, 1994; Taylor, 1991; Vreeland, 2003). Conditionalities attached to a 
loan agreement are spelt out in the “Letter of Intent” and the attached “Memorandum 
of Understanding” (IMF, 2016e), and contain those policies that the IMF deems 
appropriate to tackle the country’s balance of payment situation and restore economic 
stability and economic growth (Polak, 1991).  
The policies that form conditionality of the IMF’s agreements have evolved 
over time. Traditionally the IMF has taken a monetary approach to the design of its 
macroeconomic stabilisation programmes. This approach is known as financial 
programming and it builds on the so-called Polak Model (Polak, 1957). Financial 
programming incorporates an assessment of the current economic situation of a 
country and how changes in policy will have effects on macroeconomic target 
variables (Easterly, 2006; Mikkelsen, 1998; Polak, 1957; 1991; 1997; Tarp, 1994). The 
core result of the Polak model is that control of domestic private sector credit 
expansion is the key to controlling the money supply and, in turn, external balance. In 
developing countries, it is assumed that most domestic private sector credit expansion 
is to government, and thus the focus of attention is on controlling the fiscal deficit. 
Over time and with changes in countries requesting IMF programmes, it has become 
apparent that the IMF’s exclusive policy focus on money supply is not sufficient to 
resolve country crises, because root causes of the crises were often seen to be more 
structural, requiring deeper reform efforts. In the 1970s, therefore, the IMF began to 
include fiscal and structural policies8 in its lending activities. This emphasis on 
structural policies, beyond the IMF’s initial mission, has attracted much criticism9 and 
caused the IMF to refocus its conditionality (Köhler, 2000). The Fund seems 
committed to further streamlining conditionalities particularly in relation to structural 
reforms (IMF, 2001a). For example, structural performance criteria have been 
abolished for some types of lending, and there is a general requirement in the guidance 
to ensure that structural reforms are focused on specific policy objectives and tailored 
to a country’s policies and economic conditions (IMF, 2015c).  
                                                 
8 See footnote 1 for examples of such structural policies.  
9 See for instance Feldstein et al (2003) for details on the criticism. 
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Apart from changes in its approach to conditionality, the IMF has developed to 
take on an ever more explicit role in poverty reduction and social protection. For 
instance, in a speech Horst Köhler, IMF managing director from 2000-2004, argues 
that institutions of “the global economic system have a responsibility to ensure that 
globalization translates into a better life for all” (IMF, 2000a). Additionally, the IMF 
contributes to the debate in academia and amongst civil-society organisations on the 
effects of its lending activities on health, for instance by undertaking empirical 
research (Clements et al, 2013; Martin and Segura-Ubiergo, 2004) and seeking to 
explain and defend the Fund’s policies in the light of criticism of its alleged role in 
contributing to the Ebola crisis of 2014/2015 (Gupta, 2015). This broader commitment 
to development can be seen to impact the IMF’s lending activity, for instance, through 
the introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in 1999 (IMF, 2015f; Paloni 
and Zanardi, 2006) and the stated emphasis on poverty reduction in its concessional 
lending facilities10. These agreements are said to contain policies specifically designed 
for countries to protect and increase social and health spending (see section 1.2.4.1 
(pg. 16) for more details). 
Social protection is thereby seen as policies that aim at reducing poverty or 
preventing people from falling into poverty in the first place. More specifically it is 
intended to relive people of the burden of social risks. It includes both the provision of 
a minimum level of well-being but also the promotion of human and social potential 
(IEO, 2016). In relation to health this means to protect people against the risk of health 
and the financial burden that comes with the demand for health services.  
Conditionalities and, in particular, the emphasis placed on social protection in 
conditionalities, likely have an impact on the effect of the agreements on government 
health expenditure. Before discussing this in more detail in section 1.2.4 (pg. 15), the 
following section briefly outlines the hypothesised pathways through which 
agreements impact on health systems.  
                                                 
10 For a definition of concessional lending facilities, see section 1.2.4 (pg. 15). 
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1.2.3 The IMF and Health Systems 
Cockerham and Cockerham (2000) argue that the Fund is an important actor in 
global health governance in low- and middle-income countries, as the organisation of 
its lending process impacts on health systems and health in a number of ways. 
Musgrove (1997) suggests that almost every part of a country’s economy can be 
affected by conditionalities, which – due to the intertwined nature of the economy and 
health and health systems – means that agreements can have a number of effects on 
health systems. This section, while not a formal literature review, provides a brief 
overview of the main pathways, as identified in the literature, through which 
agreements may impact on the demand for and supply of health-related goods and 
services.11 
Agreements are seen to impact on people’s health and thereby increase demand 
for health care services. Specifically, conditionality might cause reductions in food 
subsidies and currency devaluation, which lead to increases in food prices and 
decreases in people’s ability to buy food, thereby impacting on their nutritional status 
and health. Conditionalities can also reduce public investment in sanitation and 
education and thus lead to increases in diseases or reduced health outcomes due to 
lower health literacy (Breman and Shelton, 2007; Peabody, 1996; Pinstrup-Andersen, 
1987).  
A larger body of literature exists, that focusses on the impact of IMF 
agreements on health care supply. Within this literature, health spending is most 
commonly discussed. Government health expenditure is argued to decrease through 
conditionality on macroeconomic policy. These might, for instance, demand to cut 
budget deficits. Policy makers might feel they have limited fiscal space12 and decide 
to rebalance the books by cutting government spending on health (Breman and 
Shelton, 2007; Goldsbrough et al, 2007b; Rowden, 2009). Conditionalities might also 
be set to limit the wage bill (Kentikelenis et al, 2015b). Health care is a highly labour 
                                                 
11 Another body of literature exists that discusses pathways of agreements’ indirect effects on 
health, for instance, through impacts on wages. For an overview see De Vogli and Birbeck 
(2005). 
12 See section 3.2.2 (pg. 85) for a definition of the term “fiscal space”. 
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intensive activity, and requires a large share of spending to be allocated to the health 
care workforce. Reductions or limits to wages can put downward pressure on overall 
health spending but lead to problems in the recruitment and retention of an adequate 
workforce. While the IMF argues to have reduced the emphasis placed on this kind of 
conditionality, Ruckert and Labonté (2013) demonstrate that various agreements still 
include this feature.  
Further, conditionalities might require structural reforms of an economy 
including the privatisation of state-run services (Stuckler and Basu, 2009). While 
changes have taken place in respect of this conditionality, the delivery or financing of 
health care systems might become privatised. While the effects of privatisation of 
health care services per se are debated, restructuring health systems financing through 
reductions in government provided services and an associated increase in private, out-
of-pocket spending, might impact on health system accessibility and be counter to the 
goal of UHC (De Vogli and Birbeck, 2005; Lagarde and Palmer, 2011). 
Conditionalities to devalue currencies mean that in order to import the same amount 
of goods, more money needs to be spent. When fiscal space is limited and the available 
budget fixed, the same budget buys less goods. In the context of most developing 
countries where most pharmaceuticals and health technologies are being imported, less 
products can be purchased and are available for services provided through the health 
system (De Vogli and Birbeck, 2005; Musgrove, 1997; Peabody, 1996). While the 
IMF rarely sets explicit conditionality to restrict health spending and began 
introducing thresholds for minimum spending on health care towards the end of the 
1990s (IMF, 1999; 2000b), Kentikelenis et al (2015b), however, argue that these 
targets can often be considered as spending ceilings, actually restricting, rather than 
increase spending.  
Some authors argue that these thresholds were introduced as spending floors to 
prevent reductions in spending and are designed to increase expenditure on health care 
(Clements et al, 2013). This would particularly be true for concessional lending 
facilities, which emphasis poverty reduction and the protection and expansion of social 
and health spending. Another effect how IMF agreements might increase spending is 
to argue that IMF agreements are seen as seals of approval. This means that entering 
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into an IMF agreement will inspire confidence in countries and increase donors’ 
willingness to provide aid, including development assistance to health.  
From this overview it can be seen that the impact of agreements on health 
systems and particularly government health expenditure is linked to the agreements’ 
design of conditionality and their emphasis on social protection. The following section 
shows that agreements differ systematically in respect to these dimensions, and offers 
a classification of lending facilities along their conditionality level and emphasis on 
social protection. 
1.2.4 Lending Facilities 
The Fund provides loans through a number of different types of lending 
instruments, so-called “facilities”. Each of these specific facilities is used in a specific 
situation and has a dedicated framework of conditionality and emphasis on social 
protection. With these differences between the facility types, the effects on health 
systems and government health spending is expected to differ. This section develops 
this argument and derives a classification of the different lending facilities into a set 
of three facility clusters based on their conditionality and emphasis on social protection 
(1.2.4.3). This will be used to derive the effects of each cluster on government health 
expenditure (1.2.4.4). The section begins by outlining the different lending facilities 
and is organised to present first so-called concessional facilities13 (1.2.4.1) under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) framework, which come with 
concessional14 interest rates, and second non-concessional facilities (1.2.4.2) that offer 
market-related interest rates (Copelovitch, 2010b; IMF, 2001c; 2016e). For an 
overview of the facility types see Table 1.1 (pg. 20). 
                                                 
13 In order to receive loans through these agreements, countries need to be eligible for the 
Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. These are lower income countries which have 
per capita GNI below the International Development Association (IDA) operational lending 
cut-off and do not have the capacity to access international financial markets (IMF, 2013a). 
14 Interest rates are considered to be concessional when they are set at a value below the market 
rate. In 2009 the concessional interest rate has been set to zero percent until the end of 2016 
(IMF, 2009c; 2016e). For the Rapid Credit Facility (see section 1.2.4.1) the interest rate has 
permanently been set to zero in July 2015 (IMF, 2016e). 
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1.2.4.1 Concessional Facilities  
The IMF provides financing through concessional lending facilities since the 
1980s. Most prominently lending was conducted through the Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), available 
since the mid-1980s and designed to deal with longer-term structural reform in poorer 
countries (Bird and Mosley, 2004; IMF, 2004). In 1999 the Fund replaced these 
lending facilities with lending under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund (PRGF). 
These facilities, it was claimed, were more accommodating to higher public spending, 
poverty reduction and growth priorities as long as macroeconomic stability was 
maintained (IMF, 2009d). The lending architecture was again reformed in 2009, to 
create the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust as new financing framework for 
concessional lending. Common to all facilities under the Trust is their emphasis on a 
stable and sustainable macroeconomic position that is consistent with strong and 
durable poverty reduction and growth. The IMF explicitly states that lending 
programmes through these facilities should safeguard, or, when appropriate, increase 
social spending (IMF, 2016a). In particular, financing requests should indicate how an 
IMF lending programme will advance the country’s poverty reduction objectives and 
strategies in order to ensure that the lending programme is consistent with the 
country’s strategies for poverty reduction. This can for instance include the 
establishment of social safety nets or the prioritisation of certain areas of public 
spending, for instance in health. This framework contains at present15 three facilities 
that are employed in different situations. 
The most frequently16 used lending facility within the concessional lending 
framework is the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which succeeded the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility, and is employed in situations where countries 
experience protracted balance of payment problems, which reflect underlying 
macroeconomic imbalances. The resolution of these, to achieve a stable and 
sustainable macroeconomic situation, is expected over the medium to long term and 
                                                 
15 Between 2008 and 2010 the Exogenous Shock Facility was available, which is presented 
here as well. 
16 See chapter 7 for frequencies of facility use. 
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programmes are designed to last 3-4 years. Agreements and policies are particularly 
linked to a country’s poverty reduction strategy and to safeguarding social objectives. 
These agreements come with the traditional conditionality where the disbursement of 
loan tranches is linked to achievement of programme conditions. This can also include 
structural benchmarks to build up social safety nets (IMF, 2014d; 2016a).  
The Standby Credit Facility (SCF) provides concessional financing to countries 
that experience actual or potential short-term balance of payment needs. The 
difficulties underlying the balance of payment needs are considered to be resolved 
within a shorter timeframe compared to situations where the ECF is used. The 
programmes aim to help countries in achieving a stable and sustainable 
macroeconomic position in the short-term and are designed to be aligned with a 
country’s poverty reduction strategy. Similar to the ECF, programmes under the SCF 
come with traditional conditionality that may also include structural benchmarks to 
build up social safety nets (IMF, 2014b; 2016a; 2016h). 
The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) is designed as emergency support instrument 
for countries requiring rapid financing in order to meet urgent balance of payment 
needs resulting from situations including exogenous shocks, natural disasters, conflict 
or fragility. These situations are anticipated to be resolved quickly, and do thus not 
require a full IMF programme. These programmes are designed as one-off 
disbursements and do not come with traditional conditionality like the ECF or SCF; 
nevertheless, countries are expected to address economic policies that caused balance 
of payment difficulties, where appropriate (IMF, 2013c; 2014b; 2016a).  
Between 2008 and 2010, the IMF also provided concessional lending through 
the Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF), which was designed to provide financing to 
countries facing balance of payment needs as result of sudden and exogenous shocks. 
These programmes came with no traditional conditionality but the expectation to 
adjust policies causing imbalances (IMF, 2016b).  
1.2.4.2 Non-Concessional Facilities  
Besides agreements through the PRGT, the IMF also offers financial assistance 
through non-concessional lending facilities, without explicit emphasis on social 
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protection. Five of these non-concessional lending facilities exist, that differ in their 
duration, purpose and conditionality.  
The oldest and most commonly used facility is the Stand-by Agreement (SBA), 
which is designed for use in countries facing short-term actual or potential balance of 
payment problems and aims to restore sustainable growth. Agreements through this 
facility usually last between one and two years and carry traditional conditionality 
where disbursements require achieving programme targets, which are focussed on 
overcoming the economic problems that led to the balance of payment problem in the 
first place (IMF, 2016e; 2016g).  
Lending through the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is available for countries 
experiencing medium- and longer-term balance of payment problems, which reflect 
extensive distortions of structural origins. Aim of programmes through these facilities 
is to restore macroeconomic stability. These programmes come with traditional 
conditionality and a strong focus on structural reforms designed to address the 
underlying institutional and economic weaknesses (IMF, 2016c; 2016e).  
Besides these two facilities the IMF also offers non-concessional lending with 
limited or no conditionalities. The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) is available to countries 
that meet a predefined set of quality criteria and show a track record of policy 
implementation. When countries do not meet the strict criteria of the FCL but still 
present a sound policy framework, loans under the Precautionary and Liquidity Line 
(PLL) are available. Aim of both facility types is to act as seal of approval and 
contribute to consolidate market confidence. The facilities do not carry traditional 
conditionality as it is assumed that the problems countries face can be resolved without 
substantial policy adjustments (IMF, 2016d; 2016e; 2016f). 
Countries facing urgent balance of payment needs and require rapid financial 
support as a result of an emergency situation can apply for lending under the Rapid 
Financing Instruments (RFI). These loans carry no or limited conditionalities, but 
countries are expected to make efforts to resolve their balance of payment difficulties 










yes 3-4 years; 
extendable to 
5 years 
Facility to provide financial assistance to countries with 
protracted balance of payments problems, where the 
underlying macroeconomic imbalances are expected to 
expand over the medium or long term. Programme 
designed to be linked to countries’ poverty reduction 
strategy and aim to safeguard social objectives. 
Traditional17 conditionality, with 
disbursements made conditional on 
achieving of conditions, concentrated on 
critical areas of the programme. Can include 







yes 1-2 years  Facility to provide financial assistance to countries with 
short-term balance of payment needs. Aims to help 
countries to achieve stable and sustainable 
macroeconomic position in the short-term. Programme 
ought to be aligned to country's poverty reduction and 
growth objective. 
Can be precautionary. 
Traditional conditionality, with 
disbursements made conditional on 
achieving of conditions, concentrated on 
critical areas of the programme. Can include 








Facility for countries which provides rapid support for 
countries facing urgent balance of payment needs, but 
that do not require a full agreement. It aims to provide 
policy support and can help catalyse foreign aid. 
Programmes ought to support country’s poverty 
reduction objectives.  
No traditional conditionality, but economic 
policies should aim at addressing the 





yes 1-2 years Facility designed to provide financing to countries 
facing balance of payment needs as a result of sudden 
and exogenous shocks. 
No traditional conditionality, but adjustment 





no 6 months or 1-
2 years 
Facility for countries facing moderate vulnerabilities 
but to not require substantial policy adjustments 
associated with SBA. Aim to contribute to consolidate 
market confidence by showing that country has sound 
economic fundamentals and policies in place.  
Can be precautionary. 
No traditional conditionality but countries 
need to have strong policy fundamentals; 
but standard below FCL. Pre-set qualification 











no 1-2 years Facility with strong emphasis on prevention to 
encourage countries to seek assistance before facing 
large crisis. Aims at inspiring market confidence when 
country has potential for crisis. 
Can be precautionary. 
No traditional conditionality but countries 
need to have very strong policy 
fundamentals. Pre-set qualification criteria 








Facility for countries which provides rapid support for 
countries facing urgent balance of payment needs, but 
that do not require a full agreement.  
Limited conditionality but countries need to 
make efforts to solve balance of payment 





no 3-4 years; 
extendable to 
5 years 
Facility for countries experiencing serious medium- and 
longer-term balance of payment needs that reflect 
extensive distortions often due to structural 
impediments. Aims to restore macroeconomic stability 
by providing a comprehensive programme of structural 
reforms to correct deep-rooted weaknesses over a 
longer timeframe.  
Traditional conditionality, with 
disbursements made conditional on 
achieving of conditions, with strong focus on 
structural reforms to address institutional 





no 1-2 years; 
extendable to 
3 years 
Facility aimed at helping, mostly emerging and 
advanced market countries to address short-term 
balance of payment and external financing needs.  
Aims to restore sustainable growth. 
Can be precautionary. 
Traditional conditionality, with 
disbursements made conditional on 
achieving of conditions, concentrated on 
economic policies adjustment needed to 
overcome the problems that led to seeking 
funding in the first place. 
SBA/EFF 
Table 1.1: Overview of Lending Facilities available from the IMF between 1995 and 2012 
 
                                                 
17 Traditional in this context describes a full package of conditionality traditionally used in IMF agreements. It is different from situations where there is no or 
limited conditionality as is the case in the newly introduced – and therefore non-traditional – lending facilities. 
18 The Exogenous Shock Facility was superseded by the Standby Credit Facility in 2010. 
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1.2.4.3 Developing Facility Clusters 
The previous sections showed that the IMF offers loans through a number of 
different lending facilities, which differ in their purpose, concessionality, 
conditionality and duration. This section develops a classification of these lending 
facilities and argues that the facilities can be grouped into three main clusters 
according to their degree of conditionality and emphasis on social protection, which 
reflects the concessionality.  
Conditionality is considered an important feature of facilities in terms of their 
potential effects on health expenditure, because the nature and extent of 
conditionalities are likely to impact on a government’s policy decisions. 
Concessionality is another important dimension to distinguish between facilities and 
their effects. While concessionality is an important aspect of an agreement itself as it 
affects the financing and repayment conditions, it is for this analysis used to distinguish 
between agreements with varying extents of social protection. This is mainly because 
of the emphasis on social protection that comes with agreements offered under the 
concessional financing framework. As was outlined in the previous section, 
agreements that are part of these facilities ought to consider countries’ poverty 
reduction strategy, safeguard social objectives and protect or increase social spending. 
This particular focus is absent in non-concessional facilities and their agreements. 
Applying this logic of classification to the lending facilities, three clusters can be 
established, as presented in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of Facility Clusters 
concessional Non-concessional 
SCF ECF RCF RFI FCL PLL EFF SBA 
conditionality No conditionality 
Social Protection SBA/EFF Emergency Agreements 
ESF 
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Firstly, facilities that provide concessional lending terms and thus have an 
emphasis on social protection while also attaching conditionality to the particular 
agreement. These include agreements under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) – 
including those agreements that were initiated under the PRGF – as well as agreements 
under the Standby Credit Facility (SCF). These agreements shall be summarised under 
a facility cluster termed “social protection agreement”.19 
Secondly, facilities that provide non-concessional lending terms and do thus 
not have the explicit emphasis on social protection attached to their agreements, and 
come with traditional conditionality, are arranged in one cluster, this includes the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) as well as the Standby Agreement (SBA). These 
agreements shall be summarised under a facility cluster “SBA/EFF agreement”. 
Thirdly, facilities that do not attach traditional, but limited or no conditionality 
to their agreement are summarised into a separate cluster. The concessionality of these 
agreements is thereby considered only of secondary importance because these 
agreements are used when countries experience special circumstances that require 
urgent financial assistance and do not have a special emphasis on social protection. 
These facilities include agreements under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), Rapid 
Financing Instrument (RFI), Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Precautionary and Liquidity 
Line (PLL) and the Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF). These agreements shall be 
summarised under a facility cluster termed “emergency agreements”. In this context 
the classification of the ESF requires further clarification. Funding through this facility 
was available from 2008 to 2010 and IMF literature suggests that it was succeeded by 
the SCF (IMF, 2016b), a “social protection” agreement. However, this facility was 
used when a country experienced sudden and exogenous shocks and it did not carry 
traditional conditionality. Therefore, agreements under the ESF is for this study 
classified as emergency agreement. 
In developing these three clusters, this study builds on and extends the 
classification offered by Dreher et al (2015). The authors divide lending facilities into 
                                                 
19 While not a lending facility offered during the study period (1995-2012), one case year of a 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) is contained in the dataset (section 7.1.1; pg. 250). This 
is due to the nature of the SAF, considered a social protection agreement for this study.  
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two clusters. They group the SBA and the EFF facilities together and thereby separate 
these two from the agreements under the PRGF and later the PRGT. They justify this 
classification with the PRGF/PRGT focus to promote economic development in the 
poorest countries, which is not present in the SBA and EFF facilities.  
1.2.4.4 Expected Effects of Facility Clusters on Government Health 
Expenditure 
The previous section has established three facility clusters based on the 
conditionality and emphasis on social protection of each of the agreements. This 
clustering is based on the assumption that agreements in each cluster have different 
expected effects on government health expenditure, that are outlined here. Agreements 
in the SBA/EFF cluster are classified to have conditionality but no special attention to 
social protection. Their effect on government health expenditure is therefore expected 
to be negative. This is because conditionality of these agreements is likely to have 
negative effects on health expenditure through the pathways outlined in section 1.2.3 
(pg. 13). Agreements in the social protection cluster are seen to have conditionality 
and attention to social protection. While the conditionality element might be seen to 
have negative effects on government health expenditure similar to SBA/EFF 
agreements, it is argued that this effect is offset by the emphasis on social protection 
that might lead to increases in spending. Overall, it is therefore expected that these 
agreements are associated with an increase in spending. Finally, those facilities 
clustered as emergency agreements are seen to have no or only very limited 
conditionality attached to them. This means that no negative effect of conditionality 
on health expenditure is assumed and the agreements are therefore expected to have 
no effect on government health expenditure. 
1.2.5 Summary of IMF Lending and Health Systems 
This section set out to outline the IMF, its lending activities and effects on 
health systems. It was shown that IMF lending is seen to affect health systems capacity 
and in particular government health spending through conditionalities as well as social 
protection elements. It was argued that, contrary to the assumptions often made in the 
literature (see chapter 2 for a review), IMF lending facilities differ systematically in 
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terms of the nature and extent of conditionality and the degree to which they place 
emphasis on social protection20. It was shown that, based on conditionality and social 
protection elements, lending facilities can be grouped into three clusters: (i) social 
protection agreements, that is, those with conditionalities and an emphasis on social 
protection, (ii) SBA/EFF agreements, that is, those with conditionalities but without 
emphasis on social protection, and (iii) emergency agreements, that is, those without 
conditionalities and no emphasis on social protection. Based on this, it is expected that 
social protection agreements have a positive effect on government health expenditure, 
SBA/EFF agreements are expected to have a negative effect and emergency 
agreements are assumed to have no effect. This study aims to understand if the effects 
of agreements differ according to cluster, and thus according to the nature and extent 
of conditionality and the emphasis on social protection.  
1.3 Aims and Objectives of this Study 
This study aims to contribute to the debate around the effects of IMF 
agreements on health systems by evaluating the effects, across income groups and 
different agreement types of IMF agreements on government health expenditure. 
The aim of this study incorporates a number of objectives. Specifically, the study 
intends to: 
(1) design a methodology for evaluating the effects of IMF agreements 
on government health expenditure using cross-country observational 
data; 
(2) deploy that methodology in order to evaluate the effects of IMF 
agreements on government health expenditure in low- and middle-
income-countries; 
(3) evaluate the effects of IMF agreements across individual country 
income groups (low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-
income); 
(4) develop a classification of agreement types according to their extent 
of conditionality and emphasis on social protection. 
                                                 
20 See footnote 2 (pg. 6) for a definition of social protection. 
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(5) evaluate the effects of different types of IMF agreements in low- and 
middle-income-countries; 
(6) evaluate the effects of different types of IMF agreements across 
individual country income groups; and 
(7) assess the implications of the study’s findings for universal health 
coverage in low- and middle-income-countries. 
1.4 Structure of this Study 
To achieve the aim and objectives, this study is arranged into three parts and a 
total of eleven chapters including this introductory chapter.  
The first part of this study aims at establishing a background to this study and 
is structured into two chapters, including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature assessing the effects of IMF agreement on 
health and health systems in a systematic way. It shows that while a great number of 
studies exist discussing the effects of IMF agreements, only a small set of the literature 
evaluates the effects of IMF agreements on health expenditure using reliable methods. 
It is shown that two gaps exist in the current literature of those studies that evaluate 
the effects of agreements on health expenditure. Firstly, studies do not assess effects 
across country income groups in a systematic way. Secondly, the current literature 
does not account for the fact that the IMF lends through a number of different facilities, 
and thereby ignores that different agreements can have different effects on government 
health expenditure.  
The second part sets up the study and its methodology. In order to model the 
effects of IMF agreements in a cross-country setting, a number of variables – 
determining IMF agreements and government health expenditure – need to be 
identified and their data sources discussed, before an appropriate methodology can be 
developed. To do so, this second part is structured into four chapters. 
Chapter 3 operates from the premises that no strong theory of determinants of 
government health expenditure exists and conducts a literature review in a systematic 
way to identify the concepts most commonly used in the applied literature on 
government health expenditure in low- and middle-income countries. This review 
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identifies national income, fiscal space, the population age structure as well as supply 
of care as the most commonly used determinants.  
Similar to chapter 3, no comprehensive theory exists justifying the use of a 
predefined set of determinants of IMF agreements. Chapter 4 therefore conducts a 
review of the body of applied literature working with determinants of IMF agreements 
in order to identify concepts commonly used when modelling IMF agreements.  
Chapter 5 presents the data and their sources used in this study. It shows that 
government health expenditure are best sourced from the WHO National Health 
Accounts dataset and should be measured as percentage of gross domestic product, per 
capita spending and as percentage of general government expenditure. It presents 
criteria to include countries into this study and identifies variables and datasets to 
operationalise the concepts of determinants of government health spending and IMF 
agreements identified in chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 6 outlines the methods used to obtain reliable results of the effects of 
IMF agreements on government health expenditure. It is argued that two 
methodological challenges need to be addressed. Firstly, government health 
expenditure needs to be modelled in a panel data setting. It is shown that the Fixed 
Effects estimator with standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and 
panel heteroscedasticity are the best model for this study. Additionally, time trends 
and serial correlation are controlled for. Secondly, agreement and non-agreement 
countries are likely systematically different making the agreement variable 
endogenous. To account for this, a Heckman-style selection model is fitted.  
The third part of this study presents the results and is structured into five 
chapters.  
Chapter 7 presents stylised facts about the key variables of this study, the 
variables modelling IMF agreements and government health expenditure. 
Additionally, simple bivariate analyses are conducted to gain first insights into the 
relationship between agreements and government health expenditure. It is shown that 
over the study period an almost constant number of countries is exposed to agreements. 
Government health expenditure levels increase over time and across all country 
groups, the levels of spending, however, differ between income groups. The bivariate 
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models of the effects of agreements on government health expenditure show that the 
impact of agreements is rather small, but varies between income groups. 
Chapter 8 models the effects of IMF agreements on government health 
expenditure in a multivariate way and accounts for endogeneity. The effects of 
agreements are first modelled across all countries and then for each of the country 
income groups separately. The results suggest that across all countries, agreements do 
not have a statistically significant effect. This aggregate approach across all countries, 
however, hides differences in the effects between individual country income groups. 
For low-income countries agreements are associated with statistically significant 
increases, for lower-middle-income countries with statistically significant decreases 
and for upper-middle-income countries with no statistically significant changes in 
spending.  
Chapter 9 advances the modelling by estimating the effects of agreements for 
the two main agreement clusters identified in chapter 1 separately. The results suggest 
that social protection agreements are associated with statistically significant increases 
in government health spending, but also that this effect only applies to low-income 
countries but not the other income groups. For agreements without the social 
protection component (SBA/EFF agreements) effects are found to be statistically 
significant negative for lower-middle income countries but not the other income 
groups. Overall, the results suggest that both a country’s income grouping as well as 
the agreement types matter in terms of the effect of agreements on government health 
expenditure.   
Chapter 10 summarises the main findings of this study suggesting that social 
protection agreements have positive effects on government health expenditure only in 
low-income countries. SBA/EFF agreements do have negative effects only for lower-
middle income countries. Beyond this small set of country groups and in the aggregate, 
it was shown that agreements are not a major determinant of government health 
expenditure. It is argued that the differences in effects between agreement clusters 
likely reflect the differences in terms of emphasis on social protection and poverty 
reduction. Differences between income groups are harder to explain given the present 
data but might, especially for social protection agreements, be associated with the 
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effort to achieve the Millennium Goals. It is argued that social protection agreements 
have a small positive effect on government health expenditure, which is in line with 
the expectations about this agreement types. However, this effect is not consistent 
across all income groups, suggesting that the IMF only partly lives up to its claims 
about social protection. For SBA/EFF agreements it is argued that the reductions in 
lower-middle-income countries are associated with further tightening of budgets and 
might restrict movement towards UHC. Policy implications of these findings are 
briefly discussed before limitations of this study are acknowledged.  
Chapter 11 concludes. It is argued that overall IMF agreements are not found 
to have a statistically significant effect on government health expenditure in low- and 
middle-income countries in general. This aggregate analysis, however, glosses over 
differential effects across country income groups and agreement types. This study 
suggests that as well as a specific country’s income group, the lending facility through 
which it receives agreements is an important determinant of the effect of IMF 
agreements on government health expenditure. Doing so, this study adds to the 
understanding of the effects of IMF agreements, however, more research is needed in 
order to understand the mechanisms underlying the observed effects. The chapter 
draws out directions that appear fruitful for future research in the field. 
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 Literature Review of the 
Effects of IMF Agreements 
on Health Systems 
The objective of this chapter is to review the body of literature assessing effects 
of IMF agreements on health systems in a systematic way. Section 1.2.3 (pg. 13) 
summarised the main hypothesised pathways through which IMF agreements impact 
on health systems and health spending. How these potential impacts actually play out 
has not been discussed so far. This chapter aims to identify and review literature that 
empirically assesses the effects of IMF agreements on health systems.  
When setting up this review the terms “health systems” and “agreement” need 
clarification. Health systems are understood as services performed in order to provide 
and finance health care services with the primary goal of these services being the 
improvement of the health of the population they serve (section 1.1; pg. 6).  
When discussing IMF agreements, the term “structural adjustment 
programmes” is often used.  This term can, however, have different meanings. While 
it can directly refer to agreements with the IMF and in particular those under the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), it is often used more generally and refers to 
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efforts to restructure, or “structurally adjust”, an economy in response to an economic 
or financial crisis. When used with this more general meaning, the term can refer to 
adjustment programmes offered by different organisations, such as the World Bank or 
regional development banks, or be a package of policies a country is pursuing by itself 
in order to combat economic imbalances without assistance from international 
organisations (often referred to as “home-grown” adjustment). With the interest of this 
study being on effects of IMF agreements, the review focuses on this organisation’s 
agreements and exclude other types of adjustment programmes. It is, however, worth 
noting that especially historically agreements by the IMF are often offered in 
conjunction with the World Bank and that literature on structural adjustments often 
considers IMF and World Bank agreements in conjunction. Studies discussing effects 
of such combinations of IMF and World Bank agreements are considered.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section outlines the methodology 
developed to identify the literature in a systematic way. The second section presents 
the results of the review, before the third section summarises the findings of the 
chapter, draws out gaps in the literature and formulates objectives and research 
questions for this study. 
2.1 Search Methodology  
This section outlines the search methodology developed to obtain the relevant 
literature in a systematic way21. It starts by outlining the literature sources, presents 
the search terms used to identify studies for the review, then outlines inclusion and 
exclusion criteria before summarising the search process. The final section 
acknowledges limitations of the review. 
                                                 
21 This literature review was conducted in a systematic way, it is, however, not a systematic 
review in the strictest sense of the word (Higgins and Green, 2008). This is mostly because this 
review is not attempting to review all articles from all possible sources, as this would mean to 
review an impossibly large number of sources and consequentially articles beyond the scope 
of work for one single researcher. This review therefore focusses on the main and most relevant 
sources of articles. Beyond this, this review is systematic as it asks a defined question and 
follows an explicit search strategy with clear criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies 
(White and Waddington, 2012).  
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2.1.1 Literature Sources 
This literature review aims to include both peer-reviewed articles as well as 
relevant grey literature. To do so, the literature was obtained from a variety of sources 
including bibliographic databases and webpages. In order to identify literature from 
peer-reviewed articles published in academic journals, bibliographic databases were 
searched. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the topic, the search included the 
largest and most comprehensive databases for both social sciences as well as medical 
literature: the Web of Knowledge, Scopus and PubMed. Additionally, the less 
traditional database for academic literature, Google Scholar, was searched.  
Due to the topic’s policy salience and importance to global health advocates, a 
number of civil society organisations contribute to the debate on the effects of IMF 
agreements on health systems. To capture this body of grey literature, additional 
searched were conducted on the webpages of the most important organisations in this 
field. These organisations were the Centre for Global Development, Action Aid, 
UNICEF, Save the Children, as well as Oxfam. Over the recent years the IMF has 
responded to its critics and conducted its own evaluation studies. In order to include 
relevant articles produced by the IMF and its evaluation branch, the Independent 
Evaluation Office (IEO), these webpages were searched as well.  
As a final step, after obtaining literature through the two pathways mentioned 
above, reverse searches were conducted by scrutinising recent literature reviews 
(Breman and Shelton, 2007) and the reference lists of the identified literature in order 
to ensure the inclusion of all relevant material. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the 
literature sources. 
Bibliographic Databases Civil Society Organisations IMF Sources 
Web of Knowledge Centre for Global Development IMF 
Scopus Action Aid Independent Evaluation Office 
PubMed UNICEF 
 




Table 2.1: Overview of Literature Sources 
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2.1.2 Search Terms 
To search the literature sources, a number of key words, most relevant to the 
review, were defined. These key words were chosen to be broad in order to maximise 
yield and were selected around the three blocks of IMF agreements, health and health 
systems, and low- and middle-income countries (L&MIC). As was outlines in more 
detail above, the terms “adjustment” and “structural adjustment” were, while rather 
broad, included to capture studies that might refer to IMF agreements. Table 2.2 shows 
the search terms used. 
IMF agreement Health and Health Systems L&MIC 
IMF Health care Low?income 
Fund Health system Middle?income 
International Monetary Fund Health care system Low?and?middle income 
Agreement Health LIC 
Adjustment  MIC 
Structural adjustment  LMIC 
IMF agreement  Developing countr* 
Table 2.2: Key Words used in Review 
For bibliographic databases the search terms were used in various search fields, 
including title, abstract, topic and key words as well as Mesh terms, where available, 
key words were combined using logic operators. Terms within each block were 
combined using the “OR” operator, all blocks were linked using the “AND” operator. 
Combinations of individual terms were tested for each database to identify which 
would return the best results. When doing so, it appeared that terms around L&MIC 
were not leading to the right literature, which meant that this block was excluded from 
the final searches. For the Google Scholar search it appeared that using the term 
“health” would yield the most relevant results including literature on health care and 
health system topics. Appendix Note 2.1 (p. 59) shows the combinations of key words 
used for searching each of the databases.  
Webpage searches were kept broader and only included one or two key words. 
For instance, searching the IMF and the IEO webpages, “health” was used as key word, 
for the civil society pages “IMF” was used as key word.  
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2.1.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria and Search Process 
To select studies from the obtained literature for inclusion in the review, studies 
were screened to meet a number of inclusion and exclusion criteria. Studies were 
included when they reported on L&MIC either as individual countries or as countries 
of these income groups in general. Studies were included when they reported effects 
on health or health systems. This criterion was kept rather broad to include various 
effects on health or health system. But studies were excluded when they reported on 
aspects that only have an indirect effect on health, such as wages or work conditions. 
Studies were included when they reported on IMF agreements, excluded when they 
reported on agreements with other international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank, regional development banks, assessed “home-grown” structural 
adjustment22 programmes or reported on policies that are common to IMF agreements 
but are being assessed as an individual policy outside an agreement with the IMF. 
Studies were included when they reported on adjustment programmes conducted by 
the IMF in conjunction with the World Bank, because, especially historically, such 
arrangements are common. Studies were excluded when it was unclear which 
organisation sponsored the adjustment. Studies were also excluded when they were 
not written in English or German language or the full-text of the article was not 
available through the University of Edinburgh’s or the National Library of Scotland’s 
library services, either in electronic or hard-copy form. Finally, studies were excluded, 
when they were book reviews or editorials. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the 
process.  
                                                 
22 “Home-grown” structural adjustment programmes are understood to be those that a country 
imposes on itself without the external pressures from international organisations such as the 
IMF (see also section 2; pg. 29).  
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Figure 2.1: Flowchart of process to include literature  
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2.1.4 Search Process 
The search process was performed in December 201523. Having completed the 
searches in all selected databases, relevant webpages and reverse searches, a total of 
1805 studies, including duplicates, was included. The selected literature has then 
reviewed in more detail through three screening stages (see Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2: Flowchart of Screening Process 
In the first stage, studies were excluded when it was immediately apparent from 
the title that the article was irrelevant. At this stage the number of studies was reduced 
to 318. The remaining studies were included or excluded based on the abstract. Where 
the abstract did not allow to clearly include or exclude an article, the full-text was 
skim-read to make a decision. This reduced the number of articles to 176. Full-texts of 
                                                 
23 An initial literature review was conducted in 2013. Results presented here are based on the 
December 2015 review. 
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these articles were obtained and read to make a final decision about the article’s 
inclusion into the review. Additionally, a small number of studies had to be excluded 
at this stage as full-texts were not available or the article was not written in English or 
German; mostly these were studies published in Spanish or French.24  
As outlined, the literature search was supplemented by scrutinising reference 
lists from the selected articles. This process largely confirmed that most studies had 
already be identified through the main search process, however, a small number of 
additional studies was identified. After final exclusions and removal of duplicates, a 
total of 40 studies was included (see Table 2.3).  
Database/Web page 










   Web of Knowledge 82 71 43 
40 
   Scopus 125 30 16 
   PubMed 486 116 71 
   Google Scholar 21626 50 34  
All Databases 909 267 164  
Web Pages 
   Centre for Global Development 38 5 1 
   Action Aid 3 1 1 
   UNICEF 472 10 0 
   Save the Children 3 0 0 
   Oxfam 0 0 0 
   IMF 97 2 2 
   IMF IEO 138 1 1 
All Web Pages 751 19 5 
Reverse Search 145 32 7 
All Sources 1805 318 176 
All Databases, duplicates removed 
Table 2.3: Database and Website Search Results at Screening Steps 
2.1.5 Limitations of this Literature Review Process 
The search strategy for this literature review was designed carefully and 
discussed with librarians at the University of Edinburgh. Nevertheless, some bias 
might have been introduced as not all available databases can be reviewed within the 
                                                 
24 See Appendix Note 2.2 (p. 52) for a list of all studies obtained in full-text. 
25 Individual database sources cannot be identified at this stage. 
26 This search was cut-off when results started becoming irrelevant or repetitive. This was the 
case after 20 pages with 20 results each, or a total of 400 articles.  
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scope of this review. However, databases were selected based on their size and 
relevance to the subject, reducing potential bias. The review also included a number 
of webpages from civil society organisations. Some bias might have been introduced 
as not all organisations were included, however, the search focussed on the most 
prominent actors, reducing bias.  
The selection process was conducted by only one person, which might lead to 
a bias in the included literature, however, given that this study is a PhD, this limitation 
cannot be mitigated. Not all literature found through searches could be included for a 
full-text review. The potential bias this might introduce was mitigated through 
backward searches to include studies cited in obtained articles and literature reviews.  
Limiting the sample to studies that had accessible full-texts and were written 
in English or German does not seem to bias the final sample as only very few studies 
were excluded because of these criteria. 
2.2 Results of the Review 
Having completed the review process outlined above, a total of 40 studies have 
been identified to be included in this literature review. See Table 2.4 for an overview 
of the included studies. Due to the policy relevance of the topic, different stakeholders 
in the process contribute to the debate. Three groups of author affiliation can be 
identified. Studies are most commonly (62.5% of all studies) written by academic 
authors. Authors are classified as “academic” when the article lists at least the first 
author of the paper with an academic affiliation. One fifth of the studies are written by 
authors affiliated with international financial institutions, for example the IMF or the 
World Bank. The remaining studies (17.5%) are published by authors affiliated with 
civil society organisations, this is for instance the case for publications by the Centre 
for Global Development (Goldsbrough et al, 2007a) or by individual doctors, not 
affiliated with universities.  
Studies are published between the years 1989 and 2015 with an almost equal 
spread across the time period27. All studies cover a number of years of observation, 
                                                 
27 The number of studies per year is too small to identify trends over time. 
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with the earliest observations dating back to the 1970s (Hopkins, 2006) and the latest 
data reported for 2013 (Kentikelenis et al, 2015a). Studies use different approaches to 
answer their questions on effects of IMF agreements on health and health systems. 
Most broadly these approaches can be clustered into case studies, in which authors 
investigate a small number of countries in depth, and cross-country studies in which 
authors assess effects across a number of countries of up to 140 countries (Clements 
et al, 2013). Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are most commonly studied either as 
individual cases, for instance Ghana, Uganda or Zimbabwe, or as part of wider cross-
country studies. A number of studies also look at countries in Latin America, with 
countries in Asia, and North Africa and the Middle East the least commonly studied. 
Based on the approaches taken in the studies, two categories can be identified. 
One set of studies seems to present their understanding in a rather subjective way. 
These studies might draw on other literature and data, but seem to present an opinion 
or comment on the topic. For this study, these articles shall be referred to as 
“discursive” studies. It is important to note that this classification does not represent 
the methods used in the study and does not refer to discursive in the understanding of 
some of the social sciences meaning related to discourse analysis. The other group of 
studies focusses on a clearly defined set of research questions, which are investigated 
using data collected through interviews, documents or relevant datasets. These studies 
are classified as “empirical”. Empirical in this understanding does not reflect the 
methods used but conveys the idea that the studies employ a systematic approach to 
arriving at their conclusions. The presentation of the results is organised around the 
two categories of studies.  
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Author Year Affiliation Years Covered Countries 
Discursive Studies 
Alubo  1990 academic 1980s African countries 
Anyinam 1989 academic 1980s Ghana 
Bhutta 2001 academic 1990s Pakistan 
Birn et al 2000 academic 1990s Nicaragua 
Buckley/Baker 2008 academic 1980s 
-2000s 
Sub-Saharan Africa; case 
study of Tanzania, Uganda, 
Ghana 
Cornia et al 1987 academic 1980s+ less developed countries 
Cruickshank 2000 civil society 1991-1998 Nicaragua 
Curtis 1998 academic 1990s Nicaragua 
Dejong 1995 civil society 1985-1991 Jordan 
Ekouevi/Adepoju  1995 unclear 1980s African countries 
Gupta 2010 IMF not clear no clear definition 
Gupta 2015 IMF not clear Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia 
(Ebola countries) 
Homedes/Ugalde 2005 academic 1980s Latin America; case study of 
Colombia and Chile 
Hopkins 2006 academic 1970-2000 Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia 
Hossen/Westhues 2012 academic 1980-2010 Bangladesh 
Ismail 2013 academic 1980-2003 Egypt and Tunisia 
Ismi 2004 civil society not clear Sub-Saharan Africa; case 
study of Zimbabwe, Ghana, 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Kanji et al  1991 academic 1980s Sub-Saharan Africa 
Kentikelenis et al 2015 academic 2004-2013 Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia 
(Ebola countries) 
Loewenson 1993 civil society 1980s+ African countries 
Logie/Woodroffe 1993 civil society 1980s-1990s Zambia, Senegal, Zimbabwe 
Lugalla 1995 academic 1980s Tanzania 
Tumwine 1992 academic 1980s+ Zimbabwe 
Empirical Studies 
Benson 2001 academic 1995-1993 Tanzania  
Clements et al 2013 IMF 1985-2009 140 Low-and-middle-income 
countries 
Goldsbrough et al 2007 civil society 1998-2005 78 PRGT countries  
Gupta et al 1998 IMF 1986-1996 66 countries with IMF 
agreements 
Gupta et al 2000 IMF 1985-1997 65 developing countries 
Gupta et al 2002 IMF 1999-2001 25 PRGT countries  
Hajro/Joyce 2009 academic 1985-2000 82 developing countries 
Handa/King 2003 IFI 1989-1996 Jamaica 
Hoddie/Hartzell 2014 academic 1995-1998 100 L&MIC 
Kentikelenis et al 2015 academic 1985-2009 63 low-income countries 
Martin/Segura-
Ubiergo 
2004 IMF 1985-2000 146 countries 
Maynard et al 2012 academic 1990-2005 74 countries 
Nooruddin/Simmons 2006 academic 1980-2000 73 countries  
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Author Year Affiliation Years Covered Countries 
Oliver 2006 academic 1980-2000 Uruguay and Argentina 
Pandolfelli et al 2014 academic 1990-2005 37 African countries 
Stuckler et al 2008 academic 1991-2003 21 post-communist countries 
Stuckler et al 2011 academic 1995-2006 119 aid recipient countries 
Table 2.4: Studies Included in the Literature Review 
2.2.1 Discursive Studies 
The literature review process identified at total of 23 studies that were classified 
as discursive studies. Articles within this category were written by all three groups of 
authors, with those from academia being the most common group, two pieces are 
written by an IMF-affiliated author (Gupta, 2010; 2015) and five studies come from 
civil society authors (Cruickshank, 2000; Dejong, 1995; Ismi, 2004; Loewenson, 
1993; Logie and Woodroffe, 1993). Studies are published between 1989 and 2015. It 
generally appears that studies report about certain decades rather than specific years 
or durations. The earliest observation period starts in 1970 (Hopkins, 2006) and the 
latest ends in 2013 (Kentikelenis et al, 2015a). The 1980s appear to be the most 
commonly investigated time period within this group of studies. Studies cover a 
number of world regions with Sub-Saharan Africa the most commonly studied region. 
Studies investigate effects either in all of Sub-Saharan Africa or selected country cases, 
such as Tanzania (Lugalla, 1995), Zimbabwe (Logie and Woodroffe, 1993; Tumwine, 
1992), Senegal (Logie and Woodroffe, 1993) or Ghana (Anyinam, 1989). Four studies 
look at Latin America, as a whole as well as the cases of Nicaragua (Birn et al, 2000; 
Cruickshank, 2000; Curtis, 1998), or Colombia and Chile (Homedes and Ugalde, 
2005). Other studied areas include Asia (Bhutta, 2001; Hopkins, 2006; Hossen and 
Westhues, 2012) as well as the Middle East and North Africa (Dejong, 1995; Ismail, 
2013).  
While the articles by Gupta (2010; 2015) and Kentikelenis et al (2015a) 
explicitly link their arguments to agreements with the IMF, the remaining studies 
report on “structural adjustment programmes” more generally. This term, as was 
outlined in more detail before (section 2.1.2; pg. 32), can have various meanings and 
the studies are not always explicit about their understanding of the term. Which exact 
agreement the studies refer to is often unclear especially when a rather broad brush 
approach is taken to study a whole decade of adjustment. A slightly different approach 
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is taken in three articles, which do not look at structural adjustment programme as a 
whole but at individual aspects of it, including decentralisation (Anyinam, 1989; Birn 
et al, 2000; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005) or privatisation (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005) 
of health care services. 
Studies present the trajectory of events and agreements in different ways. 
While some articles outline the trajectory of the studied countries’ development from 
the early 1960s – with progress made both economically and in terms of the health 
system – followed by economic decline in the 1980s and the demand for IMF 
assistance shortly after (Logie and Woodroffe, 1993; Tumwine, 1992), other studies 
present the situation that unfolded after the start of adjustment policies.  
The studies generally follow a rather descriptive approach, using mostly 
anecdotal evidence, citations of other studies or descriptive statistics. For their 
assessment of the adjustment programmes the authors draw on a great number of 
indicators covering both changes to the health system as well as health outcomes. All 
studies cover more than a few of these indicators and their choice is generally not 
further justified. In terms of health system indicators studies most commonly report 
reductions in health spending along with changes to service provision, mostly due to 
lack in supplies and medicines but also due to understaffing as doctors would be sacked 
or provide care under private regimes for fees. Similarly, the introduction of user fees 
and the associated negative impact this has on access to care, is commonly discussed 
in the reviewed articles. Articles also frequently report negative effects on health 
outcomes, with increases in infant, child and maternal mortality, along with increases 
in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and suicide rates being commonly reported outcomes. 
While most studies paint an overwhelmingly negative picture of structural adjustment 
programmes, the study by Buckley and Baker (2008) suggests improvements in the 
impact on health beginning in the 2000s. The studies by Gupta (2010; 2015), an IMF-
affiliated author, find positive effects particularly in health spending as well as health 
outcomes and child nutrition.  
When considering this set of studies to assess the impact of IMF agreements 
on health and health care, it appears worth considering some of the shortcomings that 
seem common to this type of study. Firstly, while the studies aim to assess the effects 
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in countries undergoing agreements and structural adjustment programmes, the 
country selection appears to be rather arbitrary especially for studies considering all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa at once. Secondly, while it appears that the wide selection of 
various outcome variables offers a comprehensive overview of effects on the adjusting 
countries, their selection is not usually justified. This could suggest that the authors 
selected their variables merely to support their overall argument rather than to provide 
a comprehensive picture to capture the situation in a balanced way. Thirdly, studies do 
in general not seem to acknowledge the fact that adjustment policies are the 
consequence of crisis, which might have caused some of the observed outcomes in the 
first place. Overall it seems that this set of discursive studies may offer only limited 
objective insight into the effects of IMF agreements. Nevertheless, these studies appear 
important to the debate around the effects of IMF agreements on health and health 
systems as they are frequently cited and seem to inform the debate. 
2.2.2 Empirical Studies 
This section reports the findings of the 17 empirical studies obtained through 
the literature review process. Studies are written by all three author groups with authors 
of academic affiliation the most common authors, followed by IMF-affiliated writers; 
and one study being written by civil society authors. Nine studies aim to assess the 
impact of agreements on health expenditure, the remaining eight studies use a number 
of different dependent variables including health outcomes and health system 
organisation related indicators. The results will be presented for each of these 
subcategories in turn. 
2.2.2.1 Studies on Health Expenditure  
The literature review identified nine studies that use country-level health 
expenditure as dependent variable. This group of studies appears to be fairly 
homogenous in the way that all but one study asks research questions related to “what 
are the effects of IMF agreements on health expenditure”. The study by Stuckler et al 
(2011), investigates a related but slightly different research question by investigating 
the effects of aid to health on health expenditure as a result of agreements. Studies are 
written by all groups of stakeholders. With five out of the 9 studies, most are written 
by authors of the IMF (Clements et al, 2013; Gupta et al, 1998; Gupta et al, 2000; 
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Gupta et al, 2002; Martin and Segura-Ubiergo, 2004), three studies (Kentikelenis et al, 
2015b; Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006; Stuckler et al, 2011) authored by academics 
and one study (Goldsbrough et al, 2007a) is written by civil society authors.  
The reasons for using health expenditure as outcome variable are not always 
explicitly stated. Clements et al (2013) and Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004) argue 
that their studies contribute to literature on the IMF and its impact on health 
expenditure. Similarly, Stuckler et al (2011) argue to contribute to the debate around 
the IMF and aid displacement. Kentikelenis et al (2015b) argue that health expenditure 
is a useful indicator to measure the IMF’s impact on health policy. Nooruddin and 
Simmons (2006) follow a similar approach in arguing that the IMF’s impact on health 
and poverty has frequently been criticised and demands evaluation. Studies by Gupta 
et al (1998; 2000; 2002) seem to understand health expenditure as a proxy to assess 
the IMF’s impact on poverty reduction, a goal it introduced in the 1980s. It is argued 
that the IMF sees public expenditure on social issues and health in particular as a way 
to reduce poverty as public health services benefit the poor and furthermore build 
human capital and enhance growth and equity. Goldsbrough et al (2007a) follow a 
similar approach in the way that they argue that health expenditure is important in 
making a health system function and provide a set of basic health interventions, which 
are benefiting the poor particularly.  
All studies take a cross-country approach to analysing health expenditure in 
between 21 and 146 countries of low or low-and-middle income and observe this 
measure in these countries over a certain period of time and on average for roughly 15 
years during the time periods between 1980 and 2009. While the inclusion of certain 
countries is not always explicitly stated, the studies by Gupta et al (1998; 2000; 2002) 
aim to provide an early analysis of Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) 
or Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) agreements and thus include 
countries eligible for these types of agreements. The study by Goldsbrough et al 
(2007a) focusses on Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) countries. Stuckler 
et al (2011) focus on aid recipient countries without further specifying this. The 
reasons for a decision on a specific timeframe are not always explicitly discussed and 
seem mostly driven by data availability. The timeframes of the Gupta et al (1998; 
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2000; 2002) studies as well as the Goldsbrough et al (2007a) analysis are chosen to 
follow the introduction of ESAF and PRGF agreements.  
Health expenditure is measured in a number of ways, with most studies 
employing more than one way of measuring spending. Most commonly spending is 
put in relation to general government expenditure. Other common ways of reporting 
expenditure on health are per capita spending and shares of GDP. 
The approaches of assessing effects on health expenditure taken in this set of 
literature can be clustered into two categories: firstly, studies using descriptive 
statistics to investigate the bivariate relationship between IMF agreements and health 
expenditure. Secondly, studies using advanced multivariate techniques to understand 
this relationship. The following sections present the studies in of these categories.  
2.2.2.1.1 Studies Using Descriptive Analyses 
This section presents and discusses the results of the set of studies assessing 
the effect of IMF agreements on health expenditure using descriptive statistical 
methods. Studies are classified as using descriptive statistics when analyses are based 
on comparisons of means and do not use inferential or modelling techniques. This set 
of literature consists of four studies (Goldsbrough et al, 2007a; Gupta et al, 1998; 
Gupta et al, 2000; Gupta et al, 2002). Two general approaches are taken to assess the 
effect on health expenditure. The study by Goldsbrough et al (2007a) compares the 
health expenditure levels and trends over time for countries with IMF agreements with 
those without agreements. The studies by Gupta et al (1998; 2000; 2002) focus on 
countries with IMF agreements and compare the level of health expenditure the last 
year before the agreement and in the last year during the agreement for which data is 
available.  
The study by Gupta et al (1998) sets out to evaluate the effect of the newly 
introduced ESAF lending facilities, with emphasis on poverty reduction. Assessing 
public sector health expenditure, measured as share of GDP, government expenditure 
and per capita, before and during the agreement, the authors find that expenditure 
generally increases during the time of agreements. They also report that increases are 
stronger for countries entering into an ESAF agreement compared to all other 
agreements. They find some differences between regions in the way that countries in 
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Sub-Saharan African countries see lower increases in expenditure while Asian 
countries see the strongest increases.  
The study by Gupta et al (2000) aims to update the results of the previous study 
using the same approach. The authors find similar results in terms of increases of 
health expenditure during agreements and the differences between countries. They also 
argue that while health expenditure increases, spending on other and less poverty 
reducing areas of public outlay, particularly the military, decrease.  
With the introduction of the PRGF lending instruments, replacing the ESAF in 
1999, Gupta et al (2002) attempt a renewed assessment of the impacts on health 
expenditure and find that spending on health increases across all measures (share of 
GDP and government expenditure, per capita spending) in the first year after entering 
into an agreement.  
The study by Goldsbrough et al (2007a) is part of a larger research effort trying 
to assess whether the IMF constrains health spending. This particular part of the study 
compares expenditure levels of countries with and without agreements. The authors 
find that while health expenditure increase slightly more in countries with agreements, 
especially in countries outside Sub-Saharan African countries, the differences in health 
expenditure changes are minor and vary between countries, which leads the authors to 
conclude that at best the impact of IMF agreements on health spending increases is 
minor. 
In summary, it appears that the studies by the IMF authors are somewhat more 
positive about the impact of IMF agreements on spending levels than the study be civil 
society authors. While these differences could be explained by a number of factors 
including the differences in years and countries included in the analysis, it is important 
to note that while these results give an indication about the association between 
agreements and spending levels, they do not allow to infer causation. 
While this is certainly true for all statistical analysis, inferring causation is 
particularly tricky when it comes to the relationship between agreements and health 
spending for two main reasons, also noted for instance by Goldstein and Montiel 
(1986) and outlined in more detail in section 6.2 (pg. 230). Firstly, health expenditure 
variation is not only caused by IMF agreements but by other factors such as the demand 
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and supply of health care as well as economic development. This means that when not 
controlling for these factors variation in expenditure levels will wrongly be attributed 
to the IMF agreement. Secondly, countries that enter into IMF agreements are likely 
to experience different economic conditions compared to countries that do not enter 
into agreements. These economic conditions are likely impacting on health 
expenditure levels in and by themselves. The multivariate studies discussed in the next 
section account for these issues. 
2.2.2.1.2 Studies Using Multivariate Analyses 
This section presents and discusses the results of studies that use multivariate 
methods to analyse the effects of IMF agreements on health expenditure. Studies are 
classified into this subgroup when they go beyond the use of descriptive statistics and 
model health expenditure. This approach appears to be a fairly recent addition to the 
literature with the earliest study dating back to 2004 (Martin and Segura-Ubiergo, 
2004). Five studies fall into this category. Three of them are authored by academics 
(Kentikelenis et al, 2015b; Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006; Stuckler et al, 2011) and 
two come from authors affiliated with the IMF (Clements et al, 2013; Martin and 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2004).  
Within this set of studies, two approaches and slightly different but overlapping 
research questions can be identified. Four of the studies aim to assess the impact of 
IMF agreements on health expenditure using regression models. In so far the studies 
follow a similar research question as the descriptive studies outlined above, they do 
however employ techniques that allow to remedy the shortcomings of the previous part 
of the literature in terms of selection effects. All studies acknowledge that health 
expenditure might be impacted by factors other than IMF agreements and therefore 
use a set of variables to control for these determinants of health expenditure levels. 
While the chosen variables vary between studies, levels and growth of GDP are the 
most commonly used variables in the models.  
47 
Additionally, studies generally28 account for the possibility that the IMF 
agreement is endogenous29 in the way that countries in IMF agreements are likely 
experiencing economic situations that are different from countries that do not enter 
into IMF agreements and that this difference between IMF and non-IMF countries 
might have an impact on the levels of health expenditure. The studies correct for 
selection differences between IMF and non-IMF countries using a selection model as 
a first stage of their estimation process (see 6.2; pg. 230). To do so, the models aim to 
predict times and countries with IMF agreements based on the values of a number of 
determinants of IMF agreements. It appears that all but one study (Clements et al, 
2013) use a model similar to that presented by Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004)30 . 
The choice of variables appears reasonable and papers report high levels of correctly 
classified cases, which inspires confidence that selection bias is successfully corrected.  
The study by Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004) uses a dataset of 146 
developing countries observed between 1985 and 2000 and employs an ARIMA model 
to estimate the effects of agreements on public health expenditure measured as share 
of GDP, total government expenditure as well as per capita spending. While results 
vary slightly between the individual ways of measuring health expenditure, all results 
suggest a positive association between IMF agreements and health expenditure. With 
the strongest correlation found for expenditure measured as share of GDP. When 
dividing the country sample by the number of years a country is under an IMF 
agreement during the observation period, the authors find that results are not 
significant for countries that are under agreements for up to five years. While the 
reported results do not allow for closer analysis it appears that increases in spending 
are more likely for countries under agreements for a longer period. Overall, the authors 
report that the effects of agreements, though positive, are fairly small and also 
reasonably short lived.  
The study by Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) adds to the debate of IMF effects 
on health expenditure by assessing the influence of democracy. The authors reason 
                                                 
28 An exception to this is the study by Stuckler et al (2011), see below for more details. 
29 See chapter 6 (pg. 215) for an explanation of endogeneity. 
30 see also chapter 4 (pg. 107). 
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that democracies need to maintain support from individuals and one way of doing this 
is by providing social services, including health services. Dictatorships on the other 
hand will not need to maintain this support and will therefore have less incentive to 
maintain health spending. Using a panel dataset of 73 countries observed over the 
period of 1980 to 2000, they find that while democracies have higher levels of health 
expenditure measured as share of total government expenditure compared to 
dictatorships, agreements are associated with increases in spending in non-
democracies and reductions in democracies.  
A recent addition to this body of literature is the study by Clements et al (2013), 
IMF-affiliated authors, using a dataset covering 140 low- and middle-income 
countries, a period of 25 years (1985-2009) and both fixed-effects and Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators. They investigate the effects of agreements 
on health spending as share of GDP and share of total government expenditure. They 
find that for low-income countries agreements are associated with statistically 
significant increases in both spending measures. For middle income countries the 
authors report no statistically significant effects. While the authors do not seem to offer 
an explicit explanation for these differences they seem to suggest that low-income 
countries are mostly those that receive agreements under the PRGT, which the IMF 
claims consider poverty reduction in particular.  
While not an exact replication of the Clements et al (2013) study, the paper by 
Kentikelenis et al (2015b) builds heavily on the previous study. In doing so it employs 
the same dataset and time period but restricts the country sample to 63 low-income 
countries. Adopting the definition of the selection model commonly used in this set of 
studies – rather than the one by Clements et al (2013) – and a slightly different set of 
health expenditure determinants, the authors find that across all low-income countries, 
agreements do not have a significant effect. Dividing the countries by region they find 
that spending increases in Sub-Saharan African countries but declines in other regions. 
The authors acknowledge that IMF policies and protection of social spending might 
play a role in the increases found in Sub-Saharan Africa, they argue however that given 
the extremely low levels of spending in the region the increases that are associated 
with agreements are not sufficient for health systems to provide an appropriate level 
of services. 
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While using health expenditure as outcome variable Stuckler et al (2011) are 
interested not in the direct effect of agreements on health expenditure but the extent to 
which IMF agreements influence the way international aid to health increases health 
expenditure. In so doing they interact with the literature on aid displacement. Building 
on the dataset employed by Lu et al (2010), including 119 aid recipient countries for 
the years 1995 to 2006, the authors use regression techniques to estimate the impact 
of aid flows on health expenditure. Running two separate regressions for IMF and non-
IMF countries, they find that in IMF countries health expenditure increases by around 
0.01 US Dollar for every Dollar of aid to health, while it increases by around 0.45 US 
Dollar in non-IMF countries. The authors seem to suggest that in IMF countries aid is 
displaced from the health system to potentially remedy macroeconomic imbalances 
more frequently than in other countries, the authors are, however, rather cautious about 
their findings not only due to rather low data quality (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). It is 
also worth noting that the approach taken by Stuckler et al (2011) does not account for 
the fact that IMF and non-IMF countries are systematically different and that countries 
experiencing macroeconomic imbalances likely observed in IMF countries, might use 
aid for purposes other than those intended initially. In other words, the study does not 
allow to identify if countries in similar economic situations as IMF countries displace 
a comparable amount of aid, while not under agreements. 
2.2.2.2 Studies on Health Outcomes and Health Systems 
Another set of eight studies within the category of empirical studies exist. Out 
of these, seven are investigating effects on health outcomes and one is concerned with 
effects on the organisation of health systems. Most studies in this categories are 
authored by academic authors, with only one study (Handa and King, 2003) being 
written by an IFI-affiliated author. All studies cover a number of years with the earliest 
starting in 1980 and studies most commonly beginning their observation period in the 
1990s. Observation periods commonly last till the 2000s with the latest data included 
dating to 2005. Most studies use a quantitative approach of some sort, while the study 
by Benson (2001) uses a mixed method approach. This body of literature appears to 
be less homogenous compared to the studies on health expenditure in a number of 
ways. These include the approaches taken in the individual studies. Studies employ 
both cross country approaches with between 21 and 100 countries as well as case 
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studies of one (Benson, 2001; Handa and King, 2003) or two (Oliver, 2006) countries. 
This section will present and discuss the identified studies in more detail, starting with 
studies investigating the effect on health outcomes before turning to the study 
assessing the impact on health system organisation. 
Seven studies have been identified that assess the IMF’s impact on health 
outcomes. A number of health outcomes are used in these studies. These include TB 
(Maynard et al, 2012; Stuckler et al, 2008), infant mortality rates (Hajro and Joyce, 
2009; Oliver, 2006), under-five years mortality rates (Oliver, 2006), maternal 
mortality (Pandolfelli et al, 2014), loss in disability adjusted life years (Hoddie and 
Hartzell, 2014), and preschool children’s weight for age and height (Handa and King, 
2003). While the study by Handa and King (2003) uses micro-survey data, all other 
studies employ aggregate country-level data. All studies fit multivariate regression 
models, apart from the one by Oliver (2006), which relies on descriptive statistics. This 
section discusses the studies using cross-country approaches before turning to the two 
case-studies (Handa and King, 2003; Oliver, 2006) within this section. 
The study by Hajro and Joyce (2009) employs a dataset of 82 developing 
countries observed during the period of 1985-2000, the authors are interested in 
investigating the impact of IMF agreements on infant mortality31 and aim to contribute 
to an assessment of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) lending instruments 
introduced in 1986. The authors fit a multivariate regression model controlling for 
determinants of economic development and institutions. They do not seem to control 
for selection bias, which might reduce the reliability of the results. Having a particular 
interest in the concessional SAF the authors are also aiming to investigate the effects 
of non-concessional agreement types on the outcome. To do so, they include dummies 
for both agreement types into their models. They show that neither of the agreement 
types has a statistically significant effect on infant mortality. Since the authors do not 
provide a comparison of the effects of the agreement types on the outcome, the analysis 
does not allow for assessing differences in the effects between agreement types. Put 
                                                 
31 The focus of this study is on poverty and the authors argue that their selected outcome 
variable of infant mortality is an indicator of poverty, the study is included in this section as 
infant mortality can also be seen as health outcome. 
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differently, the analysis does not allow for evaluating whether concessional 
agreements have different effects compared to non-concessional agreements.  
The study by Pandolfelli et al (2014) investigates the effects of IMF agreements 
on maternal mortality rates, one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), in 37 
Sub-Saharan African countries. To do so, the authors run a regression model, 
controlling for determinants of maternal mortality and control for endogeneity using a 
selection model. Using data from 1990 to 2005, they find that IMF agreements are 
associated with statistically significantly increases in maternal mortality, compared to 
countries without agreements. They suggest that cuts in health expenditure might be 
associated with the negative outcome but do not provide further analysis to support 
this claim. 
The study by Hoddie and Hartzell (2014) employ a dataset of 100 low- and 
middle-income countries for the years 1985 to 1998 and aim to contribute to the debate 
of IMF agreements’ impact on public health performance. The authors measure 
performance using disability adjusted life years from all-cause mortality as outcome 
variable. They are particularly interested in temporal trade-offs of IMF agreements by 
investigating whether agreements are associated with short-term reductions in health 
outcomes as part of the overall stabilisation efforts but long-term increases in the 
measured outcomes. To do so, they run two separate multivariate regressions 
controlling for determinants of mortality and selection bias using a selection model: 
One for countries entering into agreements between 1985 and 1989 and one for 
countries in agreements during 1995 and 1998. In both regressions the outcome 
variable of interest are disability adjusted life years in 1999. The authors expect that 
the relationship between countries in the early cohort and the 1999 outcome is positive 
to suggest that in the long-run agreements have a positive impact on public health 
performance. The relationship between the later cohort and the 1999 outcome is 
expected to be negative as health is assumed to be impacted negatively shortly after an 
agreement. The authors find that agreements have negative effects shortly after 
entering into them as well as in the long run as in both agreement cohorts are associated 
with increased loss of disability adjusted life years for all but the oldest age group 
(60+).  
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The study by Stuckler et al (2008) aims to assess the effect of IMF agreements 
on TB in 21 post-communist countries for a time period of 13 years with observations 
beginning in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using a number of TB 
indicators including incidence, prevalence and mortality, the authors aim to estimate 
the effects of IMF agreements using multivariate regression models to identify the 
difference between countries undergoing agreements and those not in agreements. TB 
is used as an outcome as it can be seen as indicator of societal health. Controlling for 
a number of covariates to capture the impact of economic and social development as 
well as determinants of TB, and using a selection model to account for systematic 
differences between IMF and non-IMF countries32, the authors find that countries in 
IMF agreements experience large increases in TB mortality. While not offering an 
explicit pathway of cause and effect, the authors hypothesise that conditionality 
attached to the IMF agreements has had negative effect on the affected country’s TB 
control infrastructure.  
The study by Maynard et al (2012) builds on the work by Stuckler et al (2008) 
outlined above. The study adds to the previous paper by extending the country 
coverage from 21 post-communist countries to 74 countries from further geographical 
regions. Additionally, they use a slightly longer dataset covering the years between 
1990 and 2005. While using TB prevalence like Stuckler et al (2008), the authors see 
this indicator not so much as indicator of societal health but as proxy to the 
government’s ability to run a health system. Similar to Stuckler et al (2008), the 
authors fit a multivariate regression model to estimate the differences in TB prevalence 
between IMF and non-IMF countries but use a slightly different set of control 
variables. Counter to Stuckler et al (2008), the authors do not seem to use a selection 
model to account for systematic differences between both country types, which might 
make the results unreliable. Maynard et al (2012) perform a number of regression 
models that while varying in significance generally, suggest that agreements are 
associated with increases in TB prevalence. The authors argue that in their preferred 
model, which also controls for public health expenditure, agreements lead to an 
                                                 
32 It is worth noting that the main analyses are conducted without using a selection model. 
Results reported with and without selection model do not change substantively.  
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increase in TB prevalence. This is taken as evidence to suggest that IMF agreements 
are associated with reductions in the government’s capacity to providing essential 
health services to curtail TB spread.  
The study by Oliver (2006) takes a different approach to estimating effects of 
agreements. Rather than conducting a cross-country analysis, the author employs a 
case-study approach and selects cases based on levels of economic development, racial 
and ethnic composition and economic as well as political progression before the onset 
of the agreements. Having matched the cases on preconditions, the differences in effect 
would be attributable to the agreements. While the individual matching variables are 
not reported, it is argued that the cases of Argentina and Uruguay would be 
comparable. Both countries are under agreements at similar periods but their 
implementation is different: Compared to Uruguay, Argentina experiences more rapid 
and severe implementation of its structural adjustment programme. This allows for the 
author to compare the effects of these different implementations. Following up a 
period of 20 years (1980 to 2000), Oliver (2006) finds that while infant and under five 
year mortalities are higher in Uruguay at the start of the observation period the country 
experiences faster reductions on these measures compared to Argentina. It is important 
to note that the descriptive nature of the findings should be, despite the efforts of 
matching, be treated with caution, as the study does not seem to account for continuous 
agreements that happened in both countries. Furthermore, lack of detail on the 
matching process does not allow for further assessment of the quality of the matching.  
The study by Handa and King (2003) looks at the 1991-1992 agreement and 
structural adjustment happening in Jamaica. While there are other elements to this 
adjustment package, the authors are particularly interested in liberalisation of 
exchange rate happening in September 1991. The authors argue that the devaluation 
of the currency would have important implications on purchasing power of the 
population and restrict their ability to purchase food stuffs, most of which are imported 
to Jamaica. To measure this impact, the authors assess the trajectory of preschool 
children’s weight for height and weight for age measures, which they argue are 
indicators of living conditions, but can also be treated as health outcomes. Using data 
from a series of household surveys the authors model both indicators controlling for 
child and parent characteristics as well as macroeconomic conditions. The results 
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suggest that weight for height, a short-term indicator, is lowest during the 
liberalisation, but higher before and after the reforms. The long-term indicator, weight 
for age, begins to decline six months after the reform and recovers after roughly two 
years. It appears that these results suggest that the liberalisation reform part of the 
agreement had negative impact on child health, however, this approach does not 
provide a counterfactual case which would assess the results in the case the 
liberalisation did not take place. This is to say, the country entered into the agreement 
as a result of economic imbalances that might in other ways have affected nutritional 
status of the children.  
The study by Benson (2001) is interested in investigating impact of agreements 
on the organisation of health systems and the push to privatise health service delivery 
during an adjustment policy happening in Tanzania after 1986. It aims to assess the 
impact of this policy on the distribution of health care facilities and the effect on equity 
of access. Providing a descriptive analysis of the number and distribution of health 
care facilities in two Tanzanian districts, the author finds that while the total number 
of facilities increased, the additional facilities did not contribute much to enhancing 
accessibility of health care services in the districts. While newly opened government 
facilities were located in high-needs areas, most new private facilities have been 
opened in area of low medical need, often duplicating services already available.  
2.3 Summary of the Literature Review, Gaps in the Literature and Re-
search Questions 
This chapter set out to conduct a review of the literature on the effects of IMF 
agreements on health systems in order to gain an understanding of the present state of 
the literature in the field and to draw out gaps for analysis in this study. Using a 
systematic approach to the literature search process, a total of 40 studies have been 
identified and included in this review (Appendix Note 2.3; pg. 66). The reviewed 
studies cover a great number of years with the earliest observations dating back to the 
1970s and the latest data available from as recent as 2013. The coverage of countries 
is similarly varied as studies cover all geographical areas of low- and middle- income 
countries, with most studies investigating impacts in countries in Africa, followed by 
Latin America.  
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Studies are authored by three main stakeholders in the debate around effects of 
IMF agreements, and include the IMF itself, civil society organisations advocating 
global health, and authors from academia. While most studies are written by authors 
from academia, the IMF contributed a fair amount to the debate as one fifth of all 
studies are from IMF-affiliated authors. Due to interests of these authors in defending 
the IMF’s practices it might be assumed that these studies paint a particularly positive 
picture of the effects. While the overall number of studies is fairly small, it appears 
that across all studies, those authored by the IMF are the only studies that report 
consistently positive results. It is worth mentioning that the same author group also 
reports, though less frequently, negative and mixed results. Authors from academia 
seem to report negative findings most frequently but also find mixed and neutral 
associations between the IMF and health systems.  
The studies were classified into discursive and empirical studies based on the 
general approach taken in the respective study, with relatively more studies falling into 
the discursive category. Studies were classified as discursive when they seemed to 
report more of a standpoint or opinion on the topic rather than an objective 
investigation of the relationship between agreements and health systems. While these 
studies provide, maybe somewhat unsurprisingly, a rather negative picture of the 
association between agreements and health systems, it was argued that these studies 
might – due to their set up – provide little insight into the true relationship between the 
IMF and its impact on health systems.  
Empirical studies investigated the effects of IMF agreements on various health 
system indicators. While this included a number of health outcomes from TB to 
different types of mortality and the loss of disability adjusted life years, studies most 
commonly investigated the effects on public health expenditure. While the review 
suggests that the effects of IMF agreements on health outcomes are generally seen to 
be rather negative, results on the relationship between IMF agreements and health 
spending seems to be somewhat more unsettled.  
Looking at the most reliable set of these studies – those that model health 
expenditure in a multivariate way and account for the differences between IMF and 
non-IMF countries using appropriate techniques – the results generally appear mixed. 
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While the study by Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) reports different effects between 
democratic and non-democratic countries, the study by Clements et al (2013)  find that 
low-income countries experience increases in spending countries of middle-income do 
not see changes in health expenditure in response to agreements. Kentikelenis et al 
(2015b) look at low-income countries exclusively, and report that this set of countries 
in general does not experience increases in spending but that increases are only found 
for a subset of Sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors33 might explain the 
differences in the observed effects of IMF agreements, this comparison seems to 
suggest that the effects of agreements are not consistent across all countries. The 
current literature seems to offer both country income group as well as geographical 
region as explanatory factors for these differences in the effects of agreements. It 
seems more likely that a country’s income group, rather than its geographical region, 
play a role in determining these effects. This is because it seems more likely that the 
IMF is treating countries of different income groups, due to their stage of development 
differently, which could explain the results. Similarly, the effects of agreements might 
differ by income group as this can be seen as proxy for the development of a country’s 
health system. The current literature, however, does not seem to offer a systematic 
assessment of income groups. Clements et al (2013) compare low-income countries 
with middle-income countries, without considering lower-middle and upper-middle 
income countries separately. Kentikelenis et al (2015b) look only at low-income 
countries. This present study will therefore attempt to assess the effects of agreements 
for each income group systematically.  
While a country’s income group can be seen as a proxy for differential 
treatment by the IMF, it does ignore34 that the IMF uses different agreement types in 
different crisis situations and for different sets of countries (see 1.2.4; pg. 15). While 
these are somewhat related to a country’s income group, they are not an exact 
representation of this differential treatment. It therefore appears fruitful to assess the 
effects of agreements not only by income groups but also for each of the agreement 
                                                 
33 These might, for instance, be differences in the employed datasets or variables or the 
observed years.  
34 The only exception to this is the study by Hajro and Joyce (2009), investigating effects on 
health outcomes, not health expenditure.  
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clusters identified in section 1.2.4.3 (pg. 21). To do so, the aim of this study is to assess 
the effects systematically across income groups and different agreement types. The 
aim of this study incorporates a number of objectives35. Specifically, the study intends 
to: 
(1) design a methodology for evaluating the effects of IMF agreements on 
government health expenditure using cross-country observational data; 
(2) deploy that methodology in order to evaluate the effects of IMF 
agreements on government health expenditure in low- and middle-
income-countries; 
(3) evaluate the effects of IMF agreements across individual country 
income groups (low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-
income); 
(4) develop a classification of agreement types according to their extent of 
conditionality and emphasis on social protection. 
(5) evaluate the effects of different types of IMF agreements in low- and 
middle-income-countries; 
(6) evaluate the effects of different types of IMF agreements across 
individual country income groups; and 
(7) assess the implications of the study’s findings for universal health 
coverage in low- and middle-income-countries. 
 
 
                                                 
35 These have previously been presented in chapter 1 (section 1.3; pg. 24) 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix Note 2.1: Key words used in Databases 
Scopus 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( imf  OR  "International Monetary Fund"  OR  "Structural 
Adjustment" )  AND  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( health  OR  health  care  OR  health  system  OR  
health  care  system ) )   
  
Web of Knowledge 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
 (IMF OR international monetary fund OR "structural Adjustment" OR "IMF 
agreement") AND TITLE: (health care or health system OR health care system OR health) 
 
PubMed 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
((IMF[All Fields] AND agreement[All Fields]) OR "structural adjustment"[All 
Fields] OR (International[All Fields] AND Monetary[All Fields] AND ("financial 
management"[MeSH Terms] OR ("financial"[All Fields] AND "management"[All Fields]) OR 
"financial management"[All Fields] OR "fund"[All Fields])) OR IMF[All Fields]) AND 
(("health"[MeSH Terms] OR "health"[All Fields]) OR (("health"[MeSH Terms] OR 
"health"[All Fields]) AND system[All Fields]) OR ("delivery of health care"[MeSH Terms] 
OR ("delivery"[All Fields] AND "health"[All Fields] AND "care"[All Fields]) OR "delivery of 
health care"[All Fields] OR ("health"[All Fields] AND "care"[All Fields]) OR "health 
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Appendix Note 2.3: Study Overview 




Alubo 1990 academic 1980s African countries Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Anyinam 1989 academic 1980s Ghana Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Bhutta 2001 academic 1990s Pakistan Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Birn et al 2000 academic 1990s Nicaragua Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Buckley/ 
Baker 
2008 academic 1980s 
-2000s 
Sub-Saharan Africa; case study of  
Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana 
Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various mixed 
Cornia et al 1987 academic 1980s+ less developed countries Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Cruickshank 2000 civil society 1991-1998 Nicaragua Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Curtis 1998 academic 1990s Nicaragua Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Dejong 1995 civil society 1985-1991 Jordan Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Ekouevi/ 
Adepoju 
1995 unclear 1980s African countries Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Gupta 2010 IMF not clear no clear definition Discursive IMF agreements anecdotal case report various neutral 
Gupta 2015 IMF not clear Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia (Ebola 
countries) 
Discursive IMF agreements anecdotal case report various positive 
Homedes/ 
Ugalde 
2005 academic 1980s Latin America; case study of 
Colombia and Chile 
Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Hopkins 2006 academic 1970-2000 Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia Discursive IMF agreement anecdotal case report various negative 
Hossen/ 
Westhues 
2012 academic 1980-2010 Bangladesh Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Ismail 2013 academic 1980-2003 Egypt and Tunisia Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Ismi 2004 civil society not clear Sub-Saharan Africa; case study of 
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire 
Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Kanji et al 1991 academic 1980s Sub-Saharan Africa Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Kentikelenis 
et al 
2015a academic 2004-2013 Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia (Ebola 
countries) 
Discursive IMF agreements anecdotal case report various negative 
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Loewenson 1993 civil society 1980s+ African countries Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Logie/ 
Woodroofe 
1993 civil society 1980s, 1990s Zambia, Senegal, Zimbabwe Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Lugalla 1995 academic 1980s Tanzania Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 
Tumwine 1992 academic 1980s+ Zimbabwe Discursive SAP (WB + IMF) anecdotal case report various negative 





Clements et al 2013 IMF 1985-2009 140 Low-and-middle-income 
countries 
Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 







2007 civil society 1998-2005 78 PRGT countries  Empirical IMF agreements descriptive statistics public health 
expenditure 
mixed 
Gupta et al 1998 IMF 1986-1996 66 countries with IMF agreements Empirical IMF agreements descriptive statistics public health 
expenditure 
positive 
Gupta et al 2000 IMF 1985-1997 65 developing countries Empirical IMF agreements descriptive statistics public health 
expenditure 
positive 
Gupta et al 2002 IMF 1999-2001 25 PRGT countries  Empirical IMF agreements descriptive statistics public health 
expenditure 
positive 





















2014 academic 1995-1998 100 low- and middle-income-
countries 
Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 
regression with selection 







2015b academic 1985-2009 63 low-income countries Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 








2004 IMF 1985-2000 146 countries Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 












2006 academic 1980-2000 73 countries  Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 













2014 academic 1990-2005 37 African countries Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 
regression with selection 




Stuckler et al 2008 academic 1991-2003 21 post-communist countries Empirical IMF agreements multivariate panel data 
regression with selection 
model    
TB mortality negative 











 Identifying Determinants 
of Government Health 
Expenditure 
This study aims to estimate the effect of IMF agreements on country level 
government health expenditure. As government health expenditure can change due to 
factors other than the agreements themselves, these factors need to be controlled for in 
order to reliably attribute changes to agreements36. To do so, determinants of 
government health expenditure need to be known. Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000) in 
relation to high-income countries and Xu et al (2011) in relation to low- and middle-
income countries suggest that the macroeconomic theory of such determinants of 
government health expenditure is rather weak. This means that no agreed set of 
variables is readily available to be used for this study and no recent and comprehensive 
review identifying such determinants exists in the literature37. While the main literature 
presented in chapter 2 included studies assessing the relationship between agreements 
                                                 
36 See chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation. 
37 Xu et al (2011) could be seen as such a paper, it does however not appear to be a review 
conducted in a systematic way and the research strategy is not accessible.  
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and health expenditure, drawing on a number of these determinants, a wider body of 
literature exists that employs determinants to model government health expenditure. 
This chapter aims to identify relevant determinants of government health expenditure 
in low- and middle-income countries in a systematic way, which will be used as 
controls in this study. To do so, a literature review underpinned by a systematic search 
process38 of studies quantitatively modelling government health expenditure is 
conducted. This chapter is structured into three parts. The first section outlines the 
methodology developed to identify the literature in a systematic way. The second 
section presents the determinants of government health expenditure identified through 
the literature review process. The third section offers a summary of the chapter 
drawing out the determinants of government health expenditure most commonly used 
in the empirical literature.  
3.1 Search Methodology 
This section outlines the search methodology developed to obtain the relevant 
literature in a systematic way39. It starts by outlining the literature sources searched to 
obtain the relevant studies, then presents the search terms used to identify studies for 
the review. The third part of this section describes the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
applied to the search. The fourth part gives an overview of the search process. The 
final part acknowledges limitations of the review. 
3.1.1 Literature Sources 
The search aimed to include peer-reviewed articles as well as grey literature. It 
was obtained from a number of sources including bibliographic databases, internet 
search engines, references listed in the reviewed studies as well as the main literature 
review presented in chapter 2. The search of bibliographic databases was limited to the 
                                                 
38 Similar to the review conducted in chapter 2, this review is also not a systematic review in 
the strictest sense. This is for the reasons outlined in more detail in footnote 21 (pg. 30) and 
the fact that this review additionally includes studies previously identified (chapter 2) to further 
enrich and complete the literature. 
39 This methodology is very similar to that presented in chapter 2, however, individual elements 
have been adjusted for the review in this chapter and the exact methodology is therefore 
described here.  
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largest and most relevant databases for social sciences, economics and health care and 
included the Web of Knowledge, Scopus and PubMed. Additionally, Google Scholar, 
the academic branch of the internet search engine “Google” was reviewed. Since the 
main literature review in chapter 2 also identified a number of articles that are relevant 
to this search, literature from that search was additionally included into the review 
process. After obtaining literature through the two main pathways, reverse searches 
were conducted by searching reference lists of previously identified literature. All 
sources were searched using the following search terms. 
3.1.2 Search Terms 
To identify the correct search terms for this review process, blocks were built 
and populated with suitable terms. Key words were selected around the four blocks of 
expenditure, public, determinants and low- and middle-income countries. See Table 
3.1 for the individual key words. 
Expenditure Public Determinant L&MIC 
Health spending* Public  Determinant* Low?income 
Health expenditure* government Factor* Middle?income 
Health care 
expenditure* 
 Variable* Low?and?middle 
income 
Health care spending*   LIC 
   MIC 
   LMIC 
Table 3.1: Building Blocks and Keywords for Literature Search for Determinants of Government 
Health Expenditure 
Search terms were used in various search fields, including title, abstract, topic 
and key words as well as Mesh terms, where available, and combined using logic 
operators. Terms within each block were combined using the “OR” operator, all blocks 
were linked together using the “AND” operator. For each of the databases the 
combinations of blocks and individual key words was altered to identify the best 
combination of keywords and blocks to obtain the most promising set of results. It 
appeared that terms from the low- and middle-income countries block were not leading 
to the right literature so that it was excluded from the searches. It was generally 
difficult to identify the exact study type because keywords like “determinants” and the 
income grouping were rarely indexed. The search strategy was therefore to identify 
studies on health expenditure and exclude studies not relevant for this search, for 
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instance those on OECD countries, or Europe and also those that refer to catastrophic 
health expenditure40. The latter was a common find, unless explicitly excluded. For 
the Google Scholar search, a broad search with only few key words generated the best 
results. Appendix Note 3.1 (pg. 97), shows the combinations of key words used for 
searching each of the databases.  
3.1.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
To select studies from the obtained literature for inclusion in the review, studies 
were screened to meet a number of inclusion and exclusion criteria. Literature was 
included in the review when the study included countries of low- or middle-income41, 
either as a single country or a group of countries. Studies of countries of high-income 
or studies that reported results on both high and lower-income countries without 
distinguishing the results between income groups were excluded. Studies were 
included when they reported results for a set of determinants of government health 
spending. This has two elements. Firstly, studies were included when they identified 
or described a set of determinants of health spending, and excluded when they reported 
on other components of government spending. Secondly, studies were included when 
they reported these determinants in relation to government spending and excluded 
when they reported on private or total42 spending. Studies were also excluded when 
the article did not make clear whether the results related to government spending. 
When studies reported on determinants of government spending, they were only 
included when they reported in spending on general rather than on a certain sub-
category of health spending. This means that, for instance, studies reporting on 
spending for HIV/AIDS were excluded from the review. Studies were also excluded 
when they were not written in the English or German language or the full-text of the 
article was not available through the University of Edinburgh’s or the National Library 
of Scotland’s library services, either in electronic or hard-copy form. Finally, studies 
                                                 
40 Catastrophic health expenditure describes costs incurred from health care services that reach 
catastrophic proportions of a household’s available income and push households into poverty 
(Xu et al, 2003). 
41 A country was defined as low- or middle-income country following the definition of income 
groups as in section 5.3 (pg. 184).  
42 Total spending is defined as the sum of public and private spending. 
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were excluded, when they were book reviews, editorials or general opinion pieces. 
Figure 3.1, below, shows the flowchart of the process of study inclusion and exclusion. 
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of Process to include Literature 
Literature from all Sources 
Database Searches Main Literature 
Review 
On Low- or Middle-Income 
countries 
High-income countries 
Determinants of Health Ex-
penditure 
No determinants reported 
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3.1.4 Search Process 
The search was conducted in October 2015. Having searched all selected 
databases, reverse searches and included studies from the main literature review a total 
of 1710 studies, including duplicates, was obtained. The selected literature has then 
been reviewed in more detail through three screening stages (Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: Flowchart of Screening Process 
The first stage excluded studies when it was immediately apparent from the 
title that the article was irrelevant. At this stage the number of studies was reduced to 
158. The remaining studies were included or excluded based on the abstract. Where 
the abstract did not allow to clearly include or exclude an article, the full-text was 
skim-read to make a decision. At this stage it was often difficult to include or exclude 
studies based on reporting government, rather than total or private, health expenditure. 
When in doubt studies were included in the full-text screening. This reduced the 
number of articles to 50. Full-texts of these articles were obtained and read to make a 
Literature from all Sources 











Clear from abstract that 
study not relevant 
Fulltext Screen 
Included N=22 
Clear from full-text that 










final decision about the study’s inclusion into the review (See Appendix Note 3.2 (pg. 
98) for the list of studies obtained in full-text). 
Databases 









Web of Knowledge 794 34 11 
22 
Scopus 148 5 3 
PubMed 561 57 13 
Google Scholar 16744 35 7 
All Databases 1670 131 34 
Reverse Search 35 22 11 
Literature from Main Literature Review 545 5 5 
All Sources 1710 158 50 
All Literature, duplicates removed 
Table 3.2: Search Results by Database and Screening Stage, for Determinants of Government Health 
Expenditure. 
As outlined, the literature search was supplemented by a reverse search of 
reference lists from the selected articles as well as those articles obtained from the 
main literature review. This process largely confirmed that most studies had already 
been identified through the main search process, however, a small number of 
additional studies was identified. After final exclusions and removal of duplicates, a 
total of 22 studies was included (See Table 3.2). 
3.1.5 Limitations of this Literature Review 
The search strategy for this literature review was designed carefully. 
Nevertheless, some limitations need to be acknowledged. These and their mitigation 
are similar to those spelled out in more detail in section 2.1.5 (pg. 36) and range around 
the use of only the largest databases, the reviewing process completed by only one 
researcher as well as limiting the languages to German and English.  
                                                 
43 Individual database sources cannot be identified at this stage. 
44 Review of article titles was concluded when hits become irrelevant, this was mostly the case 
as other forms of expenditure became subject of the studies. The search was concluded after 
the first 500 articles. 
45 There are additional studies examining the impact of IMF agreements on health expenditure 
(see 2.2.2.1; pg. 42), due to their descriptive nature (see 2.2.2.1.1; pg. 44), these studies are not 
included here as they do not provide information on determinants of health expenditure. 
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3.2 Determinants of Government Health Expenditure used in the Lit-
erature 
The review process identified 22 studies that discuss or use determinants of 
government health expenditure in low- and middle-income countries. They do so in a 
number of settings and with different methods. This section outlines some of the key 
aspects of the studies in terms of country selection and approach to the subject. Each 
of the determinants of government health expenditure are presented in the following 
sections. 
The studies identified through the literature review are both cross-country as 
well as single country studies. Most of the literature can be classified as cross-country 
studies, including up to 200 countries (Schieber and Maeda, 1999). Three studies are 
designed as single-country studies and look at China (Pan and Liu, 2012), India 
(Rahman, 2008) and Turkey (Kiymaz et al, 2006). While all studies on the IMF and 
health expenditure are time-series cross section studies observing a number of 
countries over time, the wider literature uses a number of data settings, using time 
series, cross-section (Murthy and Okunade, 2009) or time-series-cross-section data. 
The studies cover a number of years and different durations between 1985-2010. 
Government health expenditure is measured in a number of ways, including 
spending per capita, percentage of GDP or percentage of government spending. Most 
studies rely on government health expenditure as a total, while the study by Liang and 
Mirelman (2014) employs sub-analysis of total and domestic expenditure and Lu et al 
(2010) rely on domestic expenditure exclusively. When studies examine domestic 
government expenditure this measures the amount of spending from government 
excluding funds from external organisations. While the wider literature on 
determinants of health expenditure uses a small number of ways to measure spending, 
the set of studies directly relating to the IMF generally uses more than one measure46 
of health expenditure as outcome, with the percentage of GDP and government 
                                                 
46 An exception within the IMF and health expenditure literature is the study by Stuckler et al 
(2011), examining only per capita spending. 
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spending the most commonly used indicators. Table 3.3 outlines key information on 
each of the studies. 
Across all studies a number of different determinants of government health 
expenditure are used. These can be grouped thematically into a smaller number of 
concepts. The following sections discusses the variables used in the studies in more 
detail and is structured to present the variables along concept group. Each section is 
organised to first outline the variables used to operationalise each of the categories, 
then present the findings for the indicator controlling for all other variables in the 
models before discussing the theory underlying the inclusion of the determinant. Table 
3.4 gives an overview of the determinants employed in each of the studies, listing for 
each of the determinants the algebraic directions when controlling for all other 
variables in the model: + indicates that the study reports a statistically significant47 
positive relationship between the determinant and health expenditure as outcome 
variable. – indicates a statistically significant negative relationship. 0 indicates that no 
significant relationship was found and ~ is used when the results are mixed. When the 
study reports several results across a number of models, the directions are based on the 
results of the authors’ main model.  
 
                                                 
47 Statistical significance is asserted at the conventional 5% level of significance. 
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Study Countries Years Dependent Variable 
Devarajan et al (1999)  18 African countries 1971-1995 Government health spending (per capita) 
Dieleman/Hanlon (2014)  119 countries 1995-2010 Government health spending as source (share of GDP) 
Fan/Savedoff (2014)  126 countries 1995-2009 Government health spending (per capita) 
Out-of-Pocket (OOP) per capita (share of THE) 
Farag et al (2009) 144 L&MIC 1995-2006 Government health spending (per capita) 
Gbesemte/Gerdtham 
(1992) 
30 countries 1984 Government health spending (per capita) 
Jaunky/Khadaroo (2006) 28 African countries 1991-2000 Government health spending per capita  
Kiymaz et al (2006) Turkey 1984–1998 Private, government and total health expenditure (per capita and share of GDP) 
Liang/Mirelman (2014) 120 low-, middle- and high-
income countries 
1995-2010 Total government health spending (per capita) 
Domestic government health expenditure (per capita) 
Lu et al (2010) Developing countries 1995-2006 Government health spending as share of GDP (from source) 
Murthy/Okunade (2009) 44 African Countries 2001 Government health spending (per capita) 
Musgrove et al (2002) 191 countries 1997 Government health spending (per capita) 
Nandakumar/Farag 
(2008) 
   
Pan/Liu (2012)  China (by province) 2002-2006 Government health spending (per capita) 
Rahman (2008)  India (14 states) 1971-1991 Government health spending (per capita) 
Reeves et al (2015)  89 LMIC  1995-2011 Government health spending (per capita) 
Schieber/Maeda (1999) 200 countries 1994 Government health spending (share of total health spending) 
Xu et al (2011)  143 countries (LIC, MIC, 
HIC) 
1995-2008 Government health spending from domestic sources; Total health expenditure; OOP 
expenditure 
Clements et al (2013) 140 developing countries 1985-2009 Health spending (share of GDP) 
Health spending (share of total government spending) 
Kentikelenis et al (2015) 63 Low income countries  1985-2009 Health spending (share of GDP) 
Health spending (share of total government spending) 
Martin/Segura-Ubiergo 
(2004) 
146 countries 1985-2000 Health spending (share of GDP) 
Health spending (share of total government spending) 
Health spending (per capita) 
Nooruddin/Simmons 
(2006) 
92 countries 1990-2000 Health spending (share of total spending) 
Stuckler et al (2011) 119 aid recipient countries 1995-2006 Health spending (per capita) 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Devarajan et al (1999) +            ~          0             
Dieleman/Hanlon (2014) 0 + +     0     - +                      
Fan/Savedoff (2014) +  +       +                          
Farag et al (2009) +            -                       
Gbesemte/Gerdtham 
(1992) 
+         0 0    +     0    +            
Jaunky/Khadaroo (2006) +                                   
Kiymaz et al (2006) +        +                           
Liang/Mirelman (2014) +     +    0   +                    - ~  
Lu et al (2010) 0  +    0      - +  0                    
Murthy/Okunade (2009) +         0     +      0   0            
Musgrove et al (2002) +                                   
Nandakumar/Farag (2008) +         +        +      +  +  +        
Pan/Liu (2012)    +      ~ - 0      ~    0  0 0   -       + 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reeves et al (2015) +   +                                
Schieber/Maeda (1999) +                                   
Xu et al (2011) +  +       0   +    0          0 ~        
Clements et al (2013) ~    ~     ~ 0                  ~       
Kentikelenis et al (2015) 0 ~   ~     0 0    ~              ~  0 0    
Martin/Segura-Ubiergo 
(2004) 
~ ~        ~                    +  ~    
Nooruddin/Simmons (2006) 0 ~        0                      +    
Stuckler et al (2011) +            +                       
Table 3.4: Overview of Determinants of Government Health Expenditure   
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3.2.1 National Income 
Variables measuring national income of a country are the most commonly used 
determinants across the included studies. The indicator is typically operationalised to 
measure Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, only Gbesemete and Gerdtham 
(1992) use Gross National Product (GNP) per capita. The study by Dieleman and 
Hanlon (2014) and most studies on the IMF and health expenditure additionally 
measure economic development as growth of GDP.  
Most studies (Devarajan et al, 1999; Fan and Savedoff, 2014; Farag et al, 2009; 
Gbesemete and Gerdtham, 1992; Jaunky and Khadaroo, 2006; Kiymaz et al, 2006; 
Liang and Mirelman, 2014; Murthy and Okunade, 2009; Musgrove et al, 2002; 
Nandakumar and Farag, 2008; Rahman, 2008; Reeves et al, 2015; Schieber and 
Maeda, 1999; Stuckler et al, 2011; Xu et al, 2011) find a positive relationship between 
GDP/GNP and their measure of government health expenditure. Lu et al (2010) find 
no statistically significant relationship between national income and health 
expenditure. Clements et al (2013) find mixed results of the relationship between GDP 
and health expenditure. Dieleman and Hanlon (2014), including both GDP and its 
growth as determinants in their study, show that levels of GDP do not impact on health 
expenditure but that growth of GDP is positively correlated with health expenditure. 
Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) and Kentikelenis et al (2015b) find no relationship 
between GDP and health expenditure but mixed results for the association with 
growth.  
Within the literature on government health expenditure in low- and middle-
income countries similar to the wider literature there seems to be agreement that 
national income is an important determinant of levels of health expenditure (Fan and 
Savedoff, 2014; Liang and Mirelman, 2014). This research follows on from the 
seminal work by Newhouse (1977), who showed that national income is one of the 
main determinants of health expenditure. “It is well known that a strong relationship 
exists between national expenditures on health care and national income” (Parkin et 
al, 1987).  
Smith and Hanson (2012) argue that a country’s economic development affects 
government income and hence the ability to finance and provide public services, 
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including those for health. Along similar lines, the so-called “Wagner’s Law” states 
that there is a causal relationship between national income and public expenditure, 
including health expenditure (Wagner, 1994), in the way that increases in national 
income are associated with increases in public expenditure. This means that increases 
in GDP will lead to increases in public (health) spending. On a similar note, Martin 
and Segura-Ubiergo (2004) argue that growth of national income is expected to be 
positively associated with health expenditure as this suggests that there are more 
resources available, which the government can allocate to health. Musgrove et al 
(2002) conclude that there is a positive relationship between GDP and health 
expenditure both in total as well as in terms of the public share of health spending. 
While Nandakumar and Farag (2008), point out that research on the association 
between health expenditure and national income in low- and middle-income countries 
is limited and the relationship between both variables not as clear. The literature 
reviewed here seems to suggest a generally positive relationship between national 
income and government health expenditure. 
3.2.2 Fiscal Space 
A number of studies use determinants of government health expenditure that 
can be grouped as indicators of fiscal space. Heller (2006) defines fiscal space as the 
“capacity of government to provide additional budgetary resources for a desired 
purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability of its financial position.” He 
suggests that fiscal space can be influenced by variation in government expenditure, 
revenue or borrowing (Powell‐Jackson et al, 2012). The studies by Dieleman and 
Hanlon (2014); Fan and Savedoff (2014); Lu et al (2010); Xu et al (2011) 
operationalise the concept of fiscal space using government expenditure measured as 
share of GDP. The study by Pan and Liu (2012) operationalises the concept using an 
indicator of government revenue per capita. Reeves et al (2015) measure government 
revenue from different types of taxes (income tax and goods and services tax). Liang 
and Mirelman (2014) use an indicator of government gross debt per capita and Lu et 
al (2010) use debt relieve as share of GDP to operationalise the concept of fiscal 
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space48. Within the IMF and health literature, the studies by Clements et al (2013) and 
Kentikelenis et al (2015b) are the only two considering fiscal space as a determinant 
of health expenditure levels by using government balance in their models.  
The findings in the reviewed studies suggest that there is a positive association 
between increases in government expenditure as well as government revue and levels 
of government health expenditure. Lu et al (2010) find no association between debt 
relief and health expenditure while Liang and Mirelman (2014) find that when 
controlling for all other determinants of health expenditure there is a positive 
association between debt levels and government health expenditure. Clements et al 
(2013) and Kentikelenis et al (2015b) find mixed results depending on country 
selection and measure of health expenditure. 
The underlying assumptions for including these indicators of fiscal space as 
determinant of health expenditure is that health systems and health spending can be 
seen as priority within public spending, for which money will be made available when 
the government coffers allow to do so. 
3.2.3 Population Structure  
The structure of a country’s population is another factor that is commonly used 
as determinant of government health expenditure in the reviewed studies and is 
operationalised in a number of ways but most commonly the age structure of the 
population is seen to be an important indicator.  
Studies employing an indicator of the population’s age structure operationalise 
this most commonly by measuring the share of the population that is older than 60 
years (Fan and Savedoff, 2014; Rahman, 2008; Xu et al, 2011) or 65 years (Clements 
et al, 2013; Liang and Mirelman, 2014; Martin and Segura-Ubiergo, 2004; Murthy and 
Okunade, 2009; Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006; Pan and Liu, 2012). Alternative 
approaches are followed by Pan and Liu (2012), Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) , 
Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004) and Nooruddin and Simmons (2006), who measure 
the share of people no older than 15 years. Kentikelenis et al (2015b) measures the 
                                                 
48 Debt is considered within the realm of fiscal space as Heller (2006) suggests increased 
borrowing as one way to increase fiscal space. 
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dependency ratio, that is share of those over 65 and those under 14 compared to the 
rest of the population. 
Different ways of operationalising population structure can be seen in the 
studies by Pan and Liu (2012), Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992), Clements et al (2013) 
and Kentikelenis et al (2015b), that use the share of the population living in urban areas 
as indicator of the population structure. Pan and Liu (2012) additionally control for the 
share of females in the population. Dieleman and Hanlon (2014) use an indicator of 
the total size of the population and Kiymaz et al (2006) use annual population growth 
as variable. 
Indicators of the population age structures are included as determinants of 
health expenditure because it is believed that the demand for health care depends on 
the age of the individual. This means that the bulk of demand for health care, and 
therefore of costs from health care, is seen to be compounded among the very young 
and the old people. While there is considerable debate of the effects of aging on health 
expenditure within the literature on high-income countries (Garibaldi et al, 2010; Gray, 
2005; Zweifel et al, 1999), the evidence from this reviewed literature on low- and 
middle-income countries seems to suggest that an increase in the share of the older 
population is generally not associated with increases in health expenditure, as only Fan 
and Savedoff (2014) find a positive relationship between both variables. Similarly, 
Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) find no relationship between the share of younger 
people and health expenditure. Pan and Liu (2012) find a positive relationship between 
young age and health expenditure when controlling for old age and other variables. 
Kentikelenis et al (2015b) and Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) find no relationship of 
health expenditure with the dependency ratio, while the remaining studies on the IMF 
and health expenditure report mixed findings. 
Urban population is assumed to be an important determinant of health 
expenditure as it is assumed that the process of urbanisation is associated with an 
increase in overcrowded areas with inadequate sanitation facilities (Toor and Butt, 
2005). Increases in population size can be seen to be associated with increases in health 
care spending as a larger number of people demanding health care is increasing overall 
health spending. Results suggest that there is no relationship between urbanisation and 
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health expenditure, only the study by Pan and Liu (2012) find that health expenditure 
decreases as urbanisation increases. 
3.2.4 Development Assistance  
Several studies (Dieleman and Hanlon, 2014; Farag et al, 2009; Gbesemete and 
Gerdtham, 1992; Liang and Mirelman, 2014; Lu et al, 2010; Murthy and Okunade, 
2009; Stuckler et al, 2011; Xu et al, 2011) use a measure of development assistance as 
determinant of health expenditure. Studies either measure development assistance to 
health as share of GDP (Dieleman and Hanlon, 2014; Lu et al, 2010) or per capita 
(Farag et al, 2009; Gbesemete and Gerdtham, 1992; Liang and Mirelman, 2014; 
Murthy and Okunade, 2009; Stuckler et al, 2011; Xu et al, 2011). While studies 
generally do not make a distinction between the recipients of development assistance, 
Dieleman and Hanlon (2014) and Lu et al (2010) distinguish between the government 
and non-government organisations as recipients of development assistance. 
Kentikelenis et al (2015b) is the only study that employs a measure of general overseas 
development assistance, rather than development assistance to health. 
The underlying idea of including development assistance as determinants is 
that inflow of development assistance provides additional resources to the government, 
increasing overall levels of health expenditure. The effect of external funds on health 
expenditure levels has attracted considerable attention as these additional funds might 
reduce government spending on health (Xu et al, 2011). The picture that emerges from 
the studies reviewed here suggests that increases in development assistance are 
generally associated with increases in health expenditure (Stuckler et al, 2011). 
Dieleman and Hanlon (2014) and Lu et al (2010) find that health spending decreases 
when assistance is made to government, but increases when it is made to non-
government organisations. Farag et al (2009), not controlling for other determinants, 
find that development assistance increases spending.  
3.2.5 Disease Burden 
Another factor is the epidemiology or the disease burden present in a given 
country. A number of studies operationalise disease burden in different ways. Lu et al 
(2010) employ a measure of the HIV prevalence rate. Xu et al (2011) use the incidence 
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for tuberculosis per 100000 people as tracer of disease prevalence. Pan and Liu (2012) 
measure disease patterns along different dimensions including the reported morbidity 
and mortality from infectious diseases as well as the SARS outbreak in China in 2003. 
The study by Xu et al (2011)  argue that disease patterns have a direct link to the 
amount and also the types of health care that are needed and demanded. This can be 
found for both communicable and non-communicable diseases. While that latter are 
more present in high-income countries, infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis or malaria, should be considered a main issue in countries of lower income 
(Omran, 2005). This will in turn, so for instance outlined in Nandakumar and Farag 
(2008), increase health spending as the government will aim to provide more resources 
to deal with the increased demand and need in order to combat a certain disease. 
Evidence is rather mixed as studies looking at Tuberculosis (TB) (Xu et al, 2011), 
HIV/AIDS (Lu et al, 2010) or infectious diseases in general (Pan and Liu, 2012), do 
not find a statistically significant association with government health expenditure. 
Only the SARS outbreak (Pan and Liu, 2012) was found to have a significant positive 
association with health expenditure.  
3.2.6 Human Development 
Human development, defined as the “process of enlarging people’s choices” 
by the United Nations Development Programme (1990), captures factors that are 
critical to lead long and healthy lives, opportunities to be educated and to enjoy decent 
standards of living. This broad concept of human development has been 
operationalised in a number of ways in different studies. Two studies use indicators of 
education: Rahman (2008) operationalise this as literacy rate, arguing the rate is a 
structural indicator of demand for health care. Pan and Liu (2012) measure the 
proportion of the population with college or higher education degrees arguing that 
education levels can be seen as indicator of socioeconomic status which in turn is 
associated with disease burdens and demand for health care.  
Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) use the indicator of crude birth rate – 
measuring the number of live births occurring per year – as it is believed that an 
increase in the population due to births will increase the costs of maintaining a given 
level of health.  
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The study by Murthy and Okunade (2009) employs maternal mortality, 
measuring the number of women dying during pregnancy, which is seen as an indicator 
of access to adequate sanitation, hygiene information and health care facilities. 
Devarajan et al (1999), use infant mortality, a related measure, capturing the number 
of deaths of children under the age of one, while affected by a number of factors 
beyond the health care system, it can be seen as an indicator of access to health care 
facilities.  
The studies indicate that while higher education levels do not seem to be 
significantly associated with health expenditure, higher rates of literacy increase 
spending on health. Crude birth rate, maternal mortality and infant mortality are not 
found to be significantly associated with health expenditure levels.  
3.2.7 Supply of Health Care 
A number of studies uses determinants of government health expenditure that 
can be summarised in the category of supply of health care. Nandakumar and Farag 
(2008) argue that health care providers induce demand for health care in the way that 
they are critical in deciding on the type or duration of treatment that will be provided 
to patients. Higher numbers of care providers might therefore be associated with more 
health care provision, which in turn is associated with higher levels of health 
expenditure. This does not imply causation. Increases in the number of health care 
providers might address unmet needs. This means that the additional health care 
provider can now provide services to patients that have previously been under-served 
due to the absence of care providers.  
The studies by Murthy and Okunade (2009), Pan and Liu (2012) and Rahman 
(2008) operationalise the concept of supply of health care using the numbers of doctors 
or health care professionals available to a certain population. Gbesemete and Gerdtham 
(1992) use the indicator of percentage of birth attended by health care workers as 
indicator of supply of health care. Pan and Liu (2012) and Rahman (2008) additionally 
control for health care facilities by measuring the number of hospital beds per 1000 
population and the number of people per primary care centre.  
Nandakumar and Farag (2008), tapping into a large literature, mostly on high-
income countries, argue that the health technologies and pharmaceuticals present and 
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used in a country’s health care system have a positive impact on health expenditure, 
because health technologies and patented pharmaceuticals are expensive to develop 
and these costs are represented in the price charged to obtain technology and 
pharmaceuticals.  
The studies find that only the percentage of births attended by health care 
workers is statistically significantly associated with increasing health expenditure 
levels, all other indicators of supply of care do not seem to be associated with 
government health spending. 
3.2.8 Organisation of the Health Care System 
Researchers argue that the way a health care system is organised can affect the 
level of health expenditure in a given country (Blank and Burau, 2014). A small 
number of studies operationalise this concept in different ways.  
The studies by Pan and Liu (2012) and Nandakumar and Farag (2008) draw on 
the concept of level of coverage. Nandakumar and Farag (2008) argue that higher 
levels of coverage provided from public funds are related to higher levels of public 
funding. Pan and Liu (2012) measure the share of urban employees that are covered 
by basic health insurance. Related to this is the approach by Xu et al (2011), who 
measure spending outside the realm of public funding and argue that there might be 
substitution effects between different types of health expenditure, such as between 
government health expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure. This is to suggest that 
an increase in government health expenditure is seen to be associated with a decrease 
in out-of-pocket expenditure. 
Xu et al (2011) and Nandakumar and Farag (2008) argue that the way the health 
system is financed and governed impacts on health spending. Particularly, Xu et al 
(2011) argue that the way health care resources are collected – through a social-
insurance, tax based or mixed system – impacts the level of government health 
expenditure. 
While Nandakumar and Farag (2008) argue that increases in coverage are 
associated with increases in spending, Pan and Liu (2012) find that increases in breadth 
of coverage are associated with decreases in spending. Xu et al (2011) find no 
relationship between changes in Out-of-Pocket Payments (OOP) and government 
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health spending. The authors find mixed effects of revenue collection methods on 
health expenditure.  
3.2.9 Other Determinants  
A small number of studies use a set of determinants that cannot be classified in 
other categories and are discussed here. 
Liang and Mirelman (2014) argue that the size of the informal sector, measured 
as the economic output of agricultural compared to non-agricultural sector, is an 
important determinant of health expenditure. This study also has a particular focus on 
the importance of socio-political risks, measured as government stability, corruption 
levels, democratic accountability and ethnic tensions, as determinant of health 
expenditure. The authors find that the size of the informal sector has a negative 
association with health expenditure, regarding socio-political risks, the authors find 
mixed relationships with levels of health spending. Pan and Liu (2012), examining 
health expenditure across Chinese provinces, use transfers from the central to 
provincial governments as one determinant of provisional health expenditure levels. 
The authors report a positive association between transfers from central government 
and provincial spending levels.  
The studies by Clements et al (2013) and Kentikelenis et al (2015b) use trade 
openness, operationalised as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product, as additional determinant. The 
underlying argument is that globalization, as measured in trade openness, might 
restrain government spending though increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, 
governments may attempt to curtail the welfare state (Dreher, 2006). The related 
efficiency hypothesis suggests that governments reduce public spending to maintain 
competitiveness of companies (Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006). Alternatively, it can 
be argued that openness is associated with increases in social spending aimed at 
protecting citizens from the increased economic insecurities.  
The paper by Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004) includes currency devaluation 
as one of the determinants of health expenditure, does, however, not provide any 
specific justification for including this variable. 
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Kentikelenis et al (2015b) include an indicator of inflation into their models of 
health expenditure and argue that inflation levels might impact on social and health 
expenditure in the way that high levels of inflation put downward pressures on health 
spending. The results show that inflation is not statistically significantly related to 
levels of health expenditure.  
Democracy, as operationalised in the Polity IV dataset on a 0-10 scale, is a 
determinant used by Kentikelenis et al (2015b), Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004) 
and Nooruddin and Simmons (2006). The underlying argument is that democratic 
countries might be more committed to increasing or maintaining levels of health 
expenditure as they are more responsible to their citizens (Huber et al, 2008).  
3.3 Summary of Determinants of Government Health Expenditure  
Aim of this study is to assess the impact of IMF agreements on government 
health expenditure. Since agreements are not the only factor influencing levels of 
health spending, these other factors need to be controlled for in order to reliably 
establish a relationship between IMF agreements and health expenditure. Theory on 
determinants of government expenditure is weak and currently no comprehensive 
overview of determinants used in the empirical literature exists. This chapter therefore 
set out to identify these determinants of government health expenditure by reviewing 
the literature in a systematic way. A total of 22 studies were identified and their 
determinants of government health expenditure extracted. The following paragraphs 
summarise the key findings of this literature review and draw out the implications for 
this study. 
While a great number of different variables have been employed as 
determinants of government health expenditure, these can broadly be classified in eight 
categories of national income, fiscal space, population structure, development 
assistance, disease burden, human development, supply of care, and the organisation 
of the health system. Additionally, a small number of variables have been employed 
by a minority of the studies that cannot be allocated to any of the other categories. 
These include variables measuring trade openness, exchange rates, inflation, indicators 
of democracy, the structure of the economy and the socio-political context and, in one 
case, the transfer from national to state-level governments.  
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Not all variables, however, are employed by all studies and the frequency with 
which they are employed varies. National income can be seen to be the most important 
determinant as it is used by all but two studies. Most studies find a positive relationship 
between income and health expenditure levels. The second most commonly used 
determinant is the population structure of the population, which, as outlined above, is 
most commonly measured as age structure (the share of the older and/or younger 
population compared to the entire population). The role of development assistance, 
either directly to health or to a country in general, is considered by a number of studies. 
Fiscal space is another commonly used category. This is an important variable as it is 
assumed that money will be allocated to the health system when it is available to the 
government. 
Comparing the general literature of studies modelling health expenditure and 
studies on health expenditure and the IMF, reveals similarities but also differences 
between the determinants both bodies of literature employ. Similar to both sets of 
studies on health expenditure is the fact that national income and growth are along 
with the age structure of the population commonly used determinants of health 
expenditure. Beyond this, the IMF literature seems to rely on a smaller set of 
determinants. The IMF literature does not consider variables to capture variation in the 
disease burden, state of human development, supply of care of the organisation of the 
health care system. However, the IMF literature introduces various new variables, that 
are not considered by the wider literature. These include, trade openness, exchange 
rates, inflation, and indicators of democracy.  
In the context of this study, the selection of determinants of government health 
expenditure will follow the frequency with which each of the concepts is used in the 
overall body of the literature. This suggests that the health expenditure should be 
modelled as a function of a country’s national income, its fiscal space, the age structure 
as well as the supply of medical care.  
This list does, despite frequent use of this concept not contain the variables 
around overseas development assistance. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, most 
studies, for instance Lu et al (2010) and also Stuckler et al (2011), include this indicator 
out of special interest in the influence of this variable on health expenditure. Stuckler 
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et al (2011), for example, are interested in modelling the impact of development 
assistance to health on health expenditure. This special interest does not reflect the 
overall importance of this variable as a determinant of government health expenditure. 
Secondly, this study is interested in estimating the effect of IMF agreements on 
government health expenditure. As will be outlined in more detail in chapter 5, the 
variable employed as dependent variable in this study captures both money coming 
from the government as source as well as aid money from international sources 
channelled through the government. Including an indicator of development assistance 
to health would change the interpretation of the results. In most low- and middle-
income countries development assistance to health is an important part of government 
health expenditure.  
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
Appendix Note 3.1: Search Term Combinations: Determinants of Health 
Expenditure  
 
Web of Knowledge 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
TI=("health expenditure" OR "Health care expenditure" OR "Government health expenditure" 
OR "Health Expenditures" OR "Health Expenditures") NOT TI=(Europe OR OECD) NOT 
TO=(Europe OR OECD) NOT TO=catastr* NOT TI=catastr* 
 
Scopus 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
ALL ( "health expenditure"  OR  "Health care expenditure"  OR  "Government health 
expenditure"  OR  "Health Expenditures"  OR  "Health Expenditures" )  not  ALL ( europe  OR  
oecd )  not  ALL ( catastr* ) 
 
PubMed 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
(((((((financing, public[MeSH Terms]) OR financing, government[MeSH Terms]) OR 
expenditure, health[MeSH Terms]) OR expenditures, health[MeSH Terms])) AND 




 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
determinants  health expenditure 
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Appendix Note 3.3: Study details: Health Expenditure Determinants 
# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants49  Research Question Data 
Sources 










- GDP (+) 
- aid to health sector (0) 
- aid to all sectors (0) 
- Grants (+) 
- Infant mortality (0) 
What are the effects of aid on government 



















- Development assistance for health chan-
nelled to government (-) 
- Development assistance for health chan-
nelled to non-government (+) 
- Government expenditure per GDP (+) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- Population size (0) 
- Growth of GDP (+) 
What is the relationship between 
government health expenditure and 
development assistance for health 
channelled to governments? 
WHO 
IHME 














- GDP per capita (+) 
- Proportion of general government ex-
penditure per GDP (+) 
- Proportion of population 60+ (+) 
 
review the literature on the determinants of 
total health spending and out-of-pocket 
health spending. 
What determines health spending and its 
composition? 
WHO 












- Per capita donor funding for health (-) 
- GDP per capita (+) 
Does funding from donors displace 
government spending for health in 
developing countries? 
WHO 
                                                 
49 (+) suggests a statistically significant positive relationship of this determinant and HE, (-) a significant negative one and (0) no significant relationship 
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# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants49  Research Question Data 
Sources 










- GNP per capita (+) 
- Urban population as share of total popu-
lation (0) 
- Age structure, population under 15 (0) 
- % of births attended by health staff (+) 
- Crude birth rate (0) 
- Foreign aid per capita (+) 
What are the determinants of health 














(per capita)  
- GDP per capita (+) What is the elasticity of health expenditure in 
African countries? 
WDI 












- GDP per capita (+) 
- Population growth (+) 
What is the relationship between health 
























- GDP per capita (+) 
- Government gross debt per capita (+) 
- Size of informal sector (agriculture to 
non-agriculture output) (-) 
- Share of population over 65 (0) 
- Socio-political risk (of government stabil-
ity, corruption, democratic accountability, 
ethnic tensions) (+,-,+,-,0) 
- Development assistance to health per 
capita (+) 













# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants49  Research Question Data 
Sources 















- Development Assistance to Health to 
Government as share of GDP (-) 
- Development Assistance to Health to 
non-government as share of GDP (+) 
- Debt relief/GDP (0) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- General Government Expenditure as 
share of GDP (+) 
- HIV prevalence (0) 
To what extent is health expenditure related 
















- Real GDP per-capita (+) 
- Persons per physician (0) 
- Percentage of population over 65 years 
(0) 
- Foreign aid real per-capita (+) 
- Maternal mortality per 1000 persons (0) 
identify and empirically test some of the 
theoretical determinants of health care 
expenditure 
unclear 








- GDP per capita (+) What are the basic patterns of health 
expenditure and how does GDP impact 
spending? 
WHO 
12.  Nandakumar 
and Farag 
(2008) 
   - National income 
- health sector infrastructure, physician be-
haviour, health technology 
- Population age structure 
- Disease burden 
- Organisation of health care system 




# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants49  Research Question Data 
Sources 










- General budget revenue per capita (+) 
- Finance transfers from the central gov-
ernment per capita (+) 
- Percentage of population aged under 15 
(+) 
- Percentage of population aged over 64 
(0) 
- Reported morbidity of infectious dis-
eases per 1000 (0) 
- Reported mortality of infectious diseases 
per 1000 (0) 
- SARS (+) 
- Beds per 1000 population in hospital & 
health central (0) 
- Health personnel per 1000 population (0) 
- Coverage rate of urban employee basic 
health Insurance (-) 
- Proportion of urban population (-) 
- Proportion of female population (0) 
- Proportion of college & higher level 
population (0) 
What are the determinants of differences in 
provincial government health expenditure? 
Has expenditure fluctuated with the 
provincial public health status? 
National 
statistics 









- Per capita GDP (+) 
- Share of population over 60 years (0) 
- Literacy rate (+) 
- Population per primary care centre (0) 
- Population per doctor (0) 
What are the determinants of health 




15.  Reeves et al 
(2015)  






- Tax revenue (all and types: income tax 
and goods and services tax) (+) 
- GDP (+) 
What are the associations between 
alternative types of tax revenue and 
indicators designed to capture dimensions of 
the breadth, depth, and height of UHC 
WDI 
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# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants49  Research Question Data 
Sources 





1994 Public share 
of health 
spending 
- GDP per capita What are the basic patterns of health 
expenditure and how does GDP impact 
spending? 
WB 



















- GDP (+) 
- TB (0) 
- Population over 60 (0) 
- General government expenditure as 
share of GDP (+) 
- External Funds per capita (+) 
- OOP (0) 
- Social Insurance, Tax or mixed Health 
System (+,-,0) 
What determines the trajectory of health 




Studies from the IMF and health systems literature 
# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants50  Research Question Data 
Sources 














- GDP per capita (~) 
- Government Balance (~) 
- Population over 65 (~) 
- Urbanisation (0) 
- Trade openness (~) 
What are the effects of IMF agreements on 
health expenditure in low- and non-low-
income countries? 
Account for selection 
IMF HE 
dataset 
                                                 
50 (+) suggests a statistically significant positive relationship of this determinant and HE, (-) a significant negative one and (0) no significant relationship 
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# Study Countries Years Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants50  Research Question Data 
Sources 
2. Kentikelenis 













- GDP per capita (0) 
- Government Balance (~) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Negative Growth (~) 
- Trade openness (+) 
- Dependency Ratio (0) 
- Democracy (0) 
- Overseas Development Assistance 
(~) 
What are the effects of IMF agreements on 
health spending? 





















- GDP per capita (~) 
- Currency devaluation (+) 
- Democracy (~) 
- Population age structure (~) 
- GDP growth (~) 
- Negative growth (~) 
What are the effects of IMF agreements on 
health spending? 

















- GDP per capita (0) 
- Democracy (+) 
- Population age structure (~) 
- GDP growth (~) 
What are the effects of IMF programmes on 
health spending? Special emphasis on the 
role of democracy  
Account for selection 
IMF 










- GDP (+) 
- Development Assistance to Health 
(+) 
What are the effects of IMF agreements on 







 Identifying Determinants 
of IMF Agreements 
In the introduction (chapter 1) and in more detail in the chapter 6, it is outlined 
that assessing the effects of IMF agreements on government health expenditure poses 
methodological challenges. This is because countries with and without agreements are 
likely systematically different in the way that these differences impact on government 
health expenditure. These differences need to be taken into account when estimating 
effects of agreements on government health expenditure. To do so, this study uses a 
Heckman-style selection model (section 6.2; pg. 230). On order to be able to fit such 
a selection model, variables that capture these differences between countries and are 
associated with a country entering into an agreement (determinants of IMF 
agreements), need to be identified. Currently, no single strong and compelling theory 
outlining why countries enter into IMF agreements exists. Also, no comprehensive and 
up to date literature review summarising determinants used in the empirical literature 
exists51. The relevant determinants of IMF agreements are therefore identified using 
                                                 
51 An exception can be seen in the studies by Moser and Sturm (2011); Steinwand and Stone 
(2008); Sturm et al (2005). These studies, however, are somewhat outdated and their search 
process does not seem to be conducted in a systematic way. 
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empirical studies modelling IMF agreement participation. This literature broadly 
includes two sets of studies. Firstly, those that aim to identify determinants of IMF 
agreements and, secondly, those studies that set out to investigate the effects of IMF 
agreements on certain economic and social outcomes (such as growth, balance of 
payment position or health outcomes and expenditure) accounting for selection bias 
using determinants of IMF agreements. This chapter aims to identify this literature in 
a systematic way52 in order to identify the most relevant determinants and is structured 
into three parts. The first section outlines the methodology used to identify the relevant 
studies in a systematic way. The second part identifies and presents the determinants 
used in the literature. Part three summarises the findings and draws out the most 
commonly used determinants of IMF agreements. 
4.1 Search Methodology 
This section outlines the search methodology developed to obtain the relevant 
literature in a systematic way53. It starts by outlining the literature sources searched to 
obtain the relevant studies, then presents the search terms used to identify studies for 
the review. The third part of this section describes the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
applied to the search. Part four gives an overview of the search process. The final part 
acknowledges limitations.  
4.1.1 Literature Sources 
The review aims to include peer-reviewed articles as well as grey literature. 
This literature was obtained from a number of sources including bibliographic 
databases, references listed of the reviewed studies, the main literature review 
presented in chapter 2. The search of bibliographic databases was limited to the largest 
and most relevant databases for social sciences and economics and included the Web 
                                                 
52 Similar to the reviews conducted in chapter 2 and 3, this review is also not a systematic 
review in the strictest sense. This is for the reasons outlined in more detail in footnote 21 (pg. 
30) and the fact that it additionally includes studies previously identified (chapter 2) to further 
enrich and complete the literature. 
53 This methodology is very similar to those presented in chapters 2 and 3, however, individual 
elements have been adjusted for the review in this chapter and the methodology is therefore 
described here again. 
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of Knowledge and Scopus. Google Scholar was searched as less traditional source of 
academic literature. Three recent literature reviews (Moser and Sturm, 2011; 
Steinwand and Stone, 2008; Sturm et al, 2005) were screened for additional results. 
Since the main literature review also identified a number of articles that are relevant 
to this search, this literature was included in the review. After obtaining literature 
through these main pathways, reverse searches were conducted by hand searching 
reference lists of previously identified literature. All sources were searched using the 
following terms. 
4.1.2 Search Terms 
A number of key words were used to identify the relevant literature. Key words 
were selected around the three blocks of IMF agreement, determinants and low- and 
middle-income countries. See Table 4.1 below for the individual key words for each 
block. 
IMF agreement Determinant L&MIC 
IMF Determinant* Low?income 
Fund Factor* Middle?income 
International Monetary Fund Variable* Low?and?middle income 
Agreement Participat* LIC 
Adjustment  MIC 
  LMIC 
Table 4.1: Building Blocks and Keywords for Literature Search for Determinants of IMF Agreements 
Search terms were used in various search fields, including title, abstract, topic 
and key words as well as Mesh terms, where available, and combined using logic 
operators. Terms within each block were combined using the “OR” operator, all blocks 
were linked together using the “AND” operator. For each of the databases the 
combinations of blocks and individual key words was altered to identify the best 
combination of keywords and blocks to obtain the most promising set of results. It 
appeared that terms around low- and middle-income countries were not leading to the 
right literature so that this block was excluded from the searches. See Appendix Note 
4.1 (pg. 133) for the final combination of key words for each of the databases. 
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4.1.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Studies were screened to meet a number of inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Literature was included in the review when the study included countries of low- or 
middle-income54, either as a single country or a group of countries. Consequently, 
studies of countries of high-income exclusively were excluded. Studies were included 
when they aimed to identify determinants of IMF agreements and excluded when they 
identified determinants of agreements with other international financial organisations 
such as the World Bank or regional development banks. Studies were included when 
they were concerned with determinants of IMF agreements, either through identifying 
determinants or using determinants in order to account for selection bias. Studies were 
excluded when they did not report any information on determinants of IMF 
agreements. Studies were also excluded when they were not written in English or 
German language or the full-text of the article was not available through the University 
of Edinburgh’s or the National Library of Scotland’s library services, either in 
electronic or hard-copy form. Finally, studies were excluded, when they were book 
reviews, editorials or general opinion pieces. Figure 4.1 shows the flowchart of the 
process of study inclusion and exclusion.  
                                                 
54 A country was defined as low- or middle-income country following the definition of income 
groups outlined in section 5.3.1 (pg. 184).  
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart of Process to include Literature 
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4.1.4 Search Process 
The literature was searched in October 2015. Having performed the searches 
in all selected databases, reverse searches and included the studies from the main 
literature review a total of 1190 studies, including duplicates, was obtained. The 
selected literature has then reviewed in more detail through three screening stages 
(Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2: Flowchart of Screening Process 
The first stage excluded studies when it was immediately apparent from the 
title that the article was irrelevant. At this stage the number of studies was reduced to 
109. The remaining studies were included or excluded based on the abstract. Where 
the abstract did not allow to clearly include or exclude an article, the full-text was 
skim-read to make a decision. This reduced the number of articles to 70. Full-texts of 
these articles were obtained and read to make a final decision about the study’s 
inclusion into the review (see Appendix Note 4.2; pg. 134 for list of studies). Table 












Clear from abstract that 
study not relevant 
Full-text Screen 
Included N=55 
Clear from full-text that 










4.2 below gives an overview of the studies identified at different stages and from 
different sources.  
Databases 









Web of Knowledge 794 34 11 
55 
Scopus 148 5 3 
Google Scholar 21556 44 33 
All Databases 1157 83 47 
Hand Search 26 19 16 
Literature from Main Literature Review 7 7 7 
All Sources 1190 109 70 
All Literature, duplicates removed 
Table 4.2: Search Results by Database and Screening Stage for Determinants of IMF Agreements. 
4.1.5 Limitations of this Literature Review 
The search strategy for this literature review was designed carefully. 
Nevertheless, some limitations need to be acknowledged. These and their mitigation 
are similar to those spelled out in more detail above (see section 2.1.5; pg. 36) and 
range around the use of only the largest databases, the reviewing process by only one 
researcher. The limitation to include only studies written in German or English and 
available in full-text from the aforementioned library sources, did not restrict the 
search as no study had to be excluded based on these criteria.  
4.2 Determinants of IMF agreements used in the Literature 
The review process identified 55 studies providing information on 
determinants of IMF agreements. All studies employed time-series-cross-section 
datasets. The time-series are generally quite long and cover up to 60 years (Fails and 
Woo, 2015). The selected countries are in general not restricted to one geographic area, 
apart from the studies by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2011) and Ortiz and Bejar (2013), 
focussing on Latin America, the study by Harrigan et al (2006), looking at the Middle 
                                                 
55 Individual database sources cannot be identified at this stage 
56 Review of article titles was concluded when hits become irrelevant, this was mostly the case 
as the topics diverted from the IMF to other organisations. The search was concluded after the 
first 500 articles 
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East and North Africa, and the study by Pandolfelli et al (2014), studying African 
countries. 
Agreements are treated as a dummy variable coded as 1 for times in agreements 
and 0 for times without agreements. Most studies consider all types of agreements, 
while a minority focusses on a subgroup of agreements. Jorra (2012), for instance, 
exclude Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Agreements and focus only on Stand-
By Agreements and Extended Fund Facilities. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the 
identified studies. 
Study Countries Years Agreements 
Andersen et al (2006) 102 developing countries 1995-2000 SBA, EFF  
Atoyan/Conway (2006) 95 countries 1993-2002 SBA, EFF, SAF, PRGT 
Barro/Lee (2005) 130 countries  1975-2000 SBA, EFF 
Bas/Stone (2014) 104 countries 1970-2008 all agreement 
Bauer et al (2012) 142 countries 1976-2006 all agreements 
Biglaiser/DeRouen (2011) 15 Latin American 
countries  
1980-2003 SBA  
Bird/Rowlands (2001) 95 countries 1974-1994 SBA, EFF, ESAF 
Bird/Rowlands (2004) L&MIC 1966-2000 SBA, EFF, ESAF  
Bird/Rowlands (2009a) 88 L&MIC 1977-2000 SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
Bird/Rowlands (2009b) L&MIC 1973-2000 SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
Bird et al (2015) 114 countries 1984-2008 all agreements 
Breen (2013) 159 L&MIC 1983-2006 all agreements 
Broz/Hawes (2006) 96 countries 1983-2002 all agreements 
Cerutti (2007) 59 non-PRGT countries 1982-2005 SBA, EFF 
Conway (1994) 74 developing countries 1976-1986 SBA, EFF 
Copelovitch (2010) 47 countries 1984-2003 all agreements 
Dreher (2006) 98 developing countries 1970-2000 all agreements 
Dreher et al (2009) 197 countries 1951-2004 SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
Edwards (2005) 106 developing countries 1979-1995 all agreements 
Edwards/Santaella (1993) 48 countries  1954-1971 all agreements 
Eichengreen et al (2006) ? 1990-2003 all agreements 
Fails/Woo (2015) 115 countries 1946-2006 all agreements 
Garuda (2000) 39 countries 1975-1991 all agreements 
Gündüz (2009) 55 countries  1980–2004 SBA, PRGT, CFF, 
SAF/ESAF 
Harrigan et al (2006) 11 MENA countries 1975-2000 SAF, ESAF, PRGT 
Hutchison (2003) 67 L&MIC 1975-1997 SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
Hutchison (2003)  Developing countries  1975-1997 EFF, SBA 
Jensen (2004) 68 countries 1970-1998 all agreements 
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Study Countries Years Agreements 
Jorra (2012) 57 L&MIC 1975-2008 SBA, EFF PRGT  
Joyce (1992) 45 countries 1980-1994 all agreements 
Knight/Santaella (1997) 91 developing countries 1973-1991 EFF, SAF, ESAF 
Moser/Sturm (2011) 165 countries 1990-2009 all agreements 
Mukherjee/Singer (2010) 87 countries 1975-2002 all agreements 
Ortiz/Bejar (2013) 17 Latin American 
countries 
1980-2007 all agreements 
Pop-Eleches (2009) Latin American and Eastern 
Europe countries 
1982-2001 all agreements 
Presbitero/Zazzaro (2012) 56 countries 2008-2010 all agreements 
Przeworski/Vreeland (2000) 79 countries 1970-1990 all agreements 
Stone (2008) 96 countries 1990-2002 all agreements 
Sturm et al (2005) 118 countries 1971-2000 all agreements 
Thacker (1999) 78 countries 1985-1994 SBA, EFF 
Trudel (2005) unclear 1960-2000 all agreements 
van der Veer/de Jong (2013) 49 MIC 1984-2004 EFF, SBA (no debt 
restructuring) 
Veiga (2005) 10 countries 1957-1999 all agreements 
Vreeland (2002) 110 countries 1961-1993 SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF  
Vreeland (2003) 135 countries 1951-1990 all SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF 
Vreeland (2004) 179 countries 1975-1996 all agreements 
Vreeland (2005) 180 countries 1975-2000 all agreements 
Williams (2012a) unclear 1970-1999 all agreements 
Clements et al (2013) 140 developing countries 1985-2009 all agreements 
Hoddie/Hartzell (2014) 44 countries 1995-1998 all agreements 
Kentikelenis et al (2015) 63 Low income countries  1985-2009 all agreements 
Martin/Segura-Ubiergo 
(2004) 
146 countries 1985-2000 all agreements 
Nooruddin/Simmons (2006) 92 countries 1990-2000 all agreements 
Pandolfelli (2014) 37 African countries 1990-2005 all agreements 
Stuckler et al (2008) 21 post-communist 
countries 
1992-2003 all agreements 
Table 4.3: Overview of Studies on IMF Agreement Determinants 
The reviewed studies consider a large number of variables as determinants of 
IMF agreements. While some trends seem to emerge, there does not seem to be a 
consensus about which variables are important determinants and also not in which way 
the variables influence IMF participation (Steinwand and Stone, 2008). The following 
sections discuss the variables used in the studies in more detail. The presentation will 
be divided into two main parts following the main distinction made in the literature 
between political and economic variables. Economic variables are generally those that 
measure the changes in economic performance or circumstances of a country. It is 
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hypothesised that countries are more likely to enter into agreements with the IMF when 
their economic performance or position vis-à-vis the rest of the world is deteriorating. 
Political variables are those that measure wider circumstances of a country that might 
increase or decrease the likelihood of entering into agreements, such as the 
characteristics of the domestic political economy, the importance of the country in the 
international political economy or the relations with the Fund itself.57 To make the 
great number of variables presented in this study accessible, individual variables and 
determinants have been organised thematically and are aggregated into categories or 
concepts. Table 4.4 below gives an overview of the concepts used in the studies. Since 
the interest in the selection model is not in describing the relationship between 
agreements and individual determinants, but to be able to correctly classify countries 
into those in an agreement and those not in an agreement, no indication of the reported 
relationship is given. A list of all determinants used in the individual studies can be 
found in the Appendix Note 4.3 (pg. 138). 
                                                 
57 While not necessarily and strictly “political”, variables around the involvement with the IMF 
are, in line with the literature (Steinwand and Stone, 2008), clustered with other political 
determinants. 
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Andersen et al (2006)  X X X                      X    
Atoyan/Conway (2006) X   X                          
Barro/Lee (2005) X X                  X X     X X   
Bas/Stone (2014)  X X X X    X        X X    X X       
Bauer et al (2012) X X     X         X  X     X       
Biglaiser/DeRouen (2011) X X     X X         X     X    X    
Bird/Rowlands (2001) X X X X  X    X X     X   X X  X X X  X X  X 
Bird/Rowlands (2004) X X X X  X    X X     X   X X  X X X  X X  X 
Bird/Rowlands (2009a) X X X X  X X    X    X X              
Bird/Rowlands (2009b) X X X X  X    X X     X   X X  X X X  X X  X 
Bird et al (2015) X X X X        X    X       X   X X  X 
Breen (2013) X X X X  X              X X  X   X X   
Broz/Hawes (2006)  X X     X        X          X  X X 
Cerutti (2007) X X  X X X X   X      X   X X          
Conway (1994) X X X X    X  X                   X 
Copelovitch (2010) X  X X  X    X       X X X   X     X X X 
Dreher (2006)   X                   X        
Dreher et al (2009) X X X X X  X  X       X      X X      X 
Edwards (2005) X X X     X      X                
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Edwards/Santaella (1993) X   X  X   X             X  X      
Eichengreen et al (2006) X X X   X  X      X            X    
Fails/Woo (2015) X X X X            X      X X   X    
Garuda (2000) X X X X X  X X       X               
Gündüz (2009) X X  X    X    X   X            X   
Harrigan et al (2006) X X X X                  X X      X 
Hutchison (2003) X X  X X X X               X        
Hutchison (2004)  X X  X X          X             X 
Jensen (2004) X X X  X  X  X      X X      X        
Jorra (2012) X X X                          X 
Joyce (1992) X X X X X  X      X  X               
Knight/Santaella (1997) X X X X X X X X     X X  X              
Moser/Sturm (2011) X X X X X X  X X      X  X     X X X X X   X 
Mukherjee/Singer (2010) X X  X  X X X       X X      X        
Ortiz/Bejar (2013) X X X X   X         X      X X       
Pop-Eleches (2009) X X X    X         X      X   X     
Presbitero/Zazzaro (2012) X X  X  X X         X    X   X  X     
Przeworski/Vreeland (2000)  X X  X   X X        X X    X X       
Stone (2008) X  X X X    X       X    X   X X  X X  X 
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Sturm et al (2005) X X X X X X X X X X       X X     X X X    X 
Thacker (1999) X X X X X   X   X    X       X    X    
Trudel (2005) X X  X X X  X        X      X        
van der Veer/de Jong (2013) X X X   X  X      X            X   X 
Veiga (2005) X X     X         X       X      X 
Vreeland (2002) X     X   X        X X    X X       
Vreeland (2003)  X X X X    X        X X    X X       
Vreeland (2004) X X X X X    X                    X 
Vreeland (2005) X X X X            X          X   X 
Williams (2012) X X X   X X X    X    X X X     X X      
Clements et al (2013)  X   X X          X              
Hoddie (2014) X                X     X  X      
Kentikelenis et al (2015) X   X X           X      X        
Martin/Segura-Ubiergo (2004) X   X X           X      X        
Nooruddin/Simmons (2006) X   X X           X      X        
Pandolfelli (2014) X  X                   X  X  X    
Stuckler et al (2008) X        X    X  X   X    X  X     X 
Frequency of Determinant 47 43 36 35 21 21 17 16 12 7 5 3 3 4 9 26 10 9 5 8 2 28 20 11 4 17 9 2 19 
Table 4.4: Determinants of IMF Agreements 
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4.2.1 Economic Determinants of IMF Agreements 
A number of different economic determinants are used in the studies. These 
can be aggregated into categories. These different categories are presented here. Due 
to the large number of studies within each category, only examples of variables will 
be given in the text. A full list of determinants can be found in Table 4.4 at the end of 
this section.  
National income is the most commonly used concept. This is operationalised 
most commonly as an indicator of economic growth, as for instance in the studies by 
Breen (2013) or Jensen (2004). Another commonly used operationalisation of national 
income is the measure of GDP per capita, as for instance employed by Bird et al (2015) 
or Thacker (1999). Few studies (Mukherjee and Singer, 2010; Ortiz and Bejar, 2013), 
capture this concept through an “output loss” variables, which describes the difference 
between estimated and observed economic output. The underlying assumption of using 
national income as a predictor of participation in IMF agreements is that countries that 
experience relatively weak growth might be more likely to request a loan agreement.  
The second most commonly used concept is the stock of international 
reserves. This indicator is operationalised across all studies as the stock of 
international reserves in relation to imports of goods and services per month. This 
gives an indication of the size of the international reserves relative to the size of 
imports. Studies using the indicator of international reserves in their models are for 
instance Harrigan et al (2006) or Williams (2012b). The underlying assumption is that 
countries with low stocks of international reserves relative to their imports are less able 
to meet difficulties in the balance of payments using reserves and might therefore be 
more likely to request IMF assistance.  
Debt is another commonly used predictor of IMF agreements in the reviewed 
studies. The debt determinant is operationalised in a number of ways that can broadly 
be classified into debt stock, debt service and interest payment. Debt stock is either 
considered as a whole or, in some cases, subdivided into internal or external debt 
stocks. It is introduced into the models either as levels of debt stock, where it is 
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commonly scaled to exports or GDP, or change of debt stock. Debt service is generally 
measured as a debt service ratio, that is the ratio of a country’s debt service payments 
to its export earnings. Pop-Eleches (2009) operationalises the debt indicator as interest 
payments as share of gross national income (GNI). Studies argue for the use of debt 
variables as it is assumed that a large level of debt compared to the size of the economy 
will increase the likelihood of requesting an agreement.  
Most studies also include an indicator of a country’s balance of payment 
position as determinant of IMF agreements. Balance of payment is an important 
economic indicator that comprises a statistical record of all economic transactions 
between a country and the rest of the world. The balance of payments traditionally 
includes the current account, capturing income flows, and the capital account detailing 
flows of assets and liabilities (Pilbeam, 2006). While a small number of studies 
operationalise this indicator by measuring a country’s overall balance of payment (Bas 
and Stone, 2014; Harrigan et al, 2006), most studies use an indicator of the current 
account balance in their models (Bird et al, 2015; Joyce, 1992). Only Thacker (1999) 
operationalises the concept using the capital account balance. According to the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement, one of the purposes of the organisation is to “correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments” (IMF, 2011) so that imbalances in 
balance of payments can be seen as an important predictor of entering into agreements.  
Government balance is another frequently used determinant of IMF 
agreements. Government balance describes the difference between government 
expenditure and government revenue. While most studies measure government 
balance directly, a few studies measure only government expenditure (Joyce, 1992; 
Knight and Santaella, 1997) or government revenue (Sturm et al, 2005). This 
determinant is generally reported as a share of GDP. Negative government balances, 
or government deficits, are considered as determinant as it is assumed that higher 
deficits make countries more likely to enter into IMF agreements (Przeworski and 
Vreeland, 2000).  
About the same amount of studies consider exchange rates as determinant of 
agreements. Most studies using this determinant measure the exchange rate to the US 
Dollar or changes thereof (Bird and Rowlands, 2001; Cerutti, 2007; Edwards, 2005). 
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Some studies (Breen, 2013; Copelovitch, 2010a) include a currency crisis dummy, 
which indicates if the currency has been devalued by more than 30%. It is argued that 
a strong depreciation of a country’s currency is associated with an increased likelihood 
to enter into an agreement. A smaller amount of studies considers the exchange rate 
regime.58 Bird and Rowlands (2009b) suggest that hard pegs of currencies can inspire 
confidence in a country’s macroeconomic policy and therefore increase the willingness 
of the capital market to lend to a country so that agreements are not required.  
Around a third of the studies include inflation as determinant of IMF 
agreements. It is argued that higher inflation might be associated with an increased 
likelihood of participation in IMF agreements.  
Trade is considered as determinant by around one third of all studies. Trade 
variables are generally operationalised as either terms of trade (Conway, 1994; Sturm 
et al, 2005) or trade openness (Broz and Hawes, 2006). Trade is considered an 
important determinant of entering into IMF agreements as a worsening of the trade 
balance might worsen a country’s external position and thus increase the likelihood of 
a country entering into an agreement. 
Another determinant used by some studies is a variable measuring investment. 
This indicator is operationalised in a number of ways: while some studies (Sturm et al, 
2005) capture investment as a total, scaled to GDP, Stuckler et al (2008) focus on 
foreign direct investment, scaled to GDP, and Bas and Stone (2014) measure domestic 
investment as a share of GDP. It is argued that a decline in investment indicates 
difficulties accessing national or international capital markets, which might increase 
the likelihood of entering into an agreement in order to secure finance.  
A small number of studies include the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), a world interest rate, in their models. This is generally measured as the 
change in LIBOR (Bird and Rowlands, 2001). The underlying assumption is that with 
increases in world interest rates loans become harder to finance for countries, which 
might lead them to turn to the IMF for funding.  
                                                 
58 The exchange rate regime describes the way a country manages its currency in relation to 
those of other currencies. It can range from floating or fixed/pegged (Pilbeam, 2006). 
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Some studies also include an indicator of debt rescheduling (Bird and 
Rowlands, 2009b). This is usually operationalised in form of a dummy variable, which 
indicators whether or not a country has rescheduled a proportion of its debt either in a 
given year or in a following year. This is seen as a determinant of IMF agreements as 
rescheduling of debt usually requires IMF involvement. Debt rescheduling is different 
from debt, another category presented above, as it is not the level of debt or debt related 
interest payment that are important but the fact that debt has been rescheduled. 
A small number of studies include commodity prices as determinant of 
agreements in their model. Studies operationalise this either as changes in oil prices 
(Gündüz, 2009) or other commodities, such as agricultural products (Bird et al, 2015). 
Williams (2012b) include a dummy for the 1974-79 oil crisis. Studies reason that 
higher commodity prices might impact on a country’s economy by reducing economic 
growth, which might increase the likelihood of signing an agreement.  
Individual studies include additional variables. Stuckler et al (2008) and Knight 
and Santaella (1997) include a measure of flows from non-Fund external funding, 
measured as share of GDP, as indicator and argue that the likelihood of entering into 
agreement increases as the flow of external debt decreases. The studies by Edwards 
(2005) and van der Veer and de Jong (2013) use an indicator of domestic credit, 
measuring the total amount of money available to a country, scaled to GDP. van der 
Veer and de Jong (2013) argue that a domestic credit-boom would increase the chances 
of a sudden stop in capital flows, which would increase the likelihood of entering into 
an agreement. Another small set of studies use further indicators that cannot be 
classified into any of the other categories and are, due to their low frequency of use, 




Crisis index (change in growth over previ-
ous years) 
Real GDP  
Real GDP growth  
Real GDP per capita  
Negative growth year 
output loss 
International reserves 
% change in reserves/imports 
Foreign reserves in months of import  
foreign reserves/GDP  
Reserves in months of import  
reserves to debt  
Total reserves  
Debt 
% change in debt–service ratio  
Central government debt  
Change in debt/GDP  
Changes in debt-service ratio  
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Commitments for loans from private 
sources  
Debt service as share of exports 
Debt service as share of GNP or GDP 
Debt Service as share of Imports 
Debt to GNP or GDP 
External debt as share of GDP or GNI 
External debt service as share of exports 
IMF debt as share of GDP 
interest payments to GNP or GNI 
Real short-term debt per capita  
Short term debt as share of total debt  
Short Term debt as share of reserves 
short-term debt scaled by total foreign 
debt 
Stock of international debt long-term  
World real rate of interest for that country  
Balance of payment position 
Change in the current account  
balance of payments as share of GDP  
Change in current account deficit  
Change in current account to GDP  
current account balance as share of GDP  
Current account balance to exports  
overall balance of payments in US Dollar 
Overall balance of payments, % of GDP 
per capita overall balance of payments 
Fiscal balance as share of GDP  
Inflation 
Inflation  
Consumer price index  
Government balance 
Budget surplus as share of GDP 
fiscal government budget surplus as share 
of GDP 
Government balance as share of GDP  
government budget deficit as percentage 
of GDP  
Government budget deficit to GDP ratio  
Government expenditure to GDP  
Government expenditure as share of GDP 
Change in government revenues, % of GDP 
Change in government expenditure, % of 
GDP 
Trade 
Change in terms of trade  
Export markets, % change  
Growth of goods export  
Growth rate of the terms of trade  
Terms of trade  
Terms of Trade Shock  
Trade balance  
Trade Balance/GDP  
World trade  
Exchange rates 
Real exchange rate change  
Exchange rate regime (fixed vs flexible) 
Currency crisis indicator (depreciation 
larger 30%/5%) 
Change in real exchange rate 
Real exchange rate overvaluation  
Investment 
Investment (in % of GDP)  
Real gross domestic investment (private 
and public) as a % of GDP  
Net foreign assets ratio  
Non-fund financing flow, months of im-
ports  
Net Foreign Direct Investment  
LIBOR 
Real LIBOR  
Changes in real Libor 
Debt rescheduling 
Past rescheduling  
Current rescheduling  
Rescheduling next year  
Default dummy  
Commodity prices 
Crude oil prices (and change thereof) 
Agriculture prices 
Non-oil commodity prices  
Oil crisis: 1974–9 dummy 
Non-IMF Lending 
Lag of Dummy for Non-IMF Lending 
Domestic Credit  
Domestic Credit/GDP (and change thereof) 
Further economic variables  
OECD dummy  
Market pressure index  
Capital account restrictions  
Official arrears  
Private arrears  
Currency crises worldwide  
Percentage of labour force in agriculture  
Macroeconomic stability indicator  
Central bank holdings of domestic assents  
Gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP  
economic globalization  
systemic banking crisis  
Size of banking sector  
Money supply  
Table 4.5: Overview of Economic Variables used in the Reviewed Studies 
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4.2.2 Political Determinants of IMF Agreements 
Besides using economic indicators to determine whether or not a country 
participates in an IMF agreement, the literature has developed to incorporate political 
determinants into their models. Steinwand and Stone (2008), for instance, argue that 
politics affect IMF lending decisions at least as much as economic considerations do. 
These political variables can be seen to determine supply and demand of agreements 
and can loosely be arranged around three broad themes of the relationship with the 
Fund, national political economy and importance in the global political economy. 
Within these, a number of individual categories have been identified, which are 
presented here. A complete list of all variables can be found in Table 4.6, at the end of 
this section. 
Almost all studies include in their models one or more indicators designed to 
capture a country’s relationship with the Fund. Studies most commonly include an 
indicator of past IMF agreements into their models. A large body of literature exists 
discussing IMF lending in relationship to recidivism (Bird, 2007; Conway, 2007; 
Hutchison and Noy, 2004; Steinwand and Stone, 2008). It is argued that while IMF 
agreements are designed to provide financing for short-term balance of payment 
imbalances, a large number of countries have become regular clients of the IMF 
entering a sequence of agreements over time. It appears that countries with substantial 
previous exposure to IMF agreements are more likely to borrow from the IMF again 
(Steinwand and Stone, 2008). This construct is operationalised in different ways across 
the studies. A number of studies include a dummy of previous IMF agreements into 
their model to indicate whether or not a country had an agreement in the last or 
previous years (Bird and Rowlands, 2009a; Cerutti, 2007). Other studies include the 
number of years a country has been under agreements (Bas and Stone, 2014; Biglaiser 
and DeRouen, 2011; Williams, 2012b). A related argument, this time from the supply 
side, is made by studies that include the number of countries in agreements worldwide. 
It is argued that the IMF will not enter into new agreements with countries when the 
number of other countries currently in agreements is already high as its need to push 
additional loans is already satisfied (Steinwand and Stone, 2008). Related to this is the 
argument made by Bird and Rowlands (2001) and Cerutti (2007), who use an indicator 
of IMF liquidity and argue that the likelihood of entering into additional agreements 
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decreases with decreased IMF liquidity. Sturm et al (2005) argue that countries are 
more willing to enter into a new agreement when a great number of other countries is 
already in agreements as this would mean that the perceived cost of giving up 
sovereignty over policy decisions is lower.  
Barro and Lee (2005), for instance, argue that the IMF’s lending decisions are 
biased by interests of its own staff members. The authors include the number of IMF 
staff members from a certain country and this country’s IMF quota as determinants of 
participation in agreements. It is argued that the likelihood of a country entering into 
an agreement increases when the IMF has more staff member from this particular 
country or the country’s quota is larger (Bird and Rowlands, 2001; 2004; Breen, 2013; 
Stone, 2008).  
Various studies include concepts that can be arranged around the theme of the 
countries’ national political economy. The overarching idea is that a country’s 
national political situation determines the demand for agreements. This has been 
operationalised in different ways. Most commonly this is measured using a democracy 
indicator. Two opposing views on the relationship between IMF agreements and the 
regime-type are made in the literature. One set of studies argues that democracies are 
accountable to the public and would therefore find it more difficult to accept 
unfavourable terms that come with IMF agreements, they would therefore negotiate 
harder with the IMF, which might reduce the likelihood of entering into an agreement. 
In other words, since autocracies are less accountable to the public they are more likely 
to enter into agreements (Huber et al, 2008; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). Another 
argument is put forward by, for instance, Edwards and Santaella (1993) who argue that 
IMF agreements can be used to justify unpopular policy choices and thereby avoid 
blame from the electorate. When entering into an agreement, policy choices are set not 
by the government but by the IMF. Following this argument, democracies might be 
more likely to enter into agreements as they can use them as a tool to push 
unfavourable policy options.  
A related argument is made by studies including indicators of executive and 
legislative elections into their model. It is argued that governments might be more 
likely to enter into agreements shortly after an elections hoping that the negative 
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connotation of the programme will be forgotten by the electorate by the time of the 
next election (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). It is also argued that IMF agreements 
might be entered into just before an election as the additional money from the loan 
would help to fund the election campaign.  
A number of studies consider the impact of a country’s political stability. 
Related to the argument made before, that countries would use an agreement to justify 
unpopular decisions, some studies argue that IMF agreements can be used as a seal of 
approval for a certain political programme, this seal of approval would be more 
important when the political situation in a country is more unstable. Opposing this 
view some studies argue that the IMF might be less willing to enter into agreements 
with countries that are politically unstable as this instability might jeopardize the 
completion of the programme. Political stability is operationalised in a number of 
ways. Bird and Rowlands (2001), for instance, count the number of coups in a country. 
Edwards and Santaella (1993) consider the number of political assassinations. Sturm 
et al (2005) include political revolutions, guerrilla problems the number of government 
crisis and instability of government in their models. Related to this are two more sets 
of determinants that are included in some of the studies. It is argued that countries 
consider the political costs of entering into agreements. Sturm et al (2005) argue that 
countries that face high levels of social unrest, measured as number of riots, strikes or 
demonstrations before an agreement, might be associated with a higher likelihood of 
entering into IMF agreements as these countries would require outside assistance.  
It is also argued that the IMF might be more interested in lending to countries 
with good governance, measured for instance by levels of corruption, the rule of law 
or the quality of bureaucracy (Moser and Sturm, 2011; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012).  
A final set of concepts can be arranged around the theme of a country’s 
importance in the international political economy. The arguments used to justify 
including these concepts into the models can generally be summarised in a way to say 
that the supply of agreements is higher and the IMF more likely to offer agreements to 
countries that are more important to the global political economy. This has been 
operationalised in a number of ways.  
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One strand of the literature argues that the IMF’s lending decisions are 
influenced by economic interests of high-income countries. This argument is most 
often tested in relation to the influence of the United States, the largest contributor to 
the IMF’s finances (IMF, 2015e). Thacker (1999), Barro and Lee (2005) or Pop-
Eleches (2009) include variables of the countries’ voting behaviour in the United 
Nations General Assembly in their model and argue that countries that vote more in 
line with the US interests are more likely to receive loans from the IMF. Eichengreen 
et al (2006) and Stone (2008) argue that there is a positive relationship between the 
amount of foreign aid a country receives from the US and its likelihood to receive 
loans from the IMF. While it generally seems accepted that the US has greater 
influence over the IMF’s lending decisions than other high-income countries (Thacker, 
1999), some studies include indicators of a country’s proximity to these other high-
income countries. Barro and Lee (2005), for instance, include an indicator of the 
political proximity and trade intensity of a country with France, Germany and the UK 
in their model.  
Some studies argue that not only the direct interests of a country, but indirectly 
through the influence of commercial banks have an impact on the likelihood of the 
IMF entering into an agreement with a country. It is argued that commercial banks 
have a special political status to incentivise the IMF to financially support those 
countries with loans, that have higher debts at large commercial banks. While 
Copelovitch (2010a) measures this as exposure to international banks in general, Broz 
and Hawes (2006) includes exposure to US and German banks into their model.  
A small number of studies employ a set of variables that cannot be classified 
into any of the other categories. These include the country’s importance in the global 
economy based on their GDP. Sturm et al (2005) argue that a country’s economic 
importance in terms of its GDP as a share of the global GDP is an important predictor 
of a country entering into an agreement. This is to suggest that a country’s balance of 
payment imbalances are more of a risk to the global economy when the country has a 
larger GDP, the IMF would therefore be more likely to lend to these countries in order 
to avoid a spread of the crisis. Other studies use the importance of a country in the UN 
Security Council, its importance in terms of energy production or the frequency of 
military conflicts as determinants.  
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years under agreements 
Cumulative number of years a country has 
been under IMF agreements (sum total or 
last 5 years) 
Previous year agreement dummy  
Past incomplete programs  
Current IMF program  
Past IMF agreements  
participation in next period  
Years since last loan  
Non-compliance with IMF agreements 
Other IMF programs 
Years under current agreement  
Number of previous loans  
Amount drawn to agreed amount  
other countries in agreements 
Total number of other countries in the 




Imminent quota review 
IMF Quota 
IMF staff 
IMF delegation index 
Share of IMF staff 
Political regime Elections/government 
change 
Democracy/Autocracy indicator 
Democracy index  
election year (executive and/or legislative) 
Electoral competitiveness  
Fragmentation of political system  
Indicators of liberal governments 
Political Orientation of the Government  
Ideology of government or president (lib-
eral, socialist) 
Imminent new government 
Lagged election (executive and/or legisla-
tive) 
lead in elections (executive and/or legisla-
tive) 
Leader tenure (in years) 
Number of veto players 
Military autocracy dummy 
number of checks and balances 
Party autocracy dummy 
Personalist autocracy dummy 
Proximity to an Election Year  
Recent change in government 
Regime duration  
Systemic transition 
Political stability  
Civil freedom  
Coup frequency  
Political strikes  
Political assassinations  
social unrest  
Freedom House index  
political globalization  
Governance  
quality of government indicator  
Quality of bureaucracy  
Corruption  
Institutional Weakness  
Institutional Effort  
repudiation of government contracts  
rule of law  
Polity score  
Proximity to the US 
Political proximity to US, based on similar 
votes in UN on key votes  
Change in proximity (as above) to previous 
year  
Index of both  
the intensity of trade with the United 
States  
Bilateral investment treaties US and Latin 
America  
US export to country  
U.S. Aid Recipient  
Amount of US economic aid/share of total 
aid 
US military aid  
US Bank exposure  
share of a country’s bilateral trade with the 
United States relative to the country’s GDP  
US direct investment  
Index for political agreement with US  
Proximity to other advanced economies 
the political proximity to European coun-
tries  
the intensity of trade with European coun-
tries  
French Exports  
Export to G5  
Trade with G5 countries 
OECD Aid  
Table 4.6: Overview of Political Variables used in the Reviewed Studies 
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4.3 Summary of Determinants of IMF Agreements 
This chapter set out to identify determinants of IMF agreements used in the 
empirical literature. To do so, a literature review based on a systematic search strategy 
was conducted. A total of 55 studies were identified and their determinants of IMF 
agreements extracted. The following paragraphs summarises the key findings from the 
literature review and draw out implications for this study. 
A great number of different variables have been employed as determinants of 
agreements. These can broadly be classified into two main themes. Determinants 
coming from economic variables and those that measure political circumstances of a 
country. Economic variables measure the level or change in economic performance 
and condition of a country. Political variables measure wider political circumstances 
of a country, either nationally or globally. 
Various economic variables have been used to determine IMF agreements. 
While no common model of IMF participation has emerged from the literature, some 
variables are used more frequently than others. Overall, it appears that a countries 
national income, its stock or change in international reserves, its balance of payment 
position, inflation, government balance and exchange rate configuration are amongst 
the most commonly used indicators. 
Similarly, a great set of political variables has been employed in studies in the 
attempt to determine when a country is entering into an IMF agreement. These 
variables can be classified into three main themes: (i) the country’s relationship with 
the Fund, measured through the previous involvement in IMF agreements, its 
representation at the Fund through quotas and staff members. (ii) A country’s role in 
the international political economy and its importance to stakeholders and economic 
powers, mostly the United States. (iii) A country’s domestic political economy, 
measured though its regime type, proximity to elections and political stability as well 
as quality of governance.  
Comparing the determinants used in the IMF and health expenditure literature 
with those used in the wider literature on IMF agreement determinants, some variation 
can be detected. Agreement seems to be reached about determinants of agreements 
within the literature assessing the relationship between IMF agreements and health 
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systems, particularly health spending. Apart from Clements et al (2013), all other 
studies follow the model proposed by Martin and Segura-Ubiergo (2004), which 
determines IMF agreements using variables to measure a country’s current account 
balance, GDP growth and per capita GDP levels, its government balance, its 
government balance as well as a dummy to indicate if a country had an agreement in 
the previous year. The wider literature uses a much more varied set of determinants. 
In the context of this study, the selection of concepts of IMF agreement determinants 
will build on the model commonly used within the IMF and health expenditure 
literature but go beyond and include the most commonly used concepts within the 
general literature.  
Categories and variables for inclusion in this study will be selected based on 
their importance in the overall literature, as judged by the frequency with which the 
variable is used. This means that the concepts of national income, international 
reserves, debt, balance of payment position, inflation, government balance, exchange 
rates, IMF activity and democracy/regime type will be considered as concepts to be 
potentially included in the selection model to determine IMF agreements. This allows 
for the comparison of the model that has seemingly been established in the health 
expenditure and IMF literature and the relative importance of the further variables. 




Appendices to Chapter 4 
Appendix Note 4.1: Search Term Combinations: Determinants of IMF 
Agreements  
 
Web of Knowledge 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
(TS=(IMF OR "International Monetary Fund") OR TI=(IMF OR "International Monetary 
Fund")) AND (TI=(Determinant? OR participat?) OR TS=(Determinant? OR participat?)) 
 
Scopus 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 
ALL (IMF OR "International Monetary Fund") AND ALL (Determinant? OR participat?) 
 
Google Scholar 
 Best results were obtained with the following combination 




Appendix Note 4.2: List of Studies Obtained in Full-text 
Andersen, T. B., Harr, T. and Tarp, F. (2006) 'On US politics and IMF lending', European Economic 
Review, vol. 50, no. 7, pp. 1843-1862. 
Atoyan, R. and Conway, P. (2006) 'Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching 
and instrumental-variable estimators', Review of International Organizations, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 99-124. 
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. W. (2005) 'IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?', Journal of 
Monetary Economics, vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 1245-1269. 
Bas, M. A. and Stone, R. W. (2014) 'Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs', Review of 
International Organizations, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1-28. 
Bauer, M. E., Cruz, C. and Graham, B. A. T. (2012) 'Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve 
as a seal of approval?', Review of International Organizations, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 33-58. 
Biglaiser, G. and DeRouen, K. (2011) 'How soon is now? The effects of the IMF on economic reforms 
in Latin America', Review of International Organizations, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 189-213. 
Bird, G. (2007) 'The IMF: A Bird's Eye View of Its Role and Operations', Journal of Economic Surveys, 
vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 683-745. 
Bird, G., Mylonas, J. and Rowlands, D. (2015) 'The political economy of participation in IMF programs: 
a disaggregated empirical analysis', Journal of Economic Policy Reform, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 221-243. 
Bird, G. and Rowlands, D. (2001) 'IMF lending: how is it affected by economic, political and 
institutional factors?', The Journal of Policy Reform, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 243-270. 
Bird, G. and Rowlands, D. (2004) '9 The demand for IMF assistance', in Ranis, G., Vreeland, J. R. and 
Kosack, S. (eds.) Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and the World Bank, 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Bird, G. and Rowlands, D. (2009a) 'Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing and Emerging Economies 
and the Incidence of IMF Programs', World Development, vol. 37, no. 12, pp. 1839-1848. 
Bird, G. and Rowlands, D. (2009b) 'a disaggregated empirical analysis of the determinants of IMF 
arrangements: does one model fit all?', Journal of International Development, vol. 21, no. 7, pp. 915-
931. 
Breen, M. (2013) The Politics of IMF Lending, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Broz, J. L. and Hawes, M. B. (2006) 'US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy', in 
G., D., Hawkins, D., Lake, D. (eds.) Delegation and Agency in International Organizations Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Butkiewicz, J. L. and Yanikkaya, H. (2005) 'The effects of IMF and World Bank lending on long-run 
economic growth: An empirical analysis', World Development, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 371-391. 
Cerutti, E. (2007) 'IMF Drawing Programs: Participation Determinants and Forecasting', IMF Working 
Papers, WP/07/152. 
Colleges, C. and Rowlands, D. (2012) 'IMF program participation: is political influence systematic or 
selective?', Working Paper 5th Annual Conference on The Political Economy of International 
Organizations. 
Conway, P. (1994) 'IMF lending programs - participation and impact', Journal of Development 
Economics, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 365-391. 
Conway, P. (2004) 'Empirical implications of endogenous IMF conditionality', Globalization and the 
Nation State: the Impact of the IMF and the World Bank, in Ranis, G., Vreeland, J. R. and Kosack, S. 
(eds.) Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and the World Bank, Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Conway, P. (2006) 'The International Monetary Fund in a time of crisis: A review of Stanley Fischer’s 
IMF essays from a time of crisis: The international financial system. stabilization, and development', 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 115-144. 
Conway, P. (2007) 'The revolving door: Duration and recidivism in IMF programs', The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 205-220. 
Copelovitch, M. (2010) 'Master or servant? Common agency and the  political economy of IMF lending', 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 54, pp. 49-77. 
135 
Dreher, A. (2004) 'A public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality', 
Public Choice, vol. 119, no. 3-4, pp. 445-464. 
Dreher, A. (2006) 'IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with 
conditionality', World Development, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 769-788. 
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E. and Vreeland, J. R. (2009) 'Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the 
United Nations Security Council', European Economic Review, vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 742-757. 
Dreher, A. and Vaubel, R. (2004) 'Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business 
Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data', Open Economies Review vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 5-22. 
Edwards, M. S. (2005) 'Investor Responses to IMF Program Suspensions: Is Noncompliance Costly?', 
Social Science Quarterly, vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 857-873. 
Edwards, S. and Santaella, J. A. (1993) 'Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries: 
Lessons from the Bretton Woods Era', in Bordo, M. and Eichengreen, B. (eds.) A Retrospective on the 
Bretton Woods System - Lessons for International Monetary Reform, Chicago: Chicago University 
Press. 
Eichengreen, B., P, G. and A., M. (2006) 'Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs', IMF Working 
Paper No. 12235. 
Elekdağ, S. (2006) 'How Does the Global Economic Environment Influence the Demand for IMF 
Resources?', IMF Working Paper WP/06/239. 
Evrensel, A. Y. and Kim, J. S. (2006) 'Macroeconomic policies and participation in IMF programs', 
Economic Systems, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 264-281. 
Fails, M. D. and Woo, B. (2015) 'Unpacking Autocracy: Political Regimes and IMF Program 
Participation', International Interactions, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 110-132. 
Garuda, G. (2000) 'The distributional effects of IMF programs: A cross-country analysis', World 
Development, vol. 28, no. 6, pp. 1031-1051. 
Gündüz, Y. B. (2009) 'Estimating Demand for IMF Financing by Low-Income Countries in Response 
to Shocks', IMF Working Paper WP/09/263. 
Harrigan, J., Wang, C. and El-Said, H. (2005) 'The politics of IMF and World Bank lending - Will it 
backfire in the Middle East and North Africa', in Paloni, A. and Zanardi, M. (eds.) The IMF, World 
Bank and Policy Reform, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Harrigan, J., Wang, C. G. and El-Said, H. (2006) 'The economic and political determinants of IMF and 
world bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa', World Development, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 247-
270. 
Hutchison, M. (2003) 'A cure worse than the disease? Currency crises and the output costs of IMF-
supported stabilization programs', Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pp. 321-360. 
Hutchison, M. M. (2004) 'Selection bias and the output costs of IMF programs', EPRU Working Paper 
Series. 
Jensen, N. M. (2004) 'Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary Fund 
Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 
194-210. 
Jorra, M. (2012) 'The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises', Journal of 
International Money and Finance, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 709-725. 
Joyce, J. J. (1992) 'The economic characteristics of IMF program  countries', Economic Letters, vol. 38, 
no. 2, pp. 237-242. 
Knight, M. and Santaella, J. A. (1997) 'Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements', Journal 
of Development Economics, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 405-436. 
Moser, C. and Sturm, J.-E. (2011) 'Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War', Review of 
International Organizations, vol. 6, no. 3-4, pp. 307-340. 
Mukherjee, B. and Singer, D. A. (2010) 'International institutions and domestic compensation: The IMF 
and the politics of capital account liberalization', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 54, no. 1, 
pp. 45-60. 
136 
Ortiz, D. G. and Bejar, S. (2013) 'Participation in IMF-sponsored economic programs and contentious 
collective action in Latin America, 1980-2007', Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 30, no. 
5, pp. 492-515. 
Pop-Eleches, G. (2009) 'Public goods or political pandering: Evidence  from IMF programs in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, pp. 787-816. 
Presbitero, A. F. and Zazzaro, A. (2012) 'IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis 
Prevention', World Development, vol. 40, no. 10, pp. 1944-1969. 
Przeworski, A. and Vreeland, J. R. (2000) 'The effect of IMF programs on economic growth', Journal 
of Development Economics, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 385-421. 
Reynaud, J. and Vauday, J. (2009) 'Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on 
IMF facilities', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 89, no. 1, pp. 139-162. 
Steinwand, M. C. and Stone, R. W. (2008) 'The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent 
evidence', The Review of International Organizations, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 123-149. 
Stone, R. W. (2008) The scope of IMF conditionality: How autonomous is the Fund? University of 
Rochester. 
Sturm, J. E., Berger, H. and De Haan, J. (2005) 'Which variables explain decisions on IMF credit? An 
extreme bounds analysis', Economics & Politics, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 177-213. 
Thacker, S. (1999) 'The high politics of IMF lending', World Politics, vol. 52, pp. 38-75. 
Trudel, R. (2005) 'Effects of exchange rate regime on IMF program participation', Review of Policy 
Research, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 919-933. 
van der Laan, C. R., Cunha, A. M. and Alves, T. W. (2010) 'External financial liberalization and growth 
in emerging countries: a panel data estimation using a new index (1990-2004)', Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 307-331. 
van der Veer, K. J. M. and de Jong, E. (2013) 'IMF-Supported Programmes: Stimulating Capital to Non-
defaulting Countries', World Economy, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 375-395. 
Veiga, F. (2005) 'Does IMF Support Accelerate Inflation Stabilization?', Open Economies Review, vol. 
16, pp. 321-340. 
Vreeland, J. R. (2002) 'The effect of IMF programs on labor', World Development, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 
121-139. 
Vreeland, J. R. (2003) The IMF and economic development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vreeland, J. R. (2003) 'Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected 
cases', International Political Science Review, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 321-343+397. 
Vreeland, J. R. (2004) 'Institutional determinants of IMF agreements', Working Paper UCLA 
International Institute. 
Vreeland, J. R. (2005) 'The international and domestic politics of IMF programs', Working Paper 
Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and World Economic Forum Conference. 
Williams, L. K. (2012) 'Pick your poison: economic crises, international monetary fund loans and leader 




Appendix Note 4.3: Study details: IMF Agreement Determinants 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 








SBA, EFF  - Political proximity to US, based 
on similar votes in UN on key 
votes (+) 
- Change in proximity (as above) 
to previous year (+) 
- Index of both (+) 
- overall balance of payments (-) 
- per capita overall balance of 
payments (0) 
- current account (0) 
- current account balance as 
share of GDP (0) 
- debt (+) 
- debt to GNP (-) 
- interest payments to GNP (0) 
- International reserves to debt 
(0) 
What is the US 






paper for side 
models; no info 
on other data 
sources for 
main model 
2.  Atoyan and Conway (2006) 95 
countries 
1993-2002 SBA, EFF, 
SAF, PRGT 
- real per capita economic 
growth rate 
- ratios of fiscal balance to GDP  
- ratio of current-account bal-
ance to GDP 
Do the effects of 
agreements differ 





                                                 
59 (+) suggests a statistically significant positive relationship of being in an IMF agreement, (-) a significant negative one and (0) no significant relationship, (~) 
indicates mixed relationships, (*) indicates that no results are reported 
139 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
3.  Barro and Lee (2005) 130 
countries  
1975-2000 
(in 5 year 
blocks) 
SBA, EFF  - ratio of foreign reserves to im-
ports (-) 
- per capita GDP (0) squared (-) 
- total GDP (0) squared (-) 
- growth of GDP (-) 
- OECD dummy (0) 
- year dummy to control for ex-
ternal factors (*) 
- share of IMF quotas (0) and 
staff (0) 
- the political proximity to the 
United States (0) and the Euro-
pean countries (0) (based on 
the U.N. voting patterns) 
- the intensity of trade with the 
United States (+) and the Euro-
pean countries (0) 
What factors 
determine 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
4.  Bas and Stone (2014) 104 
countries 
1970-2008 Not clear, no 
differentiati
on made 
- International reserves to im-
ports of goods and services (+) 
- Central government overall sur-
plus as a percentage of the GDP 
(0) 
- Total debt service (% of GNP) 
(+) 
- Real gross domestic investment 
(private and public) as a % of 
GDP (0) 
- Cumulative number of years a 
country has been under IMF 
agreements (0) 
- Total number of other coun-
tries in the world currently un-
der an IMF agreement (exclud-
ing the given country itself) (0) 
- Dummy variable coded 1 if leg-
islative elections were held in 
previous year (-) 
- Overall balance of payments in 
billions of US dollars (IFS) (-) 
- dictatorship (0) 
What factors 
determine 




# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




- Previous year agreement 
dummy (+) 
- GDP (+) 
- GDP per capita (+) 
- Economic Growth (-) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Foreign reserves in months of 
import (-) 
- Number of countries under an 
IMF agreement (0) 
- Electoral competitiveness (0) 
What are the effect 
of IMF participation 
on FDI inflows? 
Addresses selection  
WDI 







- Consumer price index (0) 
- Economic growth (-) 
- International reserves (-) 
- Trade (-) 
- Bilateral investment treaties US 
and Latin America (+) 
- Political Regime (+) 
- Ideology of president (-) 
- Years under agreement (+) 
What are the 
effects of IMF 
agreements on 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
7.  Bird and Rowlands (2001) 95 
countries 
1974-1994 SBA, EFF, 
ESAF 
- GNP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth (0) 
- Gross real GDP (0) 
- Reserves per import (-) 
- Changes in reserves (-) 
- Current account per GDP (-) 
- Real exchange rate change (+) 
- Debt-service ratio (+) 
- Changes in debt-service ratio 
(0) 
- Debt/GDP (-) 
- Arrears/debt (0) 
- Past rescheduling (+) 
- Imminent rescheduling (+) 
- Real LIBOR (0) 
- Changes in real Libor(+) 
- US export (-) 
- French Exports (0) 
- Socialist Regime (-) 
- Recent government change (0) 
- Civil freedom (0) 
- Coup frequency (+) 
- Past incomplete programs (0) 
- Imminent quota review (0) 
- IMF liquidity (0) 
- Imminent new government (-) 
- Past IMF agreements (+) 
What are the roles 
of economic and 
political and 
institutional factors 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




1966-2000 SBA, EFF, 
ESAF  
- GNP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth (0) 
- Gross real GDP (0) 
- Reserves per import (-) 
- Changes in reserves (-) 
- Current account per GDP (-) 
- Real exchange rate change (+) 
- Debt-service ratio (+) 
- Changes in debt-service ratio 
(0) 
- Debt/GDP (-) 
- Arrears/debt (0) 
- Past rescheduling (+) 
- Imminent rescheduling (+) 
- Real LIBOR (0) 
- Changes in real Libor(+) 
- US export (-) 
- French Exports (0) 
- Socialist Regime (-) 
- Recent government change (0) 
- Civil freedom (0) 
- Coup frequency (+) 
- Past incomplete programs (0) 
- Imminent quota review (0) 
- IMF liquidity (0) 
- Imminent new government (-) 
- Past IMF agreements (+) 
What determines 
demand for IMF 
agreements? 
 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
9.  Bird and Rowlands (2009b) 88 L&MIC 1977-2000 SBA, EFF, 
SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
- GNP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth (-) 
- Reserve-to-import ratio (0) 
- % change in reserves/imports 
(0) 
- Current account balance/GDP 
(0) 
- % change in the current ac-
count (0) 
- Real exchange rate deprecia-
tion (0) 
- Debt service-to-exports ratio 
(0) 
- % change in debt–service ratio 
(0) 
- Public external debt/GDP ratio 
(0) 
- Current rescheduling (0) 
- Rescheduling in past years (0) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Fixed exchange rate regime (0) 
- Flexible exchange rate regime 
(0) 
- Market pressure index (+) 
- Current IMF program (+) 
- IMF program in prior year (+) 







# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




1973-2000 SBA,  
EFF, SAF, 
ESAF, PRGF 
- GDP growth (-) 
- Current Account/GDP (0) 
- change reserves/imports (-) 
- Real depreciation (0) 
- Debt service/exports (0) 
- Current rescheduling (-) 
- Rescheduling next year (+) 
- Past IMF agreements (+) 
- Capital account restrictions (0) 
- Exchange rate regime (~) 
What role dies 
Exchange Rate 
regime play in 














- Past IMF programme 
- IMF debt as share of GDP 
- Crude oil prices  
- Agriculture prices (+) 
- Export to G5 (-) 
- UN voting proximity (+) 
- US economic aid (+) 
- Legislative election (+) 
- Executive elections (+) 
- Debt service to exports ratio (+) 
- Current account/GDP (+) 
- Reserves to months of imports 
(-) 
- Real per capita GDP growth (-) 
- Real per capita GDP (-) 
- Official arrears (-) 
- Private arrears (+) 
What factors 
determine whether 
or not countries 
have programs with 
the IMF?  
No explicit info 
146 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
12.  Breen (2013) 159 L&MIC 1983-2006 All 
agreements  
- Trade with G5 countries (+) 
- International reserves in 
months of imports (-) 
- Current account balance (0) 
- External debt (0) 
- Debt service (0) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth rate (-) 
- IMF quota review (0) 
- IMF delegation index (0) 
- Financial crisis index (+) 
- US military aid (0) 
- Systemic transition (+) 










- International Reserves (0) 
- Trade Openness (+) 
- Debt service (0) 
- Debt (-) 
- Prior agreement (+) 
- US Bank exposure (+) 
- UN voting (0) 
- German Bank exposure (+) 
What is the role of 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 








SBA, EFF - Real GDP growth (-) 
- CPI inflation (0) 
- fiscal government budget sur-
plus (as a percentage of GDP) 
(0) 
- external current account bal-
ance (as proportion of GDP) (0) 
- net international reserves (as a 
proportion of months of im-
ports) (-) 
- real effective exchange rate (0) 
- past programs (+) 
- member country quotas (0) 
- IMF liquidity (0) 
- real world interest rates based 
on LIBOR) (0) 
- real world GDP growth (-) 






# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
15.  Conway (1994) 74 
developing 
countries 
1976-1986 SBA, EFF - Ratio of foreign-exchange re-
serves to imports (-) 
- Measure of participation in 
next period (0) 
- Growth rate of real gross na-
tional product (0) 
- Ratio of current account to GNP 
(0) 
- World real rate of interest for 
that country (-) 
- Terms of trade (-) 
- Stock of international debt 
long-term (+) 
- Stock of international debt 
short-term (+) 
What are the 
determinants of 
participation in IMF 
programmes? 
World Bank,  
IMF 
149 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




- Exposure to international banks 
(0) 
- Years since last loan (0) 
- GDP (0) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth (-) 
- Current Account/GDP (-) 
- External debt/GDP (0) 
- External debt service/exports 
(0) 
- Short-term debt/reserves (+) 
- Currency crisis (0) 
- Veto players (0) 
- IMF liquidity ratio (0) 
- Currency crises worldwide (0) 












- Short-term debt (percent of to-
tal debt) (-) 
- Total debt service (in percent of 
GDP) (+) 
- Democracy, index (-) 
What are the 








# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
18.  Dreher et al (2009) 197 
countries 
1951-2004 SBA, EFF, 
SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
- UN Security Council Member-
ship (+) 
- Past IMF agreements (+) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Autocracy (0) 
- Investment (-) 
- Debt service (+) 
- number of checks and balances 
(+) 
- Budget surplus (+) 
- Lagged election (0) 
- Foreign reserves (+) 
- Growth in real GDP per capita 
(0) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Changes in international re-
serves (0) 
- Current account balance (0) 
Does UN Security 
Council 
membership 
impact on IMF 
agreement uptake? 
IMF, UN, WB 





- Debt (+) 
- Reserves (-) 
- Growth (-) 
- Terms of trade (0) 
- Change in net domestic credit 
(0) 
What are the effect 






# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 






- GDP per capita (-) 
- Change in real exchange rate 
(0) 
- Change in current account defi-
cit (0) 
- Net foreign assets ratio (-) 
- Political strikes (0) 
- Political assassinations (0) 
- Frequency of coups (+) 
- Dictatorship (-) 





21.  Eichengreen et al (2006) unclear 1990-2003 All 
agreements 
- US Aid (+) 
- Real Growth (0) 
- Trade Balance/GDP (+) 
- Debt Servicing/Exports (+) 
- Domestic Credit/GDP (0) 
- Change in Domestic Credit/GDP 
(0) 
- Debt/GDP (+) 
- Change in Debt (0) 
- Reserves/Imports (0) 
- Short Term debt/reserves (-) 




Fit selection model 




# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




- Total reserves in months of im-
ports (-) 
- Total debt service (% of exports 
of goods, services, and income) 
(+) 
- Current account balance (+) 
- Negative growth year (+) 
- Previous IMF borrower (+) 
- Under IMF in previous year (+) 
- Party autocracy dummy (0) 
- Personalist autocracy dummy 
(0) 
- Military autocracy dummy (0) 
- Log GDP per capita (0) 
- Log of GDP (0) 
- Affinity to United States (+) 
- Regime duration (0) 
- Interactions of variables with 
autocracy variables (~) 
Do different regime 
(autocracy) types 
impact on 








# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




- Current account balance to 
GDP ratio (0) 
- Percentage of labour force in 
agriculture (0) 
- Percentage of change in con-
sumer prices (0) 
- Change in real GDP (0) 
- Government budget deficit to 
GDP ratio (0) 
- Foreign reserves to import ratio 
(-) 
- terms of trade index (-) 
- Real short-term debt (+) 
What are the 
effects of IMF 















- Current Account balance (-) 
- Reserves in months of import 
(-) 
- Macroeconomic stability indica-
tor (+) 
- GDP growth (-) 
- Change in terms of trade (-) 
- Change in oil price (+) 
- World trade (-) 
- Non-oil commodity prices (0) 
- Growth of goods export (0) 
- Paris club dummy (+) 
What determines 









# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
25.  Harrigan et al (2006) 11 MENA 
countries 
1975-2000 SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
- Peace treaty with Israel (+) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth rate (0) 
- Debt service ratio of exports of 
goods and services (+) 
- Short-term debt as % of total 
debt (0) 
- Balance of payment position (0) 
- Changes in reserves (0) 
- Democracy index (0) 
- Legislative election year (0) 
What determines 
IMF agreements in 





26.  Hutchison (2003) 67 L&MIC 1975-1997 SBA, EFF, 
SAF, ESAF, 
PRGT 
- Change in current account to 
GDP ratio (0) 
- Change in budget surplus to 
real GDP ratio (-) 
- Change in budget surplus to 
GDP ratio (+) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Real per capita GDP growth (0) 
- Foreign exchange reserves to 
imports ratio (-) 
- Real per capita GDP (0) 
- exchange rate overvaluation (0) 
- Currency crises dummy (+) 
- Africa dummy (-) 
- Asia dummy (-) 
- Latin America dummy (0) 
- Autocracy (0) 
- Post-1979 Dummy (0) 





Not so clear 
155 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
27.  Hutchison (2004) developing 
countries 
1975-1997 EFF, SBA - Debt to GDP Ratio (+) 
- Debt Service to Imports (-) 
- Change in budget surplus to 
GDP ratio (-) 
- Foreign Exchange to Imports 
Ratio (-) 
- Other IMF programs (0) 
- Currency crises dummy (+) 
- Asia Dummy (0) 
- Latin America dummy (0) 
- Capital Formation (0) 
What are the 













- Lag of IMF participation (+) 
- Political regime (0) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- GDP growth (-) 
- Budget deficit (0) 
- Central government debt (+) 
- Market size (0) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Domestic investment (0) 
- Foreign reserves in months of 
import (-) 
What are the 
effects of IMF 






29.  Jorra (2012) 57 
developing 
economies 
1975-2008 SBA, EFF, 
PRGT  
- GDP growth (+) 
- Reserves/imports (-) 
- UN voting (+) 
- Short term debt as share of to-
tal debt (+) 
- Debt service as share of exports 
(+) 
How does adoption 
of IMF programs 
affect sovereign 
risk.  
Fit selection model 




# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




- Central bank holdings of do-
mestic assets (0) 
- Government expenditure to 
GDP (+) 
- Current account balance to ex-
ports (0) 
- Inflation (0) 
- International reserves to im-
ports (-) 
- Per capita GDP (0) 
- Commitments for loans from 
private sources (0) 
- Total debt service to export (0) 






# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
31.  Knight and Santaella (1997) 91 
developing 
countries 
1973-1991 EFF, SAF, 
ESAF 
- Stock of international reserves 
in months of import (-) 
- External current account, per-
centage of GDP (-) 
- Consumer price index, percent-
age change (0) 
- External debt service percent-
age of exports (+) 
- External debt, percentage of 
GDP (+) 
- Non-fund financing flow, 
months of imports (+) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Terms of trade (+) 
- Export markets (-) 
- Gross fixed capital formation (-) 
- Overall balance of payments (-) 
- Real effective exchange rate (-) 
- GDP per capita, current USD (-) 
- Previous fund agreement (+) 
- Nominal depreciation exceed-
ing 5% (+) 
- Government revenues (+) 
- government expenditure (-) 
- Two year change in real domes-
tic credit (0) 
Which factors lead 















- total reserves in months of im-
ports (0) 
- real GDP growth (0) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- investment as percentage of 
GDP (0) 
- debt service scaled to exports 
(0) 
- external debt scaled to Gross  
National Income, GNI (+) 
- external balance on goods and 
services scaled to GDP (0) 
- economic globalization (0) 
- terms of trade adjustment 
scaled by GDP (0) 
- government budget deficit as 
percentage of GDP (0) 
- short-term debt scaled by total 
foreign debt (0) 
- fixed exchange rate (0) 
- currency crisis (0) 
- de jure measure for financial 
openness (0) 
- years under IMF—last 5 years, 
moving average (0) 
- elections for the executive and 
legislative 
- political instability (0) 
- social unrest (0) 
- Freedom House index (0) 
- political globalization (0) 
Which economic 
and political factors  
affect a country’s 
likelihood to sign 
an arrangement 
with the IMF? 
 
(extended version 
of Sturm et al, 
2005) 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
- quality of government indicator 
(0) 
- temporary membership on the 
UN Security Council (0) 
- share in world GDP (0) 
- share of a country’s bilateral 
trade with the United States 
relative to the country’s GDP 
(0) 
- vote in line with the US in UN 
Security Council (0) 






- Veto Players (0) 
- Reserves (-) 
- Inflation (0) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Current Account (0) 
- Output Loss (+) 
- Terms of Trade Shock (0) 
- systemic banking crisis (+) 
- Size of banking sector (0) 
- Previous IMF program (+) 
- GDP growth rate (0) 
What is the impact 
of IMF agreements 




World Bank and 
IMF 
160 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 





- GDP per capita (-) 
- output loss (0) 
- external debt/GDP (+) 
- balance of payments/GDP (0) 
- foreign reserves/GDP (0) 
- inflation (0) 
- election year (-) 
- veto players (+) 
- democracy (0) 








collective action in 
Latin America. 
Fits a selection 
model of IMF 
participation 
World Bank and 
dedicated 
protest datasets 








- Interest payments (+) 
- Reserves (-) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Government Orientation (0) 
- Quality of bureaucracy (0) 
- Regime (0) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- IMF Programme history (+) 
Do political 
determinants play a 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 






- growth over previous years (0) 
- Current account balance (-) 
- International Reserves (-) 
- GDP per capita (0) 
- Growth (-) 
- Inflation (+) 
- Corruption (0) 
- GDP (0) 
- IMF quota (0) 
- Non-compliance (0) 
- election 18 months before the 
IMF loan (+) 
- earlier agreements (-) 
Is IMF lending 
affected by 
politico-economic 







# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 






- foreign reserves in terms of 
monthly import (0) 
- Deficit: surplus of government 
budget as a proportion of GDP 
(-) 
- Debt service as a proportion of 
GDP (+) 
- gross domestic investment pri-
vate and public as a proportion 
of GDP (-) 
- sum of past years under agree-
ments for a country (0) 
- number of other countries cur-
rently under IMF agreements 
(0) 
- Lagged election (+) 
- overall balance of trade in con-
stant 1987 US$ (-) 
- Regime type [Dictatorship/de-
mocracy] (0) 
What are the effect 












# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 




- Foreign Debt /GDP (+) 
- Current Account Deficit /GDP 
(0) 
- Budget Deficit /GDP (+) 
- Past Participation in IMF Pro-
grams (0) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Net Foreign Direct Investment 
(0) 
- Proximity to an Election Year 
(0) 
- Foreign Debt (+) 
- Institutional Weakness (-) 
- Institutional Effort (+) 
- U.S. Aid Recipient (0) 
- UN Voting (S-Score with U.S.) 
(0) 
- IMF Quota (0) 
- OECD Aid (0) 











- International reserves to im-
ports (+) 
- Real GDP growth (+) 
- Debt service to exports (+) 
- Current Account Balance to 
GDP (+) 
- External debt/GDP (0) 
- Income per capita (+) 
- inflation (0) 
- Growth of the nominal ex-
change rate to USD (0) 
- government budget deficit/GDP 
(0) 
- growth rate of the terms of 
trade (0) 
- investment/GDP (+) 
- LIBOR (0) 
- government expenditure/GDP 
(0) 
- five-year moving average of a 
dummy indicating whether or 
not a country was under an 
agreement (+) 
- number of other countries in 
which the Fund is involved (0) 
- election years for the executive 
(0) 
- election years for the legislative 
(0) 
- repudiation of government 
contracts (+) 
Which factors are 










# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
- rule of law (0) 
- corruption (0) 
- further indicators of liberal gov-
ernments (0) 
- indicators of social unrest (0) 
40.  Thacker (1999) 78 
countries 
1985-1994 SBA, EFF - Balance of payment (-) 
- Current account (0) 
- Debt/GNP (0) 
- Debt service/GNP (+) 
- Reserves/debt (-) 
- GNP per capita (-) 
- Default dummy (+) 
- Money supply (0) 
- Budget deficit (0) 
- Trade Openness (0) 
- US exports to country (0) 
- US direct investment (0) 
- Index for political agreement 
with US (~) 
- Energy production (0) 
- Democracy indicator (0) 







# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
41.  Trudel (2005) unclear 1960-2000 all 
agreement 
- Reserves (-) 
- Per Capita Real GDP Growth (-) 
- Per Capita Real GDP (-) 
- Real GDP (+) 
- Real Trade (-) 
- Deficit/GDP (0) 
- Current Account/GDP (0) 
- Previous IMF Program (+) 
- Regime (0) 
- Fixed Exchange Rate (0) 
Does the effect of 
international 
reserves on IMF 
participation 





42.  van der Veer et al (2013) 49 middle-
income-
countries 
1984-2004 EFF, SBA 
without debt 
restructuring 
- US aid/share of total aid (+) 
- Real GDP growth (-) 
- Trade/GDP (0) 
- Debt servicing/exports (+) 
- Change in debt/GDP (0) 
- Reserves/imports (0) 
- Short-term debt/reserves (-) 
- Domestic credit/GDP (0) 
- Change in domestic credit (+) 
- Pegged Exchange rate (+) 
- UN voting (0) 
What are the effect 












- Amount drawn to agreed 
amount (0) 
- IMF lagged (0) 
- Reserves (0) 
- Inflation (+) 
- Fragmentation of political sys-
tem (+) 
- GDP growth (+) 








# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
44.  Vreeland (2002) 110 
countries 
1961-1993 SBA, EFF, 
SAF, ESAF  
- Real GDP per capita (-) 
- Growth (-) 
- Years under current agreement 
(+) 
- Total number of other coun-
tries under agreements (0) 
- Lagged elections (+) 
- Regime [dictatorship/democ-
racy] (0) 
- Exchange rate (0) 
- Investment (0) 
What are the effect 
of IMF programs on 








45.  Vreeland (2003) 135 
countries 
1951-1990 SBA, EFF, 
SAF, ESAF 
- Reserves (-) 
- Budget Balance (-) 
- Debt Service (+) 
- Investment (-) 
- Years under (0) 
- Number of other countries un-
der agreements (+) 
- Lagged elections (+) 
- Balance of Payments (-) 
- Regime (0) 
What are the 
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- Number of Veto players (~) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Foreign reserves (as a propor-
tion of average monthly im-
ports) (-) 
- Debt service (as a percentage 
of GNP) (+) 
- Investment (as a percentage of 
GDP) (-) 
- budget surplus as a percentage 
of GDP (0) 




to participate in 
IMF programs? 
Unclear in detail 




- Per capita income (-) 
- Current account (% GDP) (0) 
- Foreign reserves (-) 
- Debt service (% exports) (0) 
- Past participation (0) 
- Number of veto players (0) 
- Change in alignment between 





take up IMF 
agreements? 
Unclear in detail 
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# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants59 Research Question Data Sources 
48.  Williams (2012) unclear 1970-1999 all 
agreements 
- Political Stability (-) 
- Real effective exchange rate (0) 
- Foreign reserves (-) 
- Trade balance (0) 
- Government debt/GDP (0) 
- GDP growth (0) 
- Inflation (0) 
- Oil crisis: 1974–9 (+) 
- Leader tenure (in years) (-) 
- Previous IMF agreements (+) 
- Number of previous loans (0) 
- Other countries in agreements 
(0) 
What are the 
determinants of 
participation and 






Studies from the IMF and health systems review 
# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants60  Research Question Data Sources 
1.  Clements et al (2013) 140 
developing 
countries 
1985-2009 All agreement - Bilateral Exchange rate (0) 
- exchange rate regime (+) 
- Government Balance (0) 
- IMF programme in previous 
year (+) 
- International Reserves (0) 
What are the effects 
of IMF agreements 
on health 





IMF HE dataset 
2.  Hoodie/Hartzell (2014) 44 
countries 
1985-1998 all agreement - GDP per capita 
- Democracy  
what are the effects 
of IMF SAPs on the 
IMF, Vreeland 
(2003), 
                                                 
60 (+) suggests a statistically significant positive relationship of this determinant and HE, (-) a significant negative one and (0) no significant relationship 
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# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants60  Research Question Data Sources 
- years under agreement 







3.  Kentikelenis et al (2015) 63 Low 
income 
countries  
1985-2009 all agreement - Current account balance (0) 
- Democracy (0) 
- GDP growth (0) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Government balance (0) 
- IMF program (+) 
What are the effects 
of IMF agreements 










1985-2000 all agreement - Current account balance (0) 
- Democracy (-) 
- GDP growth (0) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Government balance (+) 
- IMF program (+) 
What are the effects 
of IMF agreements 
on health spending? 
Account for 
selection 
WEO, WDI, IMF 
HE 




1990-2000 all agreement - Current account balance (-) 
- Democracy (0) 
- GDP growth (-) 
- GDP per capita (-) 
- Government balance (+) 
- IMF program (+) 
What are the effects 
of IMF programmes 
on health spending? 
Special emphasis on 




WEO, WDI, IMF 
HE 
6.  Pandolfelli (2014) 37 African 
countries 
1990-2005 all agreement - GDP per capita 
- multilateral debt service 
- internal conflict 
- democracy 
- United States ally 
do IMF agreements 
impact on maternal 
mortality in SSA? Fit 





# Study Countries Years Agreements Determinants60  Research Question Data Sources 
7.  Stuckler et al (2008) 21 post-
communist 
countries 
1985-2009 0/1 of 
agreement 
- Change in Real GDP (0) 
- per Capita GDP (-) 
- Freedom House Democratiza-
tion Index (-) 
- Military Conflict (-) 
- Percentage of Population 
Working Age (0) 
- Percentage of Urban Popula-
tion (0) 
- Dummy for Non-IMF Lending 
(+) 
- Size of Largest Titular Nation-
ality (+) 
- Number of Countries Partici-
pating in IMF Programs (0) 
- Foreign Direct Investment (0) 
What are the effect 





















 Establishing the Dataset 
This chapter sets out to construct the dataset used for the analyses of this study 
and is structured along the four main data components needed for this study. The first 
section discusses data sources for country-level government health expenditure 
(GHE), the dependent variable of this study, along with ways to measure GHE. The 
second section presents the way IMF agreements are measured in this study. The third 
section justifies the inclusion and exclusion of countries for this study. Section four 
builds on the literature reviews conducted in chapters 3 and 4 and discusses variables 
and data sources used to operationalise the concepts commonly used to determine 
government health expenditure and IMF agreements. Section five summarises the 
chapter and briefly discusses data quality issues.  
5.1 The Dependent Variable: Government Health Expenditure  
Government health expenditure is one of the determinants of health system 
capacity and universal health coverage (UHC) and is considered the dependent 
variable for this study (see section 1.1; pg. 6). This section discusses first which of the 
available datasets are most suitable for this study, before secondly discussing which 
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ways of measuring GHE are most useful in the context of this study. The third part of 
this section summarises. 
5.1.1 Sources of Government Health Expenditure Data 
For the analysis of this study GHE is measured across countries and time. A 
small number of datasets are available that hold this type of data61, they include the 
WHO National Health Accounts (NHA) (WHO, 2013), the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2015), the IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) dataset (IMF, 2015d), and the IMF Health Expenditure Dataset 
(Clements et al, 2011)62. These datasets vary in the number of countries and years they 
cover, their completeness63 as well as the way health expenditure is measured. The 
following sections outline key characteristics of each dataset before discussing their 
suitability for this study. Table 5.1 shows a summary of the datasets. 
Source Countries  Years Completeness 
WHO NHA 194 1995-2012 99% 
WB WDI 216 1995-2012 86% 
IMF GFS 160 1990-2012 23% 
IMF Health Expenditure Dataset 145 1985-2009 66% 
Table 5.1: Sources for Government Health Expenditure Data  
5.1.1.1 WHO National Health Accounts 
The National Health Accounts “constitute the systematic, comprehensive and 
consistent monitoring of resource flows in a country’s health system” (WHO, 2002) 
and trace financial resources flowing through the health system each year. They 
thereby offer detailed statistics on health expenditure measured at an annual interval 
for the years 1995 to 201264 and cover a total of 194 countries of all income groups. 
                                                 
61 An additional source of data could be seen in getting the data points directly from each 
country locally. It is however argued that this is, due to the large number of countries, beyond 
the scope of this study (see section 5.5; pg. 206). 
62 An additional dataset is available from the OECD Health Statistics (OECD, 2015), which 
only holds data for member states of the OECD (a club of rich-world countries) and is thus not 
relevant for this study.  
63 Completeness is determined as the ratio of possible data points to available data points. 100% 
thereby describes the situation where data for all year and country data points is available.  
64 While later data are now available, at the time of analysis and writing, 2012 was the latest 
available year. 
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The NHA provide “evidence to monitor trends in health spending for all sectors, public 
and private, different health care activities, providers, diseases, population groups and 
regions in a country.” (WHO, 2013). Health spending is defined as “expenditure 
encompass[ing] all expenditures for activities whose primary purpose is to restore, 
improve, and maintain health for the nation and for individuals during a defined period 
of time” (WHO, 2013).  
The available data is sub-classified in a number of ways. The main distinction 
is between “financing by source” and “financing by agents”. The former distinguishes 
the sources of the funds between public sources and those that come from the rest of 
the world. That is “the sum of sources channeled towards health by all non-resident 
institutional units that enter into transactions with resident units, or have other 
economic links with resident units, explicitly labelled or not to health, to be used as 
mean of payments of health goods and services by financing agents in the government 
or private sectors. Includes donations and in-kind resources.” (WHO, 2015). 
Classifying funds by financing agents allows for separating total expenditure on health, 
which are all funds mobilised by the system, into general government expenditure and 
private expenditure on health.  
General government expenditure are “the sum of outlays for health 
maintenance, restoration or enhancement paid for in cash or supplied in kind by 
government entities, such as the Ministry of Health, other ministries, parastatal 
organizations, social security agencies, (without double-counting the government 
transfers to social security and to extra-budgetary funds). Includes transfer payments 
to households to offset medical care costs and extra-budgetary funds to finance health 
services and goods. The revenue base of these entities may comprise multiple sources, 
including external funds”. (WHO, 2015). Private expenditure are “the sum of outlays 
for health by private entities, such as households, commercial or mutual health 
insurance, non-profit institutions serving households, resident corporations and quasi-
corporations with a health services delivery or financing function. It includes 
expenditures from all sources, so includes any donor funding passing through these 
‘financing agents’” (WHO, 2015). 
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The WHO dataset collects the data from various sources, including the OECD 
Health Statistics dataset, national health accounts as reported by countries and other 
national and international reports, quantifying the specific categories of health 
expenditure, for instance from statistical yearbooks, reports of ministries or other 
expenditure reports (WHO, 2002). The quality of the data varies by year and country 
as not all data are based on complete data, but might be generated based only on partial 
documentation or be completely estimated. Where data are unavailable the WHO 
estimates these using extrapolation techniques, which may be based on variation of 
other macro-data (Musgrove et al, 2002; WHO, 2002). The NHA is arguably most 
commonly used in cross-country studies of health expenditure.  
5.1.1.2 World Bank World Development Indicators 
An alternative source of health expenditure data is found in the World Bank’s 
WDI Dataset. The variables capture expenditure for “the provision of health services 
(preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and 
emergency aid designated for health but does not include provision of water and 
sanitation” (World Bank, 2015). Data are available for 216 countries and territories, 
and the years 1995 to 201265. Similar to the above WHO NHA dataset, data are 
available for private and public government subgroupings of health expenditure. Data 
completeness is generally good as expenditure data is available for 86% of the 388866 
data points. The World Bank’s metadata (World Bank, 2015) indicate that the data are 
sourced from the WHO NHA dataset outlined above. Analyses comparing both 
datatsets indicate that generally and for the data points available from both datasets, 
more than 95% of the variation in one dataset is explained using the other dataset, 
which suggests that both datasets are indeed very similar and hold pretty much the 
same data.  
                                                 
65 Similar to the NHA, later data are now available, at the time of analysis and writing, 2012 
was the latest available year. 
66 There are a total of 3888 case-years based on the number of years times the number of 
countries. 
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5.1.1.3 IMF Government Finance Statistics 
A third source for government health expenditure data is the IMF GFS dataset. 
The variables in this dataset capture health expenditure as “government outlays on 
health including expenditure on services provided to individual persons and services 
provided on a collective basis. Collective health services are concerned with matters 
such as formulation and administration of government policy; setting and enforcement 
of standards for medical and paramedical personnel and for hospitals, clinics, 
surgeries, etc.; regulation and licensing of providers of health services; and applied 
research and experimental development into medical and health-related matters” 
(IMF, 2014c). Data coverage stretches across 160 countries and generally the years 
1972 to 201267, however, the earliest available data point for health expenditure is for 
the year 1990. Despite covering a fairly long time period providing, in theory, 3680 
data points68, data availability seems rather poor as data are only available for roughly 
23% of all cases. 
5.1.1.4 IMF Health Expenditure Dataset 
With the publication of the article by Clements et al (2013), a new health 
expenditure dataset has become publically available. The dataset covers 145 low- and 
middle-income countries for the years 1985-2009 and provides variables with 
information on “public health spending”. A more detailed explanation of “public” is 
not offered. Data are compiled from a number of sources, including databases of the 
“Asian Development Bank, Eurostat, the IMF (Government Finance Statistics), 
UNESCO, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and IMF country desks” 
(Clements et al, 2011). While the dataset covers the longest stretch of data with a total 
of 3625 data points, roughly 34% of all data points are missing. Comparing the dataset 
with the WHO dataset suggests are fairly low level of similarity as only around 60% 
of the variation in one dataset is explained in the other (Lu et al, 2010).  
                                                 
67 Similar to the NHA and WDI, later data are now available, at the time of analysis and writing, 
2012 was the latest available year. 
68 There are a total of 3680 case-years based on the number of years (1995-2012) times the 
number of countries. 
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5.1.1.5 Choosing a Dataset 
Based on the outline of the four datasets above, one dataset needs to be selected 
for this study. This decision about the most suitable dataset is based on the best data 
coverage, both in terms of years and countries as well as actually available data points. 
The IMF’s lending activity has happened constantly over the last decades since its 
foundation in 1945 and has been available to all of its member countries. The dataset 
for health expenditure should therefore cover as many years and countries as possible.  
While the IMF Health Expenditure Dataset covers the longest time period 
(1985-2009) it does so only for 145 countries and data coverage is rather limited as 
only 66% of all data points are actually available. Additionally, the dataset does not 
cover the latest years for the period after 200969. Furthermore, the description of the 
dataset is somewhat limited, suggesting only that the data represent “public health 
expenditure”, without giving further details as to its precise meaning. Additionally, the 
sources of the individual data points are somewhat unclear.  
The content of the health expenditure variables measured in the IMF GFS 
Dataset seems much clearer and the data stretch a long period of time (1990-2012) 
including the latest years. Data availability, however, is rather poor as data points are 
only available for around 23% of all cases. Using this dataset would, due to this low 
level of availability, suggest that all analyses could only be based on a rather small 
sample of countries and years. 
The WHO NHA dataset offers the best availability as data is available for 
virtually all data points. Additionally, data cover a reasonably long period of time for 
a large number of countries. While the World Bank WDI dataset seemingly offers a 
greater scope of countries (216 vs 194) it is worth noting that no additional data points 
are available for the 22 countries and territories not covered in the WHO NHA dataset. 
This is likely because the World Bank sources its data from the WHO NHA dataset. 
Additionally, it was shown that both datasets have a high level of comparability. This 
                                                 
69 E-mail communication with the IMF suggests that no updated version of this dataset is 
available.  
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suggests that when choosing either the WHO or the World Bank dataset, virtually the 
same data will be used.  
Comparing all datasets, it appears that the WHO NHA offers the best choice 
for this study as it covers a large number of years and countries and provides data for 
virtually all cases. Additionally, the NHA seem to be the most established dataset as it 
is constantly employed in studies involving cross-country comparisons of health 
expenditure. Musgrove et al (2002) argue that the WHO NHA dataset is the only 
available and reasonably complete source of health expenditure, especially for non-
OECD countries. It is worth noting that while the studies on health expenditure 
generally use the WHO dataset, especially the latest IMF and health expenditure 
studies (Clements et al, 2013; Kentikelenis et al, 2015b) rely on the IMF health 
expenditure dataset. However, Clements et al (2013) seems to be using this dataset as 
an IMF author and Kentikelenis et al (2015b) uses the dataset to replicate this study 
(see section 2.2.2.1.2; pg. 46). Given that the WHO dataset is generally the most 
established dataset with best coverage and availability, this study will rely on the WHO 
dataset to source the dependent variable.  
5.1.2 Measuring Government Health Expenditure 
Having established which dataset to draw the health expenditure data from, the 
way in which health expenditure should be measured is an important next step for 
discussion. While government health expenditure always represents the monetary 
value a government of a given country is dedicating to the publically financed health 
system in a given year, this value can be expressed in different ways, giving rise to 
different interpretations and potentially different conclusions (De Deken and Kittel, 
2007). In order to choose the most adequate way(s) of measuring health expenditure 
for this study, this section outlines different ways of measurement, their underlying 
assumptions and suitability for this study. The options include measuring health 
expenditure in absolute terms, as percentage of GDP or government expenditure, 
spending per capita or the percentage of total health expenditure. 
The most straightforward way of measuring health expenditure is by taking the 
absolute amount the government is spending on the health system in a given year. This 
gives an indication of how much money is, in absolute terms, dedicated to the 
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respective health system. In the context of a cross-country study this way of measuring 
health expenditure suffers from two main drawbacks. Firstly, health expenditure data 
will most genuinely be reported in a country’s national currency. As countries use 
different currencies with different values attached to each, this does not allow for 
immediate comparisons across countries. This drawback can be overcome by 
converting the value into a common currency, for instance US Dollar, or by 
additionally accounting for differences in purchasing power between currencies, by 
converting the values into purchasing power adjusted international dollars (PPP$). 
Secondly, this way of measuring health expenditure does not take into account a 
country’s population size, which will hinder comparisons across countries.  
One way of overcoming this problem is to put the absolute value spent in 
relation to country characteristics. Most commonly this is done by building a ratio of 
health expenditure to GPD, government spending or population size.  
Assessing health spending as percentage of GDP will allow one to measure 
how much of a country’s overall economic output is dedicated to the publically 
financed health system. While this allows for immediate international comparison, 
theory about the effects of IMF agreements (see section 1.2.3; pg. 13), indicates that 
changes in levels of GDP may be both a precondition of IMF agreements as well as a 
consequence in the way that GDP might be different before, during or after an 
agreement. This means that when health expenditure levels are put in relation to levels 
of GDP, the indicator might change as a consequence of changes in GDP rather than 
changes in health spending itself. For instance, when health spending remains constant 
but GDP increases/decreases, spending reported as share of GDP will 
decrease/increase. Nevertheless, health expenditure in relation to GDP is a commonly 
used indicator in cross-country studies and appears, despite its limitation, a useful 
indicator for this study. 
Alternatively, health spending can be put in relation to the general 
government’s overall expenditure. Using this indicator will allow one to judge the 
importance of public spending on health care in relation to other aspects of government 
funding, for instance, education or the military. Using this indicator is sensitive to 
changes in government expenditure. The previously outlined theory suggests that 
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levels of government expenditure might be different in the presence or absence of IMF 
agreements in the way that conditionality might directly or indirectly impact the size 
of government. Similar to the above indicator this suggests that changes in this 
indicator might be a result of changes in the size of government rather than changes in 
absolute levels of health spending. This indicator, however, gives an indication of the 
relative importance of the health sector with in the total government sector and makes 
it a useful measure for this study. 
Health expenditure can also be measured in absolute terms but related to the 
size of the population, which will give an indicator of spending per capita. This allows 
one to judge how much the government is on average dedicating to the health care 
needs of each of a country’s residents. To enable cross-country comparability of this 
indicator values of spending needs to be converted into US Dollar or $PPP accounting 
for purchasing power differences. As this indicator is not measured relative to other 
variables of macroeconomic performance, it is seemingly unaffected by changes in 
these indicators which might potentially be induced by IMF lending activity.  
Finally, an estimate of the share of government health expenditure to total 
health expenditure can be considered. Total health expenditure is thereby defined as a 
country’s total expenditure on health that includes spending from both government as 
well as private sources. This indicator seems important in the relation to this study as 
government health expenditure is seen to be an important component in achieving the 
goal of UHC (see section 1.1; pg. 6) and it can be argued that increases in government 
expenditure as share of total health expenditure can be seen as an indicator in achieving 
the goal of UHC. While it is argued that numbers of government health expenditure 
are reliable, certain doubt should be around the quality of estimates of private 
expenditure. This is because they are difficult to record as such, especially when 
statistical capacity is limited. It is therefore argued that the share of government health 
expenditure to total health expenditure should not be considered for this study. 
5.1.3 Summary of the Dependent Variable 
This section justified the data source of the dependent variable and its 
measurement. While a number of different datasets are reporting health expenditure 
data, it was argued that the WHO NHA dataset is considered the most suitable source 
182 
for this study as it provides the best data coverage. The section also discussed different 
ways of measuring health expenditure. It was argued that three commonly used 
indicators of government health expenditure are used in this study to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the effects. These include (i) health expenditure as 
percentage of GDP, a commonly used indicator that provides an indication of how 
much of a country’s economy the government is dedicating to the health system; (ii) 
government health expenditure as percentage of general government expenses, which 
gives an indication of the importance of the health care sector compared to the overall 
government outlay; (iii) per capita spending is an indicator providing an absolute 
amount of spending per capita, to allow for international comparison, the indicator is 
measured in PPP. 
5.2 Creating the IMF Agreement Indicator  
This study aims to measure the impact of IMF agreements on government 
health expenditure. To do so, two measures of IMF agreements need to be constructed. 
Firstly, in line with the rest of the literature identifying the effects of agreements, this 
study relies on an on/off dummy to indicate the presence or absence of an agreement 
in a certain country at a given year. Secondly, the effects of different agreement 
clusters will be identified. To do so, an indicator for each of the agreement clusters 
will be established. This section outlines both the sources of data and the process 
followed to construct the variables.  
Information about all agreements between the IMF and its member countries 
is available from the History of Lending Arrangements dataset, which is part of the 
IMF’s Financial Data by Country Database and freely available on the internet (IMF, 
2014a). This dataset holds, for all IMF member states and since May 1984 – amongst 
other information – the type of agreement as well as its start and end date. Information 
was downloaded for all IMF member countries and entered into a dataset for further 
processing. Aim of the data processing steps was to create one variable indicating 1 if 
a given country was in an agreement (independent of its type) in a specific year and 0 
otherwise and (“on/off dummy”). To distinguish between agreement clusters (section 
1.2.4.3; pg. 21), a set of variables was constructed. One variable to indicate 1 if a 
country is in a social protection agreement and 0 otherwise. One variable if the country 
183 
is in an SBA/EFF agreement, 0 otherwise and one variable if a country is in an 
emergency agreement, 0 otherwise. In doing so, two data characteristics need to be 
considered.  
The first relates to the fact that some countries enter into a number of 
agreements consecutively. This means that the first agreement is followed immediately 
by a second. For the on/off dummy this was dealt with by assuming that these 
agreements are continuous and both agreements will be considered as one spell of time 
spent in agreements. For the facility dummy these will be treated as different spells 
and to be part of potentially different facility clusters.  
The second aspect relates to the fact that agreement durations need to be 
converted into years as health expenditure data are measured on an annual basis. 
Analysis have shown that most agreements (95%) do start in months other than 
January and most (83%) also end in months other than December (Appendix Figure 
5.1; pg. 213). Least agreements’ first or last year’s span an entire year from January to 
December. Only looking at the whole year would potentially introduce some bias as a 
country can be under an agreement for all year or only part of the year. For example, 
policy might be affected very little in a given year, when a country enters into an 
agreement in December compared to a country entering into an agreement in January. 
Building on this, the general logic is as follows: if an agreement starts in January, it 
will be assumed that policy for the rest of the year reflects efforts to meet IMF 
conditionality. If the agreement starts in December, only for December might policies 
have to take the agreement’s conditionality into account, most of the year, it is 
assumed, is not under IMF influence70. The same applies to the end of an agreement. 
When it ends in January, it is assumed that polices starting in February are free of 
agreement influence. When the agreement ends in December, most of the year is under 
agreement influence.  
In order to model agreements correctly, start and end points need to be taken 
into account. It therefore seems important to break start and end times down into 
smaller units. For this analysis the logic of creating agreement indicators will therefore 
                                                 
70 It might well be argued that countries change policies before entering into agreements and 
as response to crises but the interest of this study is in the effects of agreements themselves. 
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follow a logic that builds on but also extends that of Clements et al (2013), who “define 
the starting year of an IMF-supported programme as the year in which the programme 
was approved. If the approval date occurred in the second half of the year, the starting 
year for the programme is the following year. The end year is the year in which the 
programme expired.” Whilst somewhat arbitrary, the year will be cut into halves along 
a January to June and a July to December part. It is argued that: 
- When IMF agreement starts in the first half of the year, the whole year is 
considered an IMF year. 
- When IMF agreement starts in the second half of the year, the whole year is 
considered a non-IMF year and starts in the next year. 
- When IMF agreement ends in first half of the year, the whole year is consid-
ered a non-IMF year and ends in the previous year. 
- When IMF agreement ends in second half of the year, the whole year is con-
sidered an IMF year. 
5.3 Country Definition 
The IMF is an international organisation with almost universal membership of 
currently 188 member countries (see section 1.2.1; pg. 9). While the study is interested 
in the overall effect of IMF agreements on health expenditure, a number of countries 
are excluded from the study. This section presents the steps taken and the underlying 
reasoning to arrive at the definition of countries included in this study.  
5.3.1 Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
During the 18 years between 1995 and 2012, 61.2% of all Fund’s member 
states were receiving IMF agreements for at least one year. As will be shown in more 
detail alter on (section 7.1.1; pg. 250), the proportion of countries receiving IMF loans 
was lowest for high income and highest for low-income countries71. Over the decades 
the IMF’s main lending activities have been in countries of low- and middle-income 
                                                 
71 The Bank divides countries according to their gross national income (GNI) per capita, 
measured in US dollars, into four income groupings of low-income, lower and upper middle-
income as well as high-income economies (Perkins et al, 2006; Todaro and Smith, 2014; World 
Bank, 2014a; 2014b). 
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(section 1.2.1; pg. 9). While high-income countries in Europe have become borrowers 
from the IMF over the last years as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, with Greece, 
Ireland or Iceland receiving loans from the IMF, this is a fairly recent development 
and not reflective of the IMF’s main lending activity. Indeed, the previously last high-
income country to receive an agreement from the IMF was the United Kingdom until 
1979 (IMF, 2016i; Stuckler and Basu, 2014). 
This study is interested in examining the effect of these agreements and it is 
therefore argued that its analysis should focus on countries frequently receiving IMF 
loan agreements. The study will therefore focus on countries of middle- and low-
income and exclude high-income countries (n=53) from the analysis.  
To determine countries as low- and middle income this study employs the 
established classification method developed by the World Bank. GNI thresholds are 
revised annually to adjust for inflation. The cut-off for this study is determined based 
on the classification at the end of the study period using 2012 data, which defines 
countries as high-income countries, when they have per capita income of more than 
12763 US dollar.  
5.3.2 Countries Recently Joining the IMF 
While a great number of countries joined the IMF shortly after its inauguration 
in December 1945, several countries have joined at later stages. A strong boost to IMF 
membership was, for instance, seen in 1992 when various former Eastern Bloc 
countries joined the IMF after the collapse of the Soviet Union (IMF, 2012a). It 
appears that joining the IMF is associated with either a previous regime change, say 
the shift from communism to some form of capitalism as is likely the case for former 
Soviet countries, or the establishing of a new nation, which broke away from a larger 
state, as was the case for South Sudan, which became independent in July 2011 and 
consequentially joined the IMF in April 2012 (IMF, 2012b). 
Either way, it is likely that decisions to join the IMF are made after drastic 
changes in this specific country; these changes are likely associated with changes in 
policy priority during the time of transition. From a methodological point of view it 
will be argued that countries that have not been IMF member states during the entire 
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study period from 1995 to 2012, will not have had the same chances of entering an 
agreement as countries that joined the IMF before 1995. For example, a country that 
joined the Fund only in 2010 will not have had an agreement before that time. This 
does however not reflect its economic stability, but rather the inability to receive 
agreements due to non-membership. Therefore, for this study, all countries that were 
not IMF member states in 1995 will be excluded from analyses. Out of the set of low- 
and middle-income countries this means to exclude the six countries given in Table 
5.2 below. 
Country Name Date of Membership 
Palau December 16, 1997 
Timor-Leste (East Timor) July 23, 2002 
Montenegro January 18, 2007 
Kosovo June 29, 2009 
Tuvalu June 24, 2010 
South Sudan April 18, 2012 
Table 5.2: List of Low- and Middle-Income Countries joining the  
IMF after 1995 
source IMF (2012a) 
5.3.3 Missing Health Expenditure Data 
This study relies on government health expenditure data reported in the WHO 
NHA dataset, the most suitable data source for this study (see section 5.1.1; pg. 174) 
Despite its high level of completeness, the database lacks individual data points. For a 
small number of countries, no health expenditure data are reported at all. Countries for 
which no expenditure data are reported in any year would be excluded from all 
analyses as health expenditure will be the dependent variable throughout this study. 
Thus, countries are excluded from the study, when data on the health expenditure 
variables are missing for the entire period. Countries are not excluded when only data 
for individual years are missing. This means to additionally Somalia and Zimbabwe. 
It is important to note that these countries are excluded here explicitly only for the 
reasons of missing data. This missingness means that they would be excluded from the 
analysis anyway as their dependent variables is unavailable.  
5.3.4 Country Definition Summary 
The analyses of this study will be based on a country set of 127 low- and 
middle-income countries, which have become IMF members before 1995 and for 
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which the WHO NHA database reports at least one data point between 1995 and 2012. 
Figure 5.1 shows a summary of all inclusion and exclusion steps and Appendix Table 
5.2 (pg. 212) a full list of countries. The study is based on N*T=2268 case years, the 
product of N=127 countries and T=18 years. 
 
Figure 5.1: Flowchart of Country Definition 
5.4 Determinants of Government Health Expenditure and IMF Agree-
ments 
The literature reviews in chapter 3 and 4 identified a set of concepts that are 
commonly used in the literature as determinants of government health expenditure and 
IMF agreements. This section builds on these chapters and identifies variables to 
measure the relevant concepts using the two most comprehensive and widely used 
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datasets for international macro-data, the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
dataset by the World Bank (2015) and the World Economic Outlook (WEO) by the 
IMF (2015g). When concepts are not available from these datasets, the Quality of 
Governance and Polity IV dataset will be used additionally. Aim is to identify variables 
that allow to measure the relevant concepts while also maintaining a high number of 
cases and the largest possible number of countries. In order to allow for meaningful 
comparison between the individual countries, the variables are selected to measure the 
concepts in international currencies, such as US Dollars or international (PPP) dollars, 
or relative to other variables such as GDP. The presentation is divided into two sections 
to first discuss and select relevant variables used to capture concepts related to 
determinants of government health expenditure and then those of IMF agreements.  
5.4.1 Determinants of Government Health Expenditure 
This section aims to select and present the variables to measure the most 
relevant and commonly used concepts to determine government health expenditure as 
identified in the literature review of chapter 3. It has been argued that studies most 
commonly use the concepts of national income, fiscal space, population structure and 
supply of health care as determinants of health expenditure. The variables to measure 
each of these concepts are discussed in turn.  
5.4.1.1 National Income 
National income is most commonly measured as GDP or GNI, where the 
former measures all production within a country while the latter attributes production 
to a country based on ownership (Perkins et al, 2006), or as economic growth. A 
number of relevant variables capturing GNI, GDP levels and growth rates are available 
from the WEO and the WDI dataset (Table 5.3). Variables measuring GNI are limited 
in their availability. Availability is higher for variables capturing GDP. When 
comparing between the datasets, it appears that the WEO dataset covers slightly more 
cases and countries. Analysis suggests a high level of correlation (r=0.994) between 
the $PPP per capita GDP variables from both datasets. Considering that health 
expenditure ought to be measured in levels it seems somewhat unlikely that growth, 
which measures change rather than levels, can be considered an appropriate indicator 
for national income in the context of this analysis. Based on this reasoning, it seems 
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that national income will for this study be measured as per capita GDP in international 
dollars using the WEO dataset.  
Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




NY.GDP.PCAP.KD GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 2221 126 97.2% 
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2237 127 97.9% 
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 2203 124 96.4% 
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 2200 124 96.2% 
NY.GNP.PCAP.KD GNI per capita (constant 2005 US$) 1569 126 68.6% 
NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.KD GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 1503 122 65.7% 
WEO Dataset 
PPPPC 
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP (Current 
international dollar) 2241 127 98.0% 
NGDP_RPCH 
Gross domestic product, constant prices (Percent 
change) 2244 127 98.2% 
Table 5.3: Variables available to measure National Income 
5.4.1.2 Fiscal Space 
Variables around the concept of fiscal space are considered in a number of 
studies to capture the availability of funds to be spent on the public health system 
(Heller, 2006; Powell‐Jackson et al, 2012). This concept is generally measured using 
an indicator of government spending or revenue, less commonly the concept is 
operationalised using indicators of debt. A number of relevant variables can be 
obtained from the WDI and WEO datasets (see Table 5.4). 
Indicators of debt are available from both datasets. The WDI dataset offers 
measures of central government debt, which capture “the entire stock of direct 
government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular 
date” (World Bank, 2015). Availability, is however limited with more than 80% of the 
data points being missing. Availability is much higher for the external debt stock, 
which measures the “total external debt owed to non-residents repayable in currency, 
goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and 
private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt” (World 
                                                 
72 Percentages are estimated based on a total of 2286 cases. This is the product of 18 years 
(1995-2012) times 127 countries, which covers all data points of the dataset.  
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Bank, 2015). The indicator is available as percentage of GNI or as percentage of 
exports of goods, services and primary income. The WEO dataset offers 
comprehensive coverage for debt indicators particularly for general government gross 
debt, which “consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest 
and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future” (IMF, 
2015g). 
Indicators of government expenditure and revenue from the WDI dataset have 
somewhat limited data availability as around half of all data points are missing. Similar 
indicators from the WEO dataset have much better data coverage, with almost 90% of 
all data points available.  
When considering fiscal space as a concept to capture determinants of 
government health expenditure, studies most commonly use an indicator of flows of 
government money, or less commonly, indicators of debt stock. It seems likely that 
government decisions to spend money on the health system are more influenced by the 
current flows of money into and out of the government coffers rather than a level of 
debt stocks. It will therefore be argued that for this study fiscal space will be measured 
using an indicator of flows of government money. Considering that the correlation 
between government revenue and government expenditure is reasonably high and 
considering both variables in one composite indicator in the form of government 
balance does not produce a large spread of values. Fiscal space should for this study 
be captured using a country’s government revenue.   
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Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 
Cases Countries  % valid 
WDI Dataset 
GC.DOD.TOTL.CN Central government debt, total (current LCU) 452 58 19.8% 
GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS Central government debt, total (% of GDP) 452 58 19.8% 
DT.DOD.DECT.EX.ZS 
External debt stocks (% of exports of goods, 
services and primary income) 1923 117 84.1% 
DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS External debt stocks (% of GNI) 2093 119 91.6% 
GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS Expense (% of GDP) 1109 105 48.5% 
GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 1172 106 51.3% 
WEO Dataset 
GGXWDN_NGDP General government net debt (Percent of GDP) 821 56 35.9% 
GGXWDG_NGDP General government gross debt (Percent of GDP) 1861 124 81.4% 
GGR_NGDP General government revenue (Percent of GDP) 2052 127 89.8% 
GGX_NGDP 
General government total expenditure (Percent of 
GDP) 2035 127 89.0% 
Table 5.4: Variables available to measure Fiscal Space 
5.4.1.3 Population Structure  
Population structure is another commonly used concept in the reviewed 
literature on determinants of government health expenditure. While the indicators 
employed to measure the concepts vary slightly, most studies measure the age structure 
within the population. This is based on the argument that health expenditure will be 
larger for younger and older people, so that a larger share of old and/or young people 
within the population will be associated with a higher level of health expenditure 
(section 3.2.3).  
The WDI dataset provides a number of variables with very good data coverage 
to measure this concept (see Table 5.5). These include the percentage of the old or 
young population compared to the total population individually and also the 
percentages of the young and old population combined to the working age population73 
(age dependency ratio). Given the underlying argument of younger and older shares of 
the population having higher need and demand for health care services compared to 
the rest of the population, it seems that the variable capturing the age dependency ratio 
will be considered the most appropriate variable for this study. 
                                                 
73 The working age population is defined as those people who are between 15 and 64 years of 
age. 
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Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 2250 125 98.4% 
SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS Population ages 15-64 (% of total) 2250 125 98.4% 
SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS Population ages 65 and above (% of total) 2250 125 98.4% 
SP.POP.DPND 
Age dependency ratio (% of working-age 
population) 2250 125 98.4% 
SP.POP.DPND.OL 
Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age 
population) 2250 125 98.4% 
SP.POP.DPND.YG 
Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age 
population) 2250 125 98.4% 
Table 5.5 Variables available to measure Population Structure  
5.4.1.4 Supply of Health Care 
A smaller number of studies include indicators to measure the concept of 
supply of health care. These are generally variables that capture the availability of 
health care services, measured by the supply of health care workers or facilities. While 
the influence of health technologies plays a big role in debates about health 
expenditure increases in high-income countries (Sorenson et al, 2013) this is not 
reflected in studies of low- and middle-income countries.  
The WDI dataset provides a small number of variables that allow one to capture 
this concept (see Table 5.6). Available variables capture the supply of health care 
providers measured as the number of physicians, community health workers or nurses 
as well as hospital beds per 1000 people, but also the coverage of antiretroviral therapy 
for people living with HIV as an indicator for technology and pharmaceutical use. 
While the indicators of health care workers and hospital beds are available for all or 
almost all countries, the number of valid cases is generally low and would mean to 
exclude more than 60% of all cases from the analysis when including hospital beds or 
the number of physicians into the models. Coverage of data on antiretroviral therapy 
is similarly limited as only about data for only half the data points is available.  
Since no other dataset is available to provide better coverage of the data and 
the fact that the concept of supply of health care is of reduced importance compared 
to the other concepts presented before, it is argued that for this analysis no variable to 
capture the supply of health care shall be included. It seems that trading off around 
60% of all cases for the inclusion of this concept does not seem reasonable.  
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Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




SH.MED.BEDS.ZS Hospital beds (per 1000 people) 825 126 36.1% 
SH.MED.CMHW.P3 Community health workers (per 1000 people) 152 61 6.6% 
SH.MED.NUMW.P3 Nurses and midwives (per 1000 people) 393 127 17.2% 
SH.MED.PHYS.ZS Physicians (per 1000 people) 809 127 35.4% 
SH.HIV.ARTC.ZS 
Antiretroviral therapy coverage (% of people living 
with HIV) 1248 96 54.6% 
Table 5.6: Variables available to measure Supply of Health Care 
5.4.1.5 Summary of the Government Health Expenditure Variables 
This section set out to identify variables to measure the concepts frequently 
used to determine government health expenditure. Employing the World Development 
Indicators and the World Economic Outlook datasets, relevant variables could be 
identified. To measure the concept of national income, a variable from the WEO 
dataset will be used, which measures Gross domestic product based on purchasing-
power-parity per capita. While both government spending and debt variables are 
available from the datasets, it was argued that a variable measuring flows to 
government funds would be an appropriate way of measuring the concept of fiscal 
space for this study. A variable of general government revenue as percentage of GDP 
from the WEO is used. The concept of population structure will be measured using the 
age dependency ratio variable from the WDI dataset. While the concepts of supply of 
health care is used in some studies, it was argued that the commonly used datasets do 
not hold relevant variables to operationalise this concept without trading off a large 
number of cases. Table 5.7, shows the selected variables and their descriptive statistics. 
Overall Between Within 
mean SD min max SD min max SD min  max 
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP (Current 
international dollar) 
5379.55 4750.58 292.19 29587.54 4385.65 459.85 21145.94 1859.88 -4102.29 14565.75 
General government Revenue (Percent of GDP)  
25.56 12.46 0 160.19 11.17 8.01 74.08 5.62 -5.53 135.89 
Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population)  
71.59 18.26 34.50 114.00 17.29 41.48 107.56 6.07 47.10 101.43 
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics of Variables selected as Determinants of Government Health 
Expenditure  
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5.4.2 Determinants of IMF Agreement 
This section aims to discuss and present the variables used to measure the 
relevant and most commonly used concepts for determinants of IMF agreements as 
identified in chapter 4. It has been shown that while the IMF and health expenditure 
literature mostly relies on one specified model to predict IMF agreements, the wider 
literature concerned with modelling IMF agreements uses a broader set of concepts 
and variables to do so. This section identifies variables for the specified model used in 
the IMF and health expenditure literature as well as variables for an extended model 
based on other commonly used concepts in the wider literature. These concepts include 
national income, international reserves, debt, balance of payments, inflation, 
government balance, exchange rates, indicators of IMF activity as well as a regime 
indicator. This section is organised to present each of the concepts and their available 
variables in turn and highlights where variables relate to the pre-defined IMF and 
health expenditure model. Similar to the previous section, focus will be on variable 
definitions that allow for cross-country comparisons. 
5.4.2.1 National Income 
Most studies include one or more indicators of national income in their models. 
Most commonly this concept is operationalised using variables measuring a country’s 
GDP, its GDP per capita or per capita growth. Less frequently studies use an indicator 
of negative growth or a crisis, defined as a larger scale change in growth to the previous 
year. The model commonly used in IMF and health expenditure studies includes a 
variable of GDP growth as well as per capita GDP. Both the WDI and the WEO dataset 
hold relevant variables (see Table 5.8).  
The WEO dataset provides a variable measuring per capita spending in current 
PPP, the WDI dataset offers a variable in constant PPP. It appears that both dataset 
offer a comparable coverage of data points (2783 vs 2788), however the WDI dataset 
covers only 124 countries, compared to 127 from the WEO, which suggests to include 
the variable from the WEO dataset in the model. 
Growth variables are also available from both datasets, while bivariate analyses 
show that there is a high level of correlation between both datasets (r=0.9078), it 
appears that the variable from the WDI dataset has a slightly higher level of coverage 
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(96.5% vs 95.6%). The growth variable from the WDI dataset will therefore be 
included in the models. 
Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD GDP, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 2783 124 95.3% 
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG GDP growth (annual %) 2820 127 96.5% 
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 2783 124 95.3% 
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 2806 126 96.1% 
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2820 127 96.5% 
WEO Dataset 
NGDP_RPCH Gross domestic product, constant prices (Percent 
change) 
2793 127 95.6% 
NGDPD Gross domestic product, current prices (U.S. 
dollars) 
2816 127 96.4% 
NGDPDPC Gross domestic product per capita, current prices 
(U.S. dollars) 
2789 127 95.5% 
PPPGDP Gross domestic product based on purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP 
(Current international dollar) 
2817 127 96.4% 
PPPPC Gross domestic product based on purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP (Current 
international dollar) 
2788 127 95.4% 
Table 5.8: Variables available to measure National Income 
5.4.2.2 International Reserves 
An indicator of international reserves is used in a large number of studies. 
While some studies measure the absolute level of reserves most put the stock of 
reserves in relation to another macroeconomic indicator, most commonly debt or 
imports. In the context of this study, it appears that the level of reserves related to 
macro-economic performance is a useful indicator. The WDI dataset has two such 
variables available (see Table 5.9). Reserves are measured in relation to a country’s 
external debt stock or the months of imports that can be covered with the current stock 
of reserves. While reserves in relation to months of import has rather limited data 
coverage, which means that including this variable would exclude roughly 70% of all 
cases75. Reserves as percentage of debt has good coverage. For this analysis, the 
                                                 
74 Valid percentage are determined using a basis of 127 countries times 23 years. This allows 
for adding up to 5 lags to the data without losing cases (see chapter 6). 
75 Constructing the variable by hand using variables of total reserves and imports does not yield 
better results in terms of data coverage. 
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variable measuring reserves as percentage of total external debt will be included. This 
is also the measure included in the selection models used in the IMF and health 
expenditure literature.  
Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




FI.RES.TOTL.DT.ZS Total reserves (% of total external debt) 2586 119 88.5% 
FI.RES.TOTL.MO Total reserves in months of imports  915 119 31.3% 
Table 5.9: Variables available to measure International Reserves 
5.4.2.3 Debt 
Debt is another commonly used concept in the literature on determinants of 
IMF agreements. The concept is commonly operationalised as the amount of interest 
payments, debt service and debt stocks. Both the WDI and the WEO datasets hold 
relevant variables (see Table 5.10).  
Variables measuring interest payments are available from the WDI dataset, 
data availability is, with around 45%, for variables measuring interest payments as 
percentage of revenue or expenses, rather limited. Better availability is given for 
variables measuring interest payments on external debt (>80%). Various variables, 
with generally good data availability, are available measuring a country’s stock of debt 
in various ways. Debt stock variables, with good data coverage, are also available from 
the WEO dataset.  
From a theoretical point of view it appears that a country might be more likely 
to enter into an IMF agreement when its external debt stock is too large in general or 
the amount of debt service is considerable given the other economic activities in a 
country. It therefore appears that variables measuring a country’s debt service 
compared to national income or those measuring a country’s external debt stock 
compared to national income can be seen the most relevant variables to be included in 
the models. Both variables shall be sourced from the WDI dataset.  
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Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




GC.XPN.INTP.RV.ZS Interest payments (% of revenue) 1327 106 45.4% 
GC.XPN.INTP.ZS Interest payments (% of expense) 1274 105 43.6% 
DT.INT.DECT.EX.ZS 
Interest payments on external debt (% of exports 
of goods, services and primary income) 2394 119 82.0% 
DT.INT.DECT.GN.ZS Interest payments on external debt (% of GNI) 2599 119 89.0% 
DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS 
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services 
and primary income) 2394 119 82.0% 
DT.TDS.DECT.GN.ZS Total debt service (% of GNI) 2594 119 88.8% 
DT.TDS.MLAT.PG.ZS 
Multilateral debt service (% of public and publicly 
guaranteed debt service) 2668 120 91.3% 
GC.DOD.TOTL.CN Central government debt, total (current LCU)  584  60 20.0% 
GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS Central government debt, total (% of GDP)  584  60 20.0% 
DT.TXR.DPPG.CD Total amount of debt rescheduled (current US$) 2695 120 92.3% 
DT.DOD.DECT.CD.CG Total change in external debt stocks (current US$) 2680 120 91.7% 
DT.DOD.DECT.EX.ZS 
External debt stocks (% of exports of goods, 
services and primary income) 2394 119 82.0% 
DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS External debt stocks (% of GNI) 2607 119 89.3% 
DT.DOD.DSTC.IR.ZS Short-term debt (% of total reserves) 2585 119 88.5% 
DT.DOD.DSTC.XP.ZS 
Short-term debt (% of exports of goods, services 
and primary income)  869 114 29.8% 
DT.DOD.DSTC.ZS Short-term debt (% of total external debt) 2695 120 92.3% 
WEO Dataset 
GGXWDN_NGDP General government net debt (Percent of GDP)  885  56 30.3% 
GGXWDG_NGDP General government gross debt (Percent of GDP) 2003 124 68.6% 
Table 5.10: Variables available to measure Debt 
5.4.2.4 Balance of Payments Position 
In line with the IMF’s core tasks to assist countries in balance of payment 
crises, a number of studies use an indicator of the country’s balance of payment 
position. While, as outlined above, balance of payment consists of several components, 
most studies measure the balance of payment position using variables of a country’s 
current account balance.  
This variable is available from both the WDI and the WEO dataset (see Table 
5.11). Variables are available both in absolute terms measured in US Dollar as well as 
in relation to the country’s GDP. To allow for international comparison focus shall be 
on the variable measuring current account balance as share of GDP. While availability 
of the variable from the WDI dataset is rather limited (31.6%), the variable from the 
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WEO is almost complete76. Therefore, the current account balance as percentage of 
GDP variable from the WEO dataset shall be included in the models.  
Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




BN.CAB.XOKA.CD Current account balance (BoP, current US$)  933 121 31.9% 
BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS Current account balance (% of GDP)  923 121 31.6% 
WEO Dataset 
BCA Current account balance (U.S. dollars) 2799 127 95.8% 
BCA_NGDPD Current account balance (Percent of GDP) 2800 127 95.9% 
Table 5.11: Variables available to measure Balance of Payments position 
5.4.2.5 Inflation 
Inflation is another commonly used indicator in the wider literature concerned 
with determinants of IMF agreements. This is either measured as inflation or a 
consumer price index. Both the WDI as well as the WEO datasets provide relevant 
variables with good data coverage (see Table 5.12).  
The WDI dataset holds variables for the GDP deflator and the consumer prices. 
The former is an indicator of the “annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator [and] 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole” (World Bank, 2015). The 
latter measures the “annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services” (World Bank, 2015). The WEO dataset 
provides a similar set of variables but also a distinction between consumer prices 
averaged over the year and those measured at the end of the period.  
Bivariate analyses show a great degree of similarity between the WDI GDP 
deflator and the consumer price variable (r=0.9915) as well as between the WDI 
consumer price variable and the average consumer price variable from the WEO 
dataset (r=0.9978). Given the high degree of similarity between the deflator and the 
consumer price variable it appears that the decision should be made based on the best 
data availability. For this model, the WEO variable for the average consumer prices 
will be included. 
                                                 
76 Bivariate analyses between the variables from both datasets show a high degree of similarity 
as r=0.8841. 
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NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 2820 127 96.5% 
FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 2486 120 85.1% 
WEO Dataset 
NGDP_D Gross domestic product, deflator (Index) 2806 127 96.1% 
PCPIPCH 
Inflation, average consumer prices (Percent 
change) 2778 127 95.1% 
PCPIEPCH 
Inflation, end of period consumer prices (Percent 
change) 2754 127 94.3% 
Table 5.12: Variables available to measure Inflation 
5.4.2.6 Government Balance 
Various studies include an indicator of government balance into their models 
to determine a country entering into an IMF agreement. As discussed in more detail 
above, countries are seen to be more likely to enter into agreements when government 
expenditure and revenues are not balanced. Variables to measure this are available 
from both the WDI and the WEO dataset (see Table 5.13). As discussed in more detail 
above (see section 5.4.1.2) variables from the WEO dataset provide better data 
coverage but neither dataset provides a variable measuring government balance as the 
difference between government expenditure and revenue. To capture this indicator, 
such a variable will be constructed using the revenue and expenditure variables from 
the WEO dataset. This is also the variable used in the models of the IMF and health 
expenditure literature.  
Variable Code Variable Description 
Valid 




GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS Expense (% of GDP) 1279 106 43.8% 
GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 1382 107 47.3% 
WEO Dataset 
GGR_NGDP General government revenue (Percent of GDP) 2338 127 80.0% 
GGX_NGDP 
General government total expenditure (Percent of 
GDP) 2318 127 79.4% 
Author Estimation 
GGB_NGDP General government balance (Percent of GDP) 2302 127 78.8% 
Table 5.13: Variables available to measure Government Balance 
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5.4.2.7 Exchange Rates 
A number of studies include an indicator of a country’s local currency’s 
exchange rate to another currency important in the global economy, mostly the US 
Dollar. Some studies do not measure the exchange rate directly but use an indicator of 
a currency crisis, which is generally defined as a drastic change in the exchange rate 
compared to the previous year. Fewer studies operationalise the concept of exchange 
rates by measuring a country’s exchange rate regime.  
From the WDI dataset two variables are available that allow to measure this 
concept (see Table 5.14). The real effective exchange rate is “the nominal effective 
exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted average of 
several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs” (World Bank, 
2015). The official exchange rate measures “the exchange rate determined by national 
authorities or the rate determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market” (World 
Bank, 2015). It is calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages of the 
local currency units relative to the US dollar. While the former variable has rather 
limited data availability (~40%), data availability for the official exchange rate 
variable is very good. This means that this variable will be selected for the model.  
The official exchange rate variable presents the relation between a country’s 
local currency and the US Dollar. While this allows for comparisons within countries 
(“how does the exchange rate change over time within the same country?”) it does not 
allow to compare between countries. To achieve this, a variable measuring the 
percentage change to the previous year will be estimated77. This also allows for the 
construction of a currency crisis indicator that holds the value 1 when the drop in value 
is larger than -30%, and 0 otherwise.  
An indicator of the exchange rate regime is not available from the WDI dataset. 
The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restriction 
(IMF, 2015a) provides such an indicator, however, this database is not available in a 
machine readable format for all years and the definitions of exchange rate regimes 
change over the years. It appears that studies including an indicator of exchange rate 
                                                 
77 The percentage change to the previous year is estimated using the formula (X/Lead.X-
1)*100. 
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regimes generally do so to answer specific research questions related to the impact of 
exchange rate regimes. It will therefore be argued that such a variable can be neglected 
for this study.  
Based on the available variables and in line with the wider literature on 
determinants of IMF agreements the annual change of the official exchange rate will 
be seen as appropriate variable to measure the concept of exchange rates. 




PX.REX.REER Real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) 1200  53 41.1% 
PA.NUS.FCRF Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 2804 126 96.0% 
Author Estimation 
PA.NUS.FCRF.PERC Annual Change of the Official exchange rate (percentage) 2677 126 91.6% 
PA.NUS.FCRF.CRIS Crisis Indicator if annual change in exchange rate >-30% 2677 126 91.6% 
Table 5.14: Variables available to measure Exchange Rates 
5.4.2.8 Indicators of IMF Activity  
Almost all studies include at least one indicator of IMF activity as determinant 
of IMF agreements into their models. Most commonly this is done as an indicator of a 
country’s previous involvement with the IMF or, less commonly, the IMF’s global 
lending activity in other countries. Data for these variables can be constructed from 
the IMF agreement dataset presented earlier (see section 5.2). Since data is complete 
for all data points in this database all variables created from it will cover all years and 
countries. Guided by theory and the previous literature review a number of relevant 
variables have been created (see Table 5.15). 
In detail, these variables are defined as follows. An indicator variable is 
constructed that is 1 when the country had an agreement in the year before the current, 
and 0 otherwise. This seems the most commonly used indicator of IMF activity. This 
is also the variable used in the IMF and health expenditure literature. An alternative 
definition of previous IMF agreements is constructed using the moving average over 
the previous 5 years (excluding the current year). This variable gives an indication of 
IMF activity during the last 5 years. A third variable was constructed that sums up the 
number of countries in agreements in the current year. This is an indicator of the IMF’s 
global lending activity in a given year. 
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Prev.year.IMF Indicator of agreement in previous year 2921 127 100% 
5yr.MA.IMF 
Moving average of years in agreements during last 
5 years 2921 127 100% 
Other.IMF Number of other countries in agreements 2921 127 100% 
Table 5.15: Variables available to measure IMF Activity 
5.4.2.9 Regime Indicator 
A number of studies include various political variables into their models, one 
of the most commonly used and most accessible such indicators is an index of 
democracy. This variable is not available from the WDI or the WEO datasets but from 
three other sources, the Polity IV (Marshall et al, 2014), Freedom House (Freedom 
House, 2015) and the Quality of Governance (Quality of Governance, 2015) databases 
(see Table 5.16).  
The Polity IV dataset holds two variables measuring democracy as well as a 
composite indicator combining both democracy indicators. Data availability is 
generally good but the dataset does not cover smaller countries, including this variable 
would mean to exclude 14 countries from the analyses.  
Freedom House provides a variable of political rights, which captures the 
people’s ability “to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote 
freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join 
political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive 
impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.” (Quality of 
Governance, 2015). This variable covers all countries and almost all years included in 
the study. 
While the Quality of Governance dataset provides a number of dedicated 
democracy variables constructed for specific studies, which are not updated beyond 
the date of the study publication, it also provides a comprehensive democracy variable 
constructed of the variables from Freedom House and the Polity IV dataset, by taking 
the average of relevant Freedom House variables, transformed to a scale 0-10, and the 
Polity variable, transformed to a scale 0-10. Additionally, missing cases from the 
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Polity variable are imputed78. (Quality of Governance, 2015). The study by Hadenius 
and Teorell (2005) shows that this averaged index performs better than its constituent 
parts both in terms of reliability and validity (Quality of Governance, 2015). Based on 
this and the better data availability this combined indicator of democracy shall be 
included in this study.  




Polity2 Polity IV combined indicator of democracy  2509 113 86.2% 
fh_pr Freedom House indicator of political rights 2873 127 98.7% 
fh_ipolity2 
Quality of Governance imputed indicator of 
democracy 2873 127 98.7% 
Table 5.16: Variables available to measure Democracy 
5.4.2.10 Summary of IMF Agreement Determinants Variables 
This section set out to identify variables to measure the concepts frequently 
used to determine countries entering into IMF agreements. Employing the World 
Development Indicators, the World Economic Outlook and the Quality of Governance 
datasets relevant variables could be identified. To measure the concept of national 
income, two variables have been selected. One from the WDI dataset measuring per 
capita growth in annual percentages and one from the WEO measuring per capita 
levels of GDP in PPP. The concept of reserves will be operationalised using a variable 
from the WDI dataset measuring the level of reserves as a percentage of total external 
debt. For the concept of debt, two variables have been selected from the WDI dataset, 
one measuring total debt services as percentage of a country’s GNI and one variable 
measuring the stock of external debt as percentage of GNI. Balance of payments is 
operationalised using a variable from the WEO dataset measuring the current account 
balance as percentage of GDP. Inflation is measured as change in average consumer 
prices sourced from the WEO dataset. Based on data from the WEO dataset a variable 
for government balance as percentage of GDP was constructed. A variable of annual 
change of the exchange rate was constructed from the WDI dataset. Three variables to 
measure IMF activity were constructed, one is an indicator of the lagged agreement 
                                                 
78 Values are imputed by regressing the Polity on the average Freedom House measure (Quality 
of Governance, 2015). 
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variable, a second variable measures the five year moving average of years in 
agreement and a third variable indicates the number of countries in agreements. As 
indicator of democracy a variable from the Quality of Governance dataset was 
selected. Table 5.17, below shows the selected variables and their descriptive statistics. 
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Overall Between Within 
mean SD min max SD min max SD min  max 
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP (Current international dollar)  
4989.16 4548.85 242.93 29587.54 4103.43 486.78 20722.13 1977.40 -4068.88 15020.32 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
2.13 7.01 -65.00 105.00 2.12 -3.15 12.35 6.71 -69.44 101.41 
Total reserves (% of total external debt) 
56.36 179.19 0.01 3650.00 119.66 2.74 1016.44 131.69 -716.77 2923.63 
Total debt service (% of GNI) 
4.92 7.04 0.00 135.00 4.23 0.08 34.77 5.72 -18.75 124.10 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 
72.28 91.15 0.24 1380.00 72.99 11.30 667.88 62.11 -564.80 902.77 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 
-4.90 9.83 -90.83 51.10 6.37 -24.05 15.76 7.63 -78.88 39.63 
Inflation, average consumer prices (% change) 
51.10 538.92 -26.32 23773.10 158.26 2.12 1517.51 514.62 -1464.28 22306.69 
General government balance (% of GDP) 
-2.21 6.04 -46.23 122.19 3.12 -16.70 8.58 5.18 -35.20 113.28 
Annual Change of the Official exchange rate (percentage) 
-6.29 29.08 -99.99 1225.14 9.86 -45.11 54.43 27.49 -104.91 1164.42 
Indicator of agreement in previous year 
0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.00 0.96 0.40 -0.60 1.31 
Moving average of years in agreements during last 5 years 
0.34 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.00 0.89 0.25 -0.48 1.18 
Number of other countries in agreements 
44.52 6.95 29.00 57.00 0.00 44.52 44.52 6.95 29.00 57.00 
Democracy Indicator 
5.59 2.90 0.00 10.00 2.68 0.27 10.00 1.14 0.01 10.99 
Table 5.17: Descriptive statistics of variables selected as determinants of IMF agreements  
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5.5 Summary of the Dataset and Notes on Data Quality 
This chapter set out to present the dataset created for use in this study. It 
outlined which variables are used for this study and which datasets the variables are 
drawn from. It first presented different datasets that hold variables on government 
health expenditure. It was argued that amongst the datasets the WHO National Health 
Accounts Dataset would be the most suitable dataset for this study as it covers the most 
countries and provides a reasonably long observation period. The second section 
outlined the creation of IMF dummies. The third section provided a country definition. 
It was argued that the study will focus on low- and middle-income countries as these 
are seen to be the countries in which most of IMF lending activity happened over the 
last decades. Building on the previous literature reviews on determinants of health 
expenditure and IMF agreements, the chapter discussed, in section four, the variables 
available and suitable for the use in this study. It was argued that GDP per capita 
measured in PPP, Government revenue and the age dependency ratio are considered 
as determinants of health expenditure in this study. A number of variables will be 
considered as determinants of IMF agreements. These include GDP per capita, GDP 
grown, total reserves as percentage of total external debt, total debt service, external 
debt stocks, the current account balance, annual changes in inflation, government 
balance, change in official exchange rate, a democracy indicator as well as indicators 
of IMF activity.  
Having identified the relevant variables, a note on the quality of the data 
employed should be made. The debate about data quality in relation to developing 
countries data is long-standing (Morgenstern, 1950; Yeats, 1990) but has recently re-
emerged with the work by Jerven (2013; 2015), the emphasis on data to measure 
progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and the associated data revolution 
(Demombynes and Sandefur, 2014; United Nations, 2016).  
Jerven (2013), using GDP data as example in his argument, claims that cross-
country macro-data are of low quality for two reasons. Firstly, producing GDP and 
other macroeconomic data estimates is technically challenging and statistical offices 
in developing countries often lack the capacity to collect all necessary information and 
process them to provide accurate estimates. Data might therefore not be reported at all 
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or be of low accuracy. Secondly, cross-national datasets available from the World 
Bank or the IMF might not accurately reflect the national estimates due to various 
reasons. These include that organisations impute missing data points or even override 
existing national estimates.  
These criticisms are directly relevant for this study. While Jerven (2013) argues 
that government expenditure data – used here as dependent variable – might be of 
better quality as their collection is easier, the government should know how much 
money it spends, the accuracy of the dependent variable might still be affected because 
the study places health expenditure estimates in relation to other macroeconomic 
indicators, including GDP, population and inflation rates. Also, while the health 
expenditure dataset from the WHO appears to be complete, a number of data points 
are imputed and might not reflect actual levels of expenditure. 
Jerven (2013) argues that one solution to data quality issues related to data 
processing of international organisations might be to obtain data locally from the 
national statistics offices. While it would in theory be possible to obtain data for this 
study from the national authorities that produce them, this appears to be beyond the 
scope of this study as it would require obtaining health expenditure and other 
macroeconomic indicators from each of the 127 countries in this study. It is also worth 
noting that almost all cross-country studies working on comparable questions source 
their data from the same datasets of the WHO, World Bank and the IMF. This means 
that this study employs the best data currently available for this topic. However, data 
quality issues should be acknowledged when interpreting the data. 
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Appendices to Chapter 5 
Appendix Table 5.1: List of Countries Included in This Study 
 included 






Afghanistan x x x 
Albania x x x 
Algeria x x x 
Angola x x x 
Antigua and Barbuda    
Argentina x x x 
Armenia x x x 
Australia    
Austria    
Azerbaijan x x x 
Bahamas    
Bahrain    
Bangladesh x x x 
Barbados    
Belarus x x x 
Belgium    
Belize x x x 
Benin x x x 
Bhutan x x x 
Bolivia x x x 
Bosnia and Herzegovina x x x 
Botswana x x x 
Brazil x x x 
Brunei Darussalam    
Bulgaria x x x 
Burkina Faso x x x 
Burundi x x x 
Cabo Verde x x x 
Cambodia x x x 
Cameroon x x x 
Canada    
Central African Republic x x x 
Chad x x x 
Chile    
China x x x 
Colombia x x x 
Comoros x x x 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic x x x 
Congo, Republic of x x x 
Costa Rica x x x 
Cote d'Ivoire x x x 
Croatia    
Cyprus    
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Czech Republic    
Denmark    
Djibouti x x x 
Dominica x x x 
Dominican Republic x x x 
Ecuador x x x 
Egypt x x x 
El Salvador x x x 
Equatorial Guinea    
Eritrea x x x 
Estonia    
Ethiopia x x x 
Fiji x x x 
Finland    
France    
Gabon x x x 
Gambia x x x 
Georgia x x x 
Germany    
Ghana x x x 
Greece    
Grenada x x x 
Guatemala x x x 
Guinea x x x 
Guinea-Bissau x x x 
Guyana x x x 
Haiti x x x 
Honduras x x x 
Hungary x x x 
Iceland    
India x x x 
Indonesia x x x 
Iran x x x 
Iraq x x x 
Ireland    
Israel    
Italy    
Jamaica x x x 
Japan    
Jordan x x x 
Kazakhstan x x x 
Kenya x x x 
Kiribati x x x 
Korea    
Kosovo x   
Kuwait    
Kyrgyz Republic x x x 
Laos x x x 
Latvia    
Lebanon x x x 
Lesotho x x x 
Liberia x x x 
Libya x x x 
Lithuania    
Luxembourg    
211 
Macedonia x x x 
Madagascar x x x 
Malawi x x x 
Malaysia x x x 
Maldives x x x 
Mali x x x 
Malta    
Marshall Islands x x x 
Mauritania x x x 
Mauritius x x x 
Mexico x x x 
Micronesia x x x 
Moldova x x x 
Mongolia x x x 
Montenegro x   
Morocco x x x 
Mozambique x x x 
Myanmar x x x 
Namibia x x x 
Nepal x x x 
Netherlands    
New Zealand    
Nicaragua x x x 
Niger x x x 
Nigeria x x x 
Norway    
Oman    
Pakistan x x x 
Palau x   
Panama x x x 
Papua New Guinea x x x 
Paraguay x x x 
Peru x x x 
Philippines x x x 
Poland    
Portugal    
Qatar    
Romania x x x 
Russia    
Rwanda x x x 
Samoa x x x 
San Marino    
Sao Tome & Principe x x x 
Saudi Arabia    
Senegal x x x 
Serbia x x x 
Seychelles x x x 
Sierra Leone x x x 
Singapore    
Slovakia    
Slovenia    
Solomon Islands x x x 
Somalia x x  
South Africa x x x 
South Sudan x   
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Spain    
Sri Lanka x x x 
St Kitts and Nevis    
St Lucia x x x 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines x x x 
Sudan x x x 
Suriname x x x 
Swaziland x x x 
Sweden    
Switzerland    
Syria x x x 
Tajikistan x x x 
Tanzania x x x 
Thailand x x x 
Timor-Leste x   
Togo x x x 
Tonga x x x 
Trinidad and Tobago    
Tunisia x x x 
Turkey x x x 
Turkmenistan x x x 
Tuvalu x   
Uganda x x x 
Ukraine x x x 
United Arab Emirates    
United Kingdom    
United States    
Uruguay    
Uzbekistan x x x 
Vanuatu x x x 
Venezuela x x x 
Vietnam x x x 
Yemen x x x 
Zambia x x x 
Zimbabwe x x  
 135 129 127 




Appendix Figure 5.1: Begin and End of Agreements 
 




 Statistical Methods 
This study aims to evaluate the effects of IMF agreements on government 
health expenditure. To do so, the study exploits the fact that some countries are 
exposed to agreements at some times, while others are not and thereby aims to estimate 
the differences in government health expenditure, during times of Fund agreements 
compared to times with no agreement. This difference is commonly referred to as 
“programme effect” (Goldstein and Montiel, 1986) or “participation effect” (Atoyan 
and Conway, 2006). To be able to attribute this effect to the IMF agreements, one 
needs to be able to compare like with like. Ideally this means that a country in an 
agreement is compared to the same country in the same situation but without 
agreement. It is easy to see that this is not possible as one country cannot experience 
two agreement states simultaneously (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Rubin, 2005). To 
overcome this “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland, 1986) in the 
natural experiment setting, a counterfactual needs to be created, which is comparable 
to the agreement country, with ideally the only difference being the difference in the 
agreement status (Morgan and Winship, 2007). When constructing counterfactuals for 
this study, two methodological challenges have to be dealt with.  
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Firstly, when modelling government health expenditure, factors that impact on 
this dependent variable need to be controlled for in order to be able to attribute the 
effects correctly to the agreement indicator, the explanatory variable of primary 
interest. A method needs to be identified to model data in the panel data structure of 
this study.  
Secondly, the decision to enter into an agreement is based on certain economic 
and political circumstances (see section 4.3; pg. 130), which suggests that assignment 
into an agreement is not random. Countries entering into agreements will face certain 
constraints, while countries not entering into agreements will not face the same 
constraints. This means that countries with and those without agreements are 
systematically different and not immediately comparable. This difference in 
circumstances is likely to have an effect on the country’s overall economic 
performance and also the decision to increase or decrease government health 
expenditure. This means that the agreement dummy is endogenous (Goldstein and 
Montiel, 1986; Vreeland, 2003). Since classical regression techniques assume 
exogeneity of all variables, a concept needs to be identified to address this problem of 
endogeneity and selection.  
This chapter outlines a strategy to tackle these two challenges using appropriate 
techniques. To do so, the chapter is structured into three parts. The first section 
considers methods that are appropriate for modelling health expenditure data with the 
given data structure. The second section discusses methods appropriate to dealing with 
the selection problem at hand. Section three summarises the chapter and outlines the 
estimation strategy for this study. 
6.1 Modelling Government Health Expenditure 
Government health expenditure will be modelled using regression techniques. 
Regression is a computational tool that allows one to compare treatment and control 
cases, which have the same observed characteristics. It is based on the somewhat 
idealistic assumption that when all other things are equal the observed difference in 
the outcome must be due to differences in the variable of interest. To “make things 
equal” regression techniques control for, or hold constant, all other variables in the 
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model (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). It thus enables to identify the independent effect 
of a set of variables on the dependent variable (Greene, 2011). This means that the 
independent effect of IMF agreements on government health expenditure as dependent 
variable can be estimated holding additional independent variables, which are seen as 
its determinants, constant.  
The most important distinction when choosing a regression method is the data 
type of the dependent variable. Given that the dependent variable in this study, 
government health expenditure, is continuous, linear regression – often described as 
the most useful tool in econometrics (Greene, 2011) – is seen as appropriate starting 
point for this study. Linear regression is a method to summarise the average value of 
a numerical outcome as defined by a linear function of predictors (Gelman and Hill, 
2006). As with all regression models and in particular in the context of the panel 
dataset used in this study, a number of decisions about the correct specification need 
to be made. This section outlines and discusses different options and derives the most 
appropriate specification for this study. The first part discusses stationarity as 
important prerequisite for regression modelling. The part section presents the Fixed 
Effects estimator as the most appropriate estimator for this study. Part three discusses 
further specifications around issues of spatial and temporal dependence as well as 
panel heteroscedasticity. Part four offers a summary and presents the estimation 
strategy. 
6.1.1 Stationarity 
Time series and thus panel data theory relies on the assumption that the 
variables are stationary. Stationarity in time series most generally describes the status 
of no systematic change over time. The literature distinguishes between strict and weak 
stationarity. The former is given when the joint probability distribution is the same for 
all time points across the entire time series. The joint probability does therefore only 
depend on the length of time between two data points but not on time. Weak or 
covariance stationarity is given when both mean and covariance between two time 
points are constant throughout the entire time series and do thus not depend on time. 
While strict stationarity is harder to achieve, most of time series theory relies on the 
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data being covariance stationary (Bisgaard and Kulahci, 2011; Chatfield, 2004; 
Hamilton, 1994; Shumway and Stoffer, 2010). 
A practical example related to this study can be used to illustrate the importance 
of stationarity. Assume that a health expenditure time series is non-stationary and it 
follows a positive/negative trend. Assume also that a country with this health 
expenditure time series is in an agreement towards the end of the observations and 
none at the beginning. Comparing periods with and without agreements would suggest 
that health expenditure is higher/lower during agreement times. While this might well 
be the case, the trending time series makes it hard to distinguish the effect of the IMF 
from that of the observed trend. This section outlines methods to identify stationarity, 
and deal with the non-stationary time series in this study. 
Stationarity can be assessed using a number of methods. Most commonly these 
rely on the assessment of individual time series79 and include visual examination of 
the time line plot, autocorrelation function (ACF) plots, as well as unit root tests of 
each time series.  
The time line plot allows to visually inspect general trends over time. It gives 
some indication about stationarity when the values of the observations increase or 
decrease constantly over time. Chatfield (2004) and Becketti (2013) suggest to use 
time line plots in combination with ACF plots to assess stationarity. Autocorrelation 
denotes the correlation of one observation with another, later observation. The ACF 
measures how closely related two observations are across time. These correlations can 
be plotted in an ACF plot which shows the autocorrelation coefficients against the 
number of lags (Becketti, 2013; Chatfield, 2004; Cowpertwait and Metcalfe, 2009; 
Koop, 2000). A time series is deemed to be non-stationary when the correlations decay 
only slowly over time (Bisgaard and Kulahci, 2011). Unit root tests are an additional 
decision tool to distinguish time series. Unit root tests commonly test the null 
hypothesis of a time series having a unit roots, which is considered evidence of a time 
series being non-stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that there is no unit root and 
                                                 
79 It is worth nothing that recently methods to assess stationarity specifically for panel data 
have become popular (Baltagi, 2008; Hadri, 2000). In empirical research, however, most 
methods rely on the assessment of individual time series. 
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the time series is stationary (Bisgaard and Kulahci, 2011; Patterson, 2011). While a 
great number of unit root tests have been developed (Patterson, 2011), the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and 
Perron, 1988), are the most commonly used tests (Maddala, 2001). They are however, 
due to the difficulty of distinguishing stationary and non-stationary time series, 
considered to be rather weak tests (DeJong et al, 1992; Schwert, 2002). This means 
that the obtained results might not be reliable. 
The literature (Becketti, 2013; Bisgaard and Kulahci, 2011; Chatfield, 2004; 
Koop, 2000) suggests a number of ways of dealing with non-stationary time series. 
One option is to difference the time series till it is stationary. This means to subtract 
the value at time 1 from the value at time 2, so that ∆𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1. Differencing 
changes the interpretation of the results from reporting levels of health expenditure 
(and their change) to reporting changes of health expenditure (or changes thereof) 
(Bisgaard and Kulahci, 2011). It comes with two main drawbacks. Firstly, the time 
series loses the information about its levels and therefore the ability to estimate long-
term effects. Secondly, one time point will be lost, as the first difference of the first 
time period cannot be estimated. Another option is to control for the time trend. This 
is particularly useful in cases where there is a gradual increase in the data. This trend 
can be controlled for by including a function of the trend itself. While more 
complicated options and forms of the trend function are possible, the simplest function 
is to simply control for time. This assumes that with every one unit increase in time, 
the value of time series variable increases/decreases.  
Chatfield (2004) suggests that it is often difficult to distinguish stationary time 
series processes with long memory80 from non-stationary processes, especially when 
the time series are rather short as is the case for this study81. This means that a time 
series might be stationary but have a slow speed of adjustment. However, due to the 
                                                 
80 Time series processes with long memories are those that revert to the mean only slowly and 
over a long period of time. 
81 This time series is based on observations for 18 time points (years), this can be considered a 
long panel in comparative political science, especially compared to survey data, where there 
are only a few time points. However, the time series is not long when compared to financial 
data, where observations are made daily and for many years. 
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short period of observation the return of the time series to the mean cannot be observed, 
which makes the series appear non-stationary. Beck and Katz (2011), using examples 
of political science data, argue that the series might be very persistent but they are 
almost naturally bounded. This is because most outcomes of interest are taken as ratios, 
for instance social spending as proportion of the overall budget. The value can thus 
not trend above 100% or below 0%. The authors argue that a trend in spending might 
not persist forever, as high levels of spending might lead to reductions and low levels 
to an increase, so that in the long run the time series reaches equilibrium at a given 
mean and is thus stationary. This argument is applicable to the health expenditure 
variables used in this study. Measuring government health expenditure as percentage 
of general government expenditure or GDP, levels are naturally bounded between 0 
and 100%. Further discussion is needed for the variable measuring expenditure as 
absolute spending per capita. Considering that over the recent years great emphasis 
has been placed on expanding health expenditure in developing countries, especially 
in relation to the Millennium Development Goals (Fryatt et al, 2010) and the emerging 
goals of universal health care (see section 1.1; pg. 6), it would be reasonable to expect 
that health expenditure trend upwards, not as a random variation, but as an upward 
trend, that is in the short- and long-term not mean stationary. As will be shown in more 
detail later on (chapter 7), most countries experience this trend over time, especially 
when measuring expenditure per capita. As was outlined before, the trend in the data 
can affect the data analysis for this project and needs to be controlled for. To do so, it 
appears that controlling for the trend using a time dummy is the best option in this 
study.  
6.1.2 Choice of Estimator 
When modelling panel data a number of estimators can be chosen, that vary in 
their assumptions about country-specific effects and their degree of data pooling. This 
section presents the most commonly used estimators and discusses their applicability 
to the present dataset. Options range from full pooling of all data points in a pooled 
regression where all data points are fully polled, over Fixed Effects as well as Random 
Effects estimators, where data is partially pooled to no pooling of the data. Not pooling 
the data would mean to model each of the cross-sections (observations of all countries 
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in one year) or each of the time-series (all time points of one country), separately. 
These are however not considered useful options in the context of this study for both 
theoretical and data reasons82. The section therefore focusses on discussing pooled 
regression and fixed as well as random effects models.  
6.1.2.1 Pooled Regression Model 
The arguably simplest approach to dealing with a panel dataset is by pooling 
all data points. The pooled regression model could be specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖 + 𝜷2𝑿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ( 6.1 ) 
In equation ( 6.1 ) yi describes the level of government health expenditure of 
each observation i. IMFi describes the value of the IMF dummy of each observation i. 
Xi is a vector of determinants of government health expenditure as identified in chapter 
5. α is the constant, β1 is the regression coefficient for the IMF dummy, β2 a vector of 
regression coefficients for the determinants of government health expenditure. εi is the 
idiosyncratic error of each observation i. 
Each coefficient (β) reports the independent effect of the variable on the 
outcome, holding all other variables in the model constant. The interpretation of the 
coefficients depends on their level of measurement. For binary predictors the 
regression coefficient describes the difference between the averages of both groups. 
Applied to the model in this study the coefficient β1 describes the difference in 
government health expenditure between countries in agreements and those without 
agreements. For continuous covariates the coefficient describes the effect of a one unit 
change on the outcome.  
The regression equation will be solved using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2005). This estimator relies, amongst other things, on the 
assumption that there is no latent heterogeneity between the countries (Greene, 2011). 
                                                 
82 When modelling each cross-section separately, the number of observations would be limited 
to N=127, which is quite low and gives the results of effects for one particular year. When 
modelling each time series separately, the results give an indication about the effects of 
agreements in individual countries, but not the overall sample of low- and middle-income 
countries as in intended in this study. Also the low number of observations of each country 
(T=18) make this analysis rather low powered. 
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This means that the individual observations are not independent of each other but 
linked by country and the observed values differ between individual countries. In the 
presence of latent heterogeneity, the OLS estimator of the pooled regression model 
will yield inconsistent results.  
6.1.2.2 Panel Data Estimators: Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimator 
Alternatives that model the country-specific effect can be seen in the Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects estimator, which make different assumptions about these 
effects. The model can be specified as follows for both estimators:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷2𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ( 6.2 ) 
In equation ( 6.2 ) yit describes the level of government health expenditure of 
each country i at time t. IMFit describes the value of the IMF dummy of each country 
i at time t. Xit is a vector of determinants of government health expenditure. αi is the 
constant, β1 is the regression coefficient for the IMF dummy, β2 a vector of regression 
coefficients for the determinants of health expenditure. εit is the idiosyncratic error of 
each country i at time t. εit is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables 
and to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ. The constant can be 
decomposed in to two parts where αi = α+μi. Where μi is the unobserved country-
specific effect. Assumptions that are made about µi differ between Fixed and Random 
Effects estimators (Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2014; Wooldridge, 2005).  
The Random Effects model assumes that the μi, capturing the unobserved 
country-specific effect, is random with a mean of 0 and a variance of σμ (see equation 
( 6.3 )).  
𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0; 𝜎𝜇) ( 6.3 ) 
It captures everything that is unmeasured and time-constant for each individual 
country. This means that intercepts vary for each country, suggesting that health 
expenditure levels are different for each country; the effect of the IMF however is seen 
to be the same across all countries. The random effects estimator assumes that the 
unobserved and time-constant effects captured in μi are independent of the independent 
variables Xit. If this assumption does not hold the model is mis-specified and the beta 
coefficients not correct (Baltagi, 2008). Random effects models can be estimated with 
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Generalised Least Squares (GLS) or Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).83 
The Fixed Effects estimator assumes μi to be a systematic component without 
a stochastic element (that is, no distribution), also referred to as a fixed parameter. This 
estimator allows for μi to be correlated with Xit and controls for all omitted time-
invariant variables. This is achieved by wiping out the country specific effect, which 
also means that the cross-sectional variation – between countries – is removed from 
the analysis and parameter estimates are based on the over-time variation in the 
independent variables. While the country-specific effect is still accounted for, it is not 
modelled explicitly. Fixed Effects models are estimated using the fixed, or within, 
estimator and can also be estimated using the so-called Least Square Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) estimator, by including a dummy variable for each of the countries into the 
pooled model estimated by OLS (Greene, 2011; Longhi and Nandi, 2015; Wooldridge, 
2005). 
6.1.2.3 Choosing the Right Estimator 
When choosing the right estimator in the context of this study, decisions need 
to be made at two stages. Firstly, it needs to be investigated whether or not the data 
can be pooled. And secondly, if this is not the case and country specific effects exist 
in the data, it needs to be decided whether these effects are considered random or fixed. 
The decision at the two stages can be made building on both theoretical as well as data-
driven arguments, using formal tests.  
Turning first to the decision about country-specific effects. The absence of 
country-specific effects would suggest that there is no systematic difference between 
the individual countries. This would for instance and looking only at the health 
expenditure variable suggest that government health expenditure levels would be 
comparable between individual countries. As will be shown in more detail in chapter 
7, this is however not the case, as some countries spend more money on health care 
                                                 
83 An extension to the Random Effects model can be seen in the random coefficients or random 
slope model, where not only the intercept is country specific but also the slope. This means 
that the model allows for the effect of individual covariates to differ between countries 
(Gelman and Hill, 2006; Greene, 2011; Robson and Pevalin, 2016).  
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than others. It can easily be seen that country-specific effects exist when inspecting the 
dependent variable univariately. While it is likely that these effects still persist when 
modelling the variables, this can also be tested more formally using the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects84 (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). It tests the 
null hypothesis that the variation of the country-specific effects in the random effects 
model equals zero. This means that if the null hypothesis holds, there are no country 
specific effects in the model and the data can be pooled. If the test result is statistically 
significant the null hypothesis of no country specific effects will be rejected in favour 
of the existence of these effects and pooling of the data would ignore the county 
specific effect (Baltagi, 2011). Performing this test for the given models suggests 
highly statistically significant results in all models (see Appendix Table 6.1; pg. 243). 
A pooled regression model should therefore not be used for this study. As was noted 
above, the Fixed Effects estimator, controlling for country-specific effects, can also be 
estimated using the LSDV estimator, which is a pooled OLS model with a dummy for 
each of the countries in the model. While this would be an appropriate estimator for 
the data, it is argued that the inclusion of 126 dummies and the estimation of their 
effects, cannot be seen as efficient.  
Having identified that the data cannot be pooled, the correct panel data 
estimator needs to be selected. This decision can again be made using both theory and 
data-driven arguments. Using a Random Effects estimator would allow to model an 
individual intercept for each of the countries, this means that the unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries’ health expenditure would be modelled. At the same 
time the slope and thus the effect of IMF agreements is similar across all countries. 
The Fixed Effects estimator accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity of health 
spending, but does not model it explicitly. This study is primarily interested in 
investigating the average effects of IMF agreements on government health 
expenditure. This means there is no interest in estimating the unobserved 
                                                 
84 It is worth pointing out that while the test is called a random effects test it only tests if unit-
specific (in this case country-specific) and thus unit (country) specific heterogeneity exists; it. 
does not test if effects are random (rather than fixed). 
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heterogeneity, it therefore does not have to be modelled. This suggests to use the Fixed 
Effects estimator. 
Turning to the data argument, it was suggested that the random effects 
estimator only produces correct estimates, when the unobserved country-specific 
effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. While this is a fairly strong 
assumption, it can be tested formally using the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The 
test is based on the assumption that in the absence of the correlation between country 
specific effect and the individual variables, both the random and the Fixed Effects 
estimators are correct. When there is a significant difference in the estimated 
coefficients, this assumption does not hold and a correlation should be expected, hence 
the random effects estimator is incorrect. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis 
that there is no systematic difference between the estimates of the Fixed and the 
Random Effects estimator. Rejecting the null would suggest that the Random Effects 
estimator is incorrect and the Fixed Effects estimator should be chosen (Greene, 2011; 
Longhi and Nandi, 2015). Applying the test to the data suggests generally highly 
statistically significant results (Appendix Table 6.2; pg. 243) and that the Fixed Effects 
estimator should be chosen. For a small number of models, the results are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that both the Fixed or the Random Effects estimator 
can be used. In order to allow for comparison across the models, all models will be 
fitted using the Fixed Effects Estimator. 
6.1.3 Further Panel Specifications: Serial and Contemporaneous 
Correlation, Panel Heteroscedasticity 
So far the section discussed issues around stationarity and the use of different 
estimators to model panel data. A number of other aspects need to be considered when 
modelling panel data. These have to do with the fact that the data points in panel data 
sets are not independent of each other, but measured repeatedly for the same country. 
This makes it unlikely that the error term is normally distributed with the mean zero 
and a variance that is constant across all observations (𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0; 𝜎)). It is more likely, 
that the data contain autocorrelation, but also panel heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence. In the presence of one or more of these characteristics in the 
model, the classic standard errors, which are used to draw inference and make 
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statements about “statistical significance” of a finding, are no longer correct (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009; Greene, 2011). To still obtain reliable results, the model needs to 
be adjusted to account for these characteristics in the data. This section builds on 
examples outlined by Beck and Katz (1995) to illustrate autocorrelation, cross-
sectional dependent and panel heteroscedasticity as well as approaches to deal with 
these structures in this study.  
6.1.3.1 Serial Correlation  
It is likely that the past realisations of a variable impact its value in the future. 
For instance, the level of health expenditure in a country at one year is most likely very 
closely correlated to the spending level in the next year. Similarly, a country’s level of 
national income, measured in GDP, is likely related to its next year’s level of income. 
That is to suggest that there is a temporal dependency of the data points, which 
indicates that the data is auto-correlated and the error term of the model serially 
correlated. This can result from two main data generation processes underlying the 
data, the autoregressive and the moving-average process. For economic data an 
autoregressive process is most commonly assumed85. Such a process can have different 
orders, which give an indication of how many past realisations have influence of the 
present (Baltagi, 2011).  
Given the use of annual data, a first-order autoregressive process is most likely 
the underlying process, as the previous year’s value informs the current year’s value. 
This can, however be tested visually and more formally. Visual inspection of 
corellograms provides information on the order of the process. For an autoregressive 
process of order one the partial autocorrelation (PACF) function will show a 
correlation only for the first lag (Cowpertwait and Metcalfe, 2009). While this 
approach allows to inspect autocorrelation of the time series univariately, 
autocorrelation appears as serial correlation of the error term of the fitted model. This 
suggests that autocorrelation is present in the data, when the error terms are correlated 
between time periods. Wooldridge (2002) proposes a suitable test for linear panel data, 
where he suggests to test for the serial correlation under the null hypothesis of no serial 
                                                 
85 Note that a moving average process can be modelled assuming a autoregressive process and 
vice versa. 
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correlation in the error term (Drukker, 2003). Using this test in combination with the 
visual inspection of the corellograms suggests a first-order autoregressive process in 
the data for this study (See Appendix Table 6.3 (pg. 243) for p-values of this test for 
each model).  
While various approaches exist in the literature to deal with autocorrelation 
(Baltagi, 2011), this study will follow the arguably most commonly used method of 
dealing with autocorrelation by including the lagged dependent variable as additional 
right-hand side variable in the model (Beck and Katz, 2011).  
6.1.3.2 Panel Heteroscedasticity and Contemporaneous Correlation 
Turning next to panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. It 
is likely that two or more countries’ experiences are similar because their economies 
are interlinked in one way or another or they are exposed to similar global trends. For 
instance, the trajectory of countries’ health expenditure in the same region might be 
very similar as countries are at similar levels of development or receive similar 
commitments from international donors. This fact that countries experience similar 
realisations at the same time is termed contemporaneous or cross-sectional correlation.  
Also, the extent to which the model fits the data might vary between countries. 
For instance, upper middle-income countries might have higher levels of health 
expenditure compared to countries of low-income. This suggests that the model shows 
panel heteroscedasticity. These examples show that panel heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependency likely exist in the dataset. Ignoring these structures would 
potentially lead to wrong results. For this study it is suggested to deal with these issues 
by choosing standard errors that relax the general assumptions of independence and 
allow for heteroscedasticity and spatial correlation.  
The probably most commonly known specification of a standard error, which 
relaxes the independency assumption is the robust standard error, proposed by White 
(1980), which estimates standard errors based on a robust covariance matric that 
allows for heteroscedasticity (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). An extension to this can be 
seen in the panel corrected standard errors, which are useful in situations where there 
is contemporaneous correlation as well as heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
This specification is commonly used in the quantitative political science literature and 
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applied especially in longer panels, as used in the context of this study. Panel corrected 
standard errors are only defined for OLS and can thus not be applied in this study. The 
procedure proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) is available for both OLS and Fixed 
Effects estimators and allows for panel heteroscedasticity as well as contemporaneous 
correlation of the errors (Hoechle, 2007). Given the possibility of these characteristics 
in the data, this definition of the standard errors is seen to be the most appropriate 
methods for this study.  
An alternative to the proposed approach can be seen in modelling the data using 
a feasible generalised least-square (FGLS) estimator, as introduced by Parks (1967) 
and applied by Kmenta (1986), which allows for heteroscedasticity, temporal and 
cross-sectional dependence of the data. This approach however is infeasible for 
datasets where the cross-sectional dimension is larger than the time component 
(Hoechle, 2007), as is the case for this study. Additionally, (Beck and Katz, 1995) 
show that this method produces unacceptably small standard errors and therefore 
misleading results on statistical significance.  
6.1.4 Summary of the Method to Model Government Health Expenditure  
This section set out to justify the methods chosen to model government health 
expenditure. It firstly discussed stationarity as an important precondition for modelling 
panel data, then turned to discussing different estimator options before considering 
autocorrelation, panel heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence as further 
panel specifications. It was argued that while potentially not non-stationary in the 
strictest sense the present data exhibit a time trend as spending increases over time. It 
was suggested to account for this trend using a time dummy. Out of the different 
estimators available for the models, it was shown that country heterogeneity is present 
in the data. As there is no explicit interest in modelling this heterogeneity, it was argued 
that the Fixed Effects estimator is the best choice for this model. Using theoretical 
reasoning and appropriate tests it was shown that the data exhibit first order 
autocorrelation, panel heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. It was 
argued to account for autocorrelation using a lag of the dependent variable and adjust 
the standard errors for panel heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence using 
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.  
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It is worth noting that including a lag of the dependent variable turns a panel 
model into a “dynamic” panel model. A common problem with dynamic panel models 
estimated with Fixed Effects is the so-called Nickell bias. It was first described by 
Nickell (1981) and is caused by the correlation of the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term. The estimator is inconsistent when the number of units (in this study 
the number of countries; N) increases while the number of time-series observations (in 
this study the number of years observed; T) is limited. The magnitude of this bias 
decreases as the number of years observed increases but remains a concern as long as 
T<N. As a result the value of the t-statistic of the coefficient, used to estimate the p-
value and thus the statistical significance of a variable, is biased upwards, which means 
that a result is more likely to be found to be statistically significant than it would be in 
the absence of the bias (Beck et al, 2014; Gaibulloev et al, 2014). The dataset of this 
study presents a situation, similar to most work in comparative politics, where T<N 
(N=127 countries observed over N=18 years) so that the Nickell bias is a potential 
concern for the results.  
Beck et al (2014) show that the size of the Nickell bias decreases as T increases 
and suggest that in a common study in comparative politics, such as this present study, 
the bias is negligible as it is fairly small. They also point out that the bias mostly affects 
the standard errors in such a way that results more easily turn statistically significant 
in the presence of the bias. The bias will thus not affect the estimated effect size of the 
IMF agreement but might turn results statistically significant, which would not be 
significant in the absence of the bias. Given the vastly non-statistically significant 
findings in this study (see chapters 8 and 9) this seems to be a minor problem86.  
Alternatively, the problem could be dealt with using a generalised methods of 
moments (GMM) procedure (Baltagi, 2008), which was arguably first described by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and uses the orthogonality conditions between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term as instruments. Fitting these types of models is 
difficult due to the high complexity of the GMM procedure and is therefore seen to be 
                                                 
86 Assuming that the Nickell bias actually affected the results, it would change the results to 
suggest that social protection agreements do not have a statistically significant positive effect 
on government health expenditure in LIC, but no effect at all. 
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beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, the literature in the field also commonly 
uses the fixed-effects estimator. Only one study (Clements et al, 2013) exists, that uses 
the GMM estimator and, comparing the results to the traditional fixed-effects 
estimator, shows that results are similar for both the GMM and the Fixed Effects 
estimator.  
6.2 Dealing with the Selection Problem 
While regression methods are capable of accounting for differences between 
individuals by controlling for these differences, they are not always capable of 
producing convincing estimates of effects when the variable of interest is endogenous, 
as is the case in this study, and other techniques need to be used (Angrist and Pischke, 
2015). It is worth noting that while the use of the Fixed Effects estimator accounts for 
some of endogeneity, particularly when the underlying selection process is constant 
over time (Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina, 2007), it does not account for all of it 
and other methods are needed to account for the remaining part (Vella, 1998). Broadly 
speaking three main methods to account for selection bias can be identified: 
instrumental variables, matching and selection models. For this project the use of a 
selection model is seen as the most appropriate method to account for the selection 
problem. To demonstrate this, the following sections briefly outline the methods of 
instrumental variables and matching to show why these are not considered for this 
study. After this, the selection model approach will be outlined in more detail and the 
modelling procedure for this study presented.  
6.2.1 Instrumental Variables Approach 
An instrumental variable approach to dealing with endogeneity and selection 
bias is commonly used in the field of economics (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). It is 
argued that in the presence of endogeneity the error term of a regression model is 
correlated with one or more of the independent variables. The instrumental variable 
approach deals with this situation by introducing a new variable, the instrumental 
variable, or instrument, that is correlated with the endogenous independent variable 
but not with the outcome variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2015; Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009; Wooldridge, 2005). In the context of this study this means that factors that have 
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an impact on government health expenditure also have an impact on the independent 
variables in the model, particularly the IMF dummy variable. It is easy to see that, for 
instance, changes in health spending are a result of changes in economic conditions in 
a country, but that these changes in economic conditions have an impact on entering 
into an IMF agreement. When using an instrumental variable approach in this study an 
instrument would need to be identified, which is associated with the IMF dummy 
variable but not with the health expenditure variable. In other words, a factor would 
need to be found that affects a country entering into an IMF agreement, but does not 
have an impact on health spending. Due to the intertwined nature of economic and 
political circumstance and IMF agreements but also between economic and political 
circumstances and health spending, it is hard to see how such an instrument could be 
identified from the available dataset. It appears that the instrumental variable approach 
breaks down in this study as no valid instrument can be identified. The instrumental 
variables approach cannot be used in this study. 
6.2.2 Matching Approach 
Another method to reduce selection bias, traditionally used in the medical 
science literature, and increasingly gaining importance in applied econometrics and 
the evaluation of social programmes is the method of matching (Heckman and 
Navarro-Lozano, 2004; Kluve and Augurzky, 2004). The ideas underlying the 
matching approach are most closely linked to the principle of the like-with-like 
comparison. When two subjects are comparable and one was exposed to a treatment 
and the other was not, the difference in outcome of both is attributable to the 
intervention. In the presence of selection bias subjects in treatment and non-treatment 
group are not immediately comparable due to the systematic difference between those 
that receive the treatment and those that do not. The matching approach attempts to 
find pairs of subjects that are judged to be comparable based on a number of 
observables. Once cases are matched they are seen to be comparable and differences 
in their outcome can be attributed to the treatment.  
While traditionally the process is done by matching units on their vector of 
observable covariates (Dehjia and Wahba, 2002), an increasingly popular approach is 
the propensity score matching, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who 
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argue that a balancing score can be created as a function of the observed covariates. 
This balancing score is called the propensity score and describes the propensity of a 
case to receive treatment. Treated and untreated cases are then matched on the 
propensity score.  
Applied to the present study on the IMF, the idea would be to match countries 
that are under agreements with countries that are not under agreements but have a 
similar propensity of entering into an agreement based on a number of observable 
variables. These observables are likely to be a number of agreement determinants 
previously identified in the chapter 4. In the IMF literature, this approach is used in 
only two studies on effects of agreements on economic factors (Atoyan and Conway, 
2006; Garuda, 2000), as it appears to suffer from two main faults that make its 
application difficult. Firstly, being able to match countries relies on the fact that there 
are countries in comparable economic conditions, with one country entering into an 
agreement and the other country not entering. It can be seen that this is likely the case 
for a smaller number of countries, however it should be assumed that most of the 
countries in agreements are not experiencing economic conditions similar to those 
countries not in agreements. This is shown by Atoyan and Conway (2006), who argue 
that using the matching approach meant to reduce the size of their sample as only a 
small subset of countries could be matched in this way. Secondly, matching is based 
on characteristics in observable variables only. This means that country characteristics 
that have not been observed or cannot be observed are not part of the matching process. 
It is however likely, that the decision to enter into agreements is at least partly due to 
unobservable characteristics (Vreeland, 2003). Taken these arguments together, it 
appears that matching is unlikely a useful approach to deal with endogeneity and 
selection bias in this study.  
6.2.3 Selection Model Approach 
A third approach to deal with selection bias – and the one proposed for this 
study, also commonly used in similar work in the field – is the adaptation of a selection 
model. The name originates from the idea that the studied sample is not randomly 
drawn but represents a selected sample, where certain cases deliberately participate 
whilst others do not. A number of different such sample selection models have been 
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described in the literature (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The most commonly used 
type of selection model is based on Heckman’s (1979) seminal publication. He states 
that the selection problem can be considered a problem of specification error in the 
way that it represents an omitted variable problem. He argues that, as usual, estimation 
results are not reliable when variables are omitted from the model. While it is usually 
not possible to capture and observe this omitted variable, in the case of self-selection 
which introduces the problem of selection bias, it is sometimes possible to estimate 
the variable that, when omitted, will give rise to the specification error in the regression 
analysis. This means that the value of the omitted variables needs to be estimated and 
this estimated value then be included as additional independent variable into the main 
regression.  
In relation to this study this means that participation in IMF agreements is seen 
as a result of self-selection87 and thus correct estimation of the effects of agreements 
on government health expenditure not possible due to the omitted variable that 
explains selection. This variable, however, can be estimated by identifying variables 
that determine the participation of a country at a certain time in an IMF agreement. 
Doing so will allow to estimate the value of the omitted variable, which will then be 
included as additional variable in the main regression of health expenditure and IMF 
agreements (as was outlined in Section 6.1; pg. 216). 
This reasoning supports the use of a Heckman-style88 two-stage estimation 
process. In the first stage a model is estimated to predict the outcome of selection using 
its determinants. These predictions of the first stage regression will be used to create 
the Inverse-Mills-Ratio (IMR). This will then, in the second stage be included in the 
main regression as additional independent variable to model government health 
expenditure.  
                                                 
87 Note that “self-selection” in this context is used as a technical term where some countries 
select to enter into agreements while others do not. It does not mean to suggest that countries 
self-select to be in an agreement.  
88 It should be noted that, the approach taken in this study – in line with the wider literature in 
the field – is referred to as Heckman-style as it is not an exact replication of the approach 
described by Heckman (1979). See Appendix Note 6.1; pg. 244.  
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6.2.3.1 Panel Data and the Selection Problem 
As the approach suggested by Heckman is designed to work with cross-
sectional data, its adaptability to the panel data structure of this study needs to be 
considered. Over the recent years a number of advanced and complex econometrical 
approaches to deal with selection in panel data settings have been developed in the 
theoretical literature; for an overview see for instance Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2010), Wooldridge (2002) or Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007). 
Implementing these methods in the present study is difficult for two main reasons. 
Firstly, common to all these models is the fact that they are not implemented in 
standard statistics software as is used for this study. Secondly, the models have a high 
degree of complexity which makes their implementation in software difficult. 
Extensive literature searches including relevant forums, such as “Statalist”89, did not 
provide additional information. This shows that these methods are beyond the 
approaches currently available to empirical studies. Additionally, it appears that the 
methods do not seem to be applied in empirical studies. Extensive literature searches 
did not yield a single empirical study that employs these methods. Outside the realm 
of theoretical econometrics, the topic seems to have received only limited attention, as 
a discussion of the panel element to the selection equation is generally missing from 
empirical studies on effects of IMF agreements on health and health systems.  
While an implementation of a full panel selection model does not seem possible 
for this study, the panel element of the selection equation deserves some more 
consideration as the additional dimension, capturing time, in the data brings new 
issues. The most important of these is the mechanism of selection. Following the 
argument put forward by Greene (2011), it is worth considering the traditional setting 
of selection bias, which arises from non-random selection into a certain programme. 
This selection mechanism operates once based on a number of characteristics. Once 
selection has been completed, the status does not change; no deselection and/or re-
selection occurs. In the case of the present study, the selection mechanism is – as will 
be shown empirically in chapter 7 – a more complex one. This is because countries 
commonly become IMF countries at one point in time, remain in agreements for a 
                                                 
89 Statalist is an expert online forum to discuss issues around Stata and statistics. 
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given period of time, before “deselecting” from the agreement and potentially re-select 
into agreements at a later point. Due to this continuous selection mechanism, a simple 
cross-sectional approach, where selection is determined and corrected for using 
information from one cross-section at the beginning of the panel does not seem to be 
the right approach. It appears that due to the dynamic nature of the selection 
mechanism the entire dataset with years and countries should be considered to estimate 
the selection equation. Two main approaches seem possible90: (i) pooling of all data 
points across countries and years and (ii) estimation of the selection equation 
repeatedly for each of the cross-sections. These approaches should be considered in 
turn. 
An approach to estimate selection repeatedly for each cross-section is for 
instance put forward by Wooldridge (1995) in his model for selection correction for 
panel data. This approach implies estimating individual models based on repeated 
cross-sections, this means that the probability of a country being in an agreement 
would be estimated separately for each year in the study. Put differently, for each year 
a single regression model would be run to estimate the probability of a country being 
in an agreement, using information only from this particular year. The alternative 
approach would be pooling all data points in one overall model. Probabilities of 
countries being in agreements will be estimated not only using information from a 
given year but using information from all countries and years. Given that the present 
dataset has only 127 observations for each cross-section, it seems likely that an 
analysis including all cross-sections is statistically more powerful compared to 
repeated models as the pooling of the data will increase the number of observations. 
The pooled approach to the selection equation can be seen as the most useful and will 
be chosen for this study.  
6.2.3.2 Estimating the Selection Equation 
Having discussed the conceptual issues behind dealing with selection bias for 
this study, this section outlines the process of estimating the selection equation. The 
first stage of the estimation process involves the estimation of a country’s probability 
                                                 
90 A third approach could be seen in the modelling of the selection equation using a panel probit 
model. 
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of being in an IMF agreement at a given year based on a number of determinants. This 
probability will be used to create the Inverse Mills Ratio, which in turn will be used as 
additional variable in the main regression model in order to correct for selection bias. 
To identify the probability, a regression model will be utilised. While regression 
models generally can serve two purposes, that of identifying the influence of individual 
variables on the outcome, and that of predicting an outcome based on a number of 
variables, the focus of this regression model is on predicting the outcome of IMF 
agreements, using a number of covariates. The outcome variable of this model is the 
IMF agreement dummy, which is 1 in case a country is in a (specific) agreement at a 
given time, and 0 otherwise. This outcome will be predicted using a number of 
covariates, that act as determinants of IMF agreements (see chapter 5).  
Given that the outcome variable of this model is binary (Agreement on/off), 
regression techniques for binary outcome variables need to be chosen. The two most 
prominent approaches for this type of outcome variable are logistic and probit 
regression91 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Heckman (1979) argues that for the purpose 
of the selection model the error term should follow a normal distribution, an 
assumption that is made in probit models, not however in logistic regression. For the 
purpose of this study, a probit model will be chosen. The model will be solved using 
maximum likelihood estimation and takes the form of: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝛾𝒁𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 ( 6.4 ) 
Where si is the agreement dummy of observation i, which can take the value of 
1 when a observation is selected or 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of determinants of the 
selection of observation i used to predict participation or selection. γ is the estimated 
coefficient of vector Zi. ξi is the idiosyncratic error. 
As was discussed previously, the selection correction will be based on a 
pooling of all data points across years and countries. Similar to the linear regression 
model outlined before (section 6.1.3; pg. 225), it is likely that assumptions about 
individual distribution of the data points are violated. Correlation and 
                                                 
91 Other less commonly used approaches are the linear probability and the complementary log-
log model (Greene, 2011). 
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heteroscedasticity are likely problems. To account for this, the model will be estimated 
using cluster-robust standard errors, which relax the independence assumption92. This 
can however be seen as a minor issue, as the focus of this regression model is on 
predicting the outcome rather than estimating the influence of individual coefficients. 
When fitting the model, two aspects, the choice of variables in the model and 
the choice of lags of these variables, need to be considered. While a number of 
variables have been identified in the previous literature review as potential 
determinants of IMF agreements, the literature does not offer a commonly accepted 
model93. Which variables provide the best determinants in this particular study using 
the given dataset cannot be determined theoretically but needs to be identified by 
fitting different models and varying the determinants included in these models.  
A similar statement will be made about the number of lags in the model. 
Countries are seen to have IMF agreements based on a number of determinants, the 
trajectory of these determinants might play a role in the decision to enter into an 
agreement. For instance, the agreement might be a result of the deterioration of 
economic performance in the previous years. While a number of studies include one 
lag of the determinants into their models, to suggest that the agreement is a result of 
the previous year’s performance, the study by Garuda (2000) includes three lags. 
Which lag structure is appropriate for the model cannot be determined theoretically 
but needs to be identified empirically using the given dataset. 
So far it was argued that the choice of model will be based on the “best model”. 
It was not discussed how the goodness of a model will be determined. The literature 
describes a number of specification and goodness of fit measures. These include a 
likelihood-ratio test, for nested model, or the use of the Bayesian or Akaike 
information criterion, for non-nested models, as well as pseudo R² values (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009; Harrell, 2015). Given the goal of this regression model to correctly 
predict involvement in IMF agreements, it seems that – in line with the empirical 
                                                 
92 Heteroscedasticity was considered as potential issue. However, testing for heteroscedasticity 
in the main model suggested that this is not a problem in the model (Harvey, 1976). 
93 It was argued that there seems to be an established model in the IMF and health expenditure 
literature, which can be used as benchmark for this study. However, other combinations of 
determinants are possible.  
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literature in the field – an estimate of the correct prediction is the most suitable measure 
of goodness of the model. In this approach the actually observed classification of the 
outcome is compared the predicted classification. The ideal model would be capable 
of classifying all cases with agreements observed in the data as such. The percentage 
of correctly classified cases can be estimated and the goal would be a high percentage 
of correctly classified cases (Pempel, 2000). The result of this classification percentage 
is sensitive to the cut-off point, at which a predicted probability is considered an “on” 
case. The literature suggests to set the cut-off point to the percent of cases with positive 
outcome (Harrell, 2015). This approach will be followed in this study. 
Outside the realm of goodness of fit, an additional consideration – that of data 
availability – needs to be made when fitting the model. From a statistical as well as 
substantive point of view a high number of cases should be in the models. It will be 
argued that for this study, retaining a high number of cases in a model is seen as 
additional goal. This may mean that trade-offs need to be made when fitting the model. 
For instance, including an additional variable might increase the percentage of 
correctly classified cases, but at the same time reduce the number of cases in the model. 
The literature does not provide guidance on dealing with such trade-offs. A decision 
will need to be made based on the individual model at hand. 
Once the best model for this study has been identified linear predictions can be 
made. Out of these predictions the Inverse Mills Ratio will be created. This means to 
estimate the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distribution 
function of a standard normal distribution of the linear predictions and is a monotone 
decreasing function of the probability that the observation is participating in an 
agreement. To obtain the results free of selection bias, the IMR will then be included 
as additional right-hand side variable in the main regression, which will be estimated 
as was suggested in section 6.1. 
6.3 Summary of the Chapter and Estimation Strategy 
This chapter set out to present the methods to reliably answer the research 
questions. This final section summarises the chapter and draws out an estimation 
strategy for this study. 
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6.3.1 Summary of this Chapter  
To answer the research questions of this study two methodological challenges 
need to be dealt with. Firstly, a methodology was developed to create a counterfactual 
in the panel data setting of this study. Secondly, an approach was devised to deal with 
the problem of selection and endogeneity. Considering a number of alternatives, it was 
argued that a Heckman-style selection model is the most appropriate approach to deal 
with selection and endogeneity. To create a counterfactual and model health 
expenditure it was shown that a Fixed Effects estimator was the most appropriate 
choice. To account for the time trend in the data, a time dummy was introduced. 
Autocorrelation will be controlled for using a lag of the dependent variable as 
additional right hand side variable. To allow for panel heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation Driscoll and Kraay standard errors will be estimated.  
6.3.2 Estimation Strategy 
This study follows a two-step estimation strategy. In the first step the selection 
equation will be estimated to obtain predictions of a country being in an IMF 
agreement. To do so, a pooled probit model is estimated using the IMF dummy as 
dependent variable that is being explained using a number of economic and political 
variables, which have been identified as determinants of IMF agreements. A number 
of different combinations of these determinants and lags of them will be empirically 
tested to identify the most suitable model for the study. A model will be deemed most 
suitable when it can classify a great number of cases correctly into agreement and non-
agreement cases and at the same time not eliminate too many cases. The selection 
equation is fitted for all agreements as well as for each of the agreement clusters 
specifically. 
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For the second step, linear predictions of this model will be used to create the 
Inverse Mills Ratio that captures the probability of a country being in an agreement. 
The Inverse Mills Ratio will be included as additional right hand side variable in the 
main equation, which will model health expenditure and identify the unbiased effect 
of IMF agreements on health expenditure. This means to estimate the following 
regression using the Fixed Effects estimator:  
HEit describes government health expenditure of country i at time period t. HEit-
1 is included as a right-hand side variable as the lagged effect of HEit to account for 
first order autocorrelation between the measures of health expenditure. IMFit is the 
agreement “treatment” variable which indicates if country i is in an agreement at time 
t. Xit is a vector describing health expenditure determinants of country i at time t. λit is 
the Inverse-Mills-Ratio of country i at time t. t is the time dummy to control for trends 
in the dependent variable, α the constant and εit the error term. β0-4 are the regression 
coefficients, whereby β1 is the coefficient of main interest for this study holding the 
effect of IMF agreements on government health expenditure.  
This equation will be estimated for each of the government health expenditure 
variables (HE/GDP, HE/GGE, HE/cap). Government health expenditure can only take 
positive values and is in the case of the HE/GDP and HE/GGE variables, bounded 
from 0 to 100. Linear regression requires that the dependent variable is unbounded94 
(Wooldridge, 2005). The boundedness of the dependent variable will be removed by 
log-transforming the variables.  
To answer the research questions outlined in chapter 1, individual models will 
be run, which include all countries as well as the sub-groups of different income 
groups. Additionally, different models will be estimated for the two main facility 
clusters, these models will again be divided by income groups. 
In order to judge the goodness of fit of the models, the coefficient of 
determination (R²) will be used as it represent the most commonly used measure for 
                                                 
94 Unboundedness means that the variable can, theoretically, take any value between minus 
and plus infinity. 
𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷2𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ( 6.5 ) 
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linear models. This measure describes the proportion of the variation of the dependent 
variable, government health expenditure, that is explained by the independent 
variables in the model (Verbeek, 2012). For panel data the R² value can be decomposed 
into a within and between value, reflecting the different dimensions of the data. The 
within R² explains the variation within countries over time. The between R² describes 
the explained variation between countries. Given that the interest of this study is in 
explaining differences within countries over time, the within R² value will be used as 
goodness of fit indicator.  
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Appendices to Chapter 6 
Appendix Table 6.1: Breusch and Pagan LM test 
 All countries LIC LMIC UMIC 
All Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/GGE <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SBA/EFF Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/GGE <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Social Protection Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/GGE <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Appendix Table 6.2: Hausman Test 
 All countries LIC LMIC UMIC 
All Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.036 
HE/CAP <0.001 0.002 <0.001 0.007 
HE/GGE <0.001 0.142 <0.001 <0.001 
SBA/EFF Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.140 
HE/CAP <0.001 0.014 <0.001 0.638 
HE/GGE <0.001 0.119 0.996 <0.001 
Social Protection Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 0.700 <0.001 0.831 
HE/GGE <0.001 0.158 0.005 0.003 
Appendix Table 6.3: Wooldridge test 
 All countries LIC LMIC UMIC 
All Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/GGE <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SBA/EFF Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/GGE <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 
Social Protection Agreements 
HE/GDP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/CAP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
HE/GGE <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
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Appendix Note 6.1: on Heckman-style selection model 
The origins of the Heckman selection model go back to the empirical challenge of estimating 
wage equations. For instance, estimating the effect of education on wages for females. Wage as a 
variable is only observed for those females that are participating in the labour market, and therefore a 
selected sample, which is likely not representative of the entire sample of women. The decision to 
participate in the labour market might be affected by women’s education. Heckman (1979) suggests to 
correct for the self-selection bias by estimating the probability of entering into the selected sample based 
on appropriate characteristics. Turn this probability into the IMR and include this IMR as additional 
variable into the main regression model. Given that the outcome of this regression model is only 
observed for the selected sample (for instance, women participating in the labour market), only 
observations in this sample will be part of the regression model.  
In the context of the IMF agreement study this would mean that only countries in agreements 
would be included in the models. This means that only those cases for which the agreement dummy 
equals 1 are included in the model. The dummy variable therefore becomes a constant and drops out of 
the model. The effect of agreements on health expenditure can thus not be estimated.  
For the case where the interest is in the effect of the intervention, an adaptation of this approach 
is proposed in the literature (see for instance Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), which has also been used 
in the study by Vreeland (2003). The intuition is as follows. First, estimate the selection equation across 
the complete sample. Second, estimate the regression equation for only the sub-sample of cases 
participating in the intervention (in this study, this would be the sub-sample of countries that have 
agreements) based on covariates and the IMR from the selection equation. Predict the outcome (in this 
study, government health expenditure) based on the covariates, excluding the IMR. Third, also estimate 
the regression equation for only the subsample of cases not participating in the intervention (countries 
not having agreements) based on covariates plus IMR. Again, predict the outcome as above. Fourth, 
estimate the effect of the intervention (in this case, IMF agreement) based on the difference between 
the predicted outcome of participating countries minus non-participating countries.  
Atoyan and Conway (2006) show that this approach is similar to estimating the selection 
equation across the entire sample and then also estimating the main equation across the entire sample 
including the IMR into the model. The effect of the intervention can then be obtained from the point 
estimate of the intervention variable (in this case agreement dummy) and its standard error. This is the 
approach used in this study and the wider literature in the field.  
Beyond this, the approach taken here seems to have advantages over the long approach 
presented above. Apart from the fact that the latter approach is easier to estimate as only one main 
regression needs to be estimated it also seems to remove one level of uncertainty. When predicting the 
outcome based on a regression, the predicted outcome will be presented as point estimate of the 
outcome, around which uncertainty exists in the form of the standard error of the prediction. When 
estimating the intervention effect as the difference of the two point estimates of the predicted outcomes, 
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the standard error of the prediction will not be considered further. This means that the level of 









 Stylised Facts 
This chapter is the first of the results part of this study. It aims to give a first 
insight into the distribution of IMF agreements, the main independent variable of this 
study, and government health expenditure, the study’s dependent variable along with 
their bivariate relationship. To do so, the chapter is organised into four parts. The first 
part presents univariate analyses of the IMF agreement dummy variables, presenting 
their distribution and trends. The second part analyses the government health 
expenditure variable to draw out spending levels and trends over time, and to 
investigate time-series dynamics of the spending variables. The third part provides 
results of bivariate analyses of health expenditure and IMF dummies derived from 
aggregate level and individual country time series, as well as simple regression models. 
Part four concludes the chapter, suggesting that the effects of agreement on 
government health spending appear to be rather minor and not entirely one-directional.  
7.1 Analysis of Agreement Dummies 
This section provides an overview of the distribution of agreements across 
countries and their dynamics over time. To do so, the frequency of agreements overall, 
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specific lending facilities and the identified agreement clusters (see Section 1.2.3; pg. 
13) are presented alongside their trends over time.  
7.1.1 Agreements and Lending Facilities Across Countries 
This section investigates the distribution of agreements, individual lending 
facilities and agreement clusters across countries. Chapter 5 outlined that this study is 
based on N=127 countries over the time of T=18 years from 1995 to 2012, or 
N*T=2286 case-years. 36.2% of the case-years are in agreements. 23.9% are in social 
protection agreements, 11.6% are in SBA/EFF agreements and 0.7% are in emergency 
agreements during this time. See Table 7.1 for frequencies.  
Lending Facility Cluster/Lending 
Facility/all Agreements LIC LMIC UMIC Total 
Social Protection Agreements 428 109 10 547 
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) 0 4 0 4 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF) 427 105 10 542 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 1 0 0 1 
SBA/EFF Agreements 33 155 77 265 
Standby Arrangement (SBA) 16 117 62 195 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 17 38 15 70 
Emergency Agreements 5 1 10 16 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) 0 0 0 0 
Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) 0 0 0 0 
Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF) 5 1 0 6 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL) 0 0 8 8 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) 0 0 2 2 
All agreements 466 265 97 828 
no agreement 444 653 361 1,458 
Total 910 918 458 2,286 
Table 7.1: Frequency of Agreements by Income Group, Lending Facility and Lending Facility Cluster  
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Comparing across income groups9596 it appears that frequencies of agreements 
vary with income. While more than half of the country-cases of low-income countries 
(LIC) are in agreements (51.2%), the share declines to 28.9% in lower-middle income 
(LMIC) countries and is lowest for upper-middle income countries (UMIC) (21.2%).  
When looking in more detail at the individual lending facilities and agreement 
clusters, it can be seen that lending is conducted through various agreement types and 
all facility clusters. The newly established facilities under the emergency agreement 
cluster see only limited uptake with most of these agreements being entered into in 
UMIC. Social Protection Agreements are most commonly, but not exclusively, used 
in LIC and lending most commonly conducted through the ECF. Agreements under 
the SBA/EFF cluster are commonly, but not exclusively, used in LMIC, with the SBA 
the most commonly used facility.  
7.1.2 Lending across Time 
The distribution of agreements and lending facilities varies not only between 
countries, but also across time. On average there are 46 agreements in any given year, 
however, the frequency of agreements varies over time and seemingly in relation to 
global needs for finance. The Economist (2009) suggests that IMF lending appeared 
“unnecessary in a world flush with private capital”, which is in line with the steep 
decline of IMF lending between 2003 and 2008. With the advent of the financial crisis, 
which proved disastrous for many emerging economies, the IMF was again a much 
sought after lender and agreement numbers started to rise for the following two years 
(See also chapter 1).  
                                                 
95 This study includes low- and middle-income countries. In line with the World Bank 
classification of countries (World Bank, 2014b) and thereby distinguishes countries into low-
income, lower-middle and upper-middle income countries. While the study by (Clements et al, 
2013) on the effects of IMF agreements on health expenditure does not distinguish between 
lower- and upper-middle income countries, this division is commonly used in academic 
research and a standard way of dividing the diverse set of middle-income countries (World 
Bank, 2014b). It is therefore also applied in this study.   
96 Note that a country’s income group is determined each year based on the World Bank’s 
annual definition. See Appendix Table 7.1 (pg. 283) for income group levels by country and 
year. Similar results are, however, obtained when using the countries’ income group in 1995. 
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While there is some variation in the frequency with which individual facilities 
are being used, it can generally be seen that throughout the years the Extended Credit 
Facility (as part of the social protection agreements cluster) and the Standby 
Agreement (as part of the SBA/EFF agreement cluster) are the main instruments for 
lending. Some fluctuation can be seen with the Extended Fund Facility, which appears 
to lose importance over the period from 1995 to 2005 but is more frequently used from 
2010 onwards. The newly established emergency agreements (ESF, FCL and SCF) see 
a small take up after their introduction in 2009. See Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Number of Agreements per Year and by Lending Facility. 
Turning from the aggregate level to the individual country level it can be seen 
that the amount of time countries in agreements varies between income groups. During 
the study period, countries received IMF agreements for between none and all 18 
years. When dividing the countries along their income grouping the following picture 
emerges. With on average 10 years, low-income countries have the longest spells in 
agreements. Lower-middle income countries are in agreements on average 6.5 years 
and upper-middle income countries on average 3 years. It is worth noting that despite 
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differences across income groups, differences also exist within each of the income 




Total LIC LMIC UMIC 
Median 10 6.5 3 6 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 18 16 13 18 
Table 7.2: Years in Agreements by Income Group 
7.1.3 Summary of Agreement Dummy Analyses 
Summing up this univariate analysis of agreements, a few key points emerge. 
The IMF is generally a constant lender of the last resort in the countries included in 
this study. This applies both across time as well as across countries. It can be shown 
that the IMF’s lending activities are mostly constant across time with slight variation 
in response to changes in global economic performance. The IMF is a fairly constant 
lender in low-income countries, where individual countries are receiving loans 
throughout the entire study period. The IMF is less frequently lending to lower-middle 
income and least frequently lending to upper-middle income countries. Across the 
study period the Extended Credit Facility (a social protection agreement) and the 
Standby Agreement (a SBA/EFF agreement) are the most commonly used lending 
facilities. Newly introduced agreement types, especially those in the emergency 
agreement cluster, are used only rarely. 
7.2 Government Health Expenditure: Trajectories and Time Series 
Dynamics 
This section provides results of univariate analyses of the government health 
expenditure variables across time and countries and is organised into two parts. It first 
investigates levels and trends of government health expenditure across countries, 
before inspecting trends and time series dynamics of individual countries. Analyses 
are based on all three measures of government health expenditure, outlined in section 
5.1.2 (pg. 179): (i) government health expenditure is measures as percentage of GDP 
(HE/GDP), providing an indicator of how much of the economy’s output is dedicated 
to publically financed health care, (ii) government health expenditure as per capita 
spending in PPP Dollars (HE/cap) to provide an assessment of how much money in 
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absolute terms is on average dedicated to an individual within a country, and (iii) 
government health expenditure as percentage of general government health 
expenditure (HE/GGE), as indicator of the importance of health spending within the 
public sector.  
7.2.1 Aggregate Government Health Expenditure Levels and Trends 
This section reports levels and trends of government health expenditure as 
aggregate across the study countries as a whole and divided by income groups. To 
allow for immediate comparisons between the three health expenditure variables, 
results are presented alongside each other.  
For all countries and the time period of 1995-2012, 2274 data points were 
available for the health expenditure as share of GDP as well as per capita variables are 
available. 2268 data points are available for the expenditure as share of government 
expenditure variable. Pooling all data across all countries and years it appears that the 
countries spent between as little as 0.01% (Iraq in 1997) and as much as 19.81% 
(Marshal Islands in 2000) and on average 3.01% (Std. Dev. 1.96%) of their GDP on 
publically financed health care. In terms of per capita spending this is between as little 
as 0.080 $ PPP (Iraq in 1996) and as much as 1017.14 $ PPP (Hungary in 2006) and 
on average 144.52 $ PPP (Std. Dev. 159.43 $ PPP). In relation to general government 
expenditure, this measures between 0.99% (Myanmar in 2005) and 34.41% (Solomon 
Islands in 2001) and on average 10.30% (Std. Dev. 4.31%).  
Decomposing the standard deviation further into its components of within 
variation, which measures the variation within one country over time, and the between 
variation, which captures the variation of expenditure between individual countries 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009), suggests that government health expenditure is both 
time- and country variant and varies more between countries than it does over time 
within one country (see Table 7.3). This is likely to reflect the level of heterogeneity 
between all countries included in the study. To explore this further, the countries were 
divided into income groups. 
Inspecting spending levels separately by income group shows that, across all 
measurements of government health expenditure, LIC spend least on health care 
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followed by LMIC and UMIC. The differences between LMIC and UMIC, however, 
are much smaller than that between LIC and LMIC/UMIC countries. The differences 
are most pronounced for the per capita measure where LIC spend only around a fifth 
of LMIC, and UMIC spend more than double the amount of LMIC (see Table 7.3).  
  Std. Dev.   
Country Set Mean Overall Between Within n Countries 
Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP [in %] 
overall 3.01 1.96 1.83 0.71 2274 127 
LIC 2.23 1.21 1.05 0.72 900 68 
LMIC 3.52 2.47 2.06 0.7 916 85 
UMIC 3.54 1.44 1.85 0.45 458 50 
Government Health Expenditure per Capita [in $ PPP] 
overall 144.52 159.43 150.49 53.98 2274 127 
LIC  30.05 26.09 29.93 10.28 900 68 
LMIC 147.99 93.55 98.13 36.55 916 85 
UMIC 362.53 184.69 153.46 85.16 458 50 
Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of General Government Expenditure [in %] 
overall 10.30 4.32 3.70 2.30 2268 127 
LIC  9.55 4.39 3.59 2.74 900 68 
LMIC 10.76 4.13 3.93 1.82 910 85 
UMIC 10.87 4.32 4.37 1.46 458 50 
Table 7.3: Overall Mean and Variation of Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, Per 
Capita and Percentage of GGE 
(Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
These variations were explored further by looking at trends over time. Across 
all countries government health expenditure as percentage of GDP increased from 
2.67% (Std. Dev. 1.75%) in 1995 to 3.48% (Std. Dev. 2.02%) in 2012; from 105.72$ 
PPP (Std. Dev. 122.50) to 200.87$ PPP (Std. Dev. 205.76) in per capita spending; and 
from 9.51% of GGE (Std. Dev. 3.73%) to 10.92% (Std. Dev. 4.69%) over the same 
time period. Dividing the countries into income groups reveals similar spending trends 
of GHE/GDP across time, with LIC spending least and UMIC/LMIC spending similar 
amounts of money.  
Inspecting trends of health expenditure as percentage of GDP of the subgroups 
of income countries suggests that low-income countries have the lowest levels of 
spending, followed by lower-middle income countries and upper-middle income 
countries, which follow a rather similar trend over time, where LMIC sometimes spend 
more and sometimes less than UMIC (see Figure 7.2).  
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Figure 7.2: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, Time Trend by Income Group 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
 
Figure 7.3: Government Health Expenditure Per Capita in constant PPP, Time Trend by and Income 
Group 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
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Looking at the timeline of spending per capita (Figure 7.3), it seems that 
spending increases across all income groups with expenditure per capita roughly 
doubling across the time period with LIC seeing slightly slower increases (see Figure 
7.3).  
Looking at the trends of health expenditure as percentage of GGE (Figure 7.4) 
reveals slightly different trends as trajectories differ between country groups. Other 
than for the previous two measures, where the trend almost approximated a linear 
relationship, the trends seem much bumpier and less one-directional. Looking at the 
different income groups it appears that low-income countries spend the lowest share 
of their government expenditure on health care and upper-middle income countries the 
largest. Low-income countries see a strong increase after 2002 when spending levels 
begin to overtake that of lower-middle income countries. Upper-middle income 
countries see an almost steady level of spending of around 10.5% of GGE from 1995 
to 2007, after which health seems to become more important as the share of spending 
increases till 2012 to just above 12% of GGE. 
 
Figure 7.4: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GGE, Time Trend by Income Group  
(Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
258 
7.2.2 Country Level Health Expenditure Trends and Time Series Dynamics  
Following this exploration of aggregate levels of government health spending 
and their trends across time, the analysis turns to an analysis of trends in individual 
countries. The reason is twofold. Firstly, while previous aggregate level analyses 
suggest general differences in levels of government health expenditure between 
income groups, they do not allow for judgement of whether trends are similar across 
all countries. To better explore if individual country trajectories follow similar 
patterns, time series of each country are inspected. Secondly, inspecting individual 
time series and their properties allows to formally assess stationarity and the 
autocorrelation process generating each of the time series, two important properties 
when modelling panel data (chapter 6). This section inspects individual country time 
series and assesses time series dynamics more formally using ACF plots and unit root 
tests.  
7.2.2.1 Individual Country Time Series 
To assess individual country’s health expenditure trajectories, timeline plots 
for all three measures of government health expenditure were produced for each of the 
127 countries. Skimming through these timeline plots for visual inspection a number 
of observations can be made. Common to almost all countries and all three health 
expenditure variables is a high degree of fluctuation from one year to the next. Rarely 
do countries exhibit clear and uniform rates of growth throughout the time period. It 
seems that the amount of spending available to allocate to health in absolute terms and 
as share of an economy’s output or importance to government overall fluctuate over 
time. Variations from one year to the other seem larger for spending as percentage of 
GDP and as percentage of GGE, compared to per capita expenditure.  
Health expenditure trajectories vary between countries in a number of ways but 
a number of common overall trends can be identified. Countries most commonly 
experience increases in health expenditure over time and across all three ways of 
measuring spending. Countries with such trends include, for instance, Belize or 
Lesotho (Figure 7.5). A number of countries experience an overall stationary trend, 
despite fluctuation, over time. Examples of such country cases include Gabon or Libya 
(Figure 7.6). A small number of countries seem to experience negative trends on their 
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health expenditure trajectory, these include, for example, Haiti or Lebanon (Figure 
7.7). In most countries all measures of health expenditure follow largely similar 
trajectories over time, where, the trends align almost perfectly (for instance in the case 
of Belize or Lesotho (Figure 7.7)). In other and much fewer cases, trends in health 
expenditure trajectories differ between the measures. This is for instance the case in 
Belarus or Cabo Verde (Figure 7.8). In both cases, though to varying extents, 
expenditure per capita seem to increase over time, while spending as share of GDP 
decreases and as share of GGE is almost stable.  
 
Figure 7.5: Timeline Plots and ACF Plots of Government Health Expenditure in Belize and Lesotho 
 
Figure 7.6: Timeline Plots and ACF Plots of Government Health Expenditure in Gabon and Libya 
 
Figure 7.7: Timeline Plots and ACF Plots of Government Health Expenditure in Haiti and Lebanon 
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Figure 7.8: Timeline Plots and ACF Plots of Government Health Expenditure in Belarus and Cabo 
Verde 
7.2.2.2 Time Series Dynamics  
Time series and panel data theory relies on the assumption that the dependent 
variable is stationary (section 6.1.1; pg. 217). Inspecting the individual country time-
series as above gives some indication about the time series dynamics. This section This 
section compliments these observations with results from more formal assessment 
through Autocorrelation Function (ACF) plots and unit root tests. 
Chatfield (2004) and Becketti (2013) suggest to use time line plots in 
combination with ACF plots to assess stationarity. ACF plots show the autocorrelation 
coefficients against the number of lags. A time series is deemed to be non-stationary 
when the correlations decay only slowly over time (See 6.1.1; pg. 217).  
Visually inspecting both the time line and the ACF plots to assess stationarity 
of each time series, looking for trends in the time line and slowly decaying ACF plots 
suggests a mix of stationary and non-stationary time series. Health expenditure per 
capita time series seem to exhibit more non-stationary processes than health 
expenditure measured as share of GGE and of GDP. Around 40 time lines of the per 
capita measure, 27 of the share of GGE and 20 time lines of the share of GDP measure 
can be considered non-stationary. 
An additional decision tool to distinguish stationary and non-stationary time 
series are unit root rests. This analysis shall therefore be enriched using the two most 
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commonly used unit root tests, the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron 
test97 (See 6.1.1; pg. 217).  
When the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests were performed to 
assess stationarity, both tests produce largely similar results suggesting that the 
individual country time-series contain both stationary and non-stationary expenditure 
tends (Probabilities range from p<0.001 to p=0.998) across all three health expenditure 
measures. Applying the conventional cut-off level for significance of p=0.05 it appears 
that for the expenditure as share of GDP variable 13 countries using the Dickey-Fuller, 
(or 14 countries using the Phillips-Perron) test, for the health expenditure per capita 
variable 7 countries using the Dickey-Fuller (or 6 using the Phillips-Perron) test, and 
for the expenditure as share of GGE variable 16 countries using the Dickey-Fuller (or 
14 countries using the Philips-Perron) test, the null hypothesis can be rejected, 
implying that most time series would not contain a unit root and would therefore be 
non-stationary. 
Taking all these approaches to assess stationarity of the expenditure time series 
together, it appears that overall the results regarding stationarity are not entirely 
congruent across the different methods. It is worth bearing in mind that visual 
inspections of both the timeline and the ACF plots are somewhat subjective and unit 
root tests are considered to be rather weak tests (DeJong et al, 1992; Schwert, 2002), 
which might explain some of the differences. Across all approaches, it can be 
concluded that a number of the time series are non-stationary. This is further supported 
when considering that over the recent years great emphasis has been placed on 
expanding government health expenditure in developing countries, especially in 
relation to the Millennium Development Goals (Fryatt et al, 2010). It would therefore 
be reasonable to expect that expenditure in these countries trend upwards. As was 
outlined in section 6.1.1 (pg. 217), this trend will be controlled for using a time 
dummy.  
                                                 
97 Both tests test the null hypothesis of a time series having a unit roots, which is considered 
evidence of a time series being non-stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that there is no 
unit root and the time series is stationary (See 6.1.1; pg. 217). 
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7.3 Bivariate Analyses  
Following the univariate analysis of the agreement variable (the main 
independent) and the government health expenditure variable (the dependent variable) 
in the previous two parts, indicative results of the relationship between government 
health expenditure and the presence and absence of IMF agreements based on bivariate 
analyses are presented. To do so, three different approaches are taken. In the first 
section, and following much of the descriptive literature on the IMF and health 
expenditure (see 2.2.2.1.1; pg. 44), aggregate time trends of health expenditure by IMF 
agreement are assessed. The second section looks at individual countries and assess 
the relationships between spending trends and IMF agreement times. In the last 
section, the bivariate relationship is assessed based on Fixed Effects regression, the 
estimator chosen for this study (see 6.1.2; pg. 220). 
7.3.1 Aggregate Bivariate Analyses  
A commonly used technique in the descriptive literature on IMF and health 
expenditure is to compare levels of health expenditure in countries with and without 
IMF agreements. This method is adopted as initial bivariate analysis step by dividing 
countries into agreement and non-agreement countries. As most countries experience 
both times in and out of agreements and countries that are in agreements for either the 
entire period or none of it are rare, countries are assigned to one or the other IMF 
agreement status group based on their status in the individual year. Section 5.2 (pg. 
182) discussed that a year is considered an agreement year when at least half the year 
is spent in an agreement (half year definition). The sections below present the timeline 
plots of all agreements as well as the two main agreement clusters98 (social protection 
and SBA/EFF agreements). 
                                                 
98 A country is thereby considered a social-protection or SBA/EFF agreement country, when it 
is in a social protection or SBA/EFF agreement in a given year. It is considered a non-
agreement country when it is not in any agreement, neither social protection nor SBA/EFF 
agreement. See also chapter 9. 
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Inspecting trends for all countries divided into agreement and non-agreement 
cases, spending is, similar to the overall health expenditure trends for all cases (see 
7.2; pg. 253) increasing over time.  
Looking first at government health spending as percentage of GDP for all 
agreements it appears that no large differences between agreement and non-agreement 
countries occur (See Figure 7.9), however non-agreement countries spend slightly 
more on health care with the differences decreasing over time and disappearing in 
2006. After a strong decrease in spending in the agreement group in 2007 this group 
sees a renewed increase and overtakes the non-agreement group in 2010.  
Generally similar trends appear when dividing countries by their income group. 
It appears that LIC with agreements have spending levels minorly higher compared to 
non-agreement countries in the same income group during most of the study period, 
with differences increasing slightly after 2003. LMIC have generally comparable 
trends but spending of agreement countries is slightly lower compared to non-
agreement countries until 2009, when the levels of agreement countries increase to 
levels higher than that of non-agreement countries. Spending levels of agreement and 
non-agreement countries are very similar for UMIC (Appendix Figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.9: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, Time Trend across all Countries 
and Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
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Figure 7.10: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, Time Trend across all Countries, 
Social Protection Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
When looking at government health spending as percentage of GDP for the 
agreement cluster subgroups, generally similar trends appear in that health expenditure 
grows for both agreement and non-agreement countries.  
 
Figure 7.11: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, Time Trend across all Countries, 
SBA/EFF Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
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Inspecting the trends for social protection agreements it is shown that non-
agreement countries spend slightly higher amount of money on health care compared 
to countries in social protection agreements. This difference, however, declines over 
time and disappears in 2011 (Figure 7.10). For SBA/EFF agreements generally no 
large difference between the two agreement states can be identified, though countries 
in agreement tend to spend slightly more (Figure 7.11). 
Inspecting the trends for spending per capita reveals that the levels of 
spending are very similar for agreement and non-agreement countries. When all 
countries are included, non-agreement countries spend more across the entire time 
period agreement countries. The differences are largest in 2008 when agreement 
countries’ spending sees a decrease, from which they recover quickly till 2010 (see 
Figure 7.12).  
 
Figure 7.12: Government Health Expenditure Per Capita, Time Trend across all Countries, all 
Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
For the subgroup of low-income countries, a similar trend is observed, however 
agreement countries spend slightly more compared to non-agreement countries until 
2011. For lower-middle income countries the trend is again similar, however, this time 
non-agreement countries have higher levels of spending compared to agreement 
countries until 2011. After this point the spending levels of agreement countries 
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increase steeply. For upper-middle income countries both subgroups (agreement and 
non-agreement) have very comparable levels of spending though the trends seem to be 
distorted somewhat after 2007, which might be result of countries with comparatively 
high levels of spending joining and leaving agreements (Appendix Figure 7.2). 
Looking at government health spending per capita for the agreement cluster 
subgroups, generally similar trends of health expenditure growth appear.  
For countries in social protection agreements, spending levels are lower 
compared to non-agreement countries (Figure 7.13). For the SBA/EFF agreement 
cluster, the difference is generally smaller, however, countries in SBA/EFF 
agreements generally spend more on health care compared to countries without 
agreements (Figure 7.14). 
 
Figure 7.13: Government Health Expenditure Per Capita, Time Trend across all Countries, Social 
Protection Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
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Figure 7.14: Government Health Expenditure Per Capita, Time Trend across all Countries, SBA/EFF 
Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
Looking lastly at spending as percentage of GGE reveals that expenditure 
does not differ much between agreement and non-agreement countries especially until 
2002. After this period agreement countries see a stronger increase in spending and the 
differences between both country groups increase, but decrease again after 2010 (see 
Figure 7.15).  
For LIC small differences between the agreement groups can be seen with 
agreement countries spending more than non-agreement countries. The difference 
widens from 2001 to 2008. During this period, agreement countries increase spending 
while spending in non-agreement countries decreases slightly. For both lower-middle 
and upper-middle income countries trends are similar for both agreement and non-
agreement countries (Appendix Figure 7.3). 
Looking at government health spending as percentage of general government 
expenditure for the agreement cluster subgroups, generally similar trends of health 
expenditure growth appear. For countries in social protection agreements, spending 
levels are roughly similar across time, though countries in social protection agreement 
have higher spending between 2004 and 2011 compared to countries without 
agreements (Figure 7.16). For the SBA/EFF agreement cluster, the differences are 
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generally small, however, countries in SBA/EFF agreements tend to spend more 
between 2002 and 2006 compared to countries without agreements (Figure 7.17). 
 
Figure 7.15: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GGE, Time Trend across all Countries 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
 
Figure 7.16: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GGE, Time Trend across all Countries, 
Social Protection Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
269 
Summing up the analysis of the impact of IMF agreements on health spending 
by comparing spending levels of IMF and non-IMF countries seems to suggest two 
main points. Firstly, spending levels of IMF and non-IMF countries do not seem to 
differ much across all expenditure measures when all countries are considered. 
Secondly, while spending is generally at comparable levels the graphs seem to suggest 
that low-income countries in agreements have slightly higher levels of spending in 
terms of their percentage of GDP as well as GGE. Although these trends appear from 
visual inspection of the graphs the differences are small and not consistent throughout 
the time period. It is worth noting that the results might be affected from individual 
countries joining and leaving the IMF sub-group every year so that the sample size in 
either of the sub-groups is not consistent during the observation period.  
 
Figure 7.17: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GGE, Time Trend across all Countries, 
SBA/EFF Agreements 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
7.3.2 Individual Country Bivariate Analysis 
While the aggregate level of analysis, is important to show differences between 
the agreement states, it does not allow to examine likely changes to trends in individual 
countries when entering or leaving agreements. This section therefore assesses the 
bivariate relationship for each country by visually inspecting the health expenditure 
trends at times of agreement starts and ends. If IMF agreements were associated with 
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decreases in health spending it would be expected that spending levels decrease after 
an agreement was entered into and would be lower at the end of an agreement 
compared to the start of an agreement. Also, it could be argued that health expenditure 
levels might increase again once agreements are over. To assess this systematically, 
health expenditure timelines were plotted for each country and indicators for 
agreement start and end were introduced using the half-year definition (section 5.2; 
pg. 182).  
The visual inspection of the individual timelines offers a mixed picture as no 
clear and one-directional relationship between the start/end of agreements99 and 
changes in health expenditure can be uncovered. Agreements start after previous 
increases as well as after decreases of health expenditure. Times in agreements have 
similarly mixed associations with health expenditure: while in some cases agreements 
seem to be associated with arguable breaks in previous trends by either increasing or 
slowing this trend. In other cases, no obvious change in trends can be observed.  
 
Figure 7.18: Trends of Government Health Expenditure and Times in and out of Agreements; Case of 
Congo 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
                                                 
99 Both the general on/off indicator and agreement specific indicators were assessed. 
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Trends after agreements are various, too, as they can be associated with 
increases or decreases in health expenditure. While the combinations of these trends 
are different for individual countries the cases of Armenia, Sierra Leone, the Republic 
of Congo and Benin shall be used as examples to illustrate the associations.  
The clearest relationship can be seen in the case of the Republic of Congo, 
where it appears that times during agreements are generally associated with increases 
of health expenditure, whilst times without agreements generally see decreases of 
health expenditure. This is, however, not the case after the end of the 2011 agreement 
which seems to be associated with an acceleration of the positive expenditure trend.  
For the case of Armenia, it seems that health expenditure drops after the end of 
the 1995 Standby Arrangement. After the start of the Extended Credit Facility in 1996 
expenditure trends seem to be reversed somewhat and spending is at roughly the same 
level at the end of the agreement as it was before its start. The 2001 Extended Credit 
Facility is associated with a strong increase in health expenditure both as percentage 
of GDP and per capita spending. Whilst health expenditure generally seems to drop at 
least partially during non-agreement periods, the relationship between health 
expenditure and agreements seems less clear cut. 
  
Figure 7.19: Trends of Government Health Expenditure and Times in and out of Agreements; Case of 
Armenia 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
272 
The trend of health expenditure in Benin seems to be somewhat positive during 
the 1997 to 2003 agreement, though large fluctuations during this time are present. 
The later 2006 agreement seems to be associated with a decrease in expenditure. Times 
without agreements are associated with both increases (2003-2006 and 2008-2010) 
and decreases (1995-1997) in health expenditure.  
  
Figure 7.20: Trends of Government Health Expenditure and Times in and out of Agreements; Case of 
Benin 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
Finally, the case of Sierra Leone offers a similar picture, where health 
expenditure both increase and decrease in association with agreement and non-
agreement times, again leaving no clear picture of possible effects of agreements on 
health expenditure trajectories.  
This analysis indicates that links between agreements and health expenditure 
trends are far from clear cut and one-directional. It is worth noting that this might 
suggest that agreements’ experience depends on the country involved100. However, 
this analysis is fairly simplistic, as it leaves out other factors that might explain 
fluctuations in government health expenditure.  
                                                 
100 This was tested using a random slope model (see footnote 83; pg. 223) was fitted. The 
results did not suggest that effects vary by country, so that this approach was not taken forward. 
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 Figure 7.21: Trends of Government Health Expenditure and Times in and out of Agreements; Case of 
Sierra Leone 
 (Data source: WHO NHA; N=127 countries) 
7.3.3 Bivariate Regressions 
In this final section, a third approach to assessing the relationship between IMF 
agreements and health expenditure in a bivariate way is taken. To do so, association 
between health expenditure and agreements are assessed using regression models to 
estimate treatment and control differences (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In relation to 
this study the exposure of a country to an IMF agreement in a given year can be seen 
as treatment, while those countries not receiving agreements in a given year can be 
seen as controls (chapter 6). Regressions are in this context used to estimate the 
difference in health spending comparing times with agreements and those without. 
Particular interest is therefore on the coefficient of the IMF agreement variable, which 
quantifies the increase or decrease of spending in presence of an agreement compared 
to no agreement. As was outlined in more detail before (see 6.1.2; pg. 220), different 
regression techniques can be performed and make different assumptions about the 
data. This section uses simple regression models, estimated using the Fixed Effects 
estimator, which acknowledges the country and year structure in the data and was 
identified as appropriate estimator for this study. Reported results are, based on the 
logged government health expenditure variables.  
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The model for this section takes the form of  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (7.1) 
where yit is government health expenditure of country i at time t, IMFit is the 
presence or absence of an IMF agreement in country i at time t and β measures the 
effect of IMF agreements on health expenditure and is common for all countries and 
years. εit is the idiosyncratic error term of country i at time t and α the constant 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). Regression results are presented for 
each of the government health expenditure variables and the country sub-groups, 
across all agreements as well as the two main agreement clusters. 
Results for regressions of the spending as percentage of GDP variable 
including all agreements (Table 7.4) reveal that for the model with all countries 
agreements are associated with a minor and not statistically significant increase in 
spending (Model (1) in Table 7.4). This effect increases in the model for LIC and 
becomes statistically significant, suggesting that these countries see a statistically 
significant increase in spending during agreement compared to no agreement (Model 
(2) in Table 7.4). For LMIC the effect is negative and not statistically significant 
(Model (3) in Table 7.4). For UMIC the size of the effect increases compared to LMIC 
and becomes statistically significant (Model (4) in Table 7.4).  
Across all models the results suggest that models explain only a very small 
proportion of the variation within countries (within R²). The explanatory power, while 
still small is largest for LIC (0.013) followed by UMIC (0.011) and is smallest in the 
all countries model (<0.000).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
IMF Dummy 0.007 0.077** -0.019 -0.042** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.012) 
Constant 0.962*** 0.668*** 1.105*** 1.189*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.017) (0.015) 
Within R² 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.011 
N 2262 872 909 458 
Countries 127 67 85 50 
Table 7.4: Bivariate Regression of Effect of IMF Agreements on HE/GDP (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
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Results of the regression models for social protection agreements and spending 
as percentage of GDP suggest a similar pattern of the effects of IMF agreements in the 
way that when all countries are included, agreements have a slight – but not 
statistically significantly – positive effect on government health spending. For LIC the 
effect is statistically significant positive, for LMIC the effect is negative but not 
statistically significant and for UMIC the effect is statistically significant negative 
(Table 7.5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
Social Protection 
Dummy 
0.028 0.111*** -0.051 -0.101** 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.029) (0.035) 
Constant 0.940*** 0.613*** 0.970*** 1.142*** 
 (0.023) (0.036) (0.025) (0.015) 
Within R² 0.001 0.025 0.006 0.007 
N 1955 514 727 714 
Countries 126 30 46 50 
Table 7.5: Bivariate Regression of Effect of Social Protection Agreements on HE/GDP (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
The effects for SBA/EFF agreements suggest a slightly different pattern. When 
all countries are considered the effect of SBA/EFF agreements is statistically 
significant negative. For LIC and LMIC the effect is negative, but not statistically 
significantly so. For UMIC, the effect is statistically significant negative (Table 7.6). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
SBA/EFF -0.037* -0.066 -0.031 -0.040* 
 (0.015) (0.056) (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant 1.006*** 0.564*** 0.949*** 1.168*** 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.017) 
Within R² 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.006 
N 1679 236 591 852 
Countries 124 28 46 50 
Table 7.6: Bivariate Regression of Effect of SBA/EFF Agreements on HE/GDP (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
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Comparing explanatory power of the models across agreement clusters suggest 
a slightly better fit for the individual agreement clusters compared to the models with 
all agreements.  
Turning to the results of regressions using health expenditure per capita as 
dependent variables (Table 7.7), it appears that across all countries there is a negative 
but not statistically significant relationship between the IMF dummy and the outcome 
variable. This suggests that IMF agreements are associated with a slight but not 
significant decrease in spending (Model (1) in Table 7.7). For LIC the results suggest 
a positive and statistically significant association between the dummy and government 
health expenditure (Model (2) in Table 7.7). For LMIC and UMIC this relationship is 
negative and while the effect is slightly larger for UMIC it is not statistically significant 
in either country definition (Model (3) and (4) in Table 7.7). Inspecting the within R² 
values suggests again that the model explains only very little of the variation of growth 
and at most 0.5% in the model of UMIC. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
IMF Dummy -0.013 0.060* -0.015 -0.047 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) 
Constant 4.302*** 3.046*** 4.760*** 5.784*** 
 (0.063) (0.053) (0.045) (0.033) 
Within R² 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.005 
N 2274 900 916 458 
Countries 127 68 85 50 
Table 7.7: Bivariate Regression of Effect of IMF Agreements on HE/cap (logged) 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
Results of the regression models for social protection agreements and spending 
per capita suggest a roughly similar pattern of the effects of IMF agreements in the 
way that when all countries are included, agreements have a slight – but not 
statistically significantly – negative effect on government health spending. For LIC the 
effect is statistically significant positive, for LMIC and UMIC the effect is statistically 
significant negative (Table 7.8). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
Social Protection 
Dummy 
-0.013 0.119*** -0.141** -0.206* 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.049) (0.087) 
Constant 4.201*** 2.628*** 4.218*** 5.362*** 
 (0.060) (0.070) (0.055) (0.058) 
Within R² 0.001 0.014 0.024 0.005 
N 1989 541 727 721 
Countries 127 31 46 50 
Table 7.8: Bivariate Regression of Effect of Social Protection Agreements on HE/cap (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
The effects for SBA/EFF agreements suggest a generally similar pattern. When 
all countries are considered the effect of SBA/EFF agreements is negative, but not 
statistically significantly so. For LIC and LMIC the effect is statistically significant 
negative. For UMIC, the effect is neutral (Table 7.9). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
SBA/EFF -0.063 -0.334*** -0.156** 0.000 
 (0.033) (0.080) (0.047) (0.045) 
Constant 4.567*** 2.465*** 4.296*** 5.391*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.050) (0.065) 
Within R² 0.002 0.006 0.025 0.000 
N 1712 261 592 859 
Countries 125 29 46 50 
Table 7.9: Bivariate Regression of Effect of SBA/EFF Agreements on HE/cap (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
Inspecting the results for regressions of health expenditure as percentage of 
GGE reveals trends largely similar to those found for the HE/GDP variable (Table 
7.10). Across all countries the relationship between IMF agreements and expenditure 
is positive and also statistically significant (Model (1) in Table 7.10). For LIC the 
relationship is also positive and highly statistically significant (Model (2) in Table 
7.10). For LMIC and UMIC this relationship is negative and while the effect is slightly 
larger for UMIC it is not statistically significant in either country definition (Model (3) 
and (4) in Table 7.10. The models are again only capable of explaining a small fraction 
(1.6% at most) of the within variation in health expenditure.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
IMF Dummy 0.031* 0.092*** -0.012 -0.017 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.015) (0.024) 
Constant 2.226*** 2.089*** 2.304*** 2.315*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) 
Within R² 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.002 
N 2268 900 910 458 
Countries 127 68 85 50 
Table 7.10: Bivariate Regression of Effect of IMF Agreements on HE/GGE (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
Results of the regression models for social protection agreements and spending 
as percentage of GGE suggest a similar pattern of the effects of IMF agreements in the 
way that when all countries are included, agreements have positive effect on health 
spending.  For LIC the effect is statistically significant positive, for LMIC and UMIC 
the effect is statistically significant negative (Table 7.11). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
Social Protection 
Dummy 
0.070*** 0.141*** -0.004 -0.006 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) 
Constant 2.209*** 2.083*** 2.213*** 2.300*** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.011) (0.011) 
Within R² 0.009 0.031 0.000 0.000 
N 1982 541 727 714 
Countries 127 31 46 50 
Table 7.11: Bivariate Regression of Effect of Social Protection Agreements on HE/GGE (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
The effects for SBA/EFF agreements suggest a slightly different pattern. When 
all countries are considered the effect of SBA/EFF agreements is negative. For LIC 
the effect is slightly positive, for LMIC, the effect is statistically significantly negative 
and for UMIC, the effect is negative, but not statistically significant (Table 7.12). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all LIC LMIC UMIC 
SBA/EFF -0.017 0.064 -0.041* -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.065) (0.018) (0.014) 
Constant 2.227*** 1.984*** 2.201*** 2.318*** 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) 
Within R² 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 
N 1706 261 593 852 
Countries 125 29 46 50 
Table 7.12: Bivariate Regression of Effect of SBA/EFF Agreements on HE/GGE (logged) 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parenthesis (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; for data source 
see chapter 5) 
Summing up the results of the bivariate regression models suggests that while 
there are minor differences in the magnitude of the effect, results seem, by and large 
comparable across all three ways of measurement. It generally appears that for LIC 
IMF agreements are associated with significantly significant positive effects on health 
expenditure. For LMIC and UMIC the effects are generally negative and so to a larger 
extent in UMIC compared to LMIC. Statistical significance differs, however, between 
the individual measurement ways. Another finding from the regression models is that 
the models’ ability to explain variation in health expenditure is across all models and 
health expenditure measures rather limited. This seems to suggest that, especially 
when not controlling for other variables, the impact of IMF agreements on health 
expenditure is limited. 
7.4 Summary of Stylised Facts 
This chapter set out to present analyses of the two main variables of this study, 
the agreement dummy and the government health expenditure variable. It also aimed 
to give first insights into the effects of IMF agreements on government health 
expenditure using bivariate analyses. To do so the chapter was structured into three 
parts, to explore the distributions of agreements and government health expenditure 
and then provide bivariate analysis of both variables.  
The first part of the analysis, inspecting frequencies of lending revealed that 
over the study period and across all countries around 36% of the case-years were in 
agreements. The frequency of agreements varied between income groups and 
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decreases as income rises. A number of different lending facilities were used. Most 
commonly, however, lending was conducted through the Extended Credit Facility and 
the Standby Agreement. While lending activity varies over time, the IMF was found 
to be a constant lender.  
The second part of this chapter provided a number of univariate analyses of the 
government health expenditure measures. It was shown that across all countries as well 
as within each of the country sub-groups expenditure increased over time. However, 
levels of spending differed between income groups. Low-income countries spend the 
smallest amount of money on health while upper-middle-income countries spend the 
largest amounts.  
The third part offered three different analyses of the bivariate relationship 
between agreements and government health spending. The first analysis compared 
aggregate timelines for IMF and non-IMF countries. It appeared that there is generally 
very little difference between both sets of countries. This holds true for the analysis of 
all countries as well as the different income groups. It does however appear that low-
income countries in agreements tend to have higher levels of spending compared to 
non-IMF countries in the same income group.  
The second analysis inspected individual country timelines and changes in 
trends of spending when agreements start or end. While it was expected that spending 
decreases after an agreement starts, a number of different patterns were found that 
suggest various relationships between agreements and health spending trends. Overall, 
it appears that there is no one directional relationship between agreements and health 
spending. 
The third analysis used Fixed-Effects regression models (section 6.1.2.3; pg. 
223) to estimate the effects of agreements on health spending. While results varied 
slightly between the health expenditure measures it generally appears that for low-
income countries IMF agreements appear to be associated with a growth of health 
expenditure, while countries of middle-income experience negative effects on health 
spending during agreement times. It is worth noting that neither of the models is 
capable of explaining a large proportion of the within variation of government health 
expenditure. 
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Taking all these results together suggests two main things. Firstly, that the 
effect of IMF agreements on health spending appears to be limited as differences 
between IMF and non-IMF countries in aggregate time series and the amount of 
variation explained in the relevant models are small. Secondly, the results also indicate 
that the effects vary between income groups. 
Two shortcomings of these analyses, that might impact the results’ reliability, 
are worth noting. Firstly, health expenditure is driven by factors other than IMF 
agreements. As was outlined in more detail previously, a number of determinants of 
government health expenditure have been identified that explain variation of spending. 
When modelling health expenditure, these factors need to be controlled for to draw 
conclusions about the impact of IMF agreements on health expenditure. Secondly, and 
also outlined in more detail before (section 6.2; pg. 230), countries in IMF agreements 
are likely systematically different from those not in agreements, due to a country’s 
economic and political position, which resulted in entering into an agreement in the 
first place. It might be that these factors have an impact on health spending itself so 
that the results of the impact of agreements on health spending might be biased. This 
systematic difference between the two country sets needs to be taken into account 
when modelling the effects of IMF agreements on health expenditure. This suggests 
to employ more advanced methods to assess the effect of IMF agreements on health 
expenditure. This will be done in the next chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 





























































































Afghanistan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Albania L LM L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM LM UM 
Algeria LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Angola L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM 
Argentina UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Armenia L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Azerbaijan L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM 
Bangladesh L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Belarus LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Belize LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM LM LM LM LM UM 
Benin L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Bhutan L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Bolivia LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Botswana LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Brazil UM UM UM UM UM UM UM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Bulgaria LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Burkina Faso L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Burundi L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Cabo Verde LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Cambodia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Cameroon L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Cent. African Republic L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Chad L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
China L L LM L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM 
Colombia LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Comoros L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Congo L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Costa Rica LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Côte d'Ivoire L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM 
Dem. Rep. Congo L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Djibouti LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Dominica LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Dominican Republic LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Ecuador LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM 
Egypt LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 





























































































Eritrea L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Ethiopia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Fiji LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM LM LM UM 
Gabon UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Georgia L LM LM LM L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Ghana L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM 
Grenada LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Guatemala LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Guinea L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Guinea-Bissau L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Guyana L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Haiti L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Honduras L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Hungary UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
India L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Indonesia LM LM LM L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Iran LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM 
Iraq LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM 
Jamaica LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Jordan LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM 
Kazakhstan LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Kenya L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Kiribati LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Kyrgyz Republic L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Lao PDR L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM 
Lebanon LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Lesotho LM L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Liberia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Libya UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Macedonia LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Madagascar L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Malawi L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Malaysia UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Maldives LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM 
Mali L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Marshall Islands LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM 
Mauritania L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM L LM 
Mauritius UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Mexico UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Micronesia LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Moldova LM L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 





























































































Morocco LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Mozambique L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Myanmar L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Namibia LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Nepal L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Nicaragua L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Niger L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Nigeria L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM 
Pakistan L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM 
Panama LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Papua New Guinea LM LM LM LM LM LM L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM 
Paraguay LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Peru LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM 
Philippines LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Romania LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Rwanda L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Samoa LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Senegal L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM 
Serbia UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Seychelles UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Sierra Leone L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Solomon Islands LM LM LM L L L L L L L L L L LM L LM LM LM 
South Africa UM UM UM LM UM UM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Sri Lanka L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
St. Lucia UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Vincent & Grenadines LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Sudan L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Suriname LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Swaziland LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Syrian Arab Republic LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
São Tomé & Principe L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM LM 
Tajikistan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Tanzania L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Thailand LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM 
The Gambia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Togo L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Tonga LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM 
Tunisia LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM UM 
Turkey LM LM UM UM LM UM LM LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Turkmenistan LM LM L L L LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM UM UM 
Uganda L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 





























































































Uzbekistan LM LM LM LM L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM 
Vanuatu LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM LM 
Venezuela LM LM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM UM 
Vietnam L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM 
Yemen L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM LM 
Zambia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L LM LM LM 
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Appendix Table 7.2 Countries by year and Facility Type (SC=SCF; EC=ECF; ES=ESF; FC=FCL; PL=PLL; 




























































































Afghanistan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC EC -- EC 
Albania EC EC -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- 
Algeria EF EF EF -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Angola -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB -- 
Argentina EF SB SB EF EF SB SB SB SB SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Armenia SB EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- SB EC EC EC 
Azerbaijan -- SB EF EF EF -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bangladesh -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- EC 
Belarus -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB -- -- -- 
Belize -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Benin EC -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC 
Bhutan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bolivia EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- SB SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina -- -- -- SB SB SB -- -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB SB 
Botswana -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Brazil -- -- -- -- SB SB SB SB SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bulgaria -- -- SB -- EF EF EF SB SB -- SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Burkina Faso EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC 
Burundi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC 
Cabo Verde -- -- -- SB SB -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Cambodia EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Cameroon SB SB -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- 
Cent. 
African 
Republic -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- EC 
Chad -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- 
China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Colombia -- -- -- -- -- EF EF EF SB SB SB SB -- -- FC FC FC FC 
Comoros -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC 
Congo -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- 
Costa Rica -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB -- -- 
Côte d'Ivoire EC EC -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- EC EC -- EC 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- EC EC EC 
Djibouti -- SB SB SB -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- 
Dominica -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dominican 
Republic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB SB SB -- -- SB SB -- 
Ecuador SB -- -- -- -- SB SB -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Egypt EF EF SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 





























































































Eritrea -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ethiopia SAF -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- ES -- -- 
Fiji -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gabon -- EF EF EF -- -- SB -- -- SB SB -- SB SB SB -- -- -- 
Georgia SB EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- SB SB -- SC 
Ghana EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- -- EC EC EC 
Grenada -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC 
Guatemala -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB -- -- -- -- -- SB SB -- -- 
Guinea EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- EC 
Guinea-
Bissau EC EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC 
Guyana EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Haiti SB -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- EC EC 
Honduras EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- SB -- -- SB -- 
Hungary -- SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB -- -- 
India -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Indonesia -- -- -- SB EF EF EF EF EF -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Iran -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Iraq -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB SB -- SB SB SB 
Jamaica EF -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB -- 
Jordan EF EF EF EF EF EF EF -- SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Kazakhstan SB -- EF EF EF EF EF -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Kenya -- EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- -- EC EC 
Kiribati -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Kyrgyz 
Republic EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- ES -- EC EC 
Lao PDR EC EC -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Lebanon -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Lesotho SB SB SB -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC 
Liberia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- 
Libya -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Macedonia SB -- EC EC EC -- EF -- SB SB -- SB SB SB -- -- PL PL 
Madagascar -- -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- 
Malawi -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC ES EC EC EC 
Malaysia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Maldives -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB SB 
Mali EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC 
Marshall 
Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Mauritania EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- EC -- -- EC EC EC EC EC EC 
Mauritius -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Mexico SB SB -- -- -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- FC FC FC FC 
Micronesia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 





























































































Mongolia EC -- -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- SB SB -- -- 
Morocco -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Mozambiqu
e EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC -- ES -- -- -- 
Myanmar -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Namibia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Nepal EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- 
Nicaragua EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- 
Niger -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC EC EC -- EC 
Nigeria -- -- -- -- -- -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Pakistan EC SB SB EF EF EF SB EC EC EC -- -- -- -- SB SB SB -- 
Panama -- SB -- EF EF SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Papua New 
Guinea -- SB SB -- -- SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Paraguay -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB SB SB SB SB -- -- -- -- 
Peru EF -- EF EF EF EF SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SB -- -- -- -- 
Philippines EF EF EF SB SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Romania SB SB SB -- -- SB -- SB SB -- SB SB -- -- SB SB SB SB 
Rwanda -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- -- 
Samoa -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Senegal EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- -- -- ES -- -- -- 
Serbia -- -- -- -- -- -- SB EF EF EF EF -- -- -- SB SB -- SB 
Seychelles -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SB EF EF EF 
Sierra Leone EC EC EC -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC 
Solomon 
Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- SC SC SC 
South Africa -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Sri Lanka EC -- -- -- -- -- SB SB EF EF EF -- -- -- -- SB SB SB 
St. Lucia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Vincent & 
Grenadines -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Sudan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Suriname -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Swaziland -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Syrian Arab 
Republic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
São Tomé & 
Principe -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- EC EC EC EC EC EC -- 
Tajikistan -- SB -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- -- -- EC EC EC -- 
Tanzania -- -- EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- ES -- -- -- 
Thailand -- -- -- SB SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
The Gambia -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- EC EC EC -- EC EC EC EC -- EC 
Togo EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC EC EC EC -- 
Tonga -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 





























































































Turkey SB -- -- -- -- SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SB -- -- -- -- -- 
Turkmenista
n -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Uganda EC EC EC EC EC EC -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ukraine SB SB -- SB EF EF EF EF -- SB -- -- -- -- SB SB SB SB 
Uzbekistan -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Vanuatu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Venezuela -- -- SB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Vietnam EC EC EC -- -- -- EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Yemen -- SB -- EC EC EC EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EC -- 




Appendix Figure 7.1: Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP by Income Group 
 












This chapter builds on the analyses conducted in chapter 7 and brings together 
all information needed to model the effects of IMF agreements on government health 
expenditure in a multivariate way. It aims to estimate the average effect of agreements 
on low- and middle-income countries, and the individual income groups (low-income 
(LIC), lower-middle-income (LMIC) and upper-middle-income (UMIC) countries). 
Government health expenditure is thereby seen to be determined by a number of 
characteristics present in each of the countries at a given time. IMF agreements are 
seen as one of these determinants in the way that they are seen as a treatment that some 
countries are exposed to at certain times. The aim is to estimate and identify the 
average size of the “treatment effect” of agreements. When modelling health 
expenditure as a function of the exposure to an agreement and other health expenditure 
determinants the problem arises that countries exposed to agreements are likely 
systematically different from countries without agreements (Vreeland (2002); Chapter 
6; pg. 215). In chapter 6 it was argued that in order to reliably attribute effects to the 
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agreements, a two-stage estimation process to account for the selection bias is best 
suited for this study. In a first step a selection model is fitted, which models IMF 
agreements as a function of determinants of agreements (section 6.2; pg. 230), before, 
in a second step, government health expenditure itself is modelled (section 6.1; pg. 
216) to identify the effects of agreements. The structure of this chapter follows this 
two stage process and it is divided into three parts.  
In the first part, the process of fitting the selection model is presented. A 
number of previously identified economic and political variables101 (section 5.4.2; pg. 
194) are used to identify the best model. It was argued that the aim of this model it to 
achieve the best possible classification of the outcome while at the same time retaining 
a high number of cases (section 6.2.3.2; pg. 235). Comparing different model 
definitions, it is shown that a model commonly used in the IMF and health expenditure 
literature (section 4.3; pg. 130) provides the best results in terms of classification. 
Fitting a parsimonious version of this established model provides comparable 
classification results and additionally includes more cases. It is suggested to base the 
selection model on this “stripped” definition.  
The second part of this chapter presents the process and the results of modelling 
government health expenditure as a function of IMF agreements and other previously 
identified determinants of government health expenditure. Models are fitted for the 
three indicators of health expenditure, as percentage of GDP (HE/GDP), per capita 
(HE/cap) and percentage of general government expenditure (HE/GGE) (section 
5.4.1.5; pg. 193), first across all low- and middle-income countries, and then for each 
of the income groups. To do so, the Fixed Effects estimator is used (section 6.1.2.3; 
pg. 223). Two sets of models are fitted. First, government health expenditure is 
modelled as a function of its determinants excluding the IMF agreement variable; the 
IMF variable is included in the second step. This allows to identify the impact of 
agreements on explaining variation in health expenditure and to identify the average 
effect of the agreements.  
                                                 
101 Political variables thereby also include those of IMF activity; compare footnote 57 (pg. 
116). 
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Part three of this chapter concludes by arguing that the results suggest that the 
effect of agreements on government health expenditure is generally very small and no 
statistically significant impact of agreements can be identified across all countries. 
However, the effect is found to vary between country income groups. The results show 
a statistically significantly positive relationship between agreements and government 
health expenditure in low-income countries, a mostly statistically significantly 
negative relationship in lower-middle-income countries and a slight, but not 
statistically significantly, negative relationship for upper-middle-income countries.   
8.1 Accounting for Endogeneity: Fitting the Selection Equation 
It has previously been argued that the IMF variable is endogenous in the way 
that IMF agreements are seen as a response to economic crises and these crises by 
themselves impact on health expenditure decisions. This problem needs to be 
accounted for to correctly estimate the effects of IMF agreements. For the analysis of 
this study, a Heckman-style selection model approach was identified as the most 
appropriate technique to do so. Therefore, a selection equation needs to be estimated 
that predicts IMF agreements (see chapter 6). Possible variables to predict IMF 
agreements have been identified in chapter 5. When deciding on the correct 
specification of the selection equation, two questions need to be addressed, that can 
only be answered empirically by fitting different models to the dataset of this study. 
Firstly, which combination of variables provide the best predictions? Secondly, which 
lag structure provides the best predictions? An iterative process will be used to identify 
the best combination of lags and variables for the present study. This part presents the 
results of this process in three sections. The first section presents the different models 
that were fitted and the reasoning behind them. Section two presents the results of the 
fitted model, before the third summarises the findings.  
8.1.1 Outline of the Model Selection Process 
This section presents the approach taken to identify the best definition of the 
selection model for this study. In chapter 4, a literature review was conducted in a 
systematic way to identify the most commonly used determinants of IMF agreements 
in the field. Based on this, chapter 5 identified a list of variables that are available for 
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this study. From the literature review it has emerged that a defined set of variables 
commonly used in studies on the IMF and health expenditure (Established Model) 
exists, to be used in selection models. The wider literature of IMF determinants, 
however, employs a number of additional variables. To identify which combination of 
these variables is best for this study and the given dataset, a number of different 
models, with varying variable definitions, is estimated and their results compared to 
the Established Model, which features as benchmark model.  
The goal of the selection equation is to be able to predict IMF agreements as 
accurately as possible. It is likely that the ability to correctly predict agreements is 
greatest when all available variables are added into the model. This will be referred to 
as “fully loaded” model, which includes all variables that have previously been 
identified as relevant and available for this study.  
Another approach in predicting IMF agreements can be seen in using those 
variables that are, according to the IMF’s mission statement, the most important when 
deciding about entering into an agreement. This means to include variables measuring 
macroeconomic conditions such as the Balance of Payments position, international 
reserves and economic growth of the country under consideration. 
The literature on determinants of IMF agreements suggests that economic 
determinants other than those directly related to the IMF’s mission statement play an 
important role in predicting IMF agreements (section 4.2.1; pg. 120). Another set of 
models will therefore be fitted to predict IMF agreements using a range of economic 
variables beyond those three determinants related to the IMF’s mission statement. This 
set of models includes the variables GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, 
international reserves, debt stock, debt service, current account balance, inflation, 
government balance and change in the exchange rate. 
Especially in that part of the literature that examines the IMF and health 
expenditure in particular, a model has been established that includes a number of 
variables that capture the country’s economic performance, political circumstances 
and the extent of previous involvement with the Fund. This model will be used in this 
study as “benchmark model”, to which the results of other models will be compared. 
This model contains the variables of GDP per capita, GDP growth, current account 
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balance, government balance, indicator of agreements in the previous year and the 






















































Gross domestic product per capita  x  x x 
GDP per capita growth (annual %)  x x x x 
Total reserves (% of total external debt) x x x  
Total debt service (% of GNI) x  x  
External debt stocks (% of GNI) x  x  
Current account balance (% of GDP) x x x x 
Inflation, average consumer prices (% change) x  x  
General government balance (% of GDP) x  x x 
Annual Change of the Official exchange rate (%) x  x  
Indicator of agreement in previous year x   x 
Moving average of years in agreements during last 5 
years 
x    
Number of other countries in agreements x    
Democracy Indicator x   x 
Table 8.1: Variable Overview by Model 
IMF agreements are generally seen as a result of changes in a country’s 
performance or circumstances. Agreements are thus entered into after a deterioration 
of performance. This suggests that a lag structure should be considered when 
modelling IMF agreements. How long after this deterioration the agreement is entered 
into, is unclear and the literature provides little guidance. This study therefore attempts 
to solve the issue empirically by including different lengths of lags into the model to 
compare outcomes before deciding on the appropriate number of lags for this model. 
The maximum length of lags is set to five. This is for two reasons, firstly, the panel is 
relatively short (T=18 years) and secondly, IMF agreement status changes fairly 
frequently between “on” and “off” so that effects of long lag structures are likely 
confounded by other agreements. 
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8.1.2 Fitting the Selection Model 
This section presents the key statistics of individual models and their lag 
structure, which were fitted using the methodology outlined in chapter 6 (pg. 215). 
Judgement about the goodness of the individual model is based on the percentage of 
correctly classified cases and the number of cases retained in the model. Table 8.2 
provides an overview of the number of cases in the model and the percentage of correct 
classification for each of the models and their lag structure. Results of the Established 
Model are shown at the bottom of the table as benchmark. To make the table more 
accessible the results have been fitted with a colour gradient where a dark green colour 
represents a desired outcome of high percentage of correct classification or large 
number of observation, while a yellow colour represents a low percentage of correct 
classification or a small number of observations. Models with green colours in both 
the correctly classified and the observation dimension represent models with the 
desired outcome. Given that the aim of this model is to predict outcomes, the effect 
size of individual variables is of secondary importance and not shown here. The 
following paragraphs discuss the results of each model and the lag structure in order 














Fully Loaded Model n 1309 1389 1465 1537 1605 1673 
 % 82.43 82.58 81.91 81.72 81.99 81.47 
BCA, Reserves and Growth n 1912 1947 1977 2003 2021 2037 
 % 59.68 58.86 58.93 57.81 55.62 52.68 
Economic Variables  n 1315 1395 1471 1543 1611 1679 
 % 66.54 65.45 64.85 62.35 61.7 61.11 
Established Model n 1492 1598 1685 1766 1843 1916 
 % 84.05 83.17 82.79 82.33 82.20 82.10 
        
Established Model n 1916      
 % 82.10      
Table 8.2: Key Statistics of Selection Equation Models based on Probit Regression Model 
n Number of cases in the model; % percentage of cases correctly classified; data source: Table 5.17 
(pg. 205) 
Inspecting first the results of the Fully Loaded Model, suggests that the 
models with different lag structures are capable to correctly classify between 82.58% 
and 81.47% of all cases in the model. Adding additional lags increases the 
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classification results slightly, however, the number of cases in the model decreases as 
the lags increase (1673 cases for the 0 lag model; 1309 cases for the 5/0 lag structure). 
Comping the results to the Established Model suggests that all models fare worse in 
terms of number of cases in the model: while the models for a 5/0 and 4/0 lag structure 
offer slightly improved results in terms of classification (+0.33 and +0.48 percentage 
points respectively), this improvement needs to be traded off with a fairly large drop 
in cases in the model (-607 and -527 cases respectively). This suggests that overall the 
Fully Loaded Models do not provide better results than the Established Model and 
should therefore not be used for this study.  
Turning to the Current Account, Reserves and Growth Models, reflecting 
the IMF’s mission statement. The results suggest that models generally offer fairly low 
levels of correct classification of between 59.68% for 5/0 lags and 52.68% for 0 lags. 
Hence each model in this group provides correct classification that is more than 22 
percentage points worse than that of the Established Model. While the models with lag 
structures 4/0 to 0 contains increasingly larger numbers of cases compared to the 
Established Model, it appears that this increase in numbers is traded off with a high 
level of reduced classification. This suggests that this set of models does not provide 
better results than the Established Model and should therefore not be used in the study.  
The set of Economic Variables Models include additional economic variables 
compared to the models above. The results suggest that these additional variables 
increase classification results slightly by on average 6 percentage points, compared to 
the previous models. Overall classification results are still much below those of the 
Established Model. Including these additional variables further reduces the number of 
cases in the model. This means that the model with the largest number of cases contains 
237 cases less than the Established Model and also offers worse classification results. 
This suggests that these models should not be used in this study as they provide worse 
classification and less cases compared to the Established Model.  
Turning finally to the Established Model that has been refitted with different 
lag structures. The results suggest that the 5/0 to 1/0 lag structure models provide better 
classification results compared to the Established Model in its original lag structure. 
However, the number of cases in these models is lower compared to the Established 
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Model. It is argued that the minor benefits of around 1 percentage point in terms of 
classification should not be traded off for sizable reductions in case numbers. This 
suggests that the Established Model with its original lag structure should be used for 
this study. 
Having systematically compared different model specifications it appears that 
the Established Model provides the best results for this study102. However, closer 
inspection of the regression results of the Established Model reveals that only the 
agreement in previous year, GDP and GDP growth variables are statistically 
significant determinants of agreements in this study (Model (1) in Table 8.3). The 
model will therefore be refitted to estimate a more parsimonious model (Stripped 
Model), including only these statistically significant variables and compare the 
obtained results to the Established Model.  
 (1) (2) 
 Established Model Stripped Model 












Democracy Indicator 1.022  
(0.113)  
per capita GDP  1.000*** 1.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 




Observations 1916 2199 
McFadden R2 0.310 0.299 
AIC 1730.8 2046.4 
BIC 1769.7 2069.1 
p of Likelihood Ratio Test 0.000 0.000 
% correctly classified 82.10 81.45 
Table 8.3: Results of Probit Regression for Selection Equation.  
Exponentiated Coefficients with p-values in parentheses;  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see Table 5.17 (pg. 205) 
Comparing the Established Model and the Stripped Model suggests that the 
stripped version has a slightly lower correct classification rate (82.10% vs 81.45%) but 
                                                 
102 Other sets of models were additionally fitted but did not provide better results (results not 
shown here). 
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allows for inclusion of an additional 283 cases into the model. It seems that this trade-
off is worthwhile as an additional number of cases are traded off for a slight reduction 
in classification success. 
 
Figure 8.1: Scatter Plot of Linear Predictions from Established and Stripped Model 
To ensure that the results of the Established Model and the Stripped Model are 
comparable, the linear predictions of both models were compared. The coefficient of 
determination (R²) suggests 98.3% similarity between the predictions of both model. 
Plotting the results against each other shows that the predictions are fairly linear 
(Figure 8.1). This suggests that the Stripped Model provides results that are 
comparable to those obtained through the Established Model but include an additional 
283 cases. 
8.1.3 Summary of the Selection Equation 
This section set out to fit the selection equation necessary to account for 
endogeneity in this study. To identify the best specification of the model in terms of 
its variables and lag structure, a number of models have been estimated and compared 
in relation to their classification results and retained cases. By and large the results 
suggest that the percentage of correct classification increases as the number of lags in 
the model increases; but this is at the expense of reducing the sample for which the 
model can be estimated. Comparing the results across all models shows that the 
Established Model offers the best results both in terms of correct classification and 
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retained cases. A parsimonious version of the Established Model was fitted, which 
offers comparable results in terms of classification and includes additional cases103. 
Additional tests suggest that both models produce comparable results. This stripped 
version of the Established Model will therefore be used to create the Inverse Mills 
Ratio to be included in the main equation to account for endogeneity (section 6.2.3.2; 
pg. 235). 
8.2 Results of the Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health 
Expenditure  
Having fitted the selection model, this second section of the chapter models 
government health expenditure. It is structured to first (section 8.2.1) model 
government health expenditure as a function of the previously identified determinants 
(GDP per capita, government revenue and age dependency ratio; section 5.4.1.5; pg. 
193), before the IMF dummy as well as the Inverse Mills Ratio used to account for 
selection bias, are included in a second step (section 8.2.2). Doing so, the importance 
of IMF agreements in explaining the variation of government health expenditure can 
be assessed by comparing the coefficients of determination (R²) of both models.  
8.2.1 Modelling Government Health Expenditure  
This section presents the results of modelling health expenditure as a function 
of its determinants without the IMF dummy and the Inverse Mills Ratio. This model 
takes the form of  
𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ( 8.1 ) 
Where HEit is the level of government health expenditure in country i at time 
t. HEit-1 is the first lag of health expenditure of country i at time t, used to account for 
                                                 
103 Theory and the literature review conducted in Chapter 4 indicate that a previous IMF 
agreement (measured as agreement in the previous year) is an important determinant of current 
agreements. It has, however, been suggested that due to the multi-year nature of IMF 
agreements an indicator of an agreement in the previous year might be confounded. In an 
alternative model, this dummy variable has therefore been removed, the IMR refitted and the 
main regression rerun. While the results show that the selection equation is less capable of 
classifying cases correctly, the results of the main equation remain unchanged. See Appendix 
to Chapter 8 for the regression output. 
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first order autocorrelation. Xit is the vector of determinants of health expenditure in 
country i at time t. t is the time dummy to account for time trends. α is the constant and 
εit is the idiosyncratic error of country i at time t. The model will be estimated using 
the Fixed Effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. 
Results are presented for all countries and each of the income groups as well 
as each of the (logged) health expenditure variables: percentage of GDP (Table 8.4), 
per capita (Table 8.5) and percentage of government expenditure (Table 8.6), 
respectively. The following paragraphs provide an interpretation of the coefficients of 
the individual variables in the model.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.674*** 0.647*** 0.630*** 0.525*** 
 (0.031) (0.039) (0.029) (0.062) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.098** -0.184* -0.094* -0.243** 
 (0.032) (0.076) (0.043) (0.070) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
time 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.802*** 1.091* 1.139** 2.099** 
 (0.222) (0.487) (0.336) (0.609) 
Within R² 0.559 0.524 0.518 0.406 
N 1893 731 760 402 
Countries 124 64 80 47 
Table 8.4: Models for Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); dependent variable logged HE/GDP 
Looking at the models for health expenditure as percentage of GDP it appears 
that the lagged health expenditure variables is strongly (p<0.001) and positively 
correlated with the dependent variable across all models. This is as expected as the 
preliminary analysis suggested a first order autocorrelation and the lagged dependent 
variable was introduced to capture this correlation between health expenditure in year 
t and year t-1.  
The coefficients of the logged GDP per capita variable are negative and 
statistically significant for the models with all countries as well as the models for each 
of the income groups, when controlling for all other variables in the model. This means 
that for every logged unit increase in GDP there is a reduction in government health 
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expenditure. This is quite surprising as GDP is seen as the strongest driver of health 
expenditure (Xu et al, 2011), so that a statistically significant positive relationship 
would be expected. Looking only at the bivariate relationship between GDP and health 
expenditure, not controlling for other variables, a positive relationship between the two 
variables is found. This suggests that when controlling for the other variables in the 
model the effect of GDP on health expenditure has changed.  
The relationship between government revenue and government health 
expenditure is positive but only statistically significant for the LMIC and UMIC 
models, when controlling for all other variables in the model. This means that for every 
one percentage point increase in government revenue as percentage of GDP, 
government health expenditure increases statistically significantly in LMIC and 
UMIC. This is in line with the expectations as it was assumed that with increases in 
fiscal space, measured in this study as government revenue, relatively more money 
will be dedicated to health care.  
The age dependency ratio has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with government health expenditure measured as percentage of GDP for 
UMIC. For the model with all countries as well as the LIC model the relationship is 
positive but not statistically significant. For LMIC the relationship is negative but not 
statistically significant. This suggests that when controlling for all other variables the 
age structure of a country’s population has a statistically significant relationship with 
government health expenditure only for UMIC. This is not unexpected as, while the 
age structure is seen as important determinant of health expenditure as it is commonly 
used in relevant studies, most commonly the reported relationship is not statistically 
significant. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.708*** 0.735*** 0.583*** 0.495*** 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.037) (0.050) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.219*** 0.083 0.332*** 0.410*** 
 (0.047) (0.093) (0.053) (0.113) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
time 0.009** 0.013** 0.006** 0.011* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Constant -0.561* 0.006 -0.475 -1.234 
 (0.258) (0.466) (0.340) (0.807) 
Within R² 0.771 0.711 0.733 0.649 
N 1903 741 760 402 
Countries 124 64 80 47 
Table 8.5: Models for Government Health Expenditure as Per Capita Spending. 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); dependent variable logged HE/cap  
The time control variable was introduced into the model to control for the 
upward trend in the data. For all models the variable is found to show a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with government health expenditure, which 
captures this trend. The coefficient is largest in LIC as well as UMIC and smallest in 
LMIC, which reflects the fact that the trends in health expenditure vary over time with 
income groups and are strongest for LIC/UMIC and weakest for LMIC (compare 
Chapter 7; pg. 249). 
Turning to the models of logged government health expenditure as per capita 
spending, a very similar picture, with some differences, emerges. The lagged 
dependent variable, introduced to capture the first order auto-correlation in the data 
shows a strong and positive correlation with the dependent variable, confirming the 
presence of first order autocorrelation. 
When controlling for all other variables, a strong positive and statistically 
significant correlation between logged per capita GDP and per capita government 
health expenditure is found for the models including all countries as well as the LMIC 
and UMIC countries. This suggests that for these models an increase in per capita GDP 
is associated with increases in government health expenditure. This is as expected as 
it was assumed that GDP is a strong predictor of government health expenditure. For 
LIC a slight positive, but not statistically significant relationship between per capita 
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GDP and per capita government health expenditure is found when controlling for all 
other variables. This suggests that for LIC per capita GDP is not a significant predictor 
of per capita government health expenditure.  
Government revenue has a small positive relationship with per capita health 
expenditure, which is only significant in LMIC. This suggests that in these countries 
increases in government revenue as percentage of GDP are associated with statistically 
significant increases in per capita health spending.  
The age dependency variable shows a statistically significant positive 
relationship with per capita government health expenditure in UMIC. This suggests 
that for UMIC the age dependency ratio is a statistically significant predictor of per 
capita government health expenditure when controlling for all other variables in the 
model. This relationship is also positive but not statistically significant for the model 
with all countries as well as that for LIC. For LMIC the relationship is slightly negative 
but not statistically significant. This suggests that for these models, the age structure 
as measured in the age dependency ratio variable is not a statistically significant 
predictor for per capita government health expenditure when controlling for all other 
variables in the model. 
The time dummy, introduced to capture the time trend in the data is found to 
have a statistically significant positive relationship with per capita health spending in 
all models. This reflects the descriptive statistics presented in chapter 7 that show a 
positive trend in per capita spending across all countries (Figure 7.9; pg. 263).  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.645*** 0.615*** 0.642*** 0.539*** 
 (0.056) (0.077) (0.035) (0.062) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.077 -0.141 -0.010 -0.202** 
 (0.048) (0.110) (0.043) (0.066) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.003* 0.003 -0.000 0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.008*** 0.009 0.003 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 1.132** 1.330* 0.999** 2.394*** 
 (0.396) (0.642) (0.312) (0.615) 
Within R² 0.437 0.405 0.450 0.341 
N 1904 741 761 402 
Countries 124 64 80 47 
Table 8.6: Models for Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of General Government 
Expenditure 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); dependent variable logged HE/GGE 
Turning to the models measuring government health expenditure as percentage 
of general government expenditure. Similar to the other two sets of models the lagged 
dependent variable is statistically significantly positively associated with the 
dependent variable capturing the first order autocorrelation observed in the dependent 
variable.  
Logged per capita GDP has across all models a slightly negative relationship 
with health expenditure measured as percentage of government expenditure Only for 
the model with UMIC this relationship is statistically significantly negative. This 
suggests that per capita GDP is, when controlling for all other variables in the model, 
only an important predictor of health spending in UMIC.  
The government revenue variable shows a slight negative relationship with 
health expenditure measured as percentage of government expenditure across all 
models, which is only statistically significant in the LMIC model. This suggests that a 
one percentage point increase in government revenue as percentage of GDP is 
associated with a minor decrease in health spending. In other words, as government 
revenue increases government health spending as a share of government expenditure 
decreases, and this decrease is statistically significant. This suggests that an increase 
in government revenue is not per se associated with increased health spending as 
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percentage of all government spending, but that the additional government revenue is 
dedicated to areas of government expenditure other than health spending.  
The age dependency ratio variable shows a positive association with health 
expenditure in all but the LMIC model, which is statistically significant in the model 
with all countries and the UMIC. This suggests that the age structure of the population 
is a significant predictor of health spending as percentage of government expenditure 
when all countries or only UMIC countries are considered. It is not a significant 
predictor in LIC and LMIC, when controlling for all other variables in the model. 
The time dummy variable coefficient is positive across all models capturing an 
upward trend. Compared to the other sets of models for health expenditure variables 
this trend is, while still statistically significant for the model with all countries as well 
as the UMIC model, smaller. This likely reflects the much slower pace of growth of 
health expenditure as percentage of general government expenditure compared to the 
other ways of measurement, which was also shown in chapter 7.  
8.2.2 The Average Effect of IMF Agreements 
This section builds on the previous analysis of modelling health expenditure 
and includes the IMF dummy variable and the Inverse Mills Ratio as additional 
determinants into the model. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, it allows to assess 
how much additional variation of health expenditure the agreement dummy help to 
explain. Secondly, it allows to directly assess the impact of IMF agreements on 
government health expenditure. The model now takes the form of 
𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡 + 𝛽5𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ( 8.2 ) 
Where IMFit is the IMF agreement dummy at time t in country i and λit is the 
Inverse Mills Ratio in country i at time t.104  
The section is organised in two parts. The first compares the explanatory power 
of the models with and without the IMF variables. The second part presents the effect 
of IMF agreements on government health expenditure.  
                                                 
104 See Section 8.2.1, pg. 302 for an explanation of the other variables in the model. 
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8.2.2.1 Explanatory Power of the Models 
This section comments on the effect the IMF variables have on the explanatory 
power of the models. To do so, it presents an interpretation of the models’ coefficient 
of determination (R²). The core assumption underlying this study is that IMF 
agreements impact on health expenditure in a country so that differences in 
expenditure can be found for times with and without agreement. This suggests that it 
would be expected that by adding the IMF variables into the model the within R² 
measure, which allows to assess the variation of health expenditure within a country 
over time, increases. It is shown that including IMF variables into the models does in 
general not seem to have a large effect on explained variation in government health 
expenditure; in some models explanatory power seems to decrease slightly. Table 8.7 
provides, an overview of the R² value before and after entering the IMF dummy and 
Inverse Mills Ratio as well as the estimated difference between the two R² values.  
Model with… All LIC LMIC UMIC 
Panel A: HE/GDP 
no IMF dummy 0.559 0.524 0.518 0.406 
IMF dummy 0.556 0.524 0.523 0.396 
difference -0.003 0.000 +0.005 -0.01 
Panel B: HE/cap 
no IMF dummy 0.771 0.711 0.733 0.649 
IMF dummy 0.770 0.713 0.735 0.649 
difference -0.001 +0.002 +0.002 0.000 
Panel C: HE/GGE 
no IMF dummy 0.437 0.405 0.450 0.341 
IMF dummy 0.452 0.433 0.453 0.344 
difference +0.015 +0.028 +0.003 +0.003 
Table 8.7: Comparison of R² Values across Models 
Data source: models presented in sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2.2 
Looking first at models of health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Panel A 
in Table 8.7). Before adding the IMF variable, the model for all countries explains 
55.9% of the variation within the countries over time, the explained variability differs 
between the individual country groups. The income group specific models explain 
between 40.6%, for UMIC, and 52.4%, for LIC, of the variation of health expenditure 
within the countries. When the IMF agreement dummy as well as the Inverse Mills 
Ratio are added into the model the explained variation changes only marginally and at 
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most by -1 percentage points, for UMIC. When the additional determinants are added 
into the models with all countries as well as the model with UMICs the within R² 
decreases by 0.3 and 1 percentage points, respectively. For LMIC the additional 
variables increase the explanatory power of within variation by 0.5 percentage points. 
This suggests that using the IMF agreement dummy variable as additional explanatory 
variable of government health expenditure does not increase the explained proportion 
of the model significantly. Put differently, this means that the explanatory power of 
health expenditure is not much increased when additionally including the IMF dummy. 
IMF agreements, therefore, do not have a large impact on explaining the observed 
variation of health expenditure within countries over time. 
Looking at the models explaining per capita health expenditure (Panel B in 
Table 8.7), before adding the IMF dummy, it appears that the models explain more 
variation of spending within countries compared to HE/GDP. The model including all 
countries is capable of explaining 77.1% of the within county variation. The 
explanatory power varies slightly between the models for individual income groups, 
with most variation being explained in the LMIC model (73.3%) and least in the UMIC 
model (64.9%). When adding the IMF dummy and the Inverse Mills Ratio into the 
model, a picture similar to that observed for the health expenditure as percentage of 
GDP emerges, as the additional explanatory power of these variables is minor. The 
variables increase the explained within component of variation by 0.2 percentage 
points in LIC and LMIC. For UMIC the additional variables do not increase the 
explanatory power at all. Across all countries the explanatory power decreases by 0.1 
percentage points. This means that when measuring health expenditure as per capita 
spending, IMF agreements do not make a large contribution to the explanatory power 
of the model. The impact of the IMF dummy on explaining variation in government 
health expenditure per capita is minor.  
Looking at the models for health spending as percentage of general government 
expenditure (Panel C in Table 8.7) suggests that these models generally explain the 
least amount of within variation of the dependent variable. The model including all 
countries, explains 43.7% of the within country variation. The model for UMIC 
explains the least variation (34.1%) and the model for LMIC explains the most 
variation (45.0%). While the additional explanatory power of the IMF dummy is still 
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small, it seems to have by and large the largest impact for this health expenditure 
measure compared to other two measures of government health expenditure. When 
considering all countries, adding in the IMF dummy increases the explanatory power 
by 1.5 percentage points. Across the individual income group models, the largest 
increase is seen in LIC, where an additional 2.8 percentage points are explained by the 
variables and smallest in LMIC and UMIC where an additional 0.3 percentage points 
are explained.  
Comparing across the different ways of measuring health expenditure it 
appears that while the additional explanatory power of the IMF variable is generally 
rather small, it is largest when measuring health expenditure as percentage of 
government expenditure. Comparing across the different models for income groups 
does not seem to provide conclusive results as the change in explanatory power does 
not seem to vary systematically between the different country groups.  
While the comparison of R² estimates seems methodologically simple and does 
not allow for making statements about the significance of the changes observed, this 
approach offers an easy to understand comparison between the models that exclude 
and include the IMF dummy as determinant of health expenditure. It should therefore 
be seen as indicative result of the importance of IMF agreements as additional 
determinant. Alternative approaches, that would make it possible to draw conclusions 
about the significance of the changes, such as Likelihood Ratio tests cannot be used 
for this study, as the models are not solved using Maximum Likelihood procedures.  
8.2.2.2 Interpretation of Agreement Dummy Coefficient 
This section provides an interpretation of the coefficients of the IMF agreement 
variable. As outlined above, an IMF agreement is for this analysis modelled as a 
dummy, that is either on (1) or off (0). This means that the agreement dummy is 
considered to be an indicator of the exposure to the “treatment” of the IMF. The 
estimated coefficient therefore describes the difference in health expenditure between 
no agreement and agreement and presents the estimated effect of changes in (logged) 
government health expenditure that is seen to be attributed to the agreement, when 
controlling for all other variables in the model. Across all models it appears that 
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including the IMF dummy as well as the Inverse Mills Ratio105, to account for selection 
bias, does not change the effect size of the other determinants of health expenditure, 
as presented in section 8.2.1, much and direction and significance of the variables 
remains the same. Focus of this section is therefore exclusively on the IMF coefficient. 
Turning first to the models for health expenditure as percentage of GDP (Table 
8.8) and looking at the model including all countries (Model (1)), the IMF dummy is 
estimated at 0.006 (SE: 0.011), which suggests that, when all countries are included in 
the analysis, there is a slight, but not statistically significant, increase in government 
health expenditure as percentage of GDP for countries with agreements compared to 
cases with no agreements. This suggests that overall, IMF agreements do not have a 
statistically significant impact on government health expenditure as percentage of 
GDP. Dividing the countries into subgroups based on their income, different effects 
can be observed.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.672*** 0.638*** 0.632*** 0.522*** 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.028) (0.065) 
Agreement Dummy 0.006 0.047** -0.030* -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.100** -0.165* -0.112* -0.232** 
 (0.033) (0.074) (0.046) (0.068) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.004 0.012 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012) 
Constant 0.796*** 0.941 1.238** 2.062** 
 (0.234) (0.486) (0.369) (0.613) 
Within R² 0.556 0.524 0.523 0.396 
N 1882 726 756 400 
Countries 123 64 79 47 
Table 8.8 Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP  
                                                 
105 Theory indicates that the effects of IMF agreements on government health expenditure are 
endogenous (see section 6.2; pg. 230). This was corrected for using a selection model. Given 
that the IMR is not statistically significant in the fitted model, this variable could be removed. 
The tables presented in Appendix to Chapter 8 suggest that removing this variable has no effect 
on the results. 
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Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 8.1.3 (pg. 301); dependent variable 
logged HE/GDP 
Inspecting the model for LIC (Model (2); Table 8.8) it appears that the effect 
of the Agreement Dummy variable is statistically significant and suggests an increase 
in health spending by 0.047 units (SE 0.018). Exponentiating the coefficient suggests 
that cases with agreements have a 4.8% higher level of government health spending 
compared to cases without agreements.  
For model for LMIC (Model (3); Table 8.8) the Agreement Dummy shows a 
decrease in spending for agreement cases compared to non-agreement cases by -0.030 
units (SE 0.014) that is statistically significant at the conventional p=0.05 level. This 
suggests that for LMIC IMF agreements are associated with decreases in government 
health spending as percentage of GDP. Exponentiating the coefficient suggests that 
cases with agreements have a 2.9% lower level of government spending compared to 
cases without agreements. 
Looking at UMIC model (Model (4); Table 8.8), the Agreement Dummy shows 
a slight decrease of government health spending as percentage of GDP by 0.012 units 
(SE 0.010), which is not statistically significant and suggests that for UMICs IMF 
agreements are associated with a small but not statistically significant decrease of 
government health spending as percentage of GDP. 
Turning next to the models of government health expenditure per capita (Table 
8.9), suggests a picture similar to that observed for the models of health expenditure 
as percentage of GDP variable outlined above. When considering all countries (Model 
(1) Table 8.9), the IMF dummy variable is associated with a slight but not statistically 
significant increase in government spending of 0.008 units (SE 0.013). Dividing the 
countries up along their income groups reveals differences between the income groups.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.706*** 0.727*** 0.589*** 0.491*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.037) (0.053) 
Agreement Dummy 0.008 0.060** -0.041** -0.026 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.225*** 0.125 0.308*** 0.414*** 
 (0.049) (0.096) (0.052) (0.109) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.003 0.002 0.003** 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.009*** 0.013** 0.007*** 0.011* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.004 0.008 -0.017 -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.013) 
Constant -0.611* -0.277 -0.341 -1.187 
 (0.280) (0.492) (0.363) (0.775) 
Within R² 0.770 0.713 0.735 0.649 
N 1892 736 756 400 
Countries 123 64 79 47 
Table 8.9 Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as per Capita Spending  
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 8.1.3 (pg. 301); dependent variable 
logged HE/cap 
Looking at the model for LIC (Model (2) Table 8.9) reveals that the IMF 
Agreement Dummy is associated with a statistically significant increase in per capita 
government health spending. This suggests that cases with agreements are found to 
have spending levels that are statistically significantly higher than those cases with no 
agreements. Exponentiating the point estimate of 0.060 (SE 0.019) suggests an 
increase of 6.2% for IMF agreement cases compared to non-agreement cases. Taking 
the average spending of LICs of 30.05$ PPP, estimated earlier (see Table 7.3; pg. 255), 
this translates into an increase of 1.86 $PPP per capita for cases in agreements 
compared to those without agreements.  
Inspecting the model for LMIC (Model (3) Table 8.9) shows that for this set of 
countries IMF agreements have a negative effect on per capita government health 
expenditure as the point estimate of the agreement dummy equals to -0.041 (SE 0.016).  
For this group of countries, IMF agreements are associated with a decrease of 4% for 
IMF agreement cases compared to non-agreement cases. Taking the average spending 
of LMIC of 147.99 $ PPP, estimated earlier (see Table 7.3; pg. 255), this translates 
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into a decrease of 5.92 $PPP per capita for cases in agreements compared to those 
without agreements. 
Looking at the model for UMIC (Model (4) Table 8.9) reveals a small negative 
but not statistically significant association of the agreement variable with the per capita 
spending variable. This suggests that for this group of countries agreements do not 
have a statistically significant impact on the levels of per capita government health 
expenditure.  
Turning lastly to models of government health expenditure as percentage of 
general government expenditure (Table 8.10), a picture emerges that is mostly, but not 
entirely, comparable to the results presented for the previous two dependent variables. 
Looking first at the model including all countries (Model (1) Table 8.10), suggests a 
slight positive but not statistically significant increase in government spending as 
percentage of general government expenditure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.660*** 0.633*** 0.643*** 0.539*** 
 (0.046) (0.064) (0.035) (0.061) 
Agreement Dummy 0.011 0.049* -0.025 -0.022 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) (0.024) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.077 -0.126 -0.021 -0.213** 
 (0.048) (0.111) (0.043) (0.070) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002* 0.003 -0.000 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.007*** 0.009* 0.003 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.012) (0.021) 
Constant 1.120** 1.257 1.080*** 2.544*** 
 (0.393) (0.666) (0.315) (0.662) 
Within R² 0.452 0.433 0.453 0.344 
N 1893 736 757 400 
Countries 123 64 79 47 
Table 8.10 Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of 
Government Spending  
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 8.1.3 (pg. 301); dependent variable 
logged HE/GGE 
Dividing the countries by their income groups reveals a statistically significant 
increase in government health spending of 0.049 units (SE 0.021) for LICs. This 
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suggests that for this group of countries IMF agreements are associated with a 5.0% 
increase in government spending on health as a percentage of general government 
expenditure, compared to countries of the same income group without agreements.  
The model for LMIC estimates a slight negative but not statistically significant 
effect of the IMF Agreement dummy with a point estimate of -0.025 units (SE 0.015). 
This suggests that countries in agreements have a slightly, but not statistically 
significantly lower level of government health spending measured as percentage of 
general government spending compared to those countries without agreements, when 
controlling for all other variables.  
The model for UMIC also estimates a slight negative but not statistically 
significant effect for the IMF agreement dummy with a point estimated of -0.022 units 
(SE 0.024). This means that for UMIC agreements do on average not have a 
statistically significant effect on government health spending as measured as 
percentage of general government spending.  
8.3 Conclusions 
This chapter set out to identify the average effect of IMF agreements on health 
expenditure by modelling health expenditure as a function of its determinants and the 
IMF agreement dummy using the Fixed Effects estimator when accounting for 
endogeneity of agreements with a Heckman-style selection model. The presentation 
was divided into two main parts.  
The first part outlined the process of fitting the selection equation and presented 
the results. A number of different models with various independent variables and lag 
structures were fitted. Including more lags of the independent variables did in general 
have a small positive effect on classification results but meant further reductions in the 
number of included cases. It was found that a variable definition that is commonly 
used in the IMF and health expenditure literature provides the best classification results 
for this study. A parsimonious version, including only statistically significant variables 
of this established model, was estimated. It was shown that this provides classification 
results similar to the established model, but increases the number of cases in the model. 
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Overall, the model is capable of classifying 81.45% of all case-years correctly into 
IMF and non-IMF case-years.  
The second part of the chapter identified the average effect of IMF agreements 
on government health expenditure measured as percentage of GDP, per capita 
spending and as percentage of government expenditure. Inspecting the coefficient of 
the IMF agreement variable suggests that by and large similar results are obtained for 
all three measures of government health expenditure. Two main conclusions can be 
drawn from the results.  
Firstly, treating IMF variables as additional determinant of health expenditure 
has very little impact on the ability of the model to explain variation in health 
expenditure within countries and across time. This suggests that IMF agreements do 
not appear to have a major influence in determining levels of health expenditure. It 
seems particularly noteworthy that including agreements as an additional explanatory 
variable into the model does generally not seem to have a big effect on the explained 
variation of expenditure levels within countries. This finding holds for both bivariate 
(compare Chapter 7; pg. 249) and multivariate relationships between IMF agreements 
and expenditure. This is somewhat surprising given that it was assumed that IMF 
agreements are a determinant of government health expenditure and thus help explain 
variation of health expenditure within a country over time.  
Secondly, on average and across all countries IMF agreements do not have a 
statistically significant effect on government health expenditure. However, the results 
suggest that the effects vary with income groups. For LIC a statistically significant 
positive association between agreements and government health expenditure is found. 
This suggests that for this set of countries government health expenditure is 
statistically significantly higher during times of agreements compared to times without 
agreements. For LMIC a statistically significant negative association between 
agreements and government health expenditure is reported for the as percentage of 
GDP and per capita health expenditure variables. This suggests that for this set of 
countries health expenditure levels are statistically significantly lower during times of 
agreements compared to times without agreements. For UMIC, the results show a 
slight negative but not statistically significant relationship between agreements and 
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expenditure levels. This suggests that for this set of countries IMF agreements do not 
have a statistically significant effect on government health expenditure levels and the 
differences in spending levels during times of agreements and those without 
agreements are not statistically significantly different.  
It is worth noting that the effect in LMIC and UMIC is somewhat counter-
intuitive as the former group of countries experience statistically significantly negative 
effects from IMF agreements while the latter group does not. When combining both 
income groups into a common lower-middle and upper-middle income countries 
(LUMIC) group the effect is statistically significantly negative for HE/GDP and 
HE/CAP with an effect size similar to that of LMIC (see Appendix to Chapter 8). 
Taking these results together suggests that combining LMIC and UMIC into one group 
would obscure the potential differences between the income groups.  
Comparing the results across the different country specifications suggests that 
averaging the results across all countries might gloss over differences in experiences 
between countries as the effects of IMF agreements on health expenditure are different 
for each of the country income groups. This means that the effects of IMF agreements 
on government health expenditure are likely not the same across all countries, but 
might vary between them. While the analyses so far suggest that income groupings are 
associated with different effects on health expenditure, it seems somewhat unlikely 
that a country’s income level itself is causally associated with the estimated effect. It 
is more likely that the income grouping should rather be treated as a proxy for other 
underlying factors. While a number of explanations can be considered, one possibility 
is that the nature of IMF conditionalities agreed as part of loans differs between these 
different country groups. This will be explored further in the next chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter 8 
Appendix Table 8.1: Selection equation Results of Probit Regression for Selection Equation, comparing 
Stripped Model and Stripped model with no lag of IMF dummy  
 (1) (2) 
 Stripped Model Stripped Model no L.IMF 








per capita GDP 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2199 2199 
McFadden R2 0.299 0.037 
AIC 2046.4 2803.0 
BIC 2069.1 2820.1 
p of Likelihood Ratio Test 0.000 0.000 
% correctly classified 81.45 55.75 
Exponentiated Coefficients with p-values in parentheses;  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see Table 5.7 
 
Appendix Table 8.2: Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.665*** 0.635*** 0.627*** 0.484*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.030) (0.068) 
Agreement Dummy 0.005 0.043* -0.028* -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.047 -0.134 -0.025 0.071 
 (0.040) (0.076) (0.101) (0.179) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.007* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.166** -0.283 -0.284 -0.417* 
 (0.054) (0.540) (0.262) (0.206) 
Constant 0.588* 1.021 0.864 -0.101 
 (0.244) (0.546) (0.538) (1.400) 
Within R² 0.558 0.524 0.524 0.410 
N 1882 726 756 400 
Countries 123 64 79 47 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7; dependent variable logged HE/GDP 
 
Appendix Table 8.3: Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Spending per Capita  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.702*** 0.725*** 0.585*** 0.436*** 
 (0.038) (0.051) (0.039) (0.050) 
Agreement Dummy 0.010 0.057** -0.037** -0.022 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.267*** 0.083 0.406** 0.958*** 
 (0.057) (0.099) (0.135) (0.154) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.003 0.001 0.003* 0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.010*** 0.013** 0.008*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.131 0.539 -0.312 -0.700*** 
 (0.068) (0.438) (0.328) (0.163) 
Constant -0.771** -0.500 -0.756 -4.880*** 
 (0.292) (0.533) (0.584) (1.154) 
Within R² 0.770 0.713 0.736 0.668 
N 1892 736 756 400 
Countries 123 64 79 47 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7; dependent variable logged HE/Cap 
 
Appendix Table 8.4: Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of 
General Government Expenditure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.661*** 0.634*** 0.643*** 0.539*** 
 (0.047) (0.063) (0.035) (0.064) 
Agreement Dummy 0.012 0.051* -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.086 -0.154 -0.035 0.118 
 (0.050) (0.110) (0.080) (0.154) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002* 0.003 -0.000 0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.007*** 0.009* 0.003 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.025 0.277 0.028 -0.439* 
 (0.056) (0.583) (0.179) (0.174) 
Constant 1.155** 1.163 1.142* 0.150 
 (0.389) (0.757) (0.463) (1.172) 
Within R² 0.452 0.434 0.452 0.359 
N 1893 736 757 400 
Countries 123 64 79 47 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7; dependent variable logged HE/GGE 
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Appendix Table 8.5: Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, 
not correcting for endogeneity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.674*** 0.639*** 0.631*** 0.520*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.029) (0.064) 
Agreement Dummy 0.006 0.045** -0.026* -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.095** -0.152* -0.110* -0.247** 
 (0.033) (0.075) (0.047) (0.072) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
time 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.779** 0.863 1.255*** 2.172** 
 (0.237) (0.495) (0.362) (0.642) 
Within R² 0.559 0.529 0.521 0.407 
N 1893 731 760 402 
Countries 124 64 80 47 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7; dependent variable logged HE/GDP 
 
Appendix Table 8.6: Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure per Capita Spending, 
not correcting for endogeneity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.708*** 0.727*** 0.586*** 0.489*** 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.037) (0.053) 
Agreement Dummy 0.011 0.058** -0.035* -0.019 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.225*** 0.132 0.309*** 0.408*** 
 (0.048) (0.094) (0.054) (0.113) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.003 0.001 0.003* 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.009** 0.013** 0.006** 0.011* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Constant -0.606* -0.316 -0.312 -1.131 
 (0.281) (0.495) (0.363) (0.802) 
Within R² 0.771 0.715 0.736 0.650 
N 1903 741 760 402 
Countries 124 64 80 47 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7; dependent variable logged HE/cap 
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Appendix Table 8.7: Effects of IMF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of 
General Government Expenditure, not correcting for endogeneity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All LIC LMIC UMIC 
 0.644*** 0.607*** 0.643*** 0.540*** 
lagged DV (0.056) (0.077) (0.035) (0.062) 
 0.017 0.061** -0.022 -0.022 
Agreement Dummy (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) 
 -0.069 -0.097 -0.022 -0.208** 
GDP per capita (logged) (0.048) (0.113) (0.042) (0.066) 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004** -0.002 
Government Revenue (% GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 0.003* 0.004 -0.000 0.005 
Age Dependency Ratio (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
 0.008*** 0.010* 0.003 0.013*** 
time (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
 1.072** 1.037 1.093*** 2.506*** 
Constant (0.399) (0.674) (0.315) (0.628) 
 0.437 0.413 0.452 0.344 
Within R² 1904 741 761 402 
N 124 64 80 47 
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 





 The Effects of Agreements 
on Government Health 
Expenditure by Agreement 
Cluster 
Chapter 8 modelled the average effect of IMF agreements on government 
health expenditure using a dummy variable that is either “on” or “off”. The analysis is 
based on the assumption that all agreements are comparable and have similar effects. 
While this approach, as outlined in chapter 2, is in line with the latest literature in the 
field, in particular Clements et al (2013) and Kentikelenis et al (2015b), it can be seen 
as an oversimplification. As was outlined in detail in section 1.2.4 (pg. 15), the IMF 
has developed a number of different lending facilities that are used in different 
situations and that differ in their objectives, the conditionalities and emphasis on social 
protection attached to the loan agreements. While conditionalities are set individually 
in each agreement and are likely to vary between them, it was demonstrated that three 
general clusters of lending facilities can be identified along the dimensions of extent 
of conditionality and attention to social protection (section 1.2.4.3; pg. 21). These are: 
(i) social protection agreements, which have a special focus on poverty reduction and 
social protection. Facilities in this cluster include the Standby Credit Facility (SCF) 
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and the Extended Credit Facility and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
(ECF/PRGF); (ii) agreements that do not have this explicit emphasis on social 
protection but do contain conditionality elements (the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
and the Standby Agreement (SBA) are included in this cluster) and (iii) agreements 
that are employed in specific or emergency situation and come with very little or no 
conditionality, including lending through the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), Exogenous 
Shock Facility (ESF), Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) 
and Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). 
It was suggested in chapter 1 that these differences in the way agreements 
consider poverty reduction and the extent of conditionality attached to agreements may 
have an influence on the effects that IMF agreements have on government health 
spending. It was suggested that social protection agreements may have a positive effect 
on government health spending, SBA/EFF agreements have a negative effect, and 
emergency agreements have no effect (section 1.2.4.4; pg. 23). This chapter explores 
empirically if agreements in different clusters have indeed different effects on 
government health expenditure. In doing so, the analysis goes beyond the current 
literature in the field.  
Focus of the analyses is thereby on the two main agreement clusters, social 
protection agreements and SBA/EFF agreements. Agreements in the emergency 
cluster are excluded for two reasons. Firstly, emergency agreements are a fairly new 
addition to the IMF’s range of facilities and are only used in 16 case-years during the 
observation period. Secondly, theory (section 1.2.3; pg. 13) suggests that agreements 
will impact on health expenditure through the conditionality and policy prescriptions 
attached to the agreements. Emergency agreements come with only little or no 
conditionality at all and are not considered full-blown IMF programmes (see section 
1.2.3; pg. 13). Therefore, it is expected that these agreements would have no effect on 
government health expenditure (section 1.2.4.4; pg. 23). 
The analysis builds on the existing methodology outlined in chapter 6 and 
applied in chapter 8. It does however, model agreements of each agreement cluster 
separately. An agreement cluster is considered to be “on” when a case-year is under 
an agreement of this type. It is “off”, when the case-year is not in an agreement. To 
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avoid confounding with other agreement clusters, case years are set to missing when 







on 547 265 
off 1,458 1,458 
other agreement 281 563 
Total 2,286 2,286 
Included in model 2,005 1,723 
Table 9.1: Frequencies of case-years by Agreement Clusters 
When estimating effects for each of the different agreement clusters, the issue 
of selection needs to be addressed again. To account for this, a separate selection 
equation is fitted for each cluster.  
This chapter is structured into four parts. The first part discusses the issue of 
selection in light of different agreement clusters and refits the selection models for the 
two agreement clusters. A number of different models are fitted to identify the best 
specification of the selection equation for each agreement cluster. The results suggest 
that a stripped version of the established model, also fitted in chapter 8, provides the 
best results for both agreement clusters. 
Part two presents the results of the analysis of effects of each of the agreement 
clusters on government health expenditure. Models are fitted for each of the three 
indicators of government health expenditure (spending as percentage of GDP 
(HE/GDP), spending per capita (HE/cap), and spending as percentage of GGE 
(HE/GGE); section 5.1.2; pg. 179). The results of this analysis suggest that social 
protection agreements have positive effects on government health expenditure. 
SBA/EFF agreements have negative effects on government health expenditure.  
Comparing these results with those obtained in the previous chapter leaves 
unclear whether agreement clusters or income group are the factor driving the observed 
differences. Part three of this chapter explores this further by estimating the results of 
each agreement cluster separately for each income group. The results suggest that 
social protection agreements do only maintain their statistically significant positive 
effect in low-income countries (LIC) but not in the other income groupings. The 
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negative effect of SBA/EFF agreements is only found in lower-middle-income 
countries (LMIC) but not in the other income groupings. 
The last part concludes the chapter. It is argued that while differences in the 
agreement clusters appear to be important they do not explain all of the variation in 
the effects. Factors associated with the income grouping seem to be important as well. 
9.1 Refitting the Selection Model 
It has previously been argued that the IMF variable is endogenous (chapter 6). 
For this study a Heckman-style selection model was identified as the best approach to 
deal with this challenge. Chapter 8 fitted a selection equation to the sample of all data 
points in the study to account for selection effects between countries with and without 
agreements. Because different agreement types are used in different situations, the 
selection effects might vary between the agreement types. This is because different 
agreements are not only associated with different conditionalities but are also used in 
different situations. For instance, SBA/EFF agreements are used in situations where 
the IMF believes that the organisation of a country’s economy requires adjustment to 
regain stability and growth. Emergency agreements on the other hand are used in rather 
different situations, where this unbalance is not present. This suggests that a selection 
model common to all agreement types might not be able to account for the differences 
between agreement and non-agreement conditions in each of the situations. To address 
this issue, a selection model will be fitted for each of the agreement clusters, before 
effects on government health expenditure are estimated for each cluster. 
Similar to chapter 8, the best specification of the selection equation cannot be 
identified through theory but needs to be found in an empirical way. This section will 
therefore build on the approach followed in the previous chapter and fit a number of 
different models with varying variable definition and lag structures. The estimated 
models include the following definitions (Table 8.1 provides an overview of the 
models). 
A fully fitted model with lag structure will be estimated, which includes all the 
variables that are available and relevant for this study. This is based on the reasoning 
that the best predictions and thus classification results can be obtained when the most 
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amount of data is available to perform the classification. Another set of models will be 
fitted, which follow the IMF’s mission statement and include variables measuring 
Balance of Payments position, international reserves as well as economic growth. In 
line with the literature on determinants of IMF agreements which argues that economic 
variables are important determinants, a set of models with all economic variables will 
be estimated. This set of models therefore includes the variables of GDP per capita, 
GDP per capita growth, reserves, debt stock, debt service, current account balance, 
inflation, government balance and change in the exchange rate. Finally, the model that 
has been established in the IMF and health literature will be fitted (“Established 
Model”), which includes a number of variables that capture both the country’s 
economic performance, political circumstances as well as the previous involvement 
with the Fund. Similar to the previous chapter, this model will be used as “benchmark” 
model to which the other models’ results will be compared. In the previous chapter it 
was argued that a stripped version of this Established Model provides the best model 
choice for classifying agreements as it offers a large number of additional cases and 
only reduces classification results marginally. This Stripped Model is fitted as 
additional set of models.  
The following two sections present and discuss the key results of the fitted 
models, first for social protection agreements (section 9.1.1) and then for SBA/EFF 
agreements (section 9.1.2), which are used to identify the best specification of the 
selection model for each of the agreement clusters. Similar to the previous chapter, 
judgement about goodness of the individual model will be based on the percentage of 
correctly classified cases and the number of cases retained in the model. Accordingly, 
only the number of cases in the model and the percentage of correct classification for 
each of the models and their lag structure are presented in Table 9.2 and Table 9.3. 
Results of the Established Model are shown at the bottom of each table as benchmark. 
To make the table more accessible, colour gradients are used, which show, similar to 
the previous chapter, a dark green colour for desired outcomes of high percentage of 
correct classification and large number of observation.  
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9.1.1 Fitting the Selection Model for Social Protection Agreements 
This section presents the key statistics of individual models for the social 
protection agreements cluster and discusses the results of each model and their lag 
structure in order to derive the best model for this study. Table 9.2 summarizes the 
models’ key findings.  














Fully Loaded Model n 1158 1223 1283 1344 1401 1462 
  % 86.70 86.26 86.20 85.34 85.01 83.93 
BCA, Reserves and Growth n 1664 1691 1716 1737 1753 1767 
  % 62.20 60.14 59.27 56.82 53.57 50.37 
Economic Variables n 1158 1223 1283 1344 1401 1462 
  % 76.17 75.72 75.84 73.96 72.38 71.55 
Established Model n 1334 1423 1495 1560 1624 1686 
  % 86.43 86.30 86.35 85.83 85.41 84.70 
Established Stripped  n 1833 1855 1878 1893 1907 1920 
  % 70.43 72.40 71.67 70.73 76.56 84.79 
 
Established Model n 1686      
  % 84.70      
Table 9.2: Key Statistics of Selection Equation Models for Social Protection Agreements based on 
Probit Regression Model 
 n Number of cases in the model; % percentage of cases correctly classified; data source: Table 5.17 
(pg. 205) 
Looking first at the Fully Loaded Model, the results suggest that the best 
classification results are obtained when the model is fitted with a five-lag structure, as 
it is capable of classifying 86.70% of all cases correctly. While this would offer a 
classification results that is superior to that of the Established Model (84.70%), the 
model includes 528 cases less than the Established Model. This reduction in cases in 
the model does not seem to justify the small increases in classification. Reducing the 
lag structure increases the number of cases retained but simultaneously decreases the 
classification results in a way that the zero-lag model includes the largest number of 
cases of this model specification with the lowest number of correctly classified cases. 
Taken these results together, the Fully Loaded Model does not seem superior to the 
Established Model and should therefore not be used for this study.  
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Turning next to the model with key economic variables shows, compared to 
the Fully Loaded Model, good results in terms of the number of cases included in the 
models (between 1664 for the five-lag model to 1767 for the zero lag model). 
However, classification results are fairly poor, as they range between 50.37% and 
62.20%. Choosing any of the models in this category over the Established Model 
would mean to accept a reduction in classification by over 20 percentage points for no 
large improvement in additional cases. So that this model specification should not be 
considered for this study. 
Looking at the Economic Variables Model, the results suggest that the 
number of cases in each of the models is similar to those of the Fully Loaded Model. 
The classification results are however between 10 and 12 percentage points lower than 
those obtained from the Fully Loaded Model. This means that the Economic Variables 
models are inferior to the Established Model and should not be considered for this 
analysis.  
The Established Model was additionally fitted with varying lag structure. The 
results suggest that an increase in the included lags leads to an increase in classification 
from 84.70% to 86.43% but at the same time reduces the number of cases included in 
the models from 1686 to 1334. This means that when choosing the model with five 
lags, an additional 1.7 percentage points in classification would need to be traded off 
by a reduction of 352 cases. Given the generally fairly small number of cases available 
this does not seem to be a reasonable trade-off for this study.  
As last set of models the Stripped Version of the Established Model, as 
presented in chapter 8, was fitted. The results show that similar to the previous chapter, 
the classification results of the zero lag model are comparable to the Established 
Model, but includes an additional 234 cases. This means that the Stripped Version is 
considered superior to the Established Model. 
Comparing across all models suggests that the stripped version of the 
Established Model is superior to the Established Model and would offer the best results 
for this study. In the previous chapter this stripped version of the Established Model 
was estimated as a model that only contains those variables of the Established Model 
that are statistically significant. Given that for this chapter the interest is no longer in 
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predicting all agreements but only the social protection agreements the sample has 
changed and it is possible that the significance of individual variables has changed as 
well. Table 9.3 compares the coefficients and their significance between the 
Established Model and the Stripped Model106. It appears that for social protection 
agreements GDP growth is no longer a statistically significant variable, while Current 
Account Balance and General Government Balance are statistically significant 
predictor of social protection agreements (Model (1)). The Stripped Model therefore 
has no longer the value of being a stripped version of the Established Model containing 
only statistically significant variables (Model (2)). A new stripped model was 
estimated containing only the statistically significant variables of the Established 
Model fitted to the sample of social protection agreements (Model (3)).  
 (1) (2) (3) 




Indicator of agreement in 
previous year 
5.205*** 5.239*** 5.318*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 
(lagged) 
1.008 1.014  
(0.381) (0.078)  
Current account balance 
(lagged) 
0.983***  0.982*** 
(0.001)  (0.000) 
Democracy Indicator 1.022   
(0.205)   
per capita GDP  1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General government balance 
(lagged) 
1.025**  1.025** 
(0.008)  (0.005) 
Observations 1686 1920 1718 
McFadden R2 0.431 0.418 0.436 
AIC 1123.4 1337.2 1124.9 
BIC 1161.4 1359.5 1152.1 
p of Likelihood Tests 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% of correctly classified 84.70 84.79 85.33 
Table 9.3: Results of Probit Regression for Selection Equation of Social Protection Agreements.  
Exponentiated Coefficients with p-values in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; data 
source: Table 5.17 (pg. 205) 
The results of this stripped version suggest that this model’s classification 
capabilities (85.33%) are superior to those of both the Established Model (84.70%) 
and the stripped model definition for all agreements (84.79%). However, this model 
reduces the number of cases in the model by 202 compared to the original Stripped 
                                                 
106 Both models are considered with the 0 lag structure. 
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Version. These results would suggest to use the Stripped Model (Model (2)) to create 
the Inverse Mills Ratio to account for selection bias in the models for social protection 
agreements.  
9.1.2 Fitting the Selection Model for SBA/EFF Agreements 
This section presents the key results of the different sets of models and their 
lag structures for the cluster of SBA/EFF agreements. Table 9.4 shows the number of 
cases in each model and the classification results. The following paragraphs discuss 
the results of each model and the lag structure in order to identify the best. 














Fully Loaded Model n 977 1034 1086 1135 1179 1229 
  % 82.50 81.24 80.57 80.26 77.69 78.03 
BCA, Reserves and Growth n 1388 1415 1437 1456 1468 1480 
  % 50.79 49.82 49.83 49.18 47.34 44.86 
Economic Variables n 977 1034 1086 1135 1179 1229 
  % 72.26 69.83 65.56 64.58 63.61 60.70 
IMF Variables n 1723 1723 1723 1723 1723 1723 
  % 82.47 82.41 82.41 82.41 82.41 82.82 
Established Model n 1144 1225 1289 1347 1403 1453 
  % 82.87 81.47 81.38 81.22 80.97 81.14 
Established Stripped Main n 1544 1571 1600 1614 1629 1641 
  % 61.79 60.03 60.94 63.01 67.89 79.59 
 
Established Model n 1453      
  % 81.14      
Table 9.4: Key Statistics of Selection Equation Models for SBA/EFF Agreements based on Probit 
Regression Model  
(n Number of cases in the model; % percentage of cases correctly classified; data source: Table 5.17 
(pg. 205) 
Inspecting the results of the Fully Loaded Model, suggests that the best 
classification results are obtained when the model is fitted with a five-lag structure, as 
it is capable of classifying 82.50% of all cases correctly. This offers a classification 
results that is superior to that of the Established Model (81.14%), however there are 
476 less cases in the model, compared to the Established Model. This reduction in 
cases in the model does not seem to justify the small increases in classification. 
Reducing the lag structure increases the number of cases but simultaneously decreases 
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the classification results in a way that the zero-lag model includes the largest number 
of cases but also the lowest number of correctly classified cases. When considering 
both dimensions simultaneously, the Established Model is superior to all specifications 
of the Fully Loaded Model, so that this model should not be used. 
Turning next to the model with key economic variables shows good results in 
terms of the number of cases included in the models from between 1388 for the five-
lag model to 1480 for the zero lag model. However, classification results are fairly 
poor, as they range from between 44.86% and 50.79%. Choosing any of the models in 
this category over the Established Model would suggest to accept a reduction in 
classification by over 30 percentage points for no real addition in cases. Therefore 
these models should not be considered. 
Looking at the Economic Variables Model, the results suggest that the 
number of cases in each of the models is comparable to those of the Fully Loaded 
Model. The classification results are however between 10 and 17 percentage points 
lower than those obtained from the Fully Loaded Model. This means that the Economic 
Variables models are inferior to the Established Model and should not be considered 
for this analysis.  
The Established Model was additionally fitted with varying lag structure. The 
results suggest that an increase in the included lags leads to an increase in classification 
from 81.14% to 82.87% but at the same time reduces the number of cases included in 
the models from 1453 to 1144. This means that when choosing the model with five 
lags, an additional 1.3 percentage points in classification would need to be traded off 
by a reduction of 309 cases. Given the generally small number of cases available this 
does not seem to be a reasonable trade-off for this study.  
As last set of models the stripped version of the Established Model, as 
presented in the previous chapter, was fitted. The results show that, counter to the two 
other sample definitions, the stripped model performs slightly worse in terms of 
classification results (79.59% compared to 81.14%) but includes an additional 188 
cases in the models.  
Comparing across all models suggests that the stripped version of the 
Established Model can be seen as superior to the Established Model as it provides just 
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slightly worse classification results but includes considerably more cases. As was 
outlined in the previous section, the variable definition of the stripped model is based 
on the statistical significance of the Established Model for all agreements. Statistical 
significance of the variables might have changed with the change in sample. Table 9.5 
compares the coefficients and their significance between the Established Model 
(Model (1)) and the Stripped Model (Model (2)). It appears that for SBA/EFF 
agreements, democracy is an additional statistically significant predictor (Model (1)). 
The Stripped Model therefore has no longer the value of being a stripped version of 
the Established Model containing only statistically significant variables (Model (2)). 
A new stripped model was estimated containing only the statistically significant 
variables of the Established Model fitted to the sample of SBA/EFF agreements 
(Model (3)). 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Indicator of agreement in 
previous year 
4.657*** 4.429*** 4.363*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 
(lagged) 
0.973** 0.977*** 0.975*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Current account balance 
(lagged) 
1.010   
(0.068)   
Democracy Indicator 1.075***  1.043** 
(0.000)  (0.009) 
per capita GDP  1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General government balance 
(lagged) 
0.994   
(0.554)   
Observations 1453 1641 1635 
McFadden R2 0.273 0.241 0.245 
AIC 896.4 1104.0 1086.4 
BIC 933.4 1125.6 1113.4 
p of Likelihood Tests 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% of correctly classified 81.14 79.59 79.82 
Table 9.5: Results of Probit Regression for Selection Equation of SBA/EFF Agreements. 
 Exponentiated Coefficients with p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; data 
source: Table 5.17 (pg. 205) 
The results of this stripped version suggest that this model’s classification 
capabilities (79.82%) are superior to those of the stripped model definition for all 
agreements (79.59%) but inferior to the Established Model (81.14%). The new 
stripped version includes 6 cases less than the stripped version for all agreements but 
188 more than the Established Model. Given the larger number of cases included in 
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the stripped versions, the Established Model seems inferior to the stripped versions. 
The difference between both stripped versions seems minor both in terms of cases and 
classification results. Given that all other models are based on the stripped version for 
all agreements (Model (2)), this model shall also be used to create the Inverse Mills 
Ratios for SBA/EFF agreements, as this allows for comparability between the models.  
9.1.3 Summary of the Selection Models 
This section set out to identify the best specification of the selection model for 
social protection and SBA/EFF agreements. Similar to the previous chapter such a 
decision was made along two dimensions, the definition of variables and their lag 
structure. A number of different model specifications were estimated and their results 
compared. While the classification results differ slightly between the agreement types, 
it was shown that a stripped version of the Established Model with no additional lag 
structure offers the best results for both of the agreement types without losing a large 
number of cases. Comparing the models’ classification results suggests that the model 
is slightly more capable of correctly classifying social protection agreements 
compared to SBA/EFF agreements. However, the differences are small and even for 
SBA/EFF agreements good enough to trust that models are capable of accounting for 
endogeneity. 
9.2 Assessing the Effects of Different Agreement Clusters 
Having fitted the selection models, this section estimates the effects of IMF 
agreements on government health expenditure for the two main agreement clusters in 
separate models and for each of the three ways to measure government health 
expenditure (health expenditure as percentage of GDP (HE/GDP), health expenditure 
per capita (HE/cap) and health expenditure as percentage of government expenditure 
(HE/GGE)). The presentation of the results107 is structured into three sections. The first 
section presents the results of regression models for the social protection agreements. 
                                                 
107 Focus of these sections is on the respective agreement dummies; the results of the other 
covariates are comparable to those found in the analysis for all agreements (section 8.2.1; pg. 
302). 
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The second section presents the regression results for SBA/EFF agreements. Section 
three summarises the findings.  
9.2.1 Assessing the Effects of Social Protection Agreements 
This section sets out to assess the effects of IMF agreements with social 
protection components on government health expenditure. To do so, it compares 
government health expenditure during times of social protection agreements with 
those with no agreements (reference category). Results are shown in Table 9.6. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
HE/GDP HE/CAP HE/GGE 
lagged DV 0.669*** 0.714*** 0.656*** 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.049) 
Social Protection Agreement 0.024 0.038* 0.040* 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.108** 0.217*** -0.075 
 (0.036) (0.059) (0.061) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.001 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
time 0.010*** 0.009** 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Constant 0.847** -0.612 1.085* 
 (0.252) (0.353) (0.484) 
Within R² 0.559 0.768 0.453 
N 1648 1658 1658 
Countries 123 123 123 
Table 9.6: Effects of Social Protection Agreements on Government Health Expenditure 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334); dependent variables 
logged 
Looking first at the model for health expenditure as percentage of GDP (Model 
(1) in Table 9.6), the results show that social protection agreements are associated with 
a slight, but not statistically significant increase in government spending of 0.024 units 
(SE 0.014). This suggests that countries in social protection agreements, that are 
otherwise comparable to non-agreement countries, see slightly, but not statistically 
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significantly, higher levels of government health spending as percentage of GDP 
compared to those countries that do not have agreements. 
Turning to the model for government health expenditure as per capita spending 
(Model (2) in Table 9.6), the results show that social protection agreements are 
associated with a statistically significant increase in spending per capita compared to 
no agreement of 0.038 units (SE 0.015). This suggests that at times of social protection 
agreements countries spend 3.97% more on government health expenditure compared 
to similar countries without agreements. Taking the average spending of countries (see 
Chapter 7), this translates into an increase in per capita government health spending of 
5.74 $.  
Looking finally at the model for government health expenditure as percentage 
of general government expenditure (Model (3) in Table 9.6), the results show that 
social protection agreements are associated with statistically significant increases in 
spending compared to countries and times without agreements. This suggests that 
comparable countries that are in social protection agreements have 0.040 unit (SE 
0.016) higher levels of government spending compared to countries without 
agreements.  
Comparing across all three models of different government health expenditure 
measures it appears that, while in the case of government health expenditure as 
percentage of GDP not statistically significant, social protection agreements are 
associated with increases in spending compared to times and countries without 
agreements. This suggests that when countries are in a social protection agreement 
health spending is increased compared to those countries that are not undergoing an 
agreement. 
9.2.2 Assessing the Effects of SBA/EFF Agreements 
Having estimated the effects of social protection agreements, the analysis shall 
now turn to the effects of SBA/EFF agreements. To do so, the difference in 
government health expenditure between no agreement (reference category) and 
SBA/EFF agreements are estimated. Results are presented in Table 9.7.  
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 (1) (2) (3) 
  HE/GDP HE/CAP HE/GGE 
lagged DV 0.640*** 0.694*** 0.649*** 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.036) 
SBA/EFF Agreement -0.022* -0.033* -0.027 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.114** 0.207*** -0.096** 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.031) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.004** 0.006*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
time 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.002 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant 0.862** -0.511 1.235*** 
  (0.267) (0.297) (0.302) 
Within R² 0.530 0.780 0.454 
N 1406 1412 1413 
Countries 121 121 121 
Table 9.7: Effects of SBA/EFF Agreements on Government Health Expenditure  
Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334); dependent variables 
logged 
Looking first at the model for government health expenditure as percentage of 
GDP (Model (1) Table 9.7), the results show that SBA/EFF agreements are associated 
with a statistically significantly lower level of health expenditure compared to 
countries that are not in agreements, but otherwise comparable. This suggests that 
countries that are undergoing SBA/EFF agreements have government health 
expenditure levels that are by 0.022 units (SE 0.010) lower compared to countries with 
no agreements.  
Turning to the model for government health expenditure as per capita spending 
(Model (2) in Table 9.7), the results show that SBA/EFF agreements are associated 
with a statistically significant decrease in spending per capita compared to no 
agreement. This suggests that at times of SBA/EFF agreements countries spend 3.36% 
less compared to similar countries without agreements. Taking the average spending 
of countries (see Chapter 7), this translates into a decrease of 4.86 $ per capita. 
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Looking finally at the model for government health expenditure as percentage 
of general government expenditure (Model (3) in Table 9.7), the results show that 
SBA/EFF agreements are associated with a slight negative, -0.027 unit (SE 0.016), but 
not statistically significant effect on health expenditure compared to countries and 
times without agreements. This suggests that there is no statistically significant 
difference in government health expenditure between agreement and no-agreement 
times.  
Comparing across all three government health expenditure measures, it appears 
that, while in the case of government health expenditure as percentage of general 
government expenditure not statistically significant, SBA/EFF agreements are 
associated with decreases in spending compared to times and countries without 
agreements. This suggests that when countries are in a SBA/EFF agreement health 
spending decreased compared to those countries that are not undergoing an agreement, 
when controlling for all other variables in the models. 
9.2.3 Summary of the Findings by Agreement Cluster 
This section set out to identify the effects of the two main clusters of lending 
facilities offered by the IMF. To do so, separate models were estimated to identify the 
effect of social protection agreements and the effects of SBA/EFF agreements on each 
of the measures of government health expenditure. The results suggest two main 
findings.  
The regression models for social protection agreements suggest that 
government health expenditure increases during times of these agreements compared 
to times of no agreements. For the measures of health expenditure as percentage of 
general government expenditure and per capita spending, this effect was found to be 
statistically significant at the conventional 5% level. This suggests that government 
health expenditure is higher during agreements when it is measured as per capita 
spending or percentage of government expenditure. A similar effect in terms of 
direction, but not in terms of significance was found for the measure of government 
health expenditure as percentage of GDP.  
339 
The regression models of the SBA/EFF agreements show that spending 
decreases during times of these agreements compared to times of no agreements. These 
findings are statistically significant for the measures of government health expenditure 
as percentage of GDP as well as per capita spending. A similar trend in direction, that 
was however just not statistically significant, was found for government health 
expenditure as percentage of general government expenditure.  
Overall, these results suggest that agreements with social protection component 
seem to be associated with an increase in spending compared to no agreements, while 
the effects of agreements without the social protection component (SBA/EFF 
agreements) are generally negative and these agreements are associated with 
reductions in spending. The next section discusses these findings in relation to the 
previous chapter and explores them further. 
9.3 Exploring the Role of Agreement Clusters and Income Groups 
This chapter set out to investigate the effects of different agreement clusters on 
government health expenditure. This is based on the assumption that agreement types 
differ in their conditionality and the extent to which they consider social protection 
and poverty reduction (section 1.2.4.4; pg. 23), which will have different effects on 
government health expenditure. To do so, analyses were conducted to estimate the 
effects of the social protection and the SBA/EFF agreements clusters. The results show 
that both agreement clusters have different effects on government health expenditure. 
For social protection agreements it was shown that agreements are associated with 
increases in government health spending, when compared to countries and times with 
no agreements. For SBA/EFF agreements it was shown that these agreements are 
associated with decreases in government health expenditure when compared to times 
and countries with no agreements.  
Chapter 8 set out to investigate the average effects of IMF agreements on 
government health spending assuming that all agreements are comparable and have 
similar effects. The analysis showed that, while there are no effects across all countries 
in the study, the effects of agreements differ between country income groups. It was 
found that for LIC the relationship was positive in the way that agreements were 
associated with increases in spending. The effects of agreements on LMIC were found 
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to be statistically significant negative in the way that agreements are associated with 
decreases in government health expenditure. For UMIC it was found that agreements 
have a slight but not statistically significantly negative effect on government health 
spending.  
This offers two different and competing explanations for the observed 
differences in the effects of agreements on government health expenditure and leaves 
unclear what the reasons underlying the observed differences are. The previous chapter 
suggested that the effects of agreements differ between country income groups in the 
way that countries experience different effects based on their income. The findings of 
this chapter suggest that the effects of agreements differ between agreement types. 
This means that the effects a country is experiencing might differ depending on the 
type of agreement the country is undergoing.  
As was outlined in more detail before (see Section 1.2.3; pg. 13) agreement 
clusters differ in their conditionality and the extent they consider social protection. 
Conditionality of social protection agreements is seen to be linked to policies to 
safeguard spending linked to social protection, while this statement is not made for 
SBA/EFF agreements. It can therefore be argued that the effect that is found can be 
attributed to the differences in agreement types. It is harder to see how a country’s 
income grouping can be a causal factor in explaining the observed differences by 
country groups.  
While it was previously shown (Table 7.1; pg. 250) that social protection 
agreements are commonly used in low-income countries and SBA/EFF agreements are 
commonly used in middle-income countries and the distinction between income 
groups and agreement clusters might pick up much of the same effect, this distinction 
is not perfect. This allows to test the two competing claims (do income groups or 
agreement types matter?) empirically. To do so, the models for the two agreement 
clusters are refitted for each of the income groups separately. When the observed 
difference in effect is due to agreements rather than income groups the effect of 
agreements will be similar across all country income groups. This section is structured 
into three parts. The first part assesses effects of social protection agreements, the 
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second part assesses the effects of SBA/EFF agreements and the third section 
summarises the findings and compares and contrasts them.  
9.3.1 Assessing the Effects of Social Protection Agreements by Income 
Group 
This section empirically assesses the effects of social protection agreement on 
government health expenditure across the three income groups. The following 
paragraphs presents the results of the analysis for each of the government health 
expenditure measures.  
9.3.1.1 Results of Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
Table 9.8 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of social protection 
agreements on government health expenditure as percentage of GDP. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.634*** 0.628*** 0.520*** 
 (0.044) (0.030) (0.091) 
Agreement Dummy 0.046* 0.000 -0.042 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.063) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.187* -0.111* -0.313*** 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.046) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.010 -0.002 -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 1.069* 1.220** 2.702*** 
  (0.513) (0.393) (0.368) 
Within R² 0.525 0.536 0.397 
N 698 631 319 
Countries 62 77 45 
Table 9.8: Effects of Social Protection Agreements on logged HE/GDP across Income Groups 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334) 
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For LIC (Model (1) of Table 9.8) the analysis shows that social protection 
agreements have a statistically significant positive effect on government health 
expenditure compared to no agreements, when controlling for all other variables in the 
model. This suggests that on average LIC in social protection agreements spend 0.046 
units (SE 0.018) more on health care compared to LIC without agreements.  
For LMIC (Model (2) of Table 9.8) the results show that there is no association 
between social protection agreements and government health expenditure as measured 
as percentage of GDP. This suggests that there is no (statically significant) difference 
in government health spending between countries and times of social protection 
agreements and countries without agreements, when controlling for all other variables 
in the model.  
For UMIC (Model (3) of Table 9.8) the results show that there is a slight 
negative but not statistically significant association between social protection 
agreements and government health expenditure as measured as percentage of GDP. 
This suggests that there is no statically significant difference in government health 
spending between countries and times of social protection agreements and countries 
without agreements, when controlling for all other variables in the model.  
9.3.1.2 Results of Government Health Expenditure per Capita 
Table 9.9 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of social protection 
agreements on government health expenditure as per capita spending. 
For LIC (Model (1) of Table 9.9) the analysis shows that social protection 
agreements have a statistically significant positive effect on government health 
expenditure compared to no agreements, when controlling for all other variables in the 
model. This suggests that on average LIC in social protection agreements spend 0.059 
units (SE 0.019) more on health care compared to countries without agreements. Based 
on the average spending of LIC, this translates into an increase of $1.83 
For LMIC (Model (2) of Table 9.9) the results show that there is a minor 
positive but not statistically significant association between social protection 
agreements and government health expenditure per capita spending. This suggests that 
there is no statically significant difference in government health spending between 
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countries and times of social protection agreements and countries without agreements, 
when controlling for all other variables in the model.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.730*** 0.596*** 0.499*** 
 (0.055) (0.035) (0.070) 
Agreement Dummy 0.059** 0.001 -0.065 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.059) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.108 0.305*** 0.342 
 (0.102) (0.054) (0.181) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.002 0.003* 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.002 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.013** 0.008*** 0.013 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant -0.187 -0.368 -0.666 
  (0.558) (0.371) (1.227) 
Within R² 0.714 0.750 0.602 
N 708 631 319 
Countries 62 77 45 
Table 9.9: Effects of Social Protection Agreements on logged HE/CAP across Income Groups 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334) 
For UMIC (Model (3) of Table 9.9) the results show that there is slight negative 
but not statistically significant association between social protection agreements and 
per capita government health expenditure. This suggests that there is no statically 
significant difference in government health spending between countries and times of 
social protection agreements and countries without agreements, when controlling for 
all other variables in the model.  
9.3.1.3 Results of Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of Gen-
eral Government Expenditure  
Table 9.10 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of social protection 
agreements on government health expenditure as percentage of government spending. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.627*** 0.646*** 0.533*** 
 (0.065) (0.035) (0.078) 
Agreement Dummy 0.054* -0.006 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.074) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.135 -0.034 -0.156* 
 (0.118) (0.049) (0.063) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) -0.001 -0.004** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.003 -0.000 0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
time 0.009* 0.004 0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.009 -0.000 -0.006 
 (0.028) (0.012) (0.014) 
Constant 1.281 1.169** 1.815** 
  (0.717) (0.421) (0.525) 
Within R² 0.433 0.461 0.343 
N 708 631 319 
Countries 62 77 45 
Table 9.10: Effects of Social Protection Agreements on logged HE/GGE across Income Groups 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334) 
For LIC (Model (1) of Table 9.10) the analysis shows that social protection 
agreements have a statistically significant positive effect on government health 
expenditure compared to no agreements. This suggests that on average LIC in social 
protection agreements spend 0.061 units (SE 0.026) more on health care compared to 
countries without agreements.  
For LMIC (Model (2) of Table 9.10) the results show that there is a slight 
negative but not statistically significant association between social protection 
agreements and government health expenditure as measured as percentage of general 
government expenditure. This suggests that there is no statically significant difference 
in government health spending between countries and times of social protection 
agreements and countries without agreements, when controlling for all other variables 
in the model.  
For UMIC (Model (3) of Table 9.10) the results show that there is a slight 
positive but not statistically significant association between social protection 
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agreements and government health expenditure as percentage of general government 
expenditure. This suggests that there is no statically significant difference in 
government health spending between countries and times of social protection 
agreements and countries without agreements, when controlling for all other variables 
in the model.  
9.3.2 Assessing the Effects of SBA/EFF Agreements by Income Group 
This section empirically assesses the effects of SBA/EFF agreement on 
government health expenditure across the three income groups. Adopting the logic and 
structure of the previous section, the following paragraphs present the results of the 
analysis for each of the ways to measure government health expenditure.  
9.3.2.1 Results of Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
Table 9.11 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of SBA/EFF 
agreements on government health expenditure as percentage of GDP. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.542*** 0.611*** 0.520*** 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.066) 
Agreement Dummy -0.005 -0.042* -0.016 
 (0.061) (0.017) (0.012) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.100 -0.145* -0.221** 
 (0.091) (0.057) (0.068) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.005* 0.003** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.007* -0.002 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
time 0.018*** 0.007** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.021 -0.009 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.012) (0.014) 
Constant 0.114 1.531*** 2.024** 
  (0.657) (0.446) (0.607) 
Within R² 0.447 0.506 0.382 
N 370 653 383 
Countries 61 77 47 
Table 9.11: Effects of SBA/EFF Agreements on logged HE/GDP across Income Groups 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334) 
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For LIC (Model (1) of Table 9.11) the analysis shows that SBA/EFF 
agreements have a slight but not statistically significant negative effect on government 
health expenditure compared to no agreements, when controlling for all other variables 
in the model.  
For LMIC (Model (2) of Table 9.11) the results show that there is a statistically 
significant negative association between SBA/EFF agreements and government health 
expenditure as measured as percentage of GDP, when controlling for all other 
variables in the model. This suggests that on average LMIC in SBA/EFF agreements 
spend 0.042 units (SE 0.017) more on health care compared to LMIC without 
agreements.  
For UMIC (Model (3) of Table 9.11) the results show that there is a slight 
negative but not statistically significant association between SBA/EFF agreements and 
government health expenditure as measured as percentage of GDP. This suggests that 
there is no statically significant difference in government health spending between 
countries and times of SBA/EFF agreements and countries without agreements, when 
controlling for all other variables in the model.  
9.3.2.2 Results of Government Health Expenditure per Capita 
Table 9.12 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of SBA/EFF 
agreements on government health expenditure as per capita spending. 
For LIC (Model (1) of Table 9.12) the analysis shows that SBA/EFF 
agreements have a slight but not statistically significant negative effect on government 
health expenditure compared to no agreements, when controlling for all other variables 
in the model. This suggests that there is no statically significant difference in 
government health spending between countries and times of SBA/EFF agreements and 
countries with no agreements.  
For LMIC (Model (2) of Table 9.12) the results show that there is a statistically 
significant negative association between SBA/EFF agreements and government health 
expenditure as measured as per capita spending compared to countries without 
agreements, when controlling for all other variables in the model. This suggests that 
on average LMIC in SBA/EFF agreements spend 0.058 units (SE 0.019) more on 
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health care compared to LMIC without agreements. This translates into a reduction of 
government health spending by $8.29 for countries in SBA/EFF agreements compared 
to countries without agreements. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.739*** 0.562*** 0.493*** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.054) 
Agreement Dummy -0.028 -0.058** -0.030 
 (0.072) (0.019) (0.015) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.137 0.289*** 0.414*** 
 (0.115) (0.051) (0.116) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) 0.006* 0.003** 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.008** -0.002 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
time 0.019*** 0.007** 0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.003 -0.012 -0.020 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.018) 
Constant -0.990 -0.034 -1.082 
  (0.677) (0.414) (0.842) 
Within R² 0.727 0.710 0.647 
N 376 653 383 
Countries 61 77 47 
Table 9.12: Effects of SBA/EFF Agreements on logged HE/CAP across Income Groups 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.17; pg. 205; Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334) 
For UMIC (Model (3) of Table 9.12) the results show that there is slight 
negative but not statistically significant association between SBA/EFF agreements and 
per capita government health expenditure. This suggests that there is no statically 
significant difference in government health spending between countries and times of 
SBA/EFF agreements and countries without agreements, when controlling for all other 
variables in the model.  
9.3.2.3 Results of Government Health Expenditure as Percentage of Gen-
eral Government Expenditure  
Table 9.13 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of SBA/EFF 
agreements on government health expenditure as percentage of government spending. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 LIC LMIC UMIC 
lagged DV 0.608*** 0.628*** 0.546*** 
 (0.057) (0.036) (0.064) 
Agreement Dummy -0.058 -0.029 -0.019 
 (0.050) (0.018) (0.021) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.168 0.008 -0.223** 
 (0.096) (0.038) (0.074) 
Government Revenue (% GDP) -0.001 -0.004** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.007* -0.001 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
time 0.016*** 0.002 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.031 -0.006 0.002 
 (0.029) (0.012) (0.027) 
Constant 1.178 0.958** 2.578*** 
  (0.723) (0.286) (0.671) 
Within R² 0.427 0.446 0.352 
N 376 654 383 
Countries 61 77 47 
Table 9.13: Effects of SBA/EFF Agreements on logged HE/GGE across Income Groups 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; for data source see 
Table 5.7 (pg. 193); Inverse Mills Ratio as described in section 9.1.3 (pg. 334) 
For LIC (Model (1) of Table 9.13) the analysis shows that SBA/EFF 
agreements have a slight but not statistically significant negative effect on government 
health expenditure compared to no agreements. This suggests that there is no statically 
significant difference in government health spending between countries and times of 
SBA/EFF agreements and countries without agreements, when controlling for all other 
variables in the model. 
For LMIC (Model (2) of Table 9.13) the results show that there is a slight 
negative but not statistically significant association between SBA/EFF agreements and 
government health expenditure as measured as percentage of general government 
health expenditure. This suggests that there is no statically significant difference in 
government health spending between countries and times of SBA/EFF agreements and 
countries without agreements, when controlling for all other variables in the model.  
For UMIC (Model (3) of Table 9.13) the results show that there is slight 
negative but not statistically significant association between SBA/EFF agreements and 
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government health expenditure as percentage of general government expenditure. This 
suggests that there is no statically significant difference in government health spending 
between countries and times of SBA/EFF agreements and countries without 
agreements, when controlling for all other variables in the model.  
9.3.3 Comparing and Contrasting the Findings 
This section set out to add to the analysis of the effects of IMF agreements on 
government health expenditure by investigating the effects of agreement clusters 
across income groups. This was done in order to identify if the observed differences 
in the effects can be attributed to differences in countries’ income group or to 
differences in agreement types. Table 9.14 presents the IMF agreement dummy 
coefficients of all models. This section summarises, compares and contrasts the 
findings.  
    [1] All [2] LIC [3] LMIC [4] UMIC 
[A] 
 All Agreements 
 
[i] HE/GDP 
0.006 0.047** -0.030* -0.012 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) 
[ii] HE/CAP 
0.008 0.060** -0.041** -0.026 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
[iii] HE/GGE 
0.011 0.049* -0.025 -0.022 





0.024 0.046* 0.000 -0.042 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.063) 
[ii] HE/CAP 
0.038* 0.059** 0.001 -0.065 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.059) 
[iii] HE/GGE 
0.040* 0.054* -0.006 0.028 





-0.022* -0.005 -0.042* -0.016 
(0.010) (0.061) (0.017) (0.012) 
[ii] HE/CAP 
-0.033* -0.028 -0.058** -0.030 
(0.013) (0.072) (0.019) (0.015) 
[iii] HE/GGE 
-0.027 -0.058 -0.029 -0.019 
(0.016) (0.050) (0.018) (0.021) 
Table 9.14: IMF Agreement Dummy Coefficients for All Agreements, Social Protection and SBA/EFF 
Agreements by Income Group 
 Driscoll/Kraay standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Looking first at social protection agreements (Panel [B] in Table 9.14). The 
results for all countries suggest that across all three measures of government health 
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expenditure spending increases during times of agreements compared to no 
agreements. This association is statistically significant for spending per capita and 
spending as percentage of government expenditure. The effects vary when dividing 
the dataset by income group. LIC see a statistically significant increase in spending 
across all three measures when in agreements compared to times without agreements. 
For LMIC a slight positive, but not statistically significant effect is observed. For 
UMIC the effect is again not statistically significant, but the point estimate suggests a 
slight negative association of social protection agreements with government health 
expenditure compared to no agreements. 
Comparing across the income groups within the Social Protection agreement 
cluster (Models [2] to [4] in Panel [B] shows that, especially for HE/GDP and 
HE/CAP, the coefficients for LIC and UMIC countries are similar in size (though of 
opposite sign). However, the standard errors are much larger and the results not 
statistically significant for UMIC. For LMIC the effect size is very small and not 
statistically significant. This suggests that the effects vary between country income 
groups, and also that the variation between the countries in the UMIC group is much 
larger. It would appear that the effect of agreements is not uniform within this income 
group. It could be argued that the effects of agreements do indeed vary between 
different countries, but that the income grouping might not be a useful variable to 
classify countries in terms of the observed effects of agreements.   
Turning next to the models for SBA/EFF agreements (Panel [C] in Table 9.14). 
For all countries, the results suggest slight decreases in government health expenditure 
across all three measures compared to times with no agreements. This association is 
statistically significant for spending per capita and spending as percentage of GDP. 
LIC see a minor, but not statistically significant, negative effect in spending across all 
three measures when in agreements compared to times without agreements. For LMIC 
a negative effect is observed that is statistically significant for measures of spending 
as percentage of GDP and per capita. For UMIC the effect is not statistically 
significant, but the point estimate suggests a slight negative association of SBA/EFF 
agreements with government health expenditure compared to no agreements. 
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Comparing across the income groups for the SBA/EFF agreement clusters 
(Models [2] to [4] in Panel [C]) shows that while the effect of these agreements is 
negative across all income groups, it is statistically significant only for LMIC 
(HE/GDP and HE/CAP). While this is somewhat counter-intuitive, combining the 
LMIC and UMIC countries together would obscure the differences in effect between 
income groups (see Appendix). The relatively wide standard errors and smaller effect 
size in the UMIC group suggests more variation between these countries.  
Comparing these findings to the results of the previous chapter’s analysis of all 
agreements (Panel [A] in Table 9.14), conclusions can be drawn about the role of 
income groups and the effects of the different agreement clusters. 
For LIC (column [2] of Table 9.14) the positive effects observed when 
analysing all agreements (column [2], Panel [A] of Table 9.14) seem to be driven by 
the positive effects of social protection agreements, which are the main agreement 
cluster of LIC. When LIC receive funding through SBA/EFF agreements (column [2], 
Panel [C] of Table 9.14), they experience a slight but not statistically significant 
reduction in spending, which is also in line with the experience of other country 
income groups receiving SBA/EFF agreements. This suggests that the agreement type 
matters for LIC.  
At the same time the effect of social protection agreements changes by income 
group. The statistically significant positive effect of these agreements observed for all 
countries and the model for LIC, disappears in LMIC and UMIC in the way that the 
point estimate becomes smaller and partly even negative (columns [3]-[4], Panel [B] 
of Table 9.14). This suggests that the positive effect of social protection agreements 
on government health expenditure only holds for LIC and not for other income groups.  
Turning to SBA/EFF agreements the income group does seem play less of a 
role when it comes to the effects of this agreement cluster (column [2]-[4], Panel [C] 
of Table 9.14). The effects of SBA/EFF agreements are always slightly negative and 
for LMIC countries statistically significantly negative when expenditure is measures 
as percentage of GDP or in terms of per capita spending (column [4], Panel [C] of 
Table 9.14). This country group also seems to be driving the statistically negative 
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effect of this agreement cluster, when all countries are included in the analysis (column 
[1], Panel [C] of Table 9.14). 
9.4 Conclusions  
This chapter set out to estimate the effects of different agreement clusters on 
government health expenditure. The analysis thereby focussed on the two main 
agreement clusters that have previously been identified: the cluster of social protection 
agreements, which offer special attention to social spending and concessional 
financing terms, and the cluster of agreements, which does not include attention to 
social protection and poverty reduction and also not include concessional financing 
terms (SBA/EFF agreements). The chapter was structured into three parts. In part one, 
the selection equation was re-estimated for each agreement clusters. Part two estimated 
to overall effects of the different agreement types on the three measures of government 
health expenditure. Part three analysed the effects of each agreement cluster across 
income groups and compared and contrasted the findings obtained across all analyses.  
To identify the best selection model specification a number of models were 
estimated and compared based on their percentage of correct classification and the 
number of cases retained. When refitting the selection model for each agreement 
clusters, slight differences in the importance of individual variables and the extent of 
correct classification were identified. Overall, however, it could be shown that for both 
a stripped version of the Established Model provides the best classification results 
while also retaining a large number of cases.  
Having estimated the selection equation, the effects of each agreement cluster 
on government health expenditure were estimated for all three ways of measuring 
health spending. For social protection agreements it was found that countries in this 
type of agreement generally have higher levels of government health expenditure 
compared to countries without agreements. This finding was statistically significant 
when measuring health spending as percentage of general government expenditure as 
well as per capita spending. For SBA/EFF agreements the analyses showed that 
government health expenditure decreases in countries receiving loans through these 
agreements compared to countries without agreements. This finding was statistically 
significant when measuring health spending as percentage of GDP as well as for 
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spending per capita. These findings suggest that social protection agreements are 
associated with higher levels of government health expenditure, while SBA/EFF 
agreements seem to be associated with reductions in government spending.  
To advance the analysis further, the third section of this chapter set out to 
investigate the effects of agreement clusters across income groups. This analysis 
allowed for an empirical assessment of the importance of income groups and 
agreement types. The results of this analysis allow to draw two main conclusions about 
the effects of IMF agreements on government health expenditure. Firstly, the positive 
effects of social protection agreements do only seem to be found in LIC, and not in 
any of the other income groups. Secondly, income groups seem to matter less for 
SBA/EFF agreements as the effect of these agreements is generally negative and varies 
less across the income groups.  
Overall, this suggests that agreement types matter in their effects on 
government health expenditure. But, beyond this, also that other factors associated 
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0.006 0.047** -0.030* -0.012 -0.028*** 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) 
[ii] HE/CAP 
0.008 0.060** -0.041** -0.026 -0.040*** 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) 
[iii] HE/GGE 
0.011 0.049* -0.025 -0.022 -0.022 






0.024 0.046* 0.000 -0.042 -0.017 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.063) (0.014) 
[ii] HE/CAP 
0.038* 0.059** 0.001 -0.065 -0.013 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.059) (0.017) 
[iii] HE/GGE 
0.040* 0.054* -0.006 0.028 -0.007 





-0.022* -0.005 -0.042* -0.016 -0.031** 
(0.010) (0.061) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) 
[ii] HE/CAP 
-0.033* -0.028 -0.058** -0.030 -0.047*** 
(0.013) (0.072) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) 
[iii] HE/GGE 
-0.027 -0.058 -0.029 -0.019 -0.025 
(0.016) (0.050) (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) 





This chapter draws together the findings of chapters 7, 8 and 9, and discusses 
them in a number of ways. To do so, the chapter is structured into five parts. The first 
part summarises the study’s main findings, focusing on the effects of IMF agreements 
and how these differ across income groups and between agreement clusters. The 
second part offers an interpretation of these findings in light of the expected findings 
outlined in chapter 1. The third part highlights the ways in which this study and its 
analyses builds on the existing literature. The fourth part outlines the implications of 
these analyses for universal health care (UHC), and makes specific recommendations 
for IMF decision-makers. The fifth part acknowledges the small number of limitations 
that remain despite careful study design and have not been acknowledged in previous 
chapters. 
10.1 The Main Findings of this Study 
This study demonstrated two main findings of the impact of IMF agreements 
on government health expenditure in low- and middle-income countries: Firstly, 
similar to the previous literature on the effects of IMF agreements on health 
expenditure, this study finds that in the aggregate of all countries and agreement types, 
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IMF agreements do not have a significant impact on government health expenditure. 
Secondly, when going beyond the aggregate and looking at individual country groups, 
this study reveals interesting effects, as it is found that the impact of agreements varies 
by the borrowing country’s income status as well as the agreement cluster, which 
reflects the nature of the conditionalities included and the extent of social protection. 
An aggregated overview of the results of individual models is shown in Table 10.1. 
In relation to the first finding, the analyses show that beyond this small number 
of country sets with statistically significant effects, agreements do not have a large nor 
statistically significant effect on government health expenditure. This has been shown 
in two ways. Firstly, analyses of chapter 7 show that the explanatory power of models 
with only the agreement dummy is very small, which suggests that agreements do not 
explain much variation in government health expenditure and can therefore be seen to 
have little impact on government health spending. Similarly, adding the agreement 
dummies into the models as additional determinant of government health expenditure 
(chapter 8) does not generally increase the ability to explain variation of health 
expenditure within countries and across time. The same conclusion can be reached 
when looking at the coefficients of IMF agreement dummies in the models. In models 
containing all agreements and countries, agreements do not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on government health expenditure. The same applies to 
most models when cases are divided by income group and agreement type108. Taking 
these results together it is reasonable to conclude that IMF agreements in the aggregate 
do not have a large significant impact on government health expenditure levels. 
In relation to the second finding, the analyses conducted in chapters 8 and 9 
provided evidence to suggest that the effects of agreements on government health 
expenditure are not monolithic in nature and more complex than has previously been 
estimated, as they vary between agreement clusters and also country income groups. 
The results show that agreement types which have an emphasis on social protection 
and poverty reduction are associated with an increase in government health spending 
in the way that spending is on average higher in periods in which agreements with 
emphasis on social protection are in place compared to periods with no agreements. 
                                                 
108 The exception are those countries discusses in the next paragraphs. 
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This effect, however, is not consistent across all income groups. Low-income countries 
(LIC) experience a statistically significant increase in spending while the results for 
lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) are positive but of a smaller (and not 
statistically significant) magnitude. For upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) the 
effect is negative, but again, not statistically significant. This means that the positive 
effect of social protection agreements does not apply to countries of middle-income 
status109.  
For countries receiving agreements that do not have the explicit focus on social 
protection and poverty reduction – i.e. agreements of the SBA/EFF cluster – the results 
show a negative (and generally statistically significant) effect of these agreements on 
government health expenditure compared to countries not receiving agreements. This 
effect again varies between income groups. Only LMIC experience statistically 
significant negative effects. The effects of the other two income groups are negative 
but not statistically significant.  
 All countries LIC LMIC UMIC 
All agreements 0 +* -* 0 
Social protection +* +* 0 0 
SBA/EFF -* 0 -* 0 
Table 10.1: Overview of Results by Agreements and Income Groups  
0 signifies a non-statistically significant result; +* a statistically significant positive result; -* a 
statistically significant negative result; indicators are printed in italics when the obtained results vary 
in their significance (but not their direction) by measure of government health expenditure (see 
footnote 109); for a summary of the exact estimates for each model see Table 9.14 (pg. 349). 
10.2 Interpretation of the Findings 
This section offers an interpretation of the study’s results and the main findings. 
To do so, it looks first at the differences between agreement clusters and then explores 
possible explanations for the more nuanced differences by income groups. The 
interpretation will thus be attempted along two dimensions. Firstly, why are the effects 
of social protection agreements different form the effects of SBA/EFF agreements? 
Secondly, why do the effects vary between countries according to their income status? 
                                                 
109 It is worth pointing out that while the effects are generally the same across all measures of 
government health expenditure (HE/GDP, HE/cap, HE/GGE), some differences can be 
observed. Where results are not similar in terms of significance, they are however similar in 
terms of direction and effect size. 
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The analyses suggest that the effects of IMF agreements with a social 
protection element are associated with increases in spending compared to no 
agreements. While the results do not provide any further input on the underlying 
reasons for these differences it appears that the IMF’s claim of emphasis on social 
protection might be underlying the results observed for this agreement type and reflects 
the expected effects (section 1.2.4.4; pg. 23) that suggested that the emphasis on social 
protection would protect and increase social spending, including on health.  
For SBA/EFF agreements, which do not come with the explicit emphasis on 
social protection, the results suggest a negative effect compared to no agreement, 
which is again in line with the expected results (section 1.2.4.4; pg. 23). For SBA/EFF 
agreements, this special emphasis on social protection is absent so that countries might 
turn to cutting health expenditure in order to achieve the goals and conditionalities set 
as part of the lending agreement with the IMF.  
It was shown that these effects do not apply equally across all income groups 
The study shows that IMF agreements with a social protection component are 
associated with an increase in government health expenditure only in the subgroup of 
LIC but not for countries in the other income groups (LMIC/UMIC). For SBA/EFF 
agreements the finding is only statistically significant negative for the subgroup of 
LMIC but not for countries in the other income groups. The following three question 
still need to be addressed: (i) why are LIC in social protection agreements experiencing 
effects different from those of other countries receiving agreements from the same 
cluster? (ii) why are the effects of LIC in social protection agreements different from 
those of LIC in SBA/EFF agreements? (iii) why are LMIC in SBA/EFF agreements 
different from other income groups in SBA/EFF agreements? While it is difficult to 
derive definite answers from the data available for this study, a number of possible 
explanations emerge. 
In terms of (i), it may be useful to consider what it is that sets LIC apart from 
other countries. Within the global health debate in relation to low-income countries, 
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the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)110 have taken a prominent role (Travis et 
al, 2004; WHO, 2005) and health policies have evolved to prioritise interventions that 
support the achievement of the goals related to health (Vassall and Martinez-Alvarez, 
2012). In this discussion it is often highlighted that a “financing gap” exists between 
the resources necessary to achieve the MDG and the resources currently available in 
low-income countries (Fryatt et al, 2010; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). This means that 
a significant increase in health expenditure will be needed to deliver on the MDG. The 
IMF argues that policies in its agreements are designed to support the countries’ 
achievement of the MDG (IMF, 2015b). The poverty reduction strategies linked to 
IMF agreements might be associated with increases in government spending on health, 
which might explain the observed increases in LIC. The IMF (2015b) also states that 
it is committed to supporting the achievement of the MDG and to advocate for 
increases in development assistance to LIC. Since the data used for the analyses of this 
study include both spending that comes directly from the government and money that 
is channelled through the government as development assistance to health (see chapter 
5; pg. 173), without distinguishing between both parts, it is left unclear if the observed 
increases are due to increases of the governments’ own commitment to health spending 
or if increases reflect an increase in development assistance to health. 
Another way of exploring these differences in the effects of social protection 
agreements across income groups could be seen in the IMF’s differential treatment of 
low-income countries. The IMF continuously claims to provide special support and 
treatment for low-income countries (IMF, 2013d). The IMF’s definition of low-
income countries is, however, somewhat broader (IMF, 2013a) and also includes some 
countries that are considered middle-income countries according to World Bank 
classification and are thus classified as LMIC or UMIC in this study (see section 
1.2.4.1; pg. 16). Nevertheless, using the results of this study this differential treatment 
argument can be assessed tentatively. While the analysis across all agreements (Table 
9.6) showed positive effects of IMF agreements for LIC and would therefore support 
the hypothesis of the IMF’s differential treatment of these countries, the analysis for 
                                                 
110 The Millennium Development Goals have now been replaced by the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) (United Nations, 2016), however, for the study period the MDG 
were relevant. 
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SBA/EFF agreements (Table 9.14) showed that LIC do not see positive effects. This 
shows that only LIC receiving social protection agreements see positive effects, not all 
LIC. This suggests that a differential treatment of LIC per se cannot be found from the 
data.  
A third approach to interpret the findings can be seen in trying to understand 
the differences in effects of social protection agreements by investigating special cases. 
While beyond the scope of this study the intuition of this approach shall be sketched 
out here. Special cases in this sense are those cases that are LMIC or UMIC but receive 
social protection agreements, which are designed more for the use of “poor countries” 
(IMF, 2013d). Investigating these cases in detail would likely require the incorporation 
of additional (most likely qualitative) data. A similar argument can be made when 
attempting to explain the effects of SBA/EFF agreements across income groupings, 
where it is difficult to understand why LMIC in particular experience negative effects 
and LIC and UMIC do not. See section 11.2.2 (pg. 378) for ideas on how to approach 
this in future research.  
It is important to note that the obtained results and their substantive 
interpretation should be taken with caveats based on two statistical mechanisms 
underlying the analyses. Firstly, identifying a result as statistically significant is 
affected by two factors: the actual effect size estimated in the point estimate and the 
standard error as measure of precision of the estimate. The standard error in turn is 
affected by the sample size of the analysis. This means that statistical significance is 
more easily achieved in a large sample compared to a smaller one. Therefore, a result 
might appear statistically significant because the sample size is larger. To find out if 
this is the case in the present analysis, the number of case-years in the models for each 
income group will be compared.  
For the models for social protection agreements it can indeed be seen (compare 
Table 9.8) that the sample of LICs (n=698) is larger compared to other income groups 
(LMICs n=631; UMICs n=319), which might explain the differences in terms of 
significance. However, it is rather unlikely that the differences are due to sample size 
alone as the point estimates are also different. For LMIC the point estimate is found to 
be very close to zero and negative for UMIC (-0.042), compared to the estimate of 
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0.046 for LIC. Variations in sample sizes should therefore not be seen as a possible 
explanation of the differences.  
For SBA/EFF agreement models it appears (from Table 9.11) that the sample 
included in the analysis for LMIC is almost twice as large (n=653) as that for each of 
the other income groups (LIC n=370; UMIC n=383), which would suggest that the 
difference in significance might well be due to the differences in sample size. It is also 
worth noting that while different in significance all point estimates show a similar 
direction. While the actual effect size is still different (-0.005 for HE/GDP in LIC, 
compared to -0.042 for HE/GDP in LMIC and -0.016 for HE/GDP in UMIC) it might 
still be possible that the significance of the finding is a statistical result rather than one 
that reflects substantive differences between the countries. 
As second caveat, it is worth noting that when performing a large number of 
tests, some produce false results. Given the conventional 5% level of significance 
chosen for this study, 5% of the obtained results in terms of statistical significance are 
found purely due to chance.  
10.3 Contributions of this Study 
This section highlights how this study fits into the literature aimed at 
understanding the impact of IMF agreements on health systems and health spending, 
reviewed in chapter 2. To do so, it compares this study’s approach and results to other 
literature in the field. The focus is thereby on studies investigating the effects of 
agreements on government health expenditure (section 2.2.2.1; pg. 42). This present 
study builds on the literature in both a substantive and a methodological way.  
This study adds to the literature in two substantive ways. Firstly, by 
systematically assessing the impact of IMF agreements on countries in different 
income groupings, and secondly by assessing the effects of different agreement types 
separately.  
As was shown in the literature review in chapter 2, the current literature in the 
field assesses the impact on countries in different income groupings only in a non-
systematic way. The study by Clements et al (2013) looks at LIC compared to middle-
income countries but does not distinguish between different income levels within the 
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middle-income bracket (lower-middle and upper-middle income). The study by 
Kentikelenis et al (2015b) focusses on LIC only. This present study adds to these 
analyses by systematically assessing the impacts of IMF agreements on countries in 
different income groupings and distinguishes between countries of low-, lower-middle 
and upper-middle income. The results suggest that this division of the countries is 
indeed meaningful in the way that each of the three income groups experience different 
effects from IMF agreements. This study thereby confirms the findings of Clements et 
al (2013), who suggest that IMF agreements have positive effects in LIC. This study 
also shows that keeping middle-income countries as one group (as is done by Clements 
et al (2013)) glosses over differential effects and indeed hides the negative effects of 
agreements for LMIC. The study, reporting statistically significant positive effects of 
agreements in LIC, somewhat contradicts the findings of Kentikelenis et al (2015b), 
who find that agreements are associated with slight but not statistically significant 
increases in government health expenditure in this income group. 
The results do, however, suggest that, while differences in the effects are found 
between income groups, this indicator might not be the best way of grouping countries 
and thereby differentiating the effects of IMF agreements, as the wide variation in the 
effects in some income groups suggests that the effect of agreements is not uniform 
across all countries. 
The current literature in the field models IMF agreements as a simple dummy 
indicator that is either “on” or “off”, which is based on the assumption that all IMF 
agreements and also their effects on government health expenditure are similar. As 
was outlined before (see 1.2.3; pg. 13), not all agreements are structured similarly but 
are used in different situations and have different emphasis on social protection. The 
effects of agreements are therefore expected to vary with their type (see 1.2.4.4; pg. 
23) and the on/off approach to modelling IMF agreements might therefore be an 
oversimplification, hiding important differences in the effects of agreements. This 
study is the first to address this issue and develops the on/off approach further by 
modelling the effects of different agreement types separately. Even though this 
approach is still fairly general and in an early stage, its results (presented in chapter 9) 
show the importance of differentiating between different agreement types as the 
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findings suggest that the effect of agreements on government health expenditure 
differs not only with income groups but also with agreement types.  
This study makes methodological contributions in two main ways. Firstly, in 
order to fit the selection model necessary to account for endogeneity, due to the 
observational nature of this study (see chapter 6), a systematic review of the relevant 
literature was conducted in chapter 4. In chapter 8 and 9 the identified variables were 
used to systematically identify the best specification of the selection model. Using this 
systematic approach to identifying the best selection model, the study is capable of 
reliably accounting for selection bias. While the results of the different model 
definitions suggest that the model already established in the literature is indeed the 
best model, this study is the first to take a systematic approach to identifying the best 
specification of the selection model.  
Secondly, the study identifies most commonly used determinants of 
government health expenditure in low- and middle-income countries through a 
literature review that was conducted in a systematic way. Doing so, the study is capable 
of controlling for the main determinants of government health expenditure, which 
inspires confidence that changes in government health expenditure levels are not due 
to changes in the determinants of spending and indeed represent effects of agreements. 
Thereby this study goes beyond the current literature in the field that does not seem to 
identify the determinants of health expenditure in a systematic way.  
10.4 Implications for Universal Health Coverage and Recommenda-
tions for IMF Lending Policy 
This section discusses implications of the findings for UHC and makes brief 
recommendations for the IMF’s lending policy. Implications for UHC are drawn in the 
light of the impact of IMF agreements on health spending and the IMF’s own claims 
about social protection. To do so, this section is structured along the main findings of 
this study (section 10.1; pg. 356) and looks first at the implications of the effects of 
agreements in general and then those specific to agreement types and income.  
By and large IMF agreements do not have a large and statistically significant 
effect on government health expenditure. This is somewhat surprising given the large 
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amount of literature produced around the effects of IMF agreements on health and 
health spending in particular and the generally rather negative “reputation” of the IMF 
in the field of social protection. For debates around health care systems and universal 
health coverage this has two implications. Firstly, by and large the IMF does not appear 
to be a major (negative) determinant of government health spending. Secondly, the 
IMF is also not a major player in increasing and expanding health spending, which 
might have positive effects on health systems and the move towards UHC. Thus, the 
role of the IMF in health care financing appears to be minor. 
The IMF continuously claims that its agreements, and particularly those of the 
PRGT, which are considered in this study under the social protection cluster, would 
protect and where possible expand social spending (see section 1.2.4.4; pg. 23). In 
general, the IMF declared its commitment to making poverty reduction and 
strengthening social safety nets including health care central to its agreements (Gupta 
et al, 1998). In relation to health spending as percentage of general government 
spending, the IMF states its effort and commitment to provide policy advice to shift 
public spending patterns in order to accommodate higher spending on health care and 
make it a priority among public expenditure (Gupta et al, 1998; IMF, 2001b). This 
study identifies a statistically significant positive effect of the social protection 
agreements and shows that an expansion of health expenditure is only found in the LIC 
subgroup but not in the other income groupings.  
This increase in government health expenditure in LIC can be translated into 
numeric values relating to each health spending indicator. During times with social 
protection agreement LIC spend on average 0.10 percentage points of GDP, $1.83 per 
capita, or 0.53 percentage points of general government expenditure more on 
government health expenditure compared to similar countries not undergoing an IMF 
agreement. While these increases are statistically significant, their substantive 
significance shall be discussed in light of the wider debates around government health 
expenditure.  
While there is no guideline on spending levels in terms of percentage of GPD 
or general government expenditure, estimates exist for per capita spending levels. In 
2009 the Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems 
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published results of a detailed costing approach conducted to estimate a minimum 
spending on health necessary to provide a health care system that ensures that everyone 
has access to an essential set of health services including those for HIV, tuberculosis, 
malaria, and maternal and child health, as well as some preventive activities targeting 
non-communicable diseases. The Taskforce’s study estimated that the bare minimum 
of spending is 44$ per capita (WHO, 2012).  
The average LIC in this study spends 30.05$ PPP per capita (section 7.2; pg. 
253) on health and therefore only about 68% of the recommended minimum. For this 
group of countries the 1.83$ increase in spending that is associated with social 
protection agreements seems to make a contribution to achieving this minimum 
spending goal by increasing expenditure and thereby contributing to achieving UHC. 
It should therefore be argued that the IMF’s social protection agreements appear to be 
making a small yet positive contribution to working towards UHC in LIC. Even with 
the Fund taking on the task of social protection and poverty reduction, it is worth 
nothing that it is not a development bank and its primary goal is to stabilise economies 
(section 1.2.1; pg. 9). Other global health actors such as the World Bank or 
international donor organisations should also help contribute to increasing spending in 
these countries.  
However, the positive effects observed in LIC do not apply to countries of 
higher income, which suggests that social protection agreements have no positive 
effect in these countries. While these countries do spend more than the recommended 
minimum, health systems in the countries are also under financial pressure. The WHO 
(2012) points out that numerous middle-income countries face severe financial 
constraints that limit their capacity to increase the number and quality of health care 
services without further increases in spending. Wagstaff et al (2015) show that some 
countries in this income group perform rather poorly when it comes to achieving UHC. 
Given that LMIC and UMIC are also struggling for increases in spending but results 
suggest that agreements do not help to increase spending, it is difficult to see how the 
IMF fully lives up to its claims about social protection.  
The results for the agreements, for which the IMF does not make explicit claims 
about poverty reduction (SBA/EFF agreements), suggest a slight decrease in spending 
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during agreements compared to no agreement. For LMIC under SBA/EFF agreements 
the results suggest that this decrease is statistically significant when country are 
compared to similar countries without agreements. The results translate into 0.15 
percentage points reductions of spending as percentage of GDP or 8.29$ less spending 
per capita. This suggests that for these countries IMF agreements might be linked to 
restrictions on their ability to maintain the level of health care services currently 
provided and hinder these countries in expanding their services further towards 
achieving UHC. 
Given the findings and their interpretation, recommendations for IMF lending 
policy shall briefly be discussed. Making policy recommendations in the setting of this 
study is somewhat difficult due to the fact that little is known about the inner workings 
of the IMF and the precise way decisions are made about details of agreements in terms 
of conditionality or social protection elements. Nevertheless, one recommendation can 
be derived from the findings. The results show that the effects of agreements vary with 
agreement type and country income group. While LIC receiving social protection 
agreements see increases in spending, other countries experience no changes or even 
reductions in expenditure. While spending levels differ by income group (see section 
7.2.1; pg. 254), countries of all income groups have to deal with fairly tight budgets 
and achievement of UHC would benefit from an expansion of government health 
expenditure. A policy recommendation can therefore be seen in the similar treatment 
of all countries in terms of the IMF’s commitment to social protection and poverty 
reduction in a way that all countries experience similar effects in terms of government 
health expenditure and support for their progression towards UHC. This seems 
especially noteworthy, since the IMF has taken on poverty reduction as additional 
objective alongside economic stability. 
10.5 Limitations of this Study 
This study was carefully designed to ensure that the results are reliable. Despite 
best effort, some limitations remain, which have previously been discussed in the 
relevant chapters. This section discusses remaining limitations around the assumptions 
made when modelling agreements, the use of income groups and the use of 
government health expenditure as dependent variable.  
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10.5.1 Assumptions about Agreements  
This study models IMF agreements in two ways. In chapter 8 all agreements 
can be either “on” or “off”. In chapter 9 the analysis distinguishes agreement clusters 
(social protection and SBA/EFF) that can, individually, be either “on” or “off”. Both 
ways of modelling agreements come with assumptions. In the first way it is assumed 
that all agreements are similar and therefore have similar effects. Agreements can 
either be “on” and have an effect, which is assumed to be the same across all 
agreements, or it can be “off” and have no effect. The second way of modelling 
agreements assumes that all agreements clustered as social protection agreements have 
the same effect that is different from “no agreement” and that is also different from 
agreements clustered as SBA/EFF agreements. Similarly, all SBA/EFF agreements are 
assumed to have similar effects, which are different from “no agreement” and different 
from social protection agreements. This can be a strong assumption to make for the 
analysis for two main reasons.  
Firstly, while individual agreements have been clustered together in the belief 
that they are comparable in terms of their emphasis on social protection and 
conditionality (section 1.2.3; pg. 13), agreements within each cluster are likely 
different because specific contents are formulated along each country’s specific needs 
(IMF, 2016e). This means that every agreement can be seen as individual in terms of 
its conditionality but also in its effects on the economy in general and health 
expenditure in particular.  
Secondly, once an agreement between a country and the IMF is in place, the 
specific implementation to achieve the conditions can vary between individual 
countries (Vreeland, 2007). For instance, to achieve a balanced household, countries 
could decide if they would cut spending on health care or the military or raise revenue. 
Even when agreements were similar their effects might still differ because they are 
implemented in different ways in different countries.  
While this can be seen as a limitation and further research is needed (section 
11.2; pg. 377), the approach taken in this study is in line with the literature, which 
models all agreements to be either “on” or “off”, indeed this study goes beyond the 
literature modelling different agreement clusters separately.  
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Chapter 9 analyses the results of IMF agreements on government expenditure 
for the two main agreement clusters. It has been argued that the selection process into 
the different clusters might be different compared to the overall selection process. To 
account for this in the selection methodology, a separate model was fitted for each of 
the clusters. While this is seen to be advantageous compared to a common selection 
model for all agreements (as was fitted for chapter 8, analysing all agreements in one 
model), this approach does not consider the interactions between different agreement 
types. This means that it does not allow for choice between the clusters. It only 
compares social protection agreement with no agreement, and separately SBA/EFF 
agreement with no agreement, but not possible choices between the agreements.  
As this part of the analysis goes beyond the current state of the literature, no 
other studies are available that use methodology that can be adopted. Similarly, the 
wider literature does not seem to offer selection models that allow for more than two 
states. One possible way to develop this further could be in adapting methodologies 
common to discrete choice experiments, which goes back to the work by McFadden 
(1980). Applying this is, however, due to the complexity of the methodology, beyond 
the scope of this study.  
10.5.2 On the Income Groups 
This study divides countries based on country income groups. This is done for 
a number of reasons including the belief that the IMF treats countries differently based 
on their income group and that countries in different income groups are in different 
stages of their development, of which income groups are a proxy (Morse, 2004).  
To assign the income group label to countries, this study relies on the 
commonly used World Bank classification (World Bank, 2013) and assigns these 
labels annually. This has limitations. Firstly, the assignment of income groups is 
somewhat arbitrary and the classification has been criticised as simplistic (Vázquez 
and Sumner, 2012). Secondly, assigning income groups annually means that countries 
might change their income group during agreements and the effects of agreements that 
started in one income group might then be attributed to another income group and 
might therefore bias the results of the analyses by income group. However, this change 
of income groups during times of agreements happens rarely (compare Appendix 
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Table 7.1 and Appendix Table 7.2) so that it is assumed that the biasing effect is minor. 
To completely eliminate the potential bias, future research might wish to assign 
income groups at the start of each agreement rather than annually. 
The empirical analysis in this study seems to suggest that the effects of IMF 
agreements vary between countries within income groups, particularly within the 
upper-middle income group. Therefore, grouping countries based on their income 
might not be a useful way of distinguishing between effects of the IMF on government 
health expenditure in different countries. However, income groupings is commonly 
used in cross-country research to understand if effects differ between countries. 
To identify the effects of IMF agreements on government health expenditure 
in different income groups, individual regressions were run for each income group. 
Doing so reduces the sample size to a few hundred data points for some regressions, 
which reduces statistical power and therefore increases the size of the standard errors 
around regression coefficients. This decreases precision and makes it harder to identify 
results as statistically significant. This approach however, is the only way to 
understanding effects in different income groups. 
10.5.3 Government Health Expenditure as Indicator 
This study uses government health expenditure as the dependent variable, 
which was chosen for a number of reasons. Government health expenditure is an 
appropriate indicator of UHC and the capacity of a health system to provide services 
in an equitable manner (section 1.1; pg. 6). It is a variable that has good data 
availability and allows for international comparability. Government health expenditure 
is also a commonly used indicator in the literature around the IMF’s impact on health 
and health systems (chapter 2) and is likely the most commonly utilised indicator in 
cross-country studies in comparative politics or public policy. However, the use of 
expenditure data as the dependent variable in cross-country studies has been criticised 
in the literature (Castles, 1994; Clasen and Siegel, 2007; De Deken and Kittel, 2007; 
Siegel, 2007) for a number of reasons that are also applicable to this study to varying 
extents.  
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De Deken and Kittel (2007) and Castles (1994) argue that cross-country 
comparisons might be difficult to undertake due to the different definitions of social 
expenditure across different countries, making reported estimates not immediately 
comparable between countries as they might not measure the exact same thing111. This 
is a minor issue for this study as data are sourced from the WHO, which ensures that 
the data is comparable across countries as it reports expenditure levels following a 
common methodology (WHO, 2015). 
A more important issue is that of the interpretation of health expenditure or the 
changes in expenditure. Siegel (2007) argues that expenditure should not be seen as 
proxy for social rights and suggests that a change in spending does not equate a change 
in services112. Changes in spending might not reflect a change in benefits by the same 
extent. Applied to this study this can be seen to be an issue in two ways. Firstly, an 
increase in spending does not necessarily reflect an increase in UHC as it leaves 
unclear what the additional money is spent on and who benefits from it. For instance, 
additional money can be spent on providing an additional service to a population that 
was not previously covered or it could be spend on providing a similar or more 
expensive but not more effective service to a population that already benefited from 
the offered service.  
Secondly, when countries undergo agreements, they are often required to 
devalue their currency, which makes importing the same amount of goods more 
expensive. Given that a large share of drugs used in developing countries are often 
imported (Kremer, 2002) this means that countries will need to spend more money in 
order to buy the same amount of drugs. An increase in spending therefore only means 
that the same amount of drugs is purchased but at higher prices. This does not imply 
improvements of health system capacity. Looking at expenditure alone does not allow 
                                                 
111 Castles (1994) also suggests that the definition of government expenditure might be 
misleading as some spending is seen to be private but nevertheless mandated and channelled 
through other bodies. For instance, social insurance or compulsory private health insurance. In 
low- and middle-income countries, this health insurance element, however is only a small 
fraction of overall spending, making this point a minor issue. 
112 Siegel (2007) also illustrates that a change in need for certain services might change 
expenditure but this does not reflect a result of a policy change. This issue can be seen as minor 
issue for this study as need and demand for health care services has been controlled for using 
relevant variables identified though the literature review. 
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for a decision to be made about the impact on health systems in general, as expenditure 
alone is not enough and should not be used in a simplistic way for arguments about 
policy outcomes (Castles, 1994). 
While these limitations exist and further research (section 11.2; pg. 377) is 
needed in order to address these issues and to gain a better understanding of the impact 
of IMF agreements, government health expenditure is still seen as a valid dependent 
variable. Even though Esping-Andersen (1990: 21) points out that it is “difficult to 
imagine that anyone struggles for spending per se”, health expenditure has indeed 
become an established indicator to evaluate the IMF’s impact on health systems as 
various studies (chapter 2) employ this indicator and also because the IMF itself uses 
expenditure levels as a benchmark to evaluate and demonstrate the successes of its 
agreements. This means that while implications for UHC might be drawn only 
carefully, this study makes a contribution to the understanding of agreements on health 




This study contributed to the literature on the influence of international 
organisations on health systems. It focussed on the role of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), a key player in global health governance. The Fund lends money to 
countries experiencing economic instability in the form of loans that come with 
conditionalities, policy prescriptions designed to re-stabilise a country’s economy but 
often require countries to reshape policies in a number of domains, including fiscal 
and monetary policies and typically demand austerity through tighter control of 
government expenditure as well as, in some cases, structural adjustments of 
economies. These conditions have the potential to impact on national health systems 
in general and government health expenditure in particular.  
The IMF’s lending policies have sparked considerable debate in the global 
health field for many years. Opponents claim that the IMF has contributed to cuts in 
public health spending, weakened health systems and thereby facilitated the spread of 
infectious diseases. Proponents claim that the Fund is protecting social spending and 
is expanding social programmes, especially in health. Understanding the true effects 
of IMF agreements on health care systems is of great importance as they have the 
potential to affect the lives of millions of people around the world.  
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This study has aimed at contributing to this debate by evaluating the effects of 
IMF agreements on government health expenditure, an important determinant of 
health system capacity and universal health coverage, in low- and middle income 
countries. Specifically, it systematically assessed differences in effect between income 
groups and is the first study to acknowledge that the IMF lends through different 
facilities, which differ in their conditionality and emphasis on social protection. It 
therefore assesses the effects on government health expenditure for different lending 
agreement clusters. This final chapter summarises the study and draws out directions 
for future research.  
11.1 Summary of the Study 
This study was structured into three parts. Part one of the study established the 
background. Chapter one of this study established an understanding of the role of 
government health expenditure in relation to universal health care, and of the IMF and 
its lending activities. It was shown that the IMF provides loans through a number of 
different lending facilities and that these facilities can be categorised into three clusters 
along the facilities’ extent of conditionality as well as their emphasis on social 
protection. Three such clusters have been identified that are expected to differ in terms 
of their effects on government health expenditure: (i) agreements with conditionality 
and social protection element (social protection agreements) are expected to have a 
positive effect on government health expenditure, (ii) agreements with conditionality 
but without social protection element (SBA/EFF agreements) are expected to be 
associated with reductions in spending, (iii) emergency agreements, those agreements 
with no conditionality nor social protection are expected to have no effect on 
government health expenditure.  
In chapter two, a systematic review of the literature on the effects of IMF 
agreements on health and health systems showed that only few studies evaluate the 
effects of agreements on government health expenditure and that these studies do not 
consider effects in different country income groups systematically and also that these 
studies do not acknowledge potential differences in the effects between different 
lending facilities. This study therefore aimed to contribute to the literature by assessing 
the effects of agreements across individual income groups and the agreement clusters.  
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Part two of this work set up the study by developing a methodology to evaluate 
the effects of agreements in a cross-country setting. Chapters three and four review the 
literature in a systematic way to identify concepts of relevant determinants of IMF 
lending and government health expenditure. Building on this, chapter five identifies 
variables and data sources to be used in this study. Chapter six outlines the methods 
used to obtain reliable results of the effects of IMF agreements on government health 
expenditure. In doing so, two methodological challenges were addressed. Firstly, 
government health expenditure needs to be modelled in a panel data setting. It was 
shown that the Fixed Effects estimator with standard errors that allow for cross-
sectional correlation and panel heteroscedasticity is the best model for this study. 
Additionally, time trends and serial correlation were controlled for. Secondly, 
agreement and non-agreement countries are likely systematically different so that the 
agreement variable is endogenous. To account for this, a Heckman-style selection 
model was fitted.  
Part three of this study presented the results. Two main findings were 
identified. Firstly, the effects of IMF agreements vary both by country income group 
and across agreement clusters. It was shown that agreements from the social protection 
agreement cluster are associated with an increase in government health expenditure. 
This effect, however, does not apply across all income groups but only to low-income 
countries. For the other income groups, social protection agreements are not associated 
with statistically significant changes in government health expenditure. Agreements 
without the social protection element (SBA/EFF agreements) are associated with 
reductions in government health expenditure, when all countries are considered. When 
dividing the countries by income groups, the results suggest that the effect is only 
statistically significant negative for lower-middle income countries, but not other 
income groups. Secondly, in the aggregate and beyond a small number of country 
groupings, IMF agreements do not seem to have a large effect on government health 
expenditure. 
A number of conclusions about the effects of IMF agreements on government 
health expenditure in low- and middle-income countries can be drawn from this study. 
The results for social protection agreements are in line with the expected effects of this 
agreement cluster and the IMF’s claims about the emphasis of its agreements to protect 
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social spending and contribute to poverty reduction. However, the results also suggest 
that the IMF does not fully live up to its claims about poverty reduction and social 
protection. Because the positive effects of social protection agreements are only found 
in low-income countries, which suggests that only countries in this income group, but 
not countries of higher income, experience increases in government health spending 
during agreements. While low-income countries clearly spend the lowest amount of 
money on health, countries of higher income also have tight budgets and their health 
systems and path to achieving universal health coverage would benefit from increases 
in spending.  
For agreements without the social protection element (SBA/EFF agreements) 
the effects of IMF agreements in lower-middle income countries translate into 
reductions of $8.29. While lower-middle income countries spend more on health care 
than the recommended minimum, these countries struggle to provide a comprehensive 
set of health care services and to make progress towards UHC. Reducing spending by 
$8.29 in such a setting means that health budgets become even tighter and that the IMF 
might restrict these countries ability to move towards achieving universal health 
coverage.  
Summing up these findings it can be said that the results show that the effects 
of the IMF’s lending activities on government health expenditure are not monolithic 
in nature and that considering the effects in the aggregate across all low- and middle-
income countries glosses over important differences in effects. Rather, the effects of 
IMF lending on government health expenditure vary both by a country’s income status 
and the lending facility that is employed by the IMF. This shows that not only a 
country’s income status – as suggested by the previous literature – is important but 
also the way the IMF conducts lending and the lending facility it uses. When lending 
is conducted through agreements with a social protection component to them, the 
IMF’s lending has positive effects on government health expenditure and by 
implication on health system capacity. This suggests that when the IMF is able to 
design its lending agreements correctly, it will be capable of having positive effects on 
global health. More research, however, is needed to understand the mechanisms 
underlying the effects.  
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11.2 Directions for Future Research  
This final section discusses directions for future research on the topic. These 
relate to understanding more of the mechanisms underlying the effects of agreements 
on health expenditure through understanding more about agreements and 
understanding how agreements are implemented, the use of other health system 
indicators and the role of development assistance to health. 
11.2.1 Detailed Knowledge about Agreements 
It was argued that the assumptions made about agreements in quantitative 
studies on the effects of agreements, such as this study, are fairly general and this might 
gloss over differential effects of agreements. The current literature in the field models 
agreements as “on” of “off” and thereby implicitly assumes that all agreements are 
comparable and have similar effects (section 10.5.1; pg. 368). This study goes beyond 
this approach by modelling the effects of different agreement clusters separately. In 
doing so it bases the results on the assumption that effects vary between agreement 
clusters but not within each cluster. Since agreements are, however, individually 
negotiated between each country and the IMF, it is likely that even agreements within 
the same cluster are different in terms of their conditionality and emphasis on social 
protection.  
Possible future research should therefore advance the understanding of the 
effects of IMF agreements by gaining more detailed knowledge about agreements. 
This could for instance be done by reviewing and analysing agreement documents, 
including letters of intent and review documents. These are available freely on the 
MONA Database (IMF, 2013e) for most agreements since 1999 (Vreeland, 2007). This 
would for instance allow for coding agreements individually according to their 
conditionality and their emphasis on social protection. Clustering similar agreements 
together and analysing their effects on government health expenditure will help to 
better understand the effects of agreements. Analyses similar to this study could then 
be conducted based on the more detailed clusters of agreements. 
A fruitful starting point might be the group of UMIC countries. The reasoning 
for this suggestion is that the results of the models suggest larger variation between 
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countries of this income group, which might suggest that the agreements are different 
for countries within this income group. Having additional information about the 
agreements in terms of their conditionality might allow for a grouping of different 
agreement types. 
11.2.2 Understanding Agreement Implementation 
When modelling agreements as either “on” or “off” or based on clusters of 
similar agreements, as was done in this study, it is assumed that agreements are 
implemented in a similar fashion in all countries. This, however, does likely not hold 
for all agreements as individual countries implement the conditionality coming with 
their agreement through different policies. This important step between agreement and 
outcome is currently ignored in the literature and this study. It appears however that 
understanding what happens in individual countries during agreements and 
understanding how conditionalities are implemented is an important part of 
understanding the effects of agreements on government health expenditure, or any 
other measure that is used to judge the outcome of IMF agreements.  
Possible future research should therefore aim at understanding the 
implementation of agreements in individual countries. This can be done in a number 
of ways. One possible approach to studying this would be by researching policy 
documents in order to understand how agreements and their conditionality are 
implemented. An alternative approach could be seen in gaining a deeper understanding 
about the dynamics around agreements and the implementation of the associated 
conditionalities by conducting interviews with stakeholders in the process. These 
could include members of the IMF working on missions in individual countries but 
also local policy makers involved in the lending process with the IMF and those in the 
departments of health. Given that these approaches are more involved as they require 
more in-depth engagement with individual agreements, it is likely that such a study 
cannot be designed as cross-country study involving a large number of countries. A 
case study approach of individual countries seems more likely to be the best option. 
While further research will be needed to make definite statements about the choice of 
country, this study can provide guidance to selecting appropriate cases for further 
investigation. This can, for instance, be done by choosing countries from country 
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groups that experience different outcomes from agreements. These might most easily 
be found from within the UMIC country group, for which the results suggest variation 
of the effects within this group.  
11.2.3 Going Beyond Health Spending: Understanding Effects on Health 
Systems 
This study used government health expenditure as the dependent variable and 
reports effects of agreements on this indicator. This study finds that agreements are 
associated with increases in spending for some countries and decreases for others. 
While this is an important finding that extends the current understanding of the effects 
of IMF agreements, using government health expenditure as an indicator does not 
allow to make in-depth statements about the effects of agreements on health systems 
or universal health coverage. This study does therefore not allow to make detailed 
statements about the effects of agreements beyond government health expenditure. 
This would however be interesting to inform wider debates around IMF effects on 
universal health coverage and health systems. More specifically, two questions need 
to be answered: (i) does the increase in health expenditure associated with social 
protection agreements in LIC translate into improvements in the health system and 
universal health coverage? And (ii) does the decrease in government health 
expenditure associated with SBA/EFF agreements in LMIC translate into decreases in 
universal health coverage and other negative effects on health care systems?  
To do so, the effect of agreements on more indicators need to be assessed. 
These indicators could include a number of different individual variables. One 
possibility would be to assess in more detail the effects of agreements in terms of 
equity of access. This could for instance be done by investigating the distributional 
effects of health expenditure and who is paying for health care services. This could be 
done by adopting the approach taken by O’Donnell et al (2008).  
Alternatively, a more comprehensive approach to understanding the effects on 
health system and particularly the achievement of universal health coverage can be 
taken. While universal health coverage has been discussed as a concept for some time, 
methodology to actually measure the achievement of universal health coverage is in 
its infancy. The work of Wagstaff et al (2015), operationalises the concept by 
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measuring service coverage and financial protection. Following this approach to assess 
the effects of IMF agreements on universal health coverage would mean to use data 
over a certain time period and generate the universal health coverage indicator for each 
time point, most likely every year. Having done so, a methodology similar to the one 
used in this study could be followed, where the level of achieving universal coverage 
as measured with the indicator could be modelled over time and the effect of IMF 
agreements be estimated in presence or absence of these agreements. This approach is 
somewhat more “data hungry” as Wagstaff et al (2015) propose to estimate the 
universal health coverage indicator using various variables from household surveys. 
This would potentially mean to reduce the number of countries in such a study to those 
for which data is available and also to restrict the observations as surveys are likely 
not conducted annually.   
11.2.4 The Role of Development Assistance 
This study uses an indicator of government health expenditure from the WHO 
National Health Accounts dataset (section 5.1.1.1; pg. 174), which captures flows of 
health expenditure that come from the government as source. This measure thereby 
includes money that comes from external organisation and is channelled through the 
government (development assistance to health). This measure of government health 
expenditure is seen as appropriate in the context of this study as development 
assistance to health is an integral part of health systems of countries with lower-
income. This approach, however, leaves unclear if, for instance, the increase in 
spending found in low-income countries under social protection agreements is due to 
an expansion of spending by the government itself or due to an increase in 
development assistance. Development assistance to health could play a role in 
explaining the increases in government spending as IMF agreements are often seen as 
“seal of approval” for donors (Bauer et al, 2012), providing confidence that a country’s 
economy is regaining strength. Donors might therefore be interested in increasing 
assistance to health in countries undergoing IMF agreements.  
It appears useful to investigate these dynamics between government health 
expenditure and the share of development assistance further. While development 
assistance is generally difficult to measure due to the various organisations involved 
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and the different pathways taken to channel money to governments, one dataset 
published by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME, 2016) appears 
promising as it aggregates all flows of development assistance to health onto a country 
level. This dataset can be used to estimate indicators to investigate changes in flows of 
development assistance to health as well as those of the share of development 
assistance of total government health expenditure. Having constructed these 
indicators, an analysis similar to the one offered in this study can be conducted to 
investigate changes in development assistance over time and in response to 
agreements. This will allow one to better understand the role of the IMF as seal of 
approval for organisations to allocate assistance to health. 
11.2.5 Understanding individual country trajectories 
This study offered a cross-country study of the effects of IMF agreements on 
government health expenditure across all low- and middle-income countries and 
estimated the effects across all countries as well as for different income groups and 
agreement types. While differences in effects between different groups of countries 
were observed, it also appears that individual countries have different experiences of 
agreements. Future research can exploit this and aim to understand country 
experiences in more depth.  
One approach to understanding the effects of IMF agreements can be seen in 
conducting in-depth country studies assessing the trajectory of government health 
expenditure of only a small number of, or even just one country. Doing so will allow 
to study this particular country in more detail and enrich the analysis with additional 
qualitative information that might help gain deeper understanding of a country’s 
experience. Synthetic controls (Abadie et al, 2014) is a relatively new, and increasingly 
popular, method that allows one to study individual country cases and thereby add 
qualitative information to quantitative data. This method was developed for research 
in comparative political research, where the effects of a certain policy that only a small 
number of countries, or only one country, experience ought to be compared to 
countries that do not experience similar policies. In particular, this method allows one 
to compare a country that has been exposed to IMF agreements for a period of time to 
a synthetic control, which is a constructed composite of non-IMF agreement countries, 
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which exhibit otherwise similar performance as the IMF country. Beyond the pure 
analysis of changes in government health expenditure, the analysis can be enriched 
with further qualitative information, such as agreement documents, to provide more 
context to the observed experience in the IMF country and therefore allow for a richer 
understanding of the effects of IMF agreements in the chosen country.  
 
11.2.6 Understanding the Role of income group and agreement types 
This study has shown that the effects of IMF agreements on government health 
expenditure vary both between income groups as well as agreement types (see Chapter 
9). In doing so, this study has made contributions to the literature (compare section 
10.3), however, future research can aim to explicitly compare (i) the role of the income 
group relative to the role of the agreement type and (ii) the effects of different 
agreement types compared to each other. To investigate this further, additional 
statistical methods can be used to advance the understanding of the effects of IMF 
agreements on government health expenditure. This can be done in two ways.  
Firstly, future research can aim to understand the importance of agreement 
types compared to income groups in order to untangle if it is indeed the type of 
agreement that makes a difference to the effect on government health expenditure, or 
a less tangible element of a country’s income group. This can for instance be done by 
performing analyses across the dataset of all countries in the study and introducing 
both an income group dummy, an agreement dummy as well as an interaction effect 
between the two. The obtained results can then for instance help inform if agreement 
type has an effect on top of income group. 
Secondly, future research can aim to understand the differences in effects of 
agreement types by comparing the effects of different agreement types against each 
other. This can for instance help to understand if social protection agreements are 
systematically different in their effect compared to SBA/EFF agreements. 
Methodologically, research that aims at understanding this can achieve this by running 
regressions across all agreement types and introduce an agreement dummy into the 
models. Quasi Variances (Firth and De Menezes, 2004), which allow to compare the 
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effects of categorical variables against each other, can be used to evaluate the effects 
of agreement types when comparing between them. Results can then help inform if the 
effects of social protection agreements are systematically different from those of 
SBA/EFF agreements. 
 
11.2.7 Determinants of IMF agreements 
This study has systematically reviewed the determinants of IMF agreements 
described in the literature. Fitting models to predict IMF agreements using the most 
commonly used determinants identified through this literature review showed good 
model fit and classification performance. In doing robustness checks on these models 
and excluding the indicator of “previous IMF agreement”, the model performance 
reduced considerably, suggesting that a large part of model fit is mostly driven by the 
lag of the agreement dummy rather than actual measures of economic performance. 
This in turn means that the variables currently used to predict IMF agreements do not 
perform very well and identifying additional variables that explain why countries enter 
into IMF agreements should be explored in future work.  
While not immediately related to the topic of IMF agreements’ effects on 
government health expenditure, it nevertheless appears useful to identify additional 
factors that explain why countries enter into IMF agreements. This can for instance be 
done by including additional variables of economic performance or the role of a 
country in the political economy and understanding the effect these variables have on 
classification performance of the models. However, the models in the literature already 
include a diverse array of variables so that it appears difficult to identify additional 
variables in this way. An alternative can be seen in identifying additional factors in a 
more qualitative way, for instance through interviews with stakeholders involved in 
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